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@@ -563,7 +563,7 @@ We have not formally surveyed Tor node operators to learn why they are
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running nodes, but
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from the information they have provided, it seems that many of them run Tor
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nodes for reasons of personal interest in privacy issues. It is possible
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-that others are running Tor nodes for the protection of their own
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+that others are running Tor nodes to protect their own
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anonymity, but of course they are
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hardly likely to tell us specifics if they are.
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@@ -603,7 +603,8 @@ to reawaken at a random offset into the next billing cycle. This feature has
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interesting policy implications, however; see
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the next section below.
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Exit policies help to limit administrative costs by limiting the frequency of
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-abuse complaints. (See Section~\ref{subsec:tor-and-blacklists}.)
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+abuse complaints (see Section~\ref{subsec:tor-and-blacklists}). We discuss
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+technical incentive mechanisms in Section~\ref{subsec:incentives-by-design}.
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@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ Anti-censorship networks hoping to bridge country-level blocks face
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a variety of challenges. One of these is that they need to find enough
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exit nodes---servers on the `free' side that are willing to relay
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traffic from users to their final destinations. Anonymizing
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-networks incorporating Tor are well-suited to this task since we have
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+networks like Tor are well-suited to this task since we have
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already gathered a set of exit nodes that are willing to tolerate some
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political heat.
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@@ -1152,11 +1153,11 @@ help address censorship; we wish them success.
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Tor is running today with hundreds of nodes and tens of thousands of
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users, but it will certainly not scale to millions.
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Scaling Tor involves four main challenges. First, to get a
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-large initial set of nodes, we must address incentives for
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+large set of nodes, we must address incentives for
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users to carry traffic for others. Next is safe node discovery, both
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while bootstrapping (Tor clients must robustly find an initial
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-node list) and later (Tor client must learn about a fair sample
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-of honest nodes and not let the adversary control his circuits).
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+node list) and later (Tor clients must learn about a fair sample
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+of honest nodes and not let the adversary control circuits).
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We must also detect and handle node speed and reliability as the network
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becomes increasingly heterogeneous: since the speed and reliability
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of a circuit is limited by its worst link, we must learn to track and
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@@ -1164,6 +1165,7 @@ predict performance. Finally, we must stop assuming that all points on
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the network can connect to all other points.
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\subsection{Incentives by Design}
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+\label{subsec:incentives-by-design}
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There are three behaviors we need to encourage for each Tor node: relaying
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traffic; providing good throughput and reliability while doing it;
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@@ -1202,12 +1204,12 @@ service to nodes that have provided good service for them.
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Unfortunately, such an approach introduces new anonymity problems.
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There are many surprising ways for nodes to game the incentive and
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-reputation system to undermine anonymity because such systems are
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-designed to encourage fairness in storage or bandwidth usage not
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+reputation system to undermine anonymity---such systems are typically
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+designed to encourage fairness in storage or bandwidth usage, not
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fairness of provided anonymity. An adversary can attract more traffic
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-by performing well or can provide targeted differential performance to
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-individual users to undermine their anonymity. Typically a user who
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-chooses evenly from all options is most resistant to an adversary
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+by performing well or can target individual users by selectively
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+performing, to undermine their anonymity. Typically a user who
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+chooses evenly from all nodes is most resistant to an adversary
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targeting him, but that approach hampers the efficient use
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of heterogeneous nodes.
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