/* Copyright (c) 2016-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */ /* See LICENSE for licensing information */ /** * \file test_hs_client.c * \brief Test prop224 HS client functionality. */ #define CONFIG_PRIVATE #define CRYPTO_PRIVATE #define MAINLOOP_PRIVATE #define HS_CLIENT_PRIVATE #define TOR_CHANNEL_INTERNAL_ #define CIRCUITBUILD_PRIVATE #define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE #define CONNECTION_PRIVATE #include "test/test.h" #include "test/test_helpers.h" #include "test/log_test_helpers.h" #include "test/rend_test_helpers.h" #include "test/hs_test_helpers.h" #include "app/config/config.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h" #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_dh.h" #include "core/or/channeltls.h" #include "feature/dircache/directory.h" #include "core/mainloop/mainloop.h" #include "feature/nodelist/nodelist.h" #include "feature/nodelist/routerset.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_circuit.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_circuitmap.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_client.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_config.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_ident.h" #include "feature/hs/hs_cache.h" #include "core/or/circuitlist.h" #include "core/or/circuitbuild.h" #include "core/mainloop/connection.h" #include "core/or/connection_edge.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus.h" #include "core/or/cpath_build_state_st.h" #include "core/or/crypt_path_st.h" #include "feature/dircommon/dir_connection_st.h" #include "core/or/entry_connection_st.h" #include "core/or/extend_info_st.h" #include "feature/nodelist/networkstatus_st.h" #include "core/or/origin_circuit_st.h" #include "core/or/socks_request_st.h" static int mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(entry_connection_t *ap_conn) { (void) ap_conn; return 0; } static networkstatus_t mock_ns; /* Always return NULL. */ static networkstatus_t * mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus_false(time_t now) { (void) now; return NULL; } static networkstatus_t * mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus(time_t now) { (void) now; return &mock_ns; } static int helper_config_client(const char *conf, int validate_only) { int ret = 0; or_options_t *options = NULL; tt_assert(conf); options = helper_parse_options(conf); tt_assert(options); ret = hs_config_client_auth_all(options, validate_only); done: or_options_free(options); return ret; } /* Test helper function: Setup a circuit and a stream with the same hidden * service destination, and put them in circ_out and * conn_out. Make the stream wait for circuits to be established to the * hidden service. */ static int helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test(origin_circuit_t **circ_out, connection_t **conn_out, int is_legacy) { int retval; channel_tls_t *n_chan=NULL; rend_data_t *conn_rend_data = NULL; origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL; connection_t *conn = NULL; ed25519_public_key_t service_pk; /* Make a dummy connection stream and make it wait for our circuit */ conn = test_conn_get_connection(AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT, CONN_TYPE_AP /* ??? */, 0); if (is_legacy) { /* Legacy: Setup rend_data of stream */ char service_id[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN_BASE32+1] = {0}; TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data = mock_rend_data(service_id); conn_rend_data = TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->rend_data; } else { /* prop224: Setup hs conn identifier on the stream */ ed25519_secret_key_t sk; tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_secret_key_generate(&sk, 0)); tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_public_key_generate(&service_pk, &sk)); /* Setup hs_conn_identifier of stream */ TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(&service_pk); } /* Make it wait for circuit */ connection_ap_mark_as_pending_circuit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)); /* This is needed to silence a BUG warning from connection_edge_update_circuit_isolation() */ TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->original_dest_address = tor_strdup(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn)->socks_request->address); /****************************************************/ /* Now make dummy circuit */ or_circ = origin_circuit_new(); or_circ->base_.purpose = CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED; or_circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t)); or_circ->build_state->is_internal = 1; if (is_legacy) { /* Legacy: Setup rend data and final cpath */ or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t)); or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC; or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state = crypto_dh_new(DH_TYPE_REND); tt_assert( or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state); retval = crypto_dh_generate_public( or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); or_circ->rend_data = rend_data_dup(conn_rend_data); } else { /* prop224: Setup hs ident on the circuit */ or_circ->hs_ident = hs_ident_circuit_new(&service_pk, HS_IDENT_CIRCUIT_RENDEZVOUS); } TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->state = CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN; /* fake n_chan */ n_chan = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(channel_tls_t)); n_chan->base_.global_identifier = 1; or_circ->base_.n_chan = &(n_chan->base_); *circ_out = or_circ; *conn_out = conn; return 0; done: /* something failed */ return -1; } /* Test: Ensure that setting up legacy e2e rendezvous circuits works * correctly. */ static void test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy(void *arg) { ssize_t retval; origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL; connection_t *conn = NULL; (void) arg; /** In this test we create a v2 legacy HS stream and a circuit with the same * hidden service destination. We make the stream wait for circuits to be * established to the hidden service, and then we complete the circuit using * the hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client() function. We then * check that the end-to-end cpath was setup correctly and that the stream * was attached to the circuit as expected. */ MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_send_begin, mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin); /* Setup */ retval = helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test( &or_circ, &conn, 1); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); tt_assert(or_circ); tt_assert(conn); /* Check number of hops */ retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); /* Check that our stream is not attached on any circuits */ tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, NULL); /********************************************** */ /* Make a good RENDEZVOUS1 cell body because it needs to pass key exchange * digest verification... */ uint8_t rend_cell_body[DH1024_KEY_LEN+DIGEST_LEN] = {2}; { char keys[DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN]; crypto_dh_t *dh_state = or_circ->build_state->pending_final_cpath->rend_dh_handshake_state; /* compute and overwrite digest of cell body with the right value */ retval = crypto_dh_compute_secret(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, dh_state, (char*)rend_cell_body, DH1024_KEY_LEN, keys, DIGEST_LEN+CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN); tt_int_op(retval, OP_GT, 0); memcpy(rend_cell_body+DH1024_KEY_LEN, keys, DIGEST_LEN); } /* Setup the circuit */ retval = hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ_legacy_client(or_circ, rend_cell_body); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); /**********************************************/ /* See that a hop was added to the circuit's cpath */ retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1); /* Check the digest algo */ tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->crypto.f_digest), OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA1); tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->crypto.b_digest), OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA1); tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->crypto.f_crypto); tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->crypto.b_crypto); /* Ensure that circ purpose was changed */ tt_int_op(or_circ->base_.purpose, OP_EQ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED); /* Test that stream got attached */ tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)); done: connection_free_minimal(conn); if (or_circ) tor_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->n_chan); circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)); } /* Test: Ensure that setting up v3 rendezvous circuits works correctly. */ static void test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup(void *arg) { uint8_t ntor_key_seed[DIGEST256_LEN] = {0}; origin_circuit_t *or_circ = NULL; int retval; connection_t *conn = NULL; (void) arg; /** In this test we create a prop224 v3 HS stream and a circuit with the same * hidden service destination. We make the stream wait for circuits to be * established to the hidden service, and then we complete the circuit using * the hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ() function. We then check that the * end-to-end cpath was setup correctly and that the stream was attached to * the circuit as expected. */ MOCK(connection_ap_handshake_send_begin, mock_connection_ap_handshake_send_begin); /* Setup */ retval = helper_get_circ_and_stream_for_test( &or_circ, &conn, 0); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); tt_assert(or_circ); tt_assert(conn); /* Check number of hops: There should be no hops yet to this circ */ retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); tt_ptr_op(or_circ->cpath, OP_EQ, NULL); /* Check that our stream is not attached on any circuits */ tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, NULL); /**********************************************/ /* Setup the circuit */ retval = hs_circuit_setup_e2e_rend_circ(or_circ, ntor_key_seed, sizeof(ntor_key_seed), 0); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 0); /**********************************************/ /* See that a hop was added to the circuit's cpath */ retval = cpath_get_n_hops(&or_circ->cpath); tt_int_op(retval, OP_EQ, 1); /* Check that the crypt path has prop224 algorithm parameters */ tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->crypto.f_digest), OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA3_256); tt_int_op(crypto_digest_get_algorithm(or_circ->cpath->crypto.b_digest), OP_EQ, DIGEST_SHA3_256); tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->crypto.f_crypto); tt_assert(or_circ->cpath->crypto.b_crypto); /* Ensure that circ purpose was changed */ tt_int_op(or_circ->base_.purpose, OP_EQ, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED); /* Test that stream got attached */ tt_ptr_op(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)->on_circuit, OP_EQ, TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)); done: connection_free_minimal(conn); if (or_circ) tor_free(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)->n_chan); circuit_free_(TO_CIRCUIT(or_circ)); } /** Test client logic for picking intro points from a descriptor. Also test how * ExcludeNodes and intro point failures affect picking intro points. */ static void test_client_pick_intro(void *arg) { int ret; ed25519_keypair_t service_kp; hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL; MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus, mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus); (void) arg; hs_init(); /* Generate service keypair */ tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&service_kp, 0)); /* Set time */ ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.valid_after); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.fresh_until); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); update_approx_time(mock_ns.fresh_until-10); time_t now = approx_time(); /* Test logic: * * 1) Add our desc with intro points to the HS cache. * * 2) Mark all descriptor intro points except _the chosen one_ as * failed. Then query the desc to get a random intro: check that we got * _the chosen one_. Then fail the chosen one as well, and see that no * intros are returned. * * 3) Then clean the intro state cache and get an intro point. * * 4) Try fetching an intro with the wrong service key: shouldn't work * * 5) Set StrictNodes and put all our intro points in ExcludeNodes: see that * nothing is returned. */ /* 1) Add desc to HS cache */ { char *encoded = NULL; desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&service_kp); ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &service_kp, NULL, &encoded); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); tt_assert(encoded); /* store it */ hs_cache_store_as_client(encoded, &service_kp.pubkey); /* fetch it to make sure it works */ const hs_descriptor_t *fetched_desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&service_kp.pubkey); tt_assert(fetched_desc); tt_mem_op(fetched_desc->subcredential, OP_EQ, desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN); tt_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char*)fetched_desc->subcredential, DIGEST256_LEN)); tor_free(encoded); } /* 2) Mark all intro points except _the chosen one_ as failed. Then query the * desc and get a random intro: check that we got _the chosen one_. */ { /* Pick the chosen intro point and get its ei */ hs_desc_intro_point_t *chosen_intro_point = smartlist_get(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, 0); extend_info_t *chosen_intro_ei = desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(chosen_intro_point); tt_assert(chosen_intro_point); tt_assert(chosen_intro_ei); /* Now mark all other intro points as failed */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) { /* Skip the chosen intro point */ if (ip == chosen_intro_point) { continue; } ed25519_public_key_t *intro_auth_key = &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key; hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&service_kp.pubkey, intro_auth_key, INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip); /* Try to get a random intro: Should return the chosen one! */ /* (We try several times, to make sure this behavior is consistent, and to * cover the different cases of client_get_random_intro().) */ for (int i = 0; i < 64; ++i) { extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey); tor_assert(ip); tt_assert(!tor_mem_is_zero((char*)ip->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)); tt_mem_op(ip->identity_digest, OP_EQ, chosen_intro_ei->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN); extend_info_free(ip); } extend_info_free(chosen_intro_ei); /* Now also mark the chosen one as failed: See that we can't get any intro points anymore. */ hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&service_kp.pubkey, &chosen_intro_point->auth_key_cert->signed_key, INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_TIMEOUT); extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey); tor_assert(!ip); } /* 3) Clean the intro state cache and get an intro point */ { /* Pretend we are 5 mins in the future and order a cleanup of the intro * state. This should clean up the intro point failures and allow us to get * an intro. */ hs_cache_client_intro_state_clean(now + 5*60); /* Get an intro. It should work! */ extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey); tor_assert(ip); extend_info_free(ip); } /* 4) Try fetching an intro with the wrong service key: shouldn't work */ { ed25519_keypair_t dummy_kp; tt_int_op(0, OP_EQ, ed25519_keypair_generate(&dummy_kp, 0)); extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&dummy_kp.pubkey); tor_assert(!ip); } /* 5) Set StrictNodes and put all our intro points in ExcludeNodes: see that * nothing is returned. */ { get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes = routerset_new(); get_options_mutable()->StrictNodes = 1; SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) { extend_info_t *intro_ei = desc_intro_point_to_extend_info(ip); if (intro_ei) { const char *ptr; char ip_addr[TOR_ADDR_BUF_LEN]; /* We need to decorate in case it is an IPv6 else routerset_parse() * doesn't like it. */ ptr = tor_addr_to_str(ip_addr, &intro_ei->addr, sizeof(ip_addr), 1); tt_assert(ptr == ip_addr); ret = routerset_parse(get_options_mutable()->ExcludeNodes, ip_addr, ""); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); extend_info_free(intro_ei); } } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip); extend_info_t *ip = client_get_random_intro(&service_kp.pubkey); tt_assert(!ip); } done: hs_descriptor_free(desc); } static int mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_false(void) { return 0; } static int mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true(void) { return 1; } static hs_client_fetch_status_t mock_fetch_v3_desc_error(const ed25519_public_key_t *key) { (void) key; return HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR; } static void mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_(entry_connection_t *conn, int endreason, int line, const char *file) { (void) line; (void) file; conn->edge_.end_reason = endreason; /* This function ultimately will flag this so make sure we do also in the * MOCK one so we can assess closed connections vs open ones. */ conn->edge_.base_.marked_for_close = 1; } static void test_descriptor_fetch(void *arg) { int ret; entry_connection_t *ec = NULL; ed25519_public_key_t service_pk; ed25519_secret_key_t service_sk; (void) arg; hs_init(); memset(&service_sk, 'A', sizeof(service_sk)); ret = ed25519_public_key_generate(&service_pk, &service_sk); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); /* Initialize this so get_voting_interval() doesn't freak out. */ ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.valid_after); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); ret = parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.fresh_until); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); ec = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET); tt_assert(ec); ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(&service_pk); tt_assert(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec)->hs_ident); TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(ec))->state = AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT; smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), &ec->edge_.base_); /* 1. FetchHidServDescriptors is false so we shouldn't be able to fetch. */ get_options_mutable()->FetchHidServDescriptors = 0; ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_NOT_ALLOWED); get_options_mutable()->FetchHidServDescriptors = 1; /* 2. We don't have a live consensus. */ MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus, mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus_false); ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk); UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO); /* From now on, return a live consensus. */ MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus, mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus); /* 3. Not enough dir information. */ MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info, mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_false); ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk); UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_MISSING_INFO); /* From now on, we do have enough directory information. */ MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info, mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true); /* 4. We do have a pending directory request. */ { dir_connection_t *dir_conn = dir_connection_new(AF_INET); dir_conn->hs_ident = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(hs_ident_dir_conn_t)); TO_CONN(dir_conn)->purpose = DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_HSDESC; ed25519_pubkey_copy(&dir_conn->hs_ident->identity_pk, &service_pk); smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), TO_CONN(dir_conn)); ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk); smartlist_remove(get_connection_array(), TO_CONN(dir_conn)); connection_free_minimal(TO_CONN(dir_conn)); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_PENDING); } /* 5. We'll trigger an error on the fetch_desc_v3 and force to close all * pending SOCKS request. */ MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info, mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true); MOCK(fetch_v3_desc, mock_fetch_v3_desc_error); MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_, mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_); ret = hs_client_refetch_hsdesc(&service_pk); UNMOCK(fetch_v3_desc); UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, HS_CLIENT_FETCH_ERROR); /* The close waiting for descriptor function has been called. */ tt_int_op(ec->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED); done: connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(ec)); UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus); UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info); hs_free_all(); } static void test_auth_key_filename_is_valid(void *arg) { (void) arg; /* Valid file name. */ tt_assert(auth_key_filename_is_valid("a.auth_private")); /* Valid file name with special character. */ tt_assert(auth_key_filename_is_valid("a-.auth_private")); /* Invalid extension. */ tt_assert(!auth_key_filename_is_valid("a.ath_private")); /* Nothing before the extension. */ tt_assert(!auth_key_filename_is_valid(".auth_private")); done: ; } static void test_parse_auth_file_content(void *arg) { hs_client_service_authorization_t *auth = NULL; (void) arg; /* Valid authorized client. */ auth = parse_auth_file_content( "4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad:descriptor:" "x25519:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq"); tt_assert(auth); /* Wrong number of fields. */ tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("a:b")); /* Wrong auth type. */ tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content( "4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad:x:" "x25519:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq")); /* Wrong key type. */ tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content( "4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad:descriptor:" "x:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq")); /* Some malformed string. */ tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:aa==")); /* Bigger key than it should be */ tt_assert(!parse_auth_file_content("xx:descriptor:x25519:" "vjqea4jbhwwc4hto7ekyvqfbeodghbaq6nxi45hz4wr3qvhqv3yqa")); done: tor_free(auth); } static char * mock_read_file_to_str(const char *filename, int flags, struct stat *stat_out) { char *ret = NULL; (void) flags; (void) stat_out; if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("auth_keys" PATH_SEPARATOR "client1.auth_private"))) { ret = tor_strdup( "4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad:descriptor:" "x25519:zdsyvn2jq534ugyiuzgjy4267jbtzcjbsgedhshzx5mforyxtryq"); goto done; } if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("auth_keys" PATH_SEPARATOR "dummy.xxx"))) { ret = tor_strdup( "xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx:descriptor:" "x25519:xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx"); goto done; } if (!strcmp(filename, get_fname("auth_keys" PATH_SEPARATOR "client2.auth_private"))) { ret = tor_strdup( "25njqamcweflpvkl73j4szahhihoc4xt3ktcgjnpaingr5yhkenl5sid:descriptor:" "x25519:fdreqzjqso7d2ac7qscrxfl5qfpamdvgy5d6cxejcgzc3hvhurmq"); goto done; } done: return ret; } static int mock_check_private_dir(const char *dirname, cpd_check_t check, const char *effective_user) { (void) dirname; (void) check; (void) effective_user; return 0; } static smartlist_t * mock_tor_listdir(const char *dirname) { smartlist_t *file_list = smartlist_new(); (void) dirname; smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("client1.auth_private")); smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("dummy.xxx")); smartlist_add(file_list, tor_strdup("client2.auth_private")); return file_list; } static void test_config_client_authorization(void *arg) { int ret; char *conf = NULL; ed25519_public_key_t pk1, pk2; digest256map_t *global_map = NULL; char *key_dir = tor_strdup(get_fname("auth_keys")); (void) arg; MOCK(read_file_to_str, mock_read_file_to_str); MOCK(tor_listdir, mock_tor_listdir); MOCK(check_private_dir, mock_check_private_dir); #define conf_fmt \ "ClientOnionAuthDir %s\n" tor_asprintf(&conf, conf_fmt, key_dir); ret = helper_config_client(conf, 0); tor_free(conf); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); #undef conf_fmt global_map = get_hs_client_auths_map(); tt_int_op(digest256map_size(global_map), OP_EQ, 2); hs_parse_address("4acth47i6kxnvkewtm6q7ib2s3ufpo5sqbsnzjpbi7utijcltosqemad", &pk1, NULL, NULL); hs_parse_address("25njqamcweflpvkl73j4szahhihoc4xt3ktcgjnpaingr5yhkenl5sid", &pk2, NULL, NULL); tt_assert(digest256map_get(global_map, pk1.pubkey)); tt_assert(digest256map_get(global_map, pk2.pubkey)); done: tor_free(key_dir); hs_free_all(); UNMOCK(read_file_to_str); UNMOCK(tor_listdir); UNMOCK(check_private_dir); } static entry_connection_t * helper_build_socks_connection(const ed25519_public_key_t *service_pk, int conn_state) { entry_connection_t *socks = entry_connection_new(CONN_TYPE_AP, AF_INET); ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(socks)->hs_ident = hs_ident_edge_conn_new(service_pk); TO_CONN(ENTRY_TO_EDGE_CONN(socks))->state = conn_state; smartlist_add(get_connection_array(), &socks->edge_.base_); return socks; } static void test_desc_has_arrived_cleanup(void *arg) { /* The goal of this test is to make sure we clean up everything in between * two descriptors from the same .onion. Because intro points can change * from one descriptor to another, once we received a new descriptor, we * need to cleanup the remaining circuits so they aren't used or selected * when establishing a connection with the newly stored descriptor. * * This test was created because of #27410. */ int ret; char *desc_str = NULL; hs_descriptor_t *desc = NULL; const hs_descriptor_t *cached_desc; ed25519_keypair_t signing_kp; entry_connection_t *socks1 = NULL, *socks2 = NULL; hs_ident_dir_conn_t hs_dir_ident; (void) arg; hs_init(); MOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus, mock_networkstatus_get_live_consensus); MOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_, mock_connection_mark_unattached_ap_); MOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info, mock_router_have_minimum_dir_info_true); /* Set consensus time before our time so the cache lookup can always * validate that the entry is not expired. */ parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 13:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.valid_after); parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 14:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.fresh_until); parse_rfc1123_time("Sat, 26 Oct 1985 16:00:00 UTC", &mock_ns.valid_until); /* Build a descriptor for a specific .onion. */ ret = ed25519_keypair_generate(&signing_kp, 0); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); desc = hs_helper_build_hs_desc_with_ip(&signing_kp); tt_assert(desc); ret = hs_desc_encode_descriptor(desc, &signing_kp, NULL, &desc_str); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); /* Store in the client cache. */ ret = hs_cache_store_as_client(desc_str, &signing_kp.pubkey); tt_int_op(ret, OP_EQ, 0); cached_desc = hs_cache_lookup_as_client(&signing_kp.pubkey); tt_assert(cached_desc); hs_helper_desc_equal(desc, cached_desc); /* Create two SOCKS connection for the same .onion both in the waiting for a * descriptor state. */ socks1 = helper_build_socks_connection(&signing_kp.pubkey, AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT); tt_assert(socks1); socks2 = helper_build_socks_connection(&signing_kp.pubkey, AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT); tt_assert(socks2); /* Now, we'll make the intro points in the current descriptor unusable so * the hs_client_desc_has_arrived() will take the right code path that we * want to test that is the fetched descriptor has bad intro points. */ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(desc->encrypted_data.intro_points, hs_desc_intro_point_t *, ip) { hs_cache_client_intro_state_note(&signing_kp.pubkey, &ip->auth_key_cert->signed_key, INTRO_POINT_FAILURE_GENERIC); } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ip); /* Simulate that a new descriptor just arrived. We should have both of our * SOCKS connection to be ended with a resolved failed. */ hs_ident_dir_conn_init(&signing_kp.pubkey, &desc->plaintext_data.blinded_pubkey, &hs_dir_ident); hs_client_desc_has_arrived(&hs_dir_ident); tt_int_op(socks1->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED); /* XXX: MUST work with OP_EQ. */ tt_int_op(socks2->edge_.end_reason, OP_EQ, END_STREAM_REASON_RESOLVEFAILED); /* Now let say tor cleans up the intro state cache which resets all intro * point failure count. */ hs_cache_client_intro_state_purge(); /* Retrying all SOCKS which should basically do nothing since we don't have * any pending SOCKS connection in AP_CONN_STATE_RENDDESC_WAIT state. */ /* XXX: BUG() is triggered here, shouldn't if socks2 wasn't alive. */ retry_all_socks_conn_waiting_for_desc(); done: connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(socks1)); connection_free_minimal(ENTRY_TO_CONN(socks2)); hs_descriptor_free(desc); tor_free(desc_str); hs_free_all(); UNMOCK(networkstatus_get_live_consensus); UNMOCK(connection_mark_unattached_ap_); UNMOCK(router_have_minimum_dir_info); } struct testcase_t hs_client_tests[] = { { "e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup_legacy, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "e2e_rend_circuit_setup", test_e2e_rend_circuit_setup, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "client_pick_intro", test_client_pick_intro, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "descriptor_fetch", test_descriptor_fetch, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "auth_key_filename_is_valid", test_auth_key_filename_is_valid, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "parse_auth_file_content", test_parse_auth_file_content, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "config_client_authorization", test_config_client_authorization, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, { "desc_has_arrived_cleanup", test_desc_has_arrived_cleanup, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL }, END_OF_TESTCASES };