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				|  |  | -\documentclass{llncs}
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				|  |  | +%\documentclass{llncs}
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				|  |  | +\documentclass{usenixsubmit}
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				|  |  | +%\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
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				|  |  | +%usepackage{usenix}
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  |  \usepackage{url}
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				|  |  |  \usepackage{amsmath}
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				|  | @@ -18,15 +21,17 @@
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				|  |  |      %  \setlength{\topsep}{0mm}
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				|  |  |      }}{\end{list}}
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  | -\begin{document}
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				|  |  | +\newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{}        % The version that hides the note.
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				|  |  | +%\newcommand{\workingnote}[1]{(**#1)}   % makes the note visible.
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  | +\date{}
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				|  |  |  \title{Design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system\\DRAFT}
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  |  %\author{Roger Dingledine\inst{1} \and Nick Mathewson\inst{1}}
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				|  |  | -\author{Roger Dingledine \and Nick Mathewson}
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				|  |  | -\institute{The Free Haven Project\\
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				|  |  | -\email{\{arma,nickm\}@freehaven.net}}
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				|  |  | +\author{Roger Dingledine \\ The Tor Project \\ arma@torproject.org \and
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				|  |  | +Nick Mathewson \\ The Tor Project \\ nickm@torproject.org}
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  | +\begin{document}
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				|  |  |  \maketitle
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				|  |  |  \pagestyle{plain}
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				|  |  |  
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				|  | @@ -93,8 +98,8 @@ In sections~\ref{sec:bridges} through~\ref{sec:discovery}, we explore the
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				|  |  |  components of our designs in detail.  Section~\ref{sec:security} considers
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				|  |  |  security implications and Section~\ref{sec:reachability} presents other
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				|  |  |  issues with maintaining connectivity and sustainability for the design.
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				|  |  | -Section~\ref{sec:future} speculates about future more complex designs,
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				|  |  | -and finally Section~\ref{sec:conclusion} summarizes our next steps and
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				|  |  | +%Section~\ref{sec:future} speculates about future more complex designs,
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				|  |  | +Finally Section~\ref{sec:conclusion} summarizes our next steps and
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				|  |  |  recommendations.
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  |  % The other motivation is for places where we're concerned they will
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				|  | @@ -278,7 +283,7 @@ that have been pressured
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				|  |  |  recently into revealing the identity of bloggers
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				|  |  |  %~\cite{arrested-bloggers}
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				|  |  |  or treating clients differently depending on their network
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				|  |  | -location~\cite{goodell-syverson06}.
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				|  |  | +location~\cite{netauth}.
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				|  |  |  %~\cite{google-geolocation}.
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  |  The Tor design provides other features as well that are not typically
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				|  | @@ -1700,6 +1705,32 @@ See Section~\ref{subsec:first-bridge} for more discussion.
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				|  |  |  % Ian suggests that we have every tor server distribute a signed copy of the
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				|  |  |  % software.
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  | +\section{Next Steps}
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				|  |  | +\label{sec:conclusion}
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  | +Technical solutions won't solve the whole censorship problem. After all,
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				|  |  | +the firewalls in places like China are \emph{socially} very
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				|  |  | +successful, even if technologies and tricks exist to get around them.
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				|  |  | +However, having a strong technical solution is still necessary as one
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				|  |  | +important piece of the puzzle.
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  | +In this paper, we have shown that Tor provides a great set of building
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				|  |  | +blocks to start from. The next steps are to deploy prototype bridges and
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				|  |  | +bridge authorities, implement some of the proposed discovery strategies,
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				|  |  | +and then observe the system in operation and get more intuition about
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				|  |  | +the actual requirements and adversaries we're up against.
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  | +\bibliographystyle{plain} \bibliography{tor-design}
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  | +%\appendix
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  | +%\section{Counting Tor users by country}
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				|  |  | +%\label{app:geoip}
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  | +\end{document}
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  | +
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				|  |  |  \section{Future designs}
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				|  |  |  \label{sec:future}
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				|  |  |  
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				|  | @@ -1727,29 +1758,8 @@ and they would be a fine target to take down the network.
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  |  % Hidden services as bridge directory authorities.
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  | -\section{Next Steps}
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				|  |  | -\label{sec:conclusion}
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  | -Technical solutions won't solve the whole censorship problem. After all,
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				|  |  | -the firewalls in places like China are \emph{socially} very
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				|  |  | -successful, even if technologies and tricks exist to get around them.
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				|  |  | -However, having a strong technical solution is still necessary as one
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				|  |  | -important piece of the puzzle.
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				|  |  | -
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				|  |  | -In this paper, we have shown that Tor provides a great set of building
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				|  |  | -blocks to start from. The next steps are to deploy prototype bridges and
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				|  |  | -bridge authorities, implement some of the proposed discovery strategies,
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				|  |  | -and then observe the system in operation and get more intuition about
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				|  |  | -the actual requirements and adversaries we're up against.
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				|  |  | -
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				|  |  | -\bibliographystyle{plain} \bibliography{tor-design}
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				|  |  | -
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				|  |  | -%\appendix
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				|  |  | -
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				|  |  | -%\section{Counting Tor users by country}
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				|  |  | -%\label{app:geoip}
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				|  |  | -
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				|  |  | -\end{document}
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				|  |  | +------------------------------------------
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				|  |  |  
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				|  |  |  ship geoip db to bridges. they look up users who tls to them in the db,
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				|  |  |  and upload a signed list of countries and number-of-users each day. the
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