More space hacks. No content removal.

svn:r758

doc/tor-design.tex

@@ -474,7 +474,7 @@ low-latency systems, Tor does not protect against such a strong
 adversary. Instead, we assume an adversary who can observe some fraction
 of network traffic; who can generate, modify, delete, or delay traffic
 on the network; who can operate onion routers of its own; and who can
-compromise some fraction of the onion routers on the network.
+compromise some fraction of the onion routers.
 
 In low-latency anonymity systems that use layered encryption, the
 adversary's typical goal is to observe both the initiator and the
@@ -506,10 +506,9 @@ the network's reliability by attacking nodes or by performing antisocial
 activities from reliable servers and trying to get them taken down;
 making the network unreliable flushes users to other less anonymous
 systems, where they may be easier to attack.
-
-We consider each of these attacks in more detail below, and summarize
+We summarize
 in Section~\ref{sec:attacks} how well the Tor design defends against
-each of them.
+each of these attacks.
 
 %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
 
@@ -601,7 +600,6 @@ and to acknowledge), \emph{relay truncate} and \emph{relay truncated}
 (to tear down only part of the circuit, and to acknowledge), \emph{relay
 sendme} (used for congestion control), and \emph{relay drop} (used to
 implement long-range dummies).
-
 We describe each of these cell types and commands in more detail below.
 
 \SubSection{Circuits and streams}
@@ -623,11 +621,12 @@ even heavy users spend a negligible amount of time and CPU in
 building circuits, but only a limited number of requests can be linked
 to each other through a given exit node. Also, because circuits are built
 in the background, OPs can recover from failed circuit creation
-without delaying streams and thereby harming user experience.
+without delaying streams and thereby harming user experience.\\
 
-\subsubsection{Constructing a circuit}
+\noindent {\large Constructing a circuit}\\
+%\subsubsection{Constructing a circuit}
 \label{subsubsec:constructing-a-circuit}
-
+%
 A user's OP constructs a circuit incrementally, negotiating a
 symmetric key with each OR on the circuit, one hop at a time. To begin
 creating a new circuit, the OP (call her Alice) sends a
@@ -687,10 +686,11 @@ signature in the second step) because a single cell is too small to
 hold both a public key and a signature. Preliminary analysis with the
 NRL protocol analyzer \cite{meadows96} shows the above protocol to be
 secure (including providing perfect forward secrecy) under the
-traditional Dolev-Yao model.
-
-\subsubsection{Relay cells}
+traditional Dolev-Yao model.\\
 
+\noindent {\large Relay cells}\\
+%\subsubsection{Relay cells}
+%
 Once Alice has established the circuit (so she shares keys with each
 OR on the circuit), she can send relay cells.  Recall that every relay
 cell has a streamID in the relay header that indicates to which
@@ -1382,11 +1382,10 @@ acknowledge his existence.
 \Section{Attacks and Defenses}
 \label{sec:attacks}
 
-Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our
-design withstands them.
-
-\subsubsection*{Passive attacks}
+%Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our
+%design withstands them.\\
 
+\noindent{\large Passive attacks}\\
 \emph{Observing user traffic patterns.} Observing the connection
 from the user will not reveal her destination or data, but it will
 reveal traffic patterns (both sent and received). Profiling via user
@@ -1452,10 +1451,9 @@ all circuits through the network, combined with those from the
 network edges to the targeted user and the responder website. While
 these are in principle feasible and surprises are always possible,
 these constitute a much more complicated attack, and there is no
-current evidence of their practicality.}
-
-\subsubsection*{Active attacks}
+current evidence of their practicality.}\\
 
+\noindent {\large Active attacks}\\
 \emph{Compromise keys.} An attacker who learns the TLS session key can
 see control cells and encrypted relay cells on every circuit on that
 connection; learning a circuit
@@ -1580,10 +1578,9 @@ prevent an attacker from subverting the official release itself
 (through threats, bribery, or insider attacks), we provide all
 releases in source code form, encourage source audits, and
 frequently warn our users never to trust any software (even from
-us!) that comes without source.
-
-\subsubsection*{Directory attacks}
+us!) that comes without source.\\
 
+\noindent{\large Directory attacks}\\
 \emph{Destroy directory servers.}  If a few directory
 servers drop out of operation, the others still arrive at a final
 directory.  So long as any directory servers remain in operation,
@@ -1629,10 +1626,9 @@ connection to it.  A hostile OR could easily subvert this test by
 accepting TLS connections from ORs but ignoring all cells. Directory
 servers must actively test ORs by building circuits and streams as
 appropriate.  The tradeoffs of a similar approach are discussed in
-\cite{mix-acc}.
+\cite{mix-acc}.\\
   
-\subsubsection*{Attacks against rendezvous points}
-
+\noindent {\large Attacks against rendezvous points}\\
 \emph{Make many introduction requests.}  An attacker could
 try to deny Bob service by flooding his Introduction Point with
 requests.  Because the introduction point can block requests that