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@@ -238,29 +238,30 @@ R d Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as
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(This is very similar to proposal 118.)
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- Fix voting to handle bug 608 case when multiple servers get
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Named.
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- - Possibly: revise link protocol to allow big circuit IDs,
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+ d Possibly: revise link protocol to allow big circuit IDs,
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variable-length cells, proposal-110 stuff, and versioned CREATES?
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- - Eliminate use of v2 networkstatus documents in v3 authority
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+ o Eliminate use of v2 networkstatus documents in v3 authority
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decision-making.
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N . Draft proposal for GeoIP aggregation (see external constraints *)
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- - Separate Guard flags for "pick this as a new guard" and "keep this
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+ o Separate Guard flags for "pick this as a new guard" and "keep this
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as an existing guard". First investigate if we want this.
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- - Figure out how to make good use of the fallback consensus file. Right
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+ . Figure out how to make good use of the fallback consensus file. Right
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now many of the addresses in the fallback consensus will be stale,
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so it will take dozens of minutes to bootstrap from it. This is a
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bad first Tor experience. But if we check the fallback consensus
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file *after* we fail to connect to any authorities, then it may
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still be valuable as a blocking-resistance step.
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+ o Write the proposal.
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- Patch our tor.spec rpm package so it knows where to put the fallback
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consensus file.
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- - Something for bug 469, to limit connections per IP.
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- - Put bandwidth weights in the networkstatus? So clients get weight
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+ d Something for bug 469, to limit connections per IP.
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+ . Put bandwidth weights in the networkstatus? So clients get weight
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their choices even before they have the descriptors; and so
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authorities can put in more accurate numbers in the future.
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d Fetch an updated geoip file from the directory authorities.
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- Tiny designs to write:
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- - Better estimate of clock skew; has anonymity implications. Clients
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+ . Better estimate of clock skew; has anonymity implications. Clients
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should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers over last
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N seconds, but for servers this is not so easy, since a server does
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not choose who it connects to.
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