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- /* Copyright (c) 2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
- /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
- /**
- * \file hs_cell.c
- * \brief Hidden service API for cell creation and handling.
- **/
- #include "or.h"
- #include "config.h"
- #include "rendservice.h"
- #include "replaycache.h"
- #include "hs_cell.h"
- #include "hs_ntor.h"
- /* Trunnel. */
- #include "ed25519_cert.h"
- #include "hs/cell_common.h"
- #include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
- #include "hs/cell_introduce1.h"
- #include "hs/cell_rendezvous.h"
- /* Compute the MAC of an INTRODUCE cell in mac_out. The encoded_cell param is
- * the cell content up to the ENCRYPTED section of length encoded_cell_len.
- * The encrypted param is the start of the ENCRYPTED section of length
- * encrypted_len. The mac_key is the key needed for the computation of the MAC
- * derived from the ntor handshake of length mac_key_len.
- *
- * The length mac_out_len must be at least DIGEST256_LEN. */
- static void
- compute_introduce_mac(const uint8_t *encoded_cell, size_t encoded_cell_len,
- const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t encrypted_len,
- const uint8_t *mac_key, size_t mac_key_len,
- uint8_t *mac_out, size_t mac_out_len)
- {
- size_t offset = 0;
- size_t mac_msg_len;
- uint8_t mac_msg[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0};
- tor_assert(encoded_cell);
- tor_assert(encrypted);
- tor_assert(mac_key);
- tor_assert(mac_out);
- tor_assert(mac_out_len >= DIGEST256_LEN);
- /* Compute the size of the message which is basically the entire cell until
- * the MAC field of course. */
- mac_msg_len = encoded_cell_len + (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN);
- tor_assert(mac_msg_len <= sizeof(mac_msg));
- /* First, put the encoded cell in the msg. */
- memcpy(mac_msg, encoded_cell, encoded_cell_len);
- offset += encoded_cell_len;
- /* Second, put the CLIENT_PK + ENCRYPTED_DATA but ommit the MAC field (which
- * is junk at this point). */
- memcpy(mac_msg + offset, encrypted, (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN));
- offset += (encrypted_len - DIGEST256_LEN);
- tor_assert(offset == mac_msg_len);
- crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac_out, mac_out_len,
- mac_key, mac_key_len,
- mac_msg, mac_msg_len);
- memwipe(mac_msg, 0, sizeof(mac_msg));
- }
- /* From a set of keys, subcredential and the ENCRYPTED section of an
- * INTRODUCE2 cell, return a newly allocated intro cell keys structure.
- * Finally, the client public key is copied in client_pk. On error, return
- * NULL. */
- static hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *
- get_introduce2_key_material(const ed25519_public_key_t *auth_key,
- const curve25519_keypair_t *enc_key,
- const uint8_t *subcredential,
- const uint8_t *encrypted_section,
- curve25519_public_key_t *client_pk)
- {
- hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *keys;
- tor_assert(auth_key);
- tor_assert(enc_key);
- tor_assert(subcredential);
- tor_assert(encrypted_section);
- tor_assert(client_pk);
- keys = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(*keys));
- /* First bytes of the ENCRYPTED section are the client public key. */
- memcpy(client_pk->public_key, encrypted_section, CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
- if (hs_ntor_service_get_introduce1_keys(auth_key, enc_key, client_pk,
- subcredential, keys) < 0) {
- /* Don't rely on the caller to wipe this on error. */
- memwipe(client_pk, 0, sizeof(curve25519_public_key_t));
- tor_free(keys);
- keys = NULL;
- }
- return keys;
- }
- /* Using the given encryption key, decrypt the encrypted_section of length
- * encrypted_section_len of an INTRODUCE2 cell and return a newly allocated
- * buffer containing the decrypted data. On decryption failure, NULL is
- * returned. */
- static uint8_t *
- decrypt_introduce2(const uint8_t *enc_key, const uint8_t *encrypted_section,
- size_t encrypted_section_len)
- {
- uint8_t *decrypted = NULL;
- crypto_cipher_t *cipher = NULL;
- tor_assert(enc_key);
- tor_assert(encrypted_section);
- /* Decrypt ENCRYPTED section. */
- cipher = crypto_cipher_new_with_bits((char *) enc_key,
- CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN * 8);
- tor_assert(cipher);
- /* This is symmetric encryption so can't be bigger than the encrypted
- * section length. */
- decrypted = tor_malloc_zero(encrypted_section_len);
- if (crypto_cipher_decrypt(cipher, (char *) decrypted,
- (const char *) encrypted_section,
- encrypted_section_len) < 0) {
- tor_free(decrypted);
- decrypted = NULL;
- goto done;
- }
- done:
- crypto_cipher_free(cipher);
- return decrypted;
- }
- /* Given a pointer to the decrypted data of the ENCRYPTED section of an
- * INTRODUCE2 cell of length decrypted_len, parse and validate the cell
- * content. Return a newly allocated cell structure or NULL on error. The
- * circuit and service object are only used for logging purposes. */
- static trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *
- parse_introduce2_encrypted(const uint8_t *decrypted_data,
- size_t decrypted_len, const origin_circuit_t *circ,
- const hs_service_t *service)
- {
- trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell = NULL;
- tor_assert(decrypted_data);
- tor_assert(circ);
- tor_assert(service);
- if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_parse(&enc_cell, decrypted_data,
- decrypted_len) < 0) {
- log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to parse the decrypted ENCRYPTED section of "
- "the INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
- TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- goto err;
- }
- if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell) !=
- HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR) {
- log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key type is invalid. Got %u but "
- "expected %u on circuit %u for service %s",
- trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_onion_key_type(enc_cell),
- HS_CELL_ONION_KEY_TYPE_NTOR, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- goto err;
- }
- if (trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(enc_cell) !=
- CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
- log_info(LD_REND, "INTRODUCE2 onion key length is invalid. Got %u but "
- "expected %d on circuit %u for service %s",
- (unsigned)trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getlen_onion_key(enc_cell),
- CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN, TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- goto err;
- }
- /* XXX: Validate NSPEC field as well. */
- return enc_cell;
- err:
- trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell);
- return NULL;
- }
- /* Build a legacy ESTABLISH_INTRO cell with the given circuit nonce and RSA
- * encryption key. The encoded cell is put in cell_out that MUST at least be
- * of the size of RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE. Return the encoded cell length on
- * success else a negative value and cell_out is untouched. */
- static ssize_t
- build_legacy_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce, crypto_pk_t *enc_key,
- uint8_t *cell_out)
- {
- ssize_t cell_len;
- tor_assert(circ_nonce);
- tor_assert(enc_key);
- tor_assert(cell_out);
- memwipe(cell_out, 0, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
- cell_len = rend_service_encode_establish_intro_cell((char*)cell_out,
- RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
- enc_key, circ_nonce);
- return cell_len;
- }
- /* Parse an INTRODUCE2 cell from payload of size payload_len for the given
- * service and circuit which are used only for logging purposes. The resulting
- * parsed cell is put in cell_ptr_out.
- *
- * This function only parses prop224 INTRODUCE2 cells even when the intro point
- * is a legacy intro point. That's because intro points don't actually care
- * about the contents of the introduce cell. Legacy INTRODUCE cells are only
- * used by the legacy system now.
- *
- * Return 0 on success else a negative value and cell_ptr_out is untouched. */
- static int
- parse_introduce2_cell(const hs_service_t *service,
- const origin_circuit_t *circ, const uint8_t *payload,
- size_t payload_len,
- trn_cell_introduce1_t **cell_ptr_out)
- {
- trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell = NULL;
- tor_assert(service);
- tor_assert(circ);
- tor_assert(payload);
- tor_assert(cell_ptr_out);
- /* Parse the cell so we can start cell validation. */
- if (trn_cell_introduce1_parse(&cell, payload, payload_len) < 0) {
- log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Unable to parse INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u "
- "for service %s",
- TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- goto err;
- }
- /* Success. */
- *cell_ptr_out = cell;
- return 0;
- err:
- return -1;
- }
- /* ========== */
- /* Public API */
- /* ========== */
- /* Build an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell with the given circuit nonce and intro point
- * object. The encoded cell is put in cell_out that MUST at least be of the
- * size of RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE. Return the encoded cell length on success else
- * a negative value and cell_out is untouched. This function also supports
- * legacy cell creation. */
- ssize_t
- hs_cell_build_establish_intro(const char *circ_nonce,
- const hs_service_intro_point_t *ip,
- uint8_t *cell_out)
- {
- ssize_t cell_len = -1;
- uint16_t sig_len = ED25519_SIG_LEN;
- trn_cell_extension_t *ext;
- trn_cell_establish_intro_t *cell = NULL;
- tor_assert(circ_nonce);
- tor_assert(ip);
- /* Quickly handle the legacy IP. */
- if (ip->base.is_only_legacy) {
- tor_assert(ip->legacy_key);
- cell_len = build_legacy_establish_intro(circ_nonce, ip->legacy_key,
- cell_out);
- tor_assert(cell_len <= RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
- /* Success or not we are done here. */
- goto done;
- }
- /* Set extension data. None used here. */
- ext = trn_cell_extension_new();
- trn_cell_extension_set_num(ext, 0);
- cell = trn_cell_establish_intro_new();
- trn_cell_establish_intro_set_extensions(cell, ext);
- /* Set signature size. Array is then allocated in the cell. We need to do
- * this early so we can use trunnel API to get the signature length. */
- trn_cell_establish_intro_set_sig_len(cell, sig_len);
- trn_cell_establish_intro_setlen_sig(cell, sig_len);
- /* Set AUTH_KEY_TYPE: 2 means ed25519 */
- trn_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_type(cell,
- HS_INTRO_AUTH_KEY_TYPE_ED25519);
- /* Set AUTH_KEY and AUTH_KEY_LEN field. Must also set byte-length of
- * AUTH_KEY to match */
- {
- uint16_t auth_key_len = ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN;
- trn_cell_establish_intro_set_auth_key_len(cell, auth_key_len);
- trn_cell_establish_intro_setlen_auth_key(cell, auth_key_len);
- /* We do this call _after_ setting the length because it's reallocated at
- * that point only. */
- uint8_t *auth_key_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_auth_key(cell);
- memcpy(auth_key_ptr, ip->auth_key_kp.pubkey.pubkey, auth_key_len);
- }
- /* Calculate HANDSHAKE_AUTH field (MAC). */
- {
- ssize_t tmp_cell_enc_len = 0;
- ssize_t tmp_cell_mac_offset =
- sig_len + sizeof(cell->sig_len) +
- trn_cell_establish_intro_getlen_handshake_mac(cell);
- uint8_t tmp_cell_enc[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0};
- uint8_t mac[TRUNNEL_SHA3_256_LEN], *handshake_ptr;
- /* We first encode the current fields we have in the cell so we can
- * compute the MAC using the raw bytes. */
- tmp_cell_enc_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(tmp_cell_enc,
- sizeof(tmp_cell_enc),
- cell);
- if (BUG(tmp_cell_enc_len < 0)) {
- goto done;
- }
- /* Sanity check. */
- tor_assert(tmp_cell_enc_len > tmp_cell_mac_offset);
- /* Circuit nonce is always DIGEST_LEN according to tor-spec.txt. */
- crypto_mac_sha3_256(mac, sizeof(mac),
- (uint8_t *) circ_nonce, DIGEST_LEN,
- tmp_cell_enc, tmp_cell_enc_len - tmp_cell_mac_offset);
- handshake_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_handshake_mac(cell);
- memcpy(handshake_ptr, mac, sizeof(mac));
- memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac));
- memwipe(tmp_cell_enc, 0, sizeof(tmp_cell_enc));
- }
- /* Calculate the cell signature SIG. */
- {
- ssize_t tmp_cell_enc_len = 0;
- ssize_t tmp_cell_sig_offset = (sig_len + sizeof(cell->sig_len));
- uint8_t tmp_cell_enc[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE] = {0}, *sig_ptr;
- ed25519_signature_t sig;
- /* We first encode the current fields we have in the cell so we can
- * compute the signature from the raw bytes of the cell. */
- tmp_cell_enc_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(tmp_cell_enc,
- sizeof(tmp_cell_enc),
- cell);
- if (BUG(tmp_cell_enc_len < 0)) {
- goto done;
- }
- if (ed25519_sign_prefixed(&sig, tmp_cell_enc,
- tmp_cell_enc_len - tmp_cell_sig_offset,
- ESTABLISH_INTRO_SIG_PREFIX, &ip->auth_key_kp)) {
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unable to make signature for ESTABLISH_INTRO cell.");
- goto done;
- }
- /* Copy the signature into the cell. */
- sig_ptr = trn_cell_establish_intro_getarray_sig(cell);
- memcpy(sig_ptr, sig.sig, sig_len);
- memwipe(tmp_cell_enc, 0, sizeof(tmp_cell_enc));
- }
- /* Encode the cell. Can't be bigger than a standard cell. */
- cell_len = trn_cell_establish_intro_encode(cell_out, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE,
- cell);
- done:
- trn_cell_establish_intro_free(cell);
- return cell_len;
- }
- /* Parse the INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell in the payload of size payload_len. If we
- * are successful at parsing it, return the length of the parsed cell else a
- * negative value on error. */
- ssize_t
- hs_cell_parse_intro_established(const uint8_t *payload, size_t payload_len)
- {
- ssize_t ret;
- trn_cell_intro_established_t *cell = NULL;
- tor_assert(payload);
- /* Try to parse the payload into a cell making sure we do actually have a
- * valid cell. */
- ret = trn_cell_intro_established_parse(&cell, payload, payload_len);
- if (ret >= 0) {
- /* On success, we do not keep the cell, we just notify the caller that it
- * was successfully parsed. */
- trn_cell_intro_established_free(cell);
- }
- return ret;
- }
- /* Parsse the INTRODUCE2 cell using data which contains everything we need to
- * do so and contains the destination buffers of information we extract and
- * compute from the cell. Return 0 on success else a negative value. The
- * service and circ are only used for logging purposes. */
- ssize_t
- hs_cell_parse_introduce2(hs_cell_introduce2_data_t *data,
- const origin_circuit_t *circ,
- const hs_service_t *service)
- {
- int ret = -1;
- time_t elapsed;
- uint8_t *decrypted = NULL;
- size_t encrypted_section_len;
- const uint8_t *encrypted_section;
- trn_cell_introduce1_t *cell = NULL;
- trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_t *enc_cell = NULL;
- hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t *intro_keys = NULL;
- tor_assert(data);
- tor_assert(circ);
- tor_assert(service);
- /* Parse the cell into a decoded data structure pointed by cell_ptr. */
- if (parse_introduce2_cell(service, circ, data->payload, data->payload_len,
- &cell) < 0) {
- goto done;
- }
- log_info(LD_REND, "Received a decodable INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u "
- "for service %s. Decoding encrypted section...",
- TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- encrypted_section = trn_cell_introduce1_getconstarray_encrypted(cell);
- encrypted_section_len = trn_cell_introduce1_getlen_encrypted(cell);
- /* Encrypted section must at least contain the CLIENT_PK and MAC which is
- * defined in section 3.3.2 of the specification. */
- if (encrypted_section_len < (CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN + DIGEST256_LEN)) {
- log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE2 encrypted section length "
- "for service %s. Dropping cell.",
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- goto done;
- }
- /* Check our replay cache for this introduction point. */
- if (replaycache_add_test_and_elapsed(data->replay_cache, encrypted_section,
- encrypted_section_len, &elapsed)) {
- log_warn(LD_REND, "Possible replay detected! An INTRODUCE2 cell with the"
- "same ENCRYPTED section was seen %ld seconds ago. "
- "Dropping cell.", elapsed);
- goto done;
- }
- /* Build the key material out of the key material found in the cell. */
- intro_keys = get_introduce2_key_material(data->auth_pk, data->enc_kp,
- data->subcredential,
- encrypted_section,
- &data->client_pk);
- if (intro_keys == NULL) {
- log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid INTRODUCE2 encrypted data. Unable to "
- "compute key material on circuit %u for service %s",
- TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- goto done;
- }
- /* Validate MAC from the cell and our computed key material. The MAC field
- * in the cell is at the end of the encrypted section. */
- {
- uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
- /* The MAC field is at the very end of the ENCRYPTED section. */
- size_t mac_offset = encrypted_section_len - sizeof(mac);
- /* Compute the MAC. Use the entire encoded payload with a length up to the
- * ENCRYPTED section. */
- compute_introduce_mac(data->payload,
- data->payload_len - encrypted_section_len,
- encrypted_section, encrypted_section_len,
- intro_keys->mac_key, sizeof(intro_keys->mac_key),
- mac, sizeof(mac));
- if (tor_memcmp(mac, encrypted_section + mac_offset, sizeof(mac))) {
- log_info(LD_REND, "Invalid MAC validation for INTRODUCE2 cell on "
- "circuit %u for service %s",
- TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- goto done;
- }
- }
- {
- /* The ENCRYPTED_DATA section starts just after the CLIENT_PK. */
- const uint8_t *encrypted_data =
- encrypted_section + sizeof(data->client_pk);
- /* It's symmetric encryption so it's correct to use the ENCRYPTED length
- * for decryption. Computes the length of ENCRYPTED_DATA meaning removing
- * the CLIENT_PK and MAC length. */
- size_t encrypted_data_len =
- encrypted_section_len - (sizeof(data->client_pk) + DIGEST256_LEN);
- /* This decrypts the ENCRYPTED_DATA section of the cell. */
- decrypted = decrypt_introduce2(intro_keys->enc_key,
- encrypted_data, encrypted_data_len);
- if (decrypted == NULL) {
- log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to decrypt the ENCRYPTED section of an "
- "INTRODUCE2 cell on circuit %u for service %s",
- TO_CIRCUIT(circ)->n_circ_id,
- safe_str_client(service->onion_address));
- goto done;
- }
- /* Parse this blob into an encrypted cell structure so we can then extract
- * the data we need out of it. */
- enc_cell = parse_introduce2_encrypted(decrypted, encrypted_data_len,
- circ, service);
- memwipe(decrypted, 0, encrypted_data_len);
- if (enc_cell == NULL) {
- goto done;
- }
- }
- /* XXX: Implement client authorization checks. */
- /* Extract onion key and rendezvous cookie from the cell used for the
- * rendezvous point circuit e2e encryption. */
- memcpy(data->onion_pk.public_key,
- trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getconstarray_onion_key(enc_cell),
- CURVE25519_PUBKEY_LEN);
- memcpy(data->rendezvous_cookie,
- trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_getconstarray_rend_cookie(enc_cell),
- sizeof(data->rendezvous_cookie));
- /* Extract rendezvous link specifiers. */
- for (size_t idx = 0;
- idx < trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_nspec(enc_cell); idx++) {
- link_specifier_t *lspec =
- trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_get_nspecs(enc_cell, idx);
- smartlist_add(data->link_specifiers, hs_link_specifier_dup(lspec));
- }
- /* Success. */
- ret = 0;
- log_info(LD_REND, "Valid INTRODUCE2 cell. Launching rendezvous circuit.");
- done:
- if (intro_keys) {
- memwipe(intro_keys, 0, sizeof(hs_ntor_intro_cell_keys_t));
- tor_free(intro_keys);
- }
- tor_free(decrypted);
- trn_cell_introduce_encrypted_free(enc_cell);
- trn_cell_introduce1_free(cell);
- return ret;
- }
- /* Build a RENDEZVOUS1 cell with the given rendezvous cookie and handshake
- * info. The encoded cell is put in cell_out and the length of the data is
- * returned. This can't fail. */
- ssize_t
- hs_cell_build_rendezvous1(const uint8_t *rendezvous_cookie,
- size_t rendezvous_cookie_len,
- const uint8_t *rendezvous_handshake_info,
- size_t rendezvous_handshake_info_len,
- uint8_t *cell_out)
- {
- ssize_t cell_len;
- trn_cell_rendezvous1_t *cell;
- tor_assert(rendezvous_cookie);
- tor_assert(rendezvous_handshake_info);
- tor_assert(cell_out);
- cell = trn_cell_rendezvous1_new();
- /* Set the RENDEZVOUS_COOKIE. */
- memcpy(trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_rendezvous_cookie(cell),
- rendezvous_cookie, rendezvous_cookie_len);
- /* Set the HANDSHAKE_INFO. */
- trn_cell_rendezvous1_setlen_handshake_info(cell,
- rendezvous_handshake_info_len);
- memcpy(trn_cell_rendezvous1_getarray_handshake_info(cell),
- rendezvous_handshake_info, rendezvous_handshake_info_len);
- /* Encoding. */
- cell_len = trn_cell_rendezvous1_encode(cell_out, RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE, cell);
- tor_assert(cell_len > 0);
- trn_cell_rendezvous1_free(cell);
- return cell_len;
- }
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