/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** * \file shared_random.c * * \brief Functions and data structure needed to accomplish the shared * random protocol as defined in proposal #250. **/ #define SHARED_RANDOM_PRIVATE #include "or.h" #include "shared_random.h" #include "config.h" #include "confparse.h" #include "networkstatus.h" #include "routerkeys.h" #include "router.h" #include "routerlist.h" #include "shared_random_state.h" /* Allocate a new commit object and initializing it with identity * that MUST be provided. The digest algorithm is set to the default one * that is supported. The rest is uninitialized. This never returns NULL. */ static sr_commit_t * commit_new(const char *rsa_identity_fpr) { sr_commit_t *commit; tor_assert(rsa_identity_fpr); commit = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*commit)); commit->alg = SR_DIGEST_ALG; strlcpy(commit->rsa_identity_fpr, rsa_identity_fpr, sizeof(commit->rsa_identity_fpr)); return commit; } /* Parse the encoded commit. The format is: * base64-encode( TIMESTAMP || H(REVEAL) ) * * If successfully decoded and parsed, commit is updated and 0 is returned. * On error, return -1. */ STATIC int commit_decode(const char *encoded, sr_commit_t *commit) { int decoded_len = 0; size_t offset = 0; /* XXX: Needs two extra bytes for the base64 decode calculation matches * the binary length once decoded. #17868. */ char b64_decoded[SR_COMMIT_LEN + 2]; tor_assert(encoded); tor_assert(commit); if (strlen(encoded) > SR_COMMIT_BASE64_LEN) { /* This means that if we base64 decode successfully the reveiced commit, * we'll end up with a bigger decoded commit thus unusable. */ goto error; } /* Decode our encoded commit. Let's be careful here since _encoded_ is * coming from the network in a dirauth vote so we expect nothing more * than the base64 encoded length of a commit. */ decoded_len = base64_decode(b64_decoded, sizeof(b64_decoded), encoded, strlen(encoded)); if (decoded_len < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Commit from authority %s can't be decoded.", commit->rsa_identity_fpr); goto error; } if (decoded_len != SR_COMMIT_LEN) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Commit from authority %s decoded length doesn't " "match the expected length (%d vs %d).", commit->rsa_identity_fpr, decoded_len, SR_COMMIT_LEN); goto error; } /* First is the timestamp (8 bytes). */ commit->commit_ts = (time_t) tor_ntohll(get_uint64(b64_decoded)); offset += sizeof(uint64_t); /* Next is hashed reveal. */ memcpy(commit->hashed_reveal, b64_decoded + offset, sizeof(commit->hashed_reveal)); /* Copy the base64 blob to the commit. Useful for voting. */ strlcpy(commit->encoded_commit, encoded, sizeof(commit->encoded_commit)); return 0; error: return -1; } /* Parse the b64 blob at encoded containing reveal information and * store the information in-place in commit. Return 0 on success else * a negative value. */ STATIC int reveal_decode(const char *encoded, sr_commit_t *commit) { int decoded_len = 0; /* XXX: Needs two extra bytes for the base64 decode calculation matches * the binary length once decoded. #17868. */ char b64_decoded[SR_REVEAL_LEN + 2]; tor_assert(encoded); tor_assert(commit); if (strlen(encoded) > SR_REVEAL_BASE64_LEN) { /* This means that if we base64 decode successfully the received reveal * value, we'll end up with a bigger decoded value thus unusable. */ goto error; } /* Decode our encoded reveal. Let's be careful here since _encoded_ is * coming from the network in a dirauth vote so we expect nothing more * than the base64 encoded length of our reveal. */ decoded_len = base64_decode(b64_decoded, sizeof(b64_decoded), encoded, strlen(encoded)); if (decoded_len < 0) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Reveal from authority %s can't be decoded.", commit->rsa_identity_fpr); goto error; } if (decoded_len != SR_REVEAL_LEN) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Reveal from authority %s decoded length is " "doesn't match the expected length (%d vs %d)", commit->rsa_identity_fpr, decoded_len, SR_REVEAL_LEN); goto error; } commit->reveal_ts = (time_t) tor_ntohll(get_uint64(b64_decoded)); /* Copy the last part, the random value. */ memcpy(commit->random_number, b64_decoded + 8, sizeof(commit->random_number)); /* Also copy the whole message to use during verification */ strlcpy(commit->encoded_reveal, encoded, sizeof(commit->encoded_reveal)); return 0; error: return -1; } /* Cleanup both our global state and disk state. */ static void sr_cleanup(void) { sr_state_free(); } /* Free a commit object. */ void sr_commit_free(sr_commit_t *commit) { if (commit == NULL) { return; } /* Make sure we do not leave OUR random number in memory. */ memwipe(commit->random_number, 0, sizeof(commit->random_number)); tor_free(commit); } /* Parse a list of arguments from a SRV value either from a vote, consensus * or from our disk state and return a newly allocated srv object. NULL is * returned on error. * * The arguments' order: * num_reveals, value */ sr_srv_t * sr_parse_srv(const smartlist_t *args) { char *value; int num_reveals, ok; sr_srv_t *srv = NULL; tor_assert(args); if (smartlist_len(args) < 2) { goto end; } /* First argument is the number of reveal values */ num_reveals = (int)tor_parse_long(smartlist_get(args, 0), 10, 0, INT32_MAX, &ok, NULL); if (!ok) { goto end; } srv = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*srv)); srv->num_reveals = num_reveals; /* Second and last argument is the shared random value it self. */ value = smartlist_get(args, 1); base16_decode((char *) srv->value, sizeof(srv->value), value, HEX_DIGEST256_LEN); end: return srv; } /* Parse a commit from a vote or from our disk state and return a newly * allocated commit object. NULL is returned on error. * * The commit's data is in args and the order matters very much: * algname, RSA fingerprint, commit value[, reveal value] */ sr_commit_t * sr_parse_commit(const smartlist_t *args) { char *value; digest_algorithm_t alg; const char *rsa_identity_fpr; sr_commit_t *commit = NULL; if (smartlist_len(args) < 3) { goto error; } /* First argument is the algorithm. */ value = smartlist_get(args, 0); alg = crypto_digest_algorithm_parse_name(value); if (alg != SR_DIGEST_ALG) { log_warn(LD_BUG, "SR: Commit algorithm %s is not recognized.", escaped(value)); goto error; } /* Second argument is the RSA fingerprint of the auth */ rsa_identity_fpr = smartlist_get(args, 1); if (base16_decode(digest, DIGEST_LEN, rsa_identity_fpr, HEX_DIGEST_LEN) < 0) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: RSA fingerprint '%s' not decodable", rsa_identity_fpr); goto error; } /* Let's make sure, for extra safety, that this fingerprint is known to * us. Even though this comes from a vote, doesn't hurt to be * extracareful. */ if (trusteddirserver_get_by_v3_auth_digest(digest) == NULL) { log_warn(LD_DIR, "SR: Fingerprint %s is not from a recognized " "authority. Discarding commit.", rsa_identity_fpr); goto error; } /* Allocate commit since we have a valid identity now. */ commit = commit_new(rsa_identity_fpr); /* Third argument is the commitment value base64-encoded. */ value = smartlist_get(args, 2); if (commit_decode(value, commit) < 0) { goto error; } /* (Optional) Fourth argument is the revealed value. */ if (smartlist_len(args) > 3) { value = smartlist_get(args, 3); if (reveal_decode(value, commit) < 0) { goto error; } } return commit; error: sr_commit_free(commit); return NULL; } /* Initialize shared random subsystem. This MUST be called early in the boot * process of tor. Return 0 on success else -1 on error. */ int sr_init(int save_to_disk) { return sr_state_init(save_to_disk, 1); } /* Save our state to disk and cleanup everything. */ void sr_save_and_cleanup(void) { sr_state_save(); sr_cleanup(); }