/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar. * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine. * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ #include "or.h" #include "addressmap.h" #include "buffers.h" #include "control.h" #include "config.h" #include "ext_orport.h" #include "proto_socks.h" #include "reasons.h" static void socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, socks5_reply_status_t reason); static int parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, size_t *want_length_out); static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, int state, char **reason, ssize_t *drain_out); /** * Wait this many seconds before warning the user about using SOCKS unsafely * again. */ #define SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL 5 /** Warn that the user application has made an unsafe socks request using * protocol socks_protocol on port port. Don't warn more than * once per SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL, unless safe_socks is set. */ static void log_unsafe_socks_warning(int socks_protocol, const char *address, uint16_t port, int safe_socks) { static ratelim_t socks_ratelim = RATELIM_INIT(SOCKS_WARN_INTERVAL); if (safe_socks) { log_fn_ratelim(&socks_ratelim, LOG_WARN, LD_APP, "Your application (using socks%d to port %d) is giving " "Tor only an IP address. Applications that do DNS resolves " "themselves may leak information. Consider using Socks4A " "(e.g. via privoxy or socat) instead. For more information, " "please see https://wiki.torproject.org/TheOnionRouter/" "TorFAQ#SOCKSAndDNS.%s", socks_protocol, (int)port, safe_socks ? " Rejecting." : ""); } control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "DANGEROUS_SOCKS PROTOCOL=SOCKS%d ADDRESS=%s:%d", socks_protocol, address, (int)port); } /** Do not attempt to parse socks messages longer than this. This value is * actually significantly higher than the longest possible socks message. */ #define MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN 512 /** Return a new socks_request_t. */ socks_request_t * socks_request_new(void) { return tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(socks_request_t)); } /** Free all storage held in the socks_request_t req. */ void socks_request_free(socks_request_t *req) { if (!req) return; if (req->username) { memwipe(req->username, 0x10, req->usernamelen); tor_free(req->username); } if (req->password) { memwipe(req->password, 0x04, req->passwordlen); tor_free(req->password); } memwipe(req, 0xCC, sizeof(socks_request_t)); tor_free(req); } /** There is a (possibly incomplete) socks handshake on buf, of one * of the forms * - socks4: "socksheader username\\0" * - socks4a: "socksheader username\\0 destaddr\\0" * - socks5 phase one: "version #methods methods" * - socks5 phase two: "version command 0 addresstype..." * If it's a complete and valid handshake, and destaddr fits in * MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN bytes, then pull the handshake off the buf, * assign to req, and return 1. * * If it's invalid or too big, return -1. * * Else it's not all there yet, leave buf alone and return 0. * * If you want to specify the socks reply, write it into req->reply * and set req->replylen, else leave req->replylen alone. * * If log_sockstype is non-zero, then do a notice-level log of whether * the connection is possibly leaking DNS requests locally or not. * * If safe_socks is true, then reject unsafe socks protocols. * * If returning 0 or -1, req->address and req->port are * undefined. */ int fetch_from_buf_socks(buf_t *buf, socks_request_t *req, int log_sockstype, int safe_socks) { int res; ssize_t n_drain; size_t want_length = 128; const char *head = NULL; size_t datalen = 0; if (buf_datalen(buf) < 2) /* version and another byte */ return 0; do { n_drain = 0; buf_pullup(buf, want_length, &head, &datalen); tor_assert(head && datalen >= 2); want_length = 0; res = parse_socks(head, datalen, req, log_sockstype, safe_socks, &n_drain, &want_length); if (n_drain < 0) buf_clear(buf); else if (n_drain > 0) buf_drain(buf, n_drain); } while (res == 0 && head && want_length < buf_datalen(buf) && buf_datalen(buf) >= 2); return res; } /** Create a SOCKS5 reply message with reason in its REP field and * have Tor send it as error response to req. */ static void socks_request_set_socks5_error(socks_request_t *req, socks5_reply_status_t reason) { req->replylen = 10; memset(req->reply,0,10); req->reply[0] = 0x05; // VER field. req->reply[1] = reason; // REP field. req->reply[3] = 0x01; // ATYP field. } static const char SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG[] = "HTTP/1.0 501 Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\r\n" "Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1\r\n\r\n" "\n" "\n" "Tor is not an HTTP Proxy\n" "\n" "\n" "

Tor is not an HTTP Proxy

\n" "

\n" "It appears you have configured your web browser to use Tor as " "an HTTP proxy.\n\n" "This is not correct: Tor is a SOCKS proxy, not an HTTP proxy.\n" "Please configure your client accordingly.\n" "

\n" "

\n" "See " "https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html for more " "information.\n" "\n" "

\n" "\n" "\n"; /** Implementation helper to implement fetch_from_*_socks. Instead of looking * at a buffer's contents, we look at the datalen bytes of data in * data. Instead of removing data from the buffer, we set * drain_out to the amount of data that should be removed (or -1 if the * buffer should be cleared). Instead of pulling more data into the first * chunk of the buffer, we set *want_length_out to the number of bytes * we'd like to see in the input buffer, if they're available. */ static int parse_socks(const char *data, size_t datalen, socks_request_t *req, int log_sockstype, int safe_socks, ssize_t *drain_out, size_t *want_length_out) { unsigned int len; char tmpbuf[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN+1]; tor_addr_t destaddr; uint32_t destip; uint8_t socksver; char *next, *startaddr; unsigned char usernamelen, passlen; struct in_addr in; if (datalen < 2) { /* We always need at least 2 bytes. */ *want_length_out = 2; return 0; } if (req->socks_version == 5 && !req->got_auth) { /* See if we have received authentication. Strictly speaking, we should also check whether we actually negotiated username/password authentication. But some broken clients will send us authentication even if we negotiated SOCKS_NO_AUTH. */ if (*data == 1) { /* username/pass version 1 */ /* Format is: authversion [1 byte] == 1 usernamelen [1 byte] username [usernamelen bytes] passlen [1 byte] password [passlen bytes] */ usernamelen = (unsigned char)*(data + 1); if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u) { *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u; return 0; } passlen = (unsigned char)*(data + 2u + usernamelen); if (datalen < 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen) { *want_length_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; return 0; } req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ req->reply[0] = 1; /* authversion == 1 */ req->reply[1] = 0; /* authentication successful */ log_debug(LD_APP, "socks5: Accepted username/password without checking."); if (usernamelen) { req->username = tor_memdup(data+2u, usernamelen); req->usernamelen = usernamelen; } if (passlen) { req->password = tor_memdup(data+3u+usernamelen, passlen); req->passwordlen = passlen; } *drain_out = 2u + usernamelen + 1u + passlen; req->got_auth = 1; *want_length_out = 7; /* Minimal socks5 command. */ return 0; } else if (req->auth_type == SOCKS_USER_PASS) { /* unknown version byte */ log_warn(LD_APP, "Socks5 username/password version %d not recognized; " "rejecting.", (int)*data); return -1; } } socksver = *data; switch (socksver) { /* which version of socks? */ case 5: /* socks5 */ if (req->socks_version != 5) { /* we need to negotiate a method */ unsigned char nummethods = (unsigned char)*(data+1); int have_user_pass, have_no_auth; int r=0; tor_assert(!req->socks_version); if (datalen < 2u+nummethods) { *want_length_out = 2u+nummethods; return 0; } if (!nummethods) return -1; req->replylen = 2; /* 2 bytes of response */ req->reply[0] = 5; /* socks5 reply */ have_user_pass = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_USER_PASS, nummethods) !=NULL); have_no_auth = (memchr(data+2, SOCKS_NO_AUTH, nummethods) !=NULL); if (have_user_pass && !(have_no_auth && req->socks_prefer_no_auth)) { req->auth_type = SOCKS_USER_PASS; req->reply[1] = SOCKS_USER_PASS; /* tell client to use "user/pass" auth method */ req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 2 (username/password)"); r=0; } else if (have_no_auth) { req->reply[1] = SOCKS_NO_AUTH; /* tell client to use "none" auth method */ req->socks_version = 5; /* remember we've already negotiated auth */ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: accepted method 0 (no authentication)"); r=0; } else { log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5: offered methods don't include 'no auth' or " "username/password. Rejecting."); req->reply[1] = '\xFF'; /* reject all methods */ r=-1; } /* Remove packet from buf. Some SOCKS clients will have sent extra * junk at this point; let's hope it's an authentication message. */ *drain_out = 2u + nummethods; return r; } if (req->auth_type != SOCKS_NO_AUTH && !req->got_auth) { log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5: negotiated authentication, but none provided"); return -1; } /* we know the method; read in the request */ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: checking request"); if (datalen < 7) {/* basic info plus >=1 for addr plus 2 for port */ *want_length_out = 7; return 0; /* not yet */ } req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE && req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { /* not a connect or resolve or a resolve_ptr? we don't support it. */ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req,SOCKS5_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED); log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", req->command); return -1; } switch (*(data+3)) { /* address type */ case 1: /* IPv4 address */ case 4: /* IPv6 address */ { const int is_v6 = *(data+3) == 4; const unsigned addrlen = is_v6 ? 16 : 4; log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: ipv4 address type"); if (datalen < 6+addrlen) {/* ip/port there? */ *want_length_out = 6+addrlen; return 0; /* not yet */ } if (is_v6) tor_addr_from_ipv6_bytes(&destaddr, data+4); else tor_addr_from_ipv4n(&destaddr, get_uint32(data+4)); tor_addr_to_str(tmpbuf, &destaddr, sizeof(tmpbuf), 1); if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 IP takes %d bytes, which doesn't fit in %d. " "Rejecting.", (int)strlen(tmpbuf)+1,(int)MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); return -1; } strlcpy(req->address,tmpbuf,sizeof(req->address)); req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+4+addrlen)); *drain_out = 6+addrlen; if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR && !addressmap_have_mapping(req->address,0)) { log_unsafe_socks_warning(5, req->address, req->port, safe_socks); if (safe_socks) { socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_NOT_ALLOWED); return -1; } } return 1; } case 3: /* fqdn */ log_debug(LD_APP,"socks5: fqdn address type"); if (req->command == SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR) { socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 received RESOLVE_PTR command with " "hostname type. Rejecting."); return -1; } len = (unsigned char)*(data+4); if (datalen < 7+len) { /* addr/port there? */ *want_length_out = 7+len; return 0; /* not yet */ } if (len+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); log_warn(LD_APP, "socks5 hostname is %d bytes, which doesn't fit in " "%d. Rejecting.", len+1,MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN); return -1; } memcpy(req->address,data+5,len); req->address[len] = 0; req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+5+len)); *drain_out = 5+len+2; if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_GENERAL_ERROR); log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) gave Tor " "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); return -1; } if (log_sockstype) log_notice(LD_APP, "Your application (using socks5 to port %d) instructed " "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " "necessary. This is good.", req->port); return 1; default: /* unsupported */ socks_request_set_socks5_error(req, SOCKS5_ADDRESS_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED); log_warn(LD_APP,"socks5: unsupported address type %d. Rejecting.", (int) *(data+3)); return -1; } tor_assert(0); break; case 4: { /* socks4 */ enum {socks4, socks4a} socks4_prot = socks4a; const char *authstart, *authend; /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4.protocol.txt */ /* http://ss5.sourceforge.net/socks4A.protocol.txt */ req->socks_version = 4; if (datalen < SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN) {/* basic info available? */ *want_length_out = SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; return 0; /* not yet */ } // buf_pullup(buf, 1280); req->command = (unsigned char) *(data+1); if (req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT && req->command != SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) { /* not a connect or resolve? we don't support it. (No resolve_ptr with * socks4.) */ log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: command %d not recognized. Rejecting.", req->command); return -1; } req->port = ntohs(get_uint16(data+2)); destip = ntohl(get_uint32(data+4)); if ((!req->port && req->command!=SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE) || !destip) { log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Port or DestIP is zero. Rejecting."); return -1; } if (destip >> 8) { log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: destip not in form 0.0.0.x."); in.s_addr = htonl(destip); tor_inet_ntoa(&in,tmpbuf,sizeof(tmpbuf)); if (strlen(tmpbuf)+1 > MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN) { log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4 addr (%d bytes) too long. Rejecting.", (int)strlen(tmpbuf)); return -1; } log_debug(LD_APP, "socks4: successfully read destip (%s)", safe_str_client(tmpbuf)); socks4_prot = socks4; } authstart = data + SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN; next = memchr(authstart, 0, datalen-SOCKS4_NETWORK_LEN); if (!next) { if (datalen >= 1024) { log_debug(LD_APP, "Socks4 user name too long; rejecting."); return -1; } log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Username not here yet."); *want_length_out = datalen+1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ return 0; } authend = next; tor_assert(next < data+datalen); startaddr = NULL; if (socks4_prot != socks4a && !addressmap_have_mapping(tmpbuf,0)) { log_unsafe_socks_warning(4, tmpbuf, req->port, safe_socks); if (safe_socks) return -1; } if (socks4_prot == socks4a) { if (next+1 == data+datalen) { log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: No part of destaddr here yet."); *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ return 0; } startaddr = next+1; next = memchr(startaddr, 0, data + datalen - startaddr); if (!next) { if (datalen >= 1024) { log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long."); return -1; } log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr not all here yet."); *want_length_out = datalen + 1024; /* More than we need, but safe */ return 0; } if (MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN <= next-startaddr) { log_warn(LD_APP,"socks4: Destaddr too long. Rejecting."); return -1; } // tor_assert(next < buf->cur+buf_datalen(buf)); if (log_sockstype) log_notice(LD_APP, "Your application (using socks4a to port %d) instructed " "Tor to take care of the DNS resolution itself if " "necessary. This is good.", req->port); } log_debug(LD_APP,"socks4: Everything is here. Success."); strlcpy(req->address, startaddr ? startaddr : tmpbuf, sizeof(req->address)); if (!string_is_valid_hostname(req->address)) { log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL, "Your application (using socks4 to port %d) gave Tor " "a malformed hostname: %s. Rejecting the connection.", req->port, escaped_safe_str_client(req->address)); return -1; } if (authend != authstart) { req->got_auth = 1; req->usernamelen = authend - authstart; req->username = tor_memdup(authstart, authend - authstart); } /* next points to the final \0 on inbuf */ *drain_out = next - data + 1; return 1; } case 'G': /* get */ case 'H': /* head */ case 'P': /* put/post */ case 'C': /* connect */ strlcpy((char*)req->reply, SOCKS_PROXY_IS_NOT_AN_HTTP_PROXY_MSG, MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN); req->replylen = strlen((char*)req->reply)+1; /* fall through */ default: /* version is not socks4 or socks5 */ log_warn(LD_APP, "Socks version %d not recognized. (Tor is not an http proxy.)", *(data)); { /* Tell the controller the first 8 bytes. */ char *tmp = tor_strndup(data, datalen < 8 ? datalen : 8); control_event_client_status(LOG_WARN, "SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL DATA=\"%s\"", escaped(tmp)); tor_free(tmp); } return -1; } } /** Inspect a reply from SOCKS server stored in buf according * to state, removing the protocol data upon success. Return 0 on * incomplete response, 1 on success and -1 on error, in which case * reason is set to a descriptive message (free() when finished * with it). * * As a special case, 2 is returned when user/pass is required * during SOCKS5 handshake and user/pass is configured. */ int fetch_from_buf_socks_client(buf_t *buf, int state, char **reason) { ssize_t drain = 0; int r; const char *head = NULL; size_t datalen = 0; if (buf_datalen(buf) < 2) return 0; buf_pullup(buf, MAX_SOCKS_MESSAGE_LEN, &head, &datalen); tor_assert(head && datalen >= 2); r = parse_socks_client((uint8_t*)head, datalen, state, reason, &drain); if (drain > 0) buf_drain(buf, drain); else if (drain < 0) buf_clear(buf); return r; } /** Implementation logic for fetch_from_*_socks_client. */ static int parse_socks_client(const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen, int state, char **reason, ssize_t *drain_out) { unsigned int addrlen; *drain_out = 0; if (datalen < 2) return 0; switch (state) { case PROXY_SOCKS4_WANT_CONNECT_OK: /* Wait for the complete response */ if (datalen < 8) return 0; if (data[1] != 0x5a) { *reason = tor_strdup(socks4_response_code_to_string(data[1])); return -1; } /* Success */ *drain_out = 8; return 1; case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_NONE: /* we don't have any credentials */ if (data[1] != 0x00) { *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our " "available authentication methods"); return -1; } log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: continuing without authentication"); *drain_out = -1; return 1; case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_METHOD_RFC1929: /* we have a username and password. return 1 if we can proceed without * providing authentication, or 2 otherwise. */ switch (data[1]) { case 0x00: log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: we have auth details but server " "doesn't require authentication."); *drain_out = -1; return 1; case 0x02: log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: need authentication."); *drain_out = -1; return 2; /* fall through */ } *reason = tor_strdup("server doesn't support any of our available " "authentication methods"); return -1; case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_AUTH_RFC1929_OK: /* handle server reply to rfc1929 authentication */ if (data[1] != 0x00) { *reason = tor_strdup("authentication failed"); return -1; } log_info(LD_NET, "SOCKS 5 client: authentication successful."); *drain_out = -1; return 1; case PROXY_SOCKS5_WANT_CONNECT_OK: /* response is variable length. BND.ADDR, etc, isn't needed * (don't bother with buf_pullup()), but make sure to eat all * the data used */ /* wait for address type field to arrive */ if (datalen < 4) return 0; switch (data[3]) { case 0x01: /* ip4 */ addrlen = 4; break; case 0x04: /* ip6 */ addrlen = 16; break; case 0x03: /* fqdn (can this happen here?) */ if (datalen < 5) return 0; addrlen = 1 + data[4]; break; default: *reason = tor_strdup("invalid response to connect request"); return -1; } /* wait for address and port */ if (datalen < 6 + addrlen) return 0; if (data[1] != 0x00) { *reason = tor_strdup(socks5_response_code_to_string(data[1])); return -1; } *drain_out = 6 + addrlen; return 1; } /* shouldn't get here... */ tor_assert(0); return -1; }