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@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
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+\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
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+\title{Challenges in bringing low-latency stream anonymity to the masses (DRAFT)}
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-
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-Challenges in bringing low-latency stream anonymity to the masses
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-
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+\begin{document}
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\section{Introduction}
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@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ useful network to a practical useful anonymous network.
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Tor works like this.
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-weasel's graph of # nodes and of bandwidth, ideally from week 0.
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+weasel's graph of \# nodes and of bandwidth, ideally from week 0.
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Tor has the following goals.
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@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ continued money, and they periodically ask what they will do when it
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dries up.
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Logging. Making logs not revealing. A happy coincidence that verbose
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-logging is our #2 performance bottleneck. Is there a way to detect
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+logging is our \#2 performance bottleneck. Is there a way to detect
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modified servers, or to have them volunteer the information that they're
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logging verbosely? Would that actually solve any attacks?
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@@ -172,3 +172,5 @@ assuming that, how much anonymity can we get. we're not here to model or
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to simulate or to produce equations and formulae. but those have their
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roles too.
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+\end{document}
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+
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Nick Mathewson