|
|
@@ -135,3 +135,23 @@ Status: Draft
|
|
|
answers to popular requests, so we don't have to keep getting
|
|
|
them again.)
|
|
|
|
|
|
+6. Outstanding problems
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ 1) HTTP proxies already exist. Why waste our time cloning one
|
|
|
+ badly? When we clone existing stuff, we usually regret it.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ 2) It's overbroad. We only seem to need a secure get-a-tor feature,
|
|
|
+ and instead we're contemplating building a locked-down HTTP proxy.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ 3) It's going to add a fair bit of complexity to our code. We do
|
|
|
+ not currently implement HTTPS. We'd need to refactor lots of the
|
|
|
+ low-level connection stuff so that "SSL" and "Cell-based" were no
|
|
|
+ longer synonymous.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ 4) It's still unclear how effective this proposal would be in
|
|
|
+ practice. You need to know that this feature exists, which means
|
|
|
+ somebody needs to tell you about a bridge (mirror) address and tell
|
|
|
+ you how to use it. And if they're doing that, they could (e.g.) tell
|
|
|
+ you about a gmail autoresponder address just as easily, and then you'd
|
|
|
+ get better authentication of the Tor program to boot.
|
|
|
+
|
Roger Dingledine