Drop support for v1 rendezvous descriptors, since we never used

them anyway, and the code has probably rotted by now. Based on
patch from Karsten Loesing.


svn:r11496

ChangeLog

@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@ Changes in version 0.2.0.7-alpha - 2007-??-??
      - Remove the contrib scripts ExerciseServer.py, PathDemo.py,
        and TorControl.py, as they use the old v0 controller protocol,
        and are obsoleted by TorFlow anyway.
+     - Drop support for v1 rendezvous descriptors, since we never used
+       them anyway, and the code has probably rotted by now. Based on
+       patch from Karsten Loesing.
 
   o Major bugfixes:
     - Fix possible segfaults in functions called from

doc/spec/rend-spec.txt

@@ -200,6 +200,7 @@ $Id$
 
    [Once Tor 0.1.0.x is obsolete, we can stop generating or using V0
     descriptors. -NM]
+   [This should rather be retarded until V2 descriptors are stable. -KL]
 
 1.3. Bob's OP establishes his introduction points.
 
@@ -282,14 +283,11 @@ $Id$
 1.6. Alice's OP retrieves a service descriptor.
 
    Alice opens a stream to a directory server via Tor, and makes an HTTP GET
-   request for the document '/tor/rendezvous/<z>' or '/tor/rendezvous1/<z>',
-   where '<z>' is replaced with the encoding of Bob's public key as described
-   above. (She may re-use old circuits for this.) The directory replies with
-   a 404 HTTP response if it does not recognize <z>, and otherwise returns
-   Bob's most recently uploaded service descriptor.  (If Alice requests
-   'rendezvous1', the directory server provides a V1 descriptor or a V0
-   descriptor if no V1 descriptor is available.  If Alice requests
-   'rendezvous', the directory server returns a V0 descriptor.)
+   request for the document '/tor/rendezvous/<z>', where '<z>' is replaced
+   with the encoding of Bob's public key as described above. (She may re-use
+   old circuits for this.) The directory replies with a 404 HTTP response if
+   it does not recognize <z>, and otherwise returns Bob's most recently
+   uploaded service descriptor.
 
    If Alice's OP receives a 404 response, it tries the other directory
    servers, and only fails the lookup if none recognize the public key hash.
@@ -356,7 +354,7 @@ $Id$
           RC     Rendezvous cookie            [20 octets]
           g^x    Diffie-Hellman data, part 1 [128 octets]
         OR
-          VER    Version byte: set to 3.           [1 octet]
+          VER    Version byte: set to 4.           [1 octet]
           ATYPE  An address type (typically 4)     [1 octet]
           ADDR   Rendezvous point's IP address     [4 or 16 octets]
           PORT   Rendezvous point's OR port        [2 octets]
@@ -373,11 +371,12 @@ $Id$
    and must contain EITHER a nickname, or an identity key digest, encoded in
    hex, and prefixed with a '$'.
 
-   Implementations SHOULD accept all variants, and list the variants they
-   accept in their V1 descriptor.  Implementations should only generate the
-   variants listed in the service's V1 descriptor; if no V1 descriptor is
-   available, only the first variant should be generated.  No version should
-   generate the second variant (version byte=1).
+   Implementations SHOULD accept all variants, although only the first,
+   unversioned variant SHOULD be generated.  If V1 descriptors were used,
+   implementations SHOULD have listed the variants they accept in their V1
+   descriptor, and implementations SHOULD only have generated the variants
+   listed in the service's V1 descriptor.  No version SHOULD generate the
+   second variant (version byte=1).
 
    The hybrid encryption to Bob's PK works just like the hybrid
    encryption in CREATE cells (see main spec). Thus the payload of the

src/or/connection_edge.c

@@ -1441,7 +1441,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite_and_attach(edge_connection_t *conn,
     log_info(LD_REND,"Got a hidden service request for ID '%s'",
              safe_str(conn->rend_query));
     /* see if we already have it cached */
-    r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, -1, &entry);
+    r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, 0, &entry);
     if (r<0) {
       log_warn(LD_BUG,"Invalid service name '%s'",
                safe_str(conn->rend_query));

src/or/directory.c

@@ -1515,7 +1515,7 @@ connection_dir_client_reached_eof(dir_connection_t *conn)
     switch (status_code) {
       case 200:
         if (rend_cache_store(body, body_len, 0) < 0) {
-          log_warn(LD_REND,"Failed to store rendezvous descriptor.");
+          log_warn(LD_REND,"Failed to fetch rendezvous descriptor.");
           /* alice's ap_stream will notice when connection_mark_for_close
            * cleans it up */
         } else {
@@ -2209,17 +2209,14 @@ directory_handle_command_get(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers,
     goto done;
   }
 
-  if (options->HSAuthoritativeDir &&
-      (!strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous/") ||
-       !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous1/"))) {
+  if (options->HSAuthoritativeDir && !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous/")) {
     /* rendezvous descriptor fetch */
     const char *descp;
     size_t desc_len;
-    int versioned = !strcmpstart(url,"/tor/rendezvous1/");
-    const char *query = url+strlen("/tor/rendezvous/")+(versioned?1:0);
+    const char *query = url+strlen("/tor/rendezvous/");
 
     log_info(LD_REND, "Handling rendezvous descriptor get");
-    switch (rend_cache_lookup_desc(query, versioned?-1:0, &descp, &desc_len)) {
+    switch (rend_cache_lookup_desc(query, 0, &descp, &desc_len)) {
       case 1: /* valid */
         write_http_response_header_impl(conn, desc_len,
                                    "application/octet-stream",
@@ -2376,7 +2373,6 @@ directory_handle_command_post(dir_connection_t *conn, const char *headers,
     /* rendezvous descriptor post */
     log_info(LD_REND, "Handling rendezvous descriptor post.");
     if (rend_cache_store(body, body_len, 1) < 0) {
-//      char tmp[1024*2+1];
       log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_DIRSERV,
              "Rejected rend descriptor (length %d) from %s.",
              (int)body_len, conn->_base.address);

src/or/or.h

@@ -3244,7 +3244,7 @@ int rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
 /** Information used to connect to a hidden service. */
 typedef struct rend_service_descriptor_t {
   crypto_pk_env_t *pk; /**< This service's public key. */
-  int version; /**< 0 or 1. */
+  int version; /**< 0. */
   time_t timestamp; /**< Time when the descriptor was generated. */
   uint16_t protocols; /**< Bitmask: which rendezvous protocols are supported?
                        * (We allow bits '0', '1', and '2' to be set.) */
@@ -3267,7 +3267,6 @@ void rend_process_relay_cell(circuit_t *circ, int command, size_t length,
 
 void rend_service_descriptor_free(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc);
 int rend_encode_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc,
-                                   int version,
                                    crypto_pk_env_t *key,
                                    char **str_out,
                                    size_t *len_out);

src/or/rendclient.c

@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ rend_client_send_introduction(origin_circuit_t *introcirc,
   tor_assert(!rend_cmp_service_ids(introcirc->rend_query,
                                    rendcirc->rend_query));
 
-  if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_query, -1, &entry) < 1) {
+  if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(introcirc->rend_query, 0, &entry) < 1) {
     log_warn(LD_REND,
              "query %s didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
              escaped_safe_str(introcirc->rend_query));
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ rend_client_remove_intro_point(extend_info_t *failed_intro, const char *query)
   rend_cache_entry_t *ent;
   connection_t *conn;
 
-  r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, -1, &ent);
+  r = rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, 0, &ent);
   if (r<0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Malformed service ID %s.", escaped_safe_str(query));
     return -1;
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ rend_client_desc_here(const char *query)
     if (rend_cmp_service_ids(query, conn->rend_query))
       continue;
     assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn), now);
-    if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, -1, &entry) == 1 &&
+    if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(conn->rend_query, 0, &entry) == 1 &&
         entry->parsed->n_intro_points > 0) {
       /* either this fetch worked, or it failed but there was a
        * valid entry from before which we should reuse */
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ rend_client_get_random_intro(const char *query)
   int i;
   rend_cache_entry_t *entry;
 
-  if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, -1, &entry) < 1) {
+  if (rend_cache_lookup_entry(query, 0, &entry) < 1) {
     log_warn(LD_REND,
              "Query '%s' didn't have valid rend desc in cache. Failing.",
              safe_str(query));

src/or/rendcommon.c

@@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ rend_service_descriptor_free(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc)
  */
 int
 rend_encode_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc,
-                               int version,
                                crypto_pk_env_t *key,
                                char **str_out, size_t *len_out)
 {
@@ -60,42 +59,17 @@ rend_encode_service_descriptor(rend_service_descriptor_t *desc,
   size_t buflen = PK_BYTES*2*(desc->n_intro_points+2);/*Too long, but ok*/
   cp = *str_out = tor_malloc(buflen);
   end = cp + PK_BYTES*2*(desc->n_intro_points+1);
-  if (version) {
-    *(uint8_t*)cp = (uint8_t)0xff;
-    *(uint8_t*)(cp+1) = (uint8_t)version;
-    cp += 2;
-  }
   asn1len = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(desc->pk, cp+2, end-(cp+2));
   set_uint16(cp, htons((uint16_t)asn1len));
   cp += 2+asn1len;
   set_uint32(cp, htonl((uint32_t)desc->timestamp));
   cp += 4;
-  if (version == 1) {
-    set_uint16(cp, htons(desc->protocols));
-    cp += 2;
-  }
   set_uint16(cp, htons((uint16_t)desc->n_intro_points));
   cp += 2;
-  if (version == 0) {
-    for (i=0; i < desc->n_intro_points; ++i) {
-      char *ipoint = (char*)desc->intro_points[i];
-      strlcpy(cp, ipoint, buflen-(cp-*str_out));
-      cp += strlen(ipoint)+1;
-    }
-  } else {
-    if (desc->n_intro_points)
-      tor_assert(desc->intro_point_extend_info);
-    for (i=0; i < desc->n_intro_points; ++i) {
-      extend_info_t *info = desc->intro_point_extend_info[i];
-      int klen;
-      set_uint32(cp, htonl(info->addr));
-      set_uint16(cp+4, htons(info->port));
-      memcpy(cp+6, info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
-      klen = crypto_pk_asn1_encode(info->onion_key, cp+6+DIGEST_LEN+2,
-                                   (end-(cp+6+DIGEST_LEN+2)));
-      set_uint16(cp+6+DIGEST_LEN, htons((uint16_t)klen));
-      cp += 6+DIGEST_LEN+2+klen;
-    }
+  for (i=0; i < desc->n_intro_points; ++i) {
+    char *ipoint = (char*)desc->intro_points[i];
+    strlcpy(cp, ipoint, buflen-(cp-*str_out));
+    cp += strlen(ipoint)+1;
   }
   note_crypto_pk_op(REND_SERVER);
   i = crypto_pk_private_sign_digest(key, cp, *str_out, cp-*str_out);
@@ -119,18 +93,12 @@ rend_parse_service_descriptor(const char *str, size_t len)
   int i;
   size_t keylen, asn1len;
   const char *end, *cp, *eos;
-  int version = 0;
 
   result = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
   cp = str;
   end = str+len;
   if (end-cp<2) goto truncated;
-  if (*(uint8_t*)cp == 0xff) {
-    result->version = version = *(uint8_t*)(cp+1);
-    cp += 2;
-  } else {
-    result->version = version = 0;
-  }
+  result->version = 0;
   if (end-cp < 2) goto truncated;
   asn1len = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
   cp += 2;
@@ -141,18 +109,12 @@ rend_parse_service_descriptor(const char *str, size_t len)
   if (end-cp < 4) goto truncated;
   result->timestamp = (time_t) ntohl(get_uint32(cp));
   cp += 4;
-  if (version == 1) {
-    if (end-cp < 2) goto truncated;
-    result->protocols = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
-    cp += 2;
-  } else {
-    result->protocols = 1;
-  }
+  result->protocols = 1;
   if (end-cp < 2) goto truncated;
   result->n_intro_points = ntohs(get_uint16(cp));
   cp += 2;
 
-  if (version == 0 && result->n_intro_points != 0) {
+  if (result->n_intro_points != 0) {
     result->intro_points =
       tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*result->n_intro_points);
     for (i=0;i<result->n_intro_points;++i) {
@@ -162,33 +124,6 @@ rend_parse_service_descriptor(const char *str, size_t len)
       result->intro_points[i] = tor_strdup(cp);
       cp = eos+1;
     }
-  } else if (version != 0 && result->n_intro_points != 0) {
-    result->intro_point_extend_info =
-      tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t*)*result->n_intro_points);
-    result->intro_points =
-      tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(char*)*result->n_intro_points);
-    for (i=0;i<result->n_intro_points;++i) {
-      extend_info_t *info = result->intro_point_extend_info[i] =
-        tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
-      int klen;
-      if (end-cp < 8+DIGEST_LEN) goto truncated;
-      info->addr = ntohl(get_uint32(cp));
-      info->port = ntohs(get_uint16(cp+4));
-      memcpy(info->identity_digest, cp+6, DIGEST_LEN);
-      info->nickname[0] = '$';
-      base16_encode(info->nickname+1, sizeof(info->nickname)-1,
-                    info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
-      result->intro_points[i] = tor_strdup(info->nickname);
-      klen = ntohs(get_uint16(cp+6+DIGEST_LEN));
-      cp += 8+DIGEST_LEN;
-      if (end-cp < klen) goto truncated;
-      if (!(info->onion_key = crypto_pk_asn1_decode(cp,klen))) {
-        log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
-                 "Internal error decoding onion key for intro point.");
-        goto error;
-      }
-      cp += klen;
-    }
   }
   keylen = crypto_pk_keysize(result->pk);
   tor_assert(end-cp >= 0);
@@ -307,28 +242,20 @@ rend_valid_service_id(const char *query)
   return 1;
 }
 
-/** If we have a cached rend_cache_entry_t for the service ID <b>query</b>,
- * set *<b>e</b> to that entry and return 1.  Else return 0.  If
- * <b>version</b> is nonnegative, only return an entry in that descriptor
- * format version. Otherwise (if <b>version</b> is negative), return the most
- * recent format we have.
+/** If we have a cached rend_cache_entry_t for the service ID <b>query</b>
+ * with <b>version</b>, set *<b>e</b> to that entry and return 1.
+ * Else return 0.
  */
 int
 rend_cache_lookup_entry(const char *query, int version, rend_cache_entry_t **e)
 {
-  char key[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+2]; /* 1<query>\0   or  0<query>\0 */
+  char key[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+2]; /* <version><query>\0 */
   tor_assert(rend_cache);
+  tor_assert(!version);
   if (!rend_valid_service_id(query))
     return -1;
-  *e = NULL;
-  if (version != 0) {
-    tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "1%s", query);
-    *e = strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, key);
-  }
-  if (!*e && version != 1) {
-    tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "0%s", query);
-    *e = strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, key);
-  }
+  tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "%d%s", version, query);
+  *e = strmap_get_lc(rend_cache, key);
   if (!*e)
     return 0;
   return 1;
@@ -369,7 +296,7 @@ rend_cache_store(const char *desc, size_t desc_len, int published)
   rend_cache_entry_t *e;
   rend_service_descriptor_t *parsed;
   char query[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+1];
-  char key[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+2]; /* 1<query>\0  or  0<query>\0 */
+  char key[REND_SERVICE_ID_LEN+2]; /* 0<query>\0 */
   time_t now;
   or_options_t *options = get_options();
   tor_assert(rend_cache);
@@ -383,7 +310,7 @@ rend_cache_store(const char *desc, size_t desc_len, int published)
     rend_service_descriptor_free(parsed);
     return -1;
   }
-  tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "%c%s", parsed->version?'1':'0', query);
+  tor_snprintf(key, sizeof(key), "0%s", query);
   now = time(NULL);
   if (parsed->timestamp < now-REND_CACHE_MAX_AGE-REND_CACHE_MAX_SKEW) {
     log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_REND,

src/or/rendservice.c

@@ -937,7 +937,7 @@ find_intro_circuit(routerinfo_t *router, const char *pk_digest)
  * and upload it to all the dirservers.
  */
 static void
-upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service, int version)
+upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service)
 {
   char *desc;
   size_t desc_len;
@@ -946,7 +946,6 @@ upload_service_descriptor(rend_service_t *service, int version)
   /* Update the descriptor. */
   rend_service_update_descriptor(service);
   if (rend_encode_service_descriptor(service->desc,
-                                     version,
                                      service->private_key,
                                      &desc, &desc_len)<0) {
     log_warn(LD_BUG, "Internal error: couldn't encode service descriptor; "
@@ -1110,7 +1109,7 @@ rend_consider_services_upload(time_t now)
       /* if it's time, or if the directory servers have a wrong service
        * descriptor and ours has been stable for 30 seconds, upload a
        * new one of each format. */
-      upload_service_descriptor(service, 0);
+      upload_service_descriptor(service);
       service->next_upload_time = now + rendpostperiod;
     }
   }

src/or/test.c

@@ -2916,7 +2916,7 @@ test_rend_fns(void)
   pk1 = pk_generate(0);
   pk2 = pk_generate(1);
 
-  /* Test unversioned descriptor */
+  /* Test unversioned (v0) descriptor */
   d1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
   d1->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
   now = time(NULL);
@@ -2927,7 +2927,7 @@ test_rend_fns(void)
   d1->intro_points[0] = tor_strdup("tom");
   d1->intro_points[1] = tor_strdup("crow");
   d1->intro_points[2] = tor_strdup("joel");
-  test_assert(! rend_encode_service_descriptor(d1, 0, pk1, &encoded, &len));
+  test_assert(! rend_encode_service_descriptor(d1, pk1, &encoded, &len));
   d2 = rend_parse_service_descriptor(encoded, len);
   test_assert(d2);
 
@@ -2945,62 +2945,11 @@ test_rend_fns(void)
   rend_service_descriptor_free(d2);
   tor_free(encoded);
 
-  /* Test versioned descriptor. */
-  d1 = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(rend_service_descriptor_t));
-  d1->pk = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
-  now = time(NULL);
-  d1->timestamp = now;
-  d1->n_intro_points = 2;
-  d1->version = 1;
-  d1->protocols = 60;
-  d1->intro_points = tor_malloc(sizeof(char*)*2);
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info = tor_malloc(sizeof(extend_info_t*)*2);
-  d1->intro_points[0] = tor_strdup("tom");
-  d1->intro_points[1] = tor_strdup("crow");
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info[0] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
-  strlcpy(d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->nickname, "tom", 4);
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->addr = 1234;
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->port = 4567;
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk1);
-  memset(d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->identity_digest, 'a', DIGEST_LEN);
-
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info[1] = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
-  strlcpy(d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->nickname, "crow", 5);
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->addr = 6060842;
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->port = 8000;
-  d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(pk2);
-  memset(d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->identity_digest, 'b', DIGEST_LEN);
-
-  test_assert(! rend_encode_service_descriptor(d1, 1, pk1, &encoded, &len));
-  d2 = rend_parse_service_descriptor(encoded, len);
-  test_assert(d2);
-
-  test_assert(!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(d1->pk, d2->pk));
-  test_eq(d2->timestamp, now);
-  test_eq(d2->version, 1);
-  test_eq(d2->protocols, 60);
-  test_eq(d2->n_intro_points, 2);
-  test_streq(d2->intro_points[0], d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->nickname);
-  test_streq(d2->intro_points[1], d2->intro_point_extend_info[1]->nickname);
-  test_eq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->addr, 1234);
-  test_eq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->port, 4567);
-  test_assert(!crypto_pk_cmp_keys(pk1,
-                                  d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->onion_key));
-  test_memeq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[0]->identity_digest,
-             d1->intro_point_extend_info[0]->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
-  test_eq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[1]->addr, 6060842);
-  test_eq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[1]->port, 8000);
-
-  test_memeq(d2->intro_point_extend_info[1]->identity_digest,
-             d1->intro_point_extend_info[1]->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
-
   test_assert(BAD_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address1));
   test_assert(ONION_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address2));
   test_assert(EXIT_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address3));
   test_assert(NORMAL_HOSTNAME == parse_extended_hostname(address4));
 
-  rend_service_descriptor_free(d1);
-  rend_service_descriptor_free(d2);
   crypto_free_pk_env(pk1);
   crypto_free_pk_env(pk2);
 }