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@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ Motivation
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Implementation
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- Storing Build Times
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+ Gathering Build Times
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Circuit build times are stored in the circular array
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'circuit_build_times' consisting of uint32_t elements as milliseconds.
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@@ -30,8 +30,16 @@ Implementation
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too large, because it will make it difficult for clients to adapt to
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moving between different links.
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- From our observations, this value appears to be on the order of 1000,
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- but is configurable in a #define NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE.
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+ From our observations, the minimum value for a reasonable fit appears
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+ to be on the order of 500 (MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE). However, to keep
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+ a good fit over the long term, we store 5000 most recent circuits in
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+ the array (NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE).
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+
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+ The Tor client will build test circuits at a rate of one per
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+ minute (BUILD_TIMES_TEST_FREQUENCY) up to the point of
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+ MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE. This allows a fresh Tor to have
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+ a CircuitBuildTimeout estimated within 8 hours after install,
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+ upgrade, or network change (see below).
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Long Term Storage
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@@ -43,9 +51,9 @@ Implementation
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Example:
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TotalBuildTimes 100
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- CircuitBuildTimeBin 0 50
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- CircuitBuildTimeBin 50 25
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- CircuitBuildTimeBin 100 13
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+ CircuitBuildTimeBin 25 50
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+ CircuitBuildTimeBin 75 25
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+ CircuitBuildTimeBin 125 13
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...
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Reading the histogram in will entail inserting <count> values
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@@ -57,7 +65,12 @@ Implementation
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Learning the CircuitBuildTimeout
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Based on studies of build times, we found that the distribution of
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- circuit buildtimes appears to be a Pareto distribution.
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+ circuit buildtimes appears to be a Frechet distribution. However,
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+ estimators and quantile functions of the Frechet distribution are
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+ difficult to work with and slow to converge. So instead, since we
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+ are only interested in the accuracy of the tail, we approximate
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+ the tail of the distribution with a Pareto curve starting at
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+ the mode of the circuit build time sample set.
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We will calculate the parameters for a Pareto distribution
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fitting the data using the estimators at
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@@ -73,11 +86,8 @@ Implementation
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Detecting Changing Network Conditions
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- We attempt to detect both network connectivty loss and drastic
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- changes in the timeout characteristics. Network connectivity loss
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- is detected by recording a timestamp every time Tor either completes
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- a TLS connection or receives a cell. If this timestamp is more than
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- 90 seconds in the past, circuit timeouts are no longer counted.
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+ We attempt to detect both network connectivity loss and drastic
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+ changes in the timeout characteristics.
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If more than MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_RATE (80%) of the past
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RECENT_CIRCUITS (20) time out, we assume the network connection
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@@ -86,6 +96,11 @@ Implementation
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position on the Pareto Quartile function for the ratio of
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timeouts.
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+ Network connectivity loss is detected by recording a timestamp every
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+ time Tor either completes a TLS connection or receives a cell. If
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+ this timestamp is more than CircuitBuildTimeout*RECENT_CIRCUITS/3
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+ seconds in the past, circuit timeouts are no longer counted.
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+
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Testing
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After circuit build times, storage, and learning are implemented,
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@@ -96,44 +111,28 @@ Implementation
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the python produces matches that which is output to the state file in Tor,
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and verify that the Pareto parameters and cutoff points also match.
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- Soft timeout vs Hard Timeout
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-
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- At some point, it may be desirable to change the cutoff from a
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- single hard cutoff that destroys the circuit to a soft cutoff and
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- a hard cutoff, where the soft cutoff merely triggers the building
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- of a new circuit, and the hard cutoff triggers destruction of the
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- circuit.
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-
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- Good values for hard and soft cutoffs seem to be 80% and 60%
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- respectively, but we should eventually justify this with observation.
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-
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- When to Begin Calculation
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-
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- The number of circuits to observe (NCIRCUITS_TO_CUTOFF) before
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- changing the CircuitBuildTimeout will be tunable via a #define. From
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- our measurements, a good value for NCIRCUITS_TO_CUTOFF appears to be
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- on the order of 100.
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+ We will also verify that there are no unexpected large deviations from
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+ node selection, such as nodes from distant geographical locations being
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+ completely excluded.
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Dealing with Timeouts
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Timeouts should be counted as the expectation of the region of
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- of the Pareto distribution beyond the cutoff. The proposal will
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- be updated with this value soon.
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+ of the Pareto distribution beyond the cutoff. This is done by
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+ generating a random sample for each timeout at points on the
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+ curve beyond the current timeout cutoff.
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- Also, in the event of network failure, the observation mechanism
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- should stop collecting timeout data.
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+ Future Work
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- Client Hints
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-
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- Some research still needs to be done to provide initial values
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- for CircuitBuildTimeout based on values learned from modem
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- users, DSL users, Cable Modem users, and dedicated links. A
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- radiobutton in Vidalia should eventually be provided that
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- sets CircuitBuildTimeout to one of these values and also
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- provide the option of purging all learned data, should any exist.
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+ At some point, it may be desirable to change the cutoff from a
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+ single hard cutoff that destroys the circuit to a soft cutoff and
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+ a hard cutoff, where the soft cutoff merely triggers the building
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+ of a new circuit, and the hard cutoff triggers destruction of the
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+ circuit.
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- These values can either be published in the directory, or
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- shipped hardcoded for a particular Tor version.
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+ It may also be beneficial to learn separate timeouts for each
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+ guard node, as they will have slightly different distributions.
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+ This will take longer to generate initial values though.
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Issues
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