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@@ -128,17 +128,18 @@ Tor Rendezvous Spec
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introduction. To establish the introduction, Bob sends a
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RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, containing:
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- KL Key length [2 octets
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+ KL Key length [2 octets]
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PK Bob's public key [KL octets]
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HS Hash of session info [20 octets]
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SIG Signature of above information [KL octets]
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To prevent replay attacks, the HS field contains a SHA-1 hash based on the
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- shared secret g^xy between Bob's OP and the introduction point, as
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+ shared secret KH between Bob's OP and the introduction point, as
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follows:
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- HS = H(g^xy | "INTRODUCE")
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+ HS = H(KH | "INTRODUCE")
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That is:
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- HS = H(g^xy | [49 4E 54 52 4F 44 55 43 45])
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+ HS = H(KH | [49 4E 54 52 4F 44 55 43 45])
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+ (KH, as specified in tor-spec.txt, is H(g^xy | [00]) .)
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Upon receiving such a cell, the OR first checks that the signature is
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correct with the included public key. If so, it checks whether HS is
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@@ -268,7 +269,7 @@ Tor Rendezvous Spec
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point, and sends a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell along this circuit, containing:
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RC Rendezvous cookie [20 octets]
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g^y Diffie-Hellman [128 octets]
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- H(KH) Handshake digest [20 octets]
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+ KH Handshake digest [20 octets]
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(Bob's OP MUST NOT use this circuit for any other purpose.)
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@@ -276,7 +277,7 @@ Tor Rendezvous Spec
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corresponding circuit in a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS2 cell, containing:
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g^y Diffie-Hellman [128 octets]
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- H(KH) Handshake digest [20 octets]
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+ KH Handshake digest [20 octets]
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(If the RP does not recognize the RC, it discards the cell and
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tears down the circuit.)
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