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@@ -1418,10 +1418,8 @@ and its resistance to attacks.
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\SubSection{Attacks and Defenses}
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\label{sec:attacks}
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-Below we summarize a variety of attacks and how well our design withstands
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-them.
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-
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-[XXX Note that some of these attacks are outside our threat model! -NM]
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+Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our
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+design withstands them.
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\subsubsection*{Passive attacks}
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\begin{tightlist}
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@@ -1708,7 +1706,33 @@ them.
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\subsubsection*{Attacks against rendezvous points}
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\begin{tightlist}
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-\item foo
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+\item \emph{Make many introduction requests.} An attacker could
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+ attempt to deny Bob service by flooding his Introduction Point with
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+ requests. Because the introduction point can block requests that
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+ lack authentication tokens, however, Bob can restrict the volume of
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+ requests he receives, or require a certain amount of computation for
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+ every request he receives.
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+
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+\item \emph{Attack an introduction point.} An attacker could try to
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+ disrupt a location-hidden service by disabling its introduction
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+ point. But because a service's identity is attached to its public
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+ key, not its introduction point, the service can simply re-advertise
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+ itself at a different introduction point.
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+
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+\item \emph{Compromise an introduction point.} If an attacker controls
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+ an introduction point for a service, it can flood the service with
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+ introduction requests, or prevent valid introduction requests from
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+ reaching the hidden server. The server will notice a flooding
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+ attempt if it receives many introduction requests. To notice
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+ blocking of valid requests, however, the hidden server should
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+ periodically test the introduction point by sending its introduction
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+ requests, and making sure it receives them.
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+
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+\item \emph{Compromise a rendezvous point.} Controlling a rendezvous
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+ point gains an attacker no more than controlling any other OR along
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+ a circuit, since all data passing along the rendezvous is protected
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+ by the session key shared by the client and server.
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+
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\end{tightlist}
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