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- /* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
- * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
- * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
- * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
- /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
- #ifndef ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_ST_H
- #define ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_ST_H
- #include "or/or.h"
- #include "or/circuit_st.h"
- struct onion_queue_t;
- /** An origin_circuit_t holds data necessary to build and use a circuit.
- */
- struct origin_circuit_t {
- circuit_t base_;
- /** Linked list of AP streams (or EXIT streams if hidden service)
- * associated with this circuit. */
- edge_connection_t *p_streams;
- /** Bytes read on this circuit since last call to
- * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
- * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
- uint32_t n_read_circ_bw;
- /** Bytes written to on this circuit since last call to
- * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
- * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
- uint32_t n_written_circ_bw;
- /** Total known-valid relay cell bytes since last call to
- * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
- * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
- uint32_t n_delivered_read_circ_bw;
- /** Total written relay cell bytes since last call to
- * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
- * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
- uint32_t n_delivered_written_circ_bw;
- /** Total overhead data in all known-valid relay data cells since last
- * call to control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're
- * configured to emit CIRC_BW events. */
- uint32_t n_overhead_read_circ_bw;
- /** Total written overhead data in all relay data cells since last call to
- * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
- * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
- uint32_t n_overhead_written_circ_bw;
- /** Build state for this circuit. It includes the intended path
- * length, the chosen exit router, rendezvous information, etc.
- */
- cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
- /** The doubly-linked list of crypt_path_t entries, one per hop,
- * for this circuit. This includes ciphers for each hop,
- * integrity-checking digests for each hop, and package/delivery
- * windows for each hop.
- */
- crypt_path_t *cpath;
- /** Holds all rendezvous data on either client or service side. */
- rend_data_t *rend_data;
- /** Holds hidden service identifier on either client or service side. This
- * is for both introduction and rendezvous circuit. */
- struct hs_ident_circuit_t *hs_ident;
- /** Holds the data that the entry guard system uses to track the
- * status of the guard this circuit is using, and thereby to determine
- * whether this circuit can be used. */
- struct circuit_guard_state_t *guard_state;
- /** Index into global_origin_circuit_list for this circuit. -1 if not
- * present. */
- int global_origin_circuit_list_idx;
- /** How many more relay_early cells can we send on this circuit, according
- * to the specification? */
- unsigned int remaining_relay_early_cells : 4;
- /** Set if this circuit is insanely old and we already informed the user */
- unsigned int is_ancient : 1;
- /** Set if this circuit has already been opened. Used to detect
- * cannibalized circuits. */
- unsigned int has_opened : 1;
- /**
- * Path bias state machine. Used to ensure integrity of our
- * circuit building and usage accounting. See path_state_t
- * for more details.
- */
- path_state_bitfield_t path_state : 3;
- /* If this flag is set, we should not consider attaching any more
- * connections to this circuit. */
- unsigned int unusable_for_new_conns : 1;
- /**
- * Tristate variable to guard against pathbias miscounting
- * due to circuit purpose transitions changing the decision
- * of pathbias_should_count(). This variable is informational
- * only. The current results of pathbias_should_count() are
- * the official decision for pathbias accounting.
- */
- uint8_t pathbias_shouldcount;
- #define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_UNDECIDED 0
- #define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED 1
- #define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED 2
- /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe stream ID
- * for response comparison */
- streamid_t pathbias_probe_id;
- /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe address nonce
- * (in host byte order) for response comparison. */
- uint32_t pathbias_probe_nonce;
- /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out
- * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has
- * been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to
- * its destination, and which is not a fully-connected rendezvous
- * circuit.
- *
- * (We clear this flag for client-side rendezvous circuits when they
- * are 'joined' to the other side's rendezvous circuit, so that
- * connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit can put client streams on
- * the circuit. We also clear this flag for service-side rendezvous
- * circuits when they are 'joined' to a client's rend circ, but only
- * for symmetry with the client case. Client-side introduction
- * circuits are closed when we get a joined rend circ, and
- * service-side introduction circuits never have this flag set.) */
- unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1;
- /** Set iff this circuit has been given a relaxed timeout because
- * no circuits have opened. Used to prevent spamming logs. */
- unsigned int relaxed_timeout : 1;
- /** Set iff this is a service-side rendezvous circuit for which a
- * new connection attempt has been launched. We consider launching
- * a new service-side rend circ to a client when the previous one
- * fails; now that we don't necessarily close a service-side rend
- * circ when we launch a new one to the same client, this flag keeps
- * us from launching two retries for the same failed rend circ. */
- unsigned int hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched : 1;
- /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the
- * RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */
- uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT];
- /** How many RELAY_EARLY cells have been sent over this circuit? This is
- * for debugging task 878, too. */
- int relay_early_cells_sent;
- /** The next stream_id that will be tried when we're attempting to
- * construct a new AP stream originating at this circuit. */
- streamid_t next_stream_id;
- /* The intro key replaces the hidden service's public key if purpose is
- * S_ESTABLISH_INTRO or S_INTRO, provided that no unversioned rendezvous
- * descriptor is used. */
- crypto_pk_t *intro_key;
- /** Quasi-global identifier for this circuit; used for control.c */
- /* XXXX NM This can get re-used after 2**32 circuits. */
- uint32_t global_identifier;
- /** True if we have associated one stream to this circuit, thereby setting
- * the isolation parameters for this circuit. Note that this doesn't
- * necessarily mean that we've <em>attached</em> any streams to the circuit:
- * we may only have marked up this circuit during the launch process.
- */
- unsigned int isolation_values_set : 1;
- /** True iff any stream has <em>ever</em> been attached to this circuit.
- *
- * In a better world we could use timestamp_dirty for this, but
- * timestamp_dirty is far too overloaded at the moment.
- */
- unsigned int isolation_any_streams_attached : 1;
- /** A bitfield of ISO_* flags for every isolation field such that this
- * circuit has had streams with more than one value for that field
- * attached to it. */
- uint8_t isolation_flags_mixed;
- /** @name Isolation parameters
- *
- * If any streams have been associated with this circ (isolation_values_set
- * == 1), and all streams associated with the circuit have had the same
- * value for some field ((isolation_flags_mixed & ISO_FOO) == 0), then these
- * elements hold the value for that field.
- *
- * Note again that "associated" is not the same as "attached": we
- * preliminarily associate streams with a circuit while the circuit is being
- * launched, so that we can tell whether we need to launch more circuits.
- *
- * @{
- */
- uint8_t client_proto_type;
- uint8_t client_proto_socksver;
- uint16_t dest_port;
- tor_addr_t client_addr;
- char *dest_address;
- int session_group;
- unsigned nym_epoch;
- size_t socks_username_len;
- uint8_t socks_password_len;
- /* Note that the next two values are NOT NUL-terminated; see
- socks_username_len and socks_password_len for their lengths. */
- char *socks_username;
- char *socks_password;
- /** Global identifier for the first stream attached here; used by
- * ISO_STREAM. */
- uint64_t associated_isolated_stream_global_id;
- /**@}*/
- /** A list of addr_policy_t for this circuit in particular. Used by
- * adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure.
- */
- smartlist_t *prepend_policy;
- /** How long do we wait before closing this circuit if it remains
- * completely idle after it was built, in seconds? This value
- * is randomized on a per-circuit basis from CircuitsAvailableTimoeut
- * to 2*CircuitsAvailableTimoeut. */
- int circuit_idle_timeout;
- };
- #endif
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