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mess with the formatting in sec9

svn:r703
Roger Dingledine 22 years ago
parent
commit
6a909560be
1 changed files with 12 additions and 14 deletions
  1. 12 14
      doc/tor-design.tex

+ 12 - 14
doc/tor-design.tex

@@ -1704,9 +1704,8 @@ presence of unreliable nodes.
 Below we summarize a variety of attacks and how well our design withstands
 Below we summarize a variety of attacks and how well our design withstands
 them.
 them.
 
 
-\begin{enumerate}
-\item \textbf{Passive attacks}
-\begin{itemize}
+\subsubsection*{Passive attacks}
+\begin{tightlist}
 \item \emph{Observing user behavior.}
 \item \emph{Observing user behavior.}
 \item \emph{End-to-end Timing correlation.}
 \item \emph{End-to-end Timing correlation.}
 \item \emph{End-to-end Size correlation.}
 \item \emph{End-to-end Size correlation.}
@@ -1733,10 +1732,10 @@ DOS three of the 4 who would allow a certain exit.
   anonymization of data stream.
   anonymization of data stream.
 
 
 
 
-\end{itemize}
+\end{tightlist}
 
 
-\item \textbf{Active attacks}
-\begin{itemize}
+\subsubsection*{Active attacks}
+\begin{tightlist}
 \item \emph{Key compromise.} Talk about all three keys. 3 bullets
 \item \emph{Key compromise.} Talk about all three keys. 3 bullets
 \item \emph{Iterated subpoena.} Legal roving adversary. Works bad against
 \item \emph{Iterated subpoena.} Legal roving adversary. Works bad against
 this because of ephemeral keys. Criticize pets paper in section 2 for
 this because of ephemeral keys. Criticize pets paper in section 2 for
@@ -1756,7 +1755,6 @@ Subcase of running a hostile node:
 the exit node can change the content you're getting to try to
 the exit node can change the content you're getting to try to
 trick you. similarly, when it rejects you due to exit policy,
 trick you. similarly, when it rejects you due to exit policy,
 it could give you a bad IP that sends you somewhere else.
 it could give you a bad IP that sends you somewhere else.
-\end{itemize}
 \item \emph{replaying traffic} Can't in Tor. NonSSL anonymizer.
 \item \emph{replaying traffic} Can't in Tor. NonSSL anonymizer.
 
 
 \item Do bad things with the Tor network, so we are hated and
 \item Do bad things with the Tor network, so we are hated and
@@ -1771,23 +1769,23 @@ Exit policy's are a start.
 we rely on DNS being globally consistent. if people in africa resolve
 we rely on DNS being globally consistent. if people in africa resolve
 IPs differently, then asking to extend a circuit to a certain IP can
 IPs differently, then asking to extend a circuit to a certain IP can
 give away your origin.
 give away your origin.
+\end{tightlist}
 
 
-\item \textbf{Directory attacks}
-\begin{itemize}
+\subsubsection*{Directory attacks}
+\begin{tightlist}
 \item knock out a dirserver
 \item knock out a dirserver
 \item knock out half the dirservers
 \item knock out half the dirservers
 \item trick user into using different software (with different dirserver
 \item trick user into using different software (with different dirserver
 keys)
 keys)
 \item OR connects to the dirservers but nowhere else
 \item OR connects to the dirservers but nowhere else
 \item foo
 \item foo
-\end{itemize}
+\end{tightlist}
 
 
-\item \textbf{Attacks against rendezvous points}
-\begin{itemize}
+\subsubsection*{Attacks against rendezvous points}
+\begin{tightlist}
 \item foo
 \item foo
-\end{itemize}
+\end{tightlist}
 
 
-\end{enumerate}
 
 
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