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@@ -271,22 +271,29 @@
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directory to see if they really do offer roughly the bandwidth
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they advertise. Include these observations in the directory. (For
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simplicity, the directory servers could be the measurers.) Then Tor
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- servers weight priority for other servers depending on advertised
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- bandwidth, giving particularly low priority to connections not
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- listed or that failed their spot-checks. The spot-checking can be
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- done anonymously to prevent selectively performing only for the
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- measurers, because hey, we have an anonymity network.
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+ servers give priority to other servers. We'd like to weight the
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+ priority by advertised bandwidth to encourage people to donate more,
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+ but it seems hard to distinguish between a slow server and a busy
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+ server.
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+
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+ The spot-checking can be done anonymously to prevent selectively
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+ performing only for the measurers, because hey, we have an anonymity
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+ network.
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We could also reward exit nodes by giving them better priority, but
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like above this only will affect their first hop. Another problem
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is that it's darn hard to spot-check whether a server allows exits
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- to all the pieces of the Internet that it claims to. A last problem
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- is that since directory servers will be doing their tests directly
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- (easy to detect) or indirectly (through other Tor servers), then
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- we know that we can get away with poor performance for people that
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- aren't listed in the directory. Maybe we can turn this around and
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- call it a feature though -- another reason to get listed in the
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- directory.
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+ to all the pieces of the Internet that it claims to. If necessary,
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+ perhaps this can be solved by a distributed reporting mechanism,
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+ where clients that can reach a site from one exit but not another
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+ anonymously submit that site to the measurers, who verify.
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+
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+ A last problem is that since directory servers will be doing their
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+ tests directly (easy to detect) or indirectly (through other Tor
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+ servers), then we know that we can get away with poor performance for
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+ people that aren't listed in the directory. Maybe we can turn this
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+ around and call it a feature though -- another reason to get listed
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+ in the directory.
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5. Recommendations and next steps.
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