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@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
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- o Security fixes:
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-
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- - Try to leak less information about what relays a client is
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- choosing to a side-channel attacker. Previously, a Tor client
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- would stop iterating through the list of available relays as
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- soon as it had chosen one, thus finishing a little earlier
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- when it picked a router earlier in the list. If an attacker
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- can recover this timing information (nontrivial but not
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- proven to be impossible), they could learn some coarse-
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- grained information about which relays a client was picking
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- (middle nodes in particular are likelier to be affected than
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- exits). The timing attack might be mitigated by other factors
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- (see bug #6537 for some discussion), but it's best not to
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- take chances. Fixes bug 6537; bugfix on 0.0.8rc1.
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