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@@ -380,9 +380,14 @@ transporting arbitrary IP packets, and also supported
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pseudonymity in addition to anonymity; but it has
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a different approach to sustainability (collecting money from users
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and paying ISPs to run Tor nodes), and was eventually shut down due to financial
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-load. Finally,
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-more scalable peer-to-peer designs like Tarzan~\cite{tarzan:ccs02} and
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-MorphMix~\cite{morphmix:fc04} have been proposed in the literature, but
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+load. Finally,
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+peer-to-peer designs that are intended to be more scalable,
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+for example Tarzan~\cite{tarzan:ccs02} and
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+MorphMix~\cite{morphmix:fc04}, have been proposed in the literature but
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have not been fielded. These systems differ somewhat
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in threat model and presumably practical resistance to threats.
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Note that MorphMix differs from Tor only in
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@@ -889,7 +894,9 @@ prevent individual machines within the enclave from running Tor
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clients~\cite{or-jsac98,or-discex00}.
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Of course, Tor's default path length of
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-three is insufficient for these enclaves, since the entry or exit
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+three is insufficient for these enclaves, since the entry and/or exit
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themselves are sensitive. Tor thus increments path length by one
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for each sensitive endpoint in the circuit.
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Enclaves also help to protect against end-to-end attacks, since it's
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