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@@ -247,6 +247,24 @@ Nice-to-have items for 0.2.0.x, time permitting:
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servers. but sometimes our entry node is the same for multiple
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test circuits. this defeats the point.
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+Planned for 0.2.1.x:
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+ - switch out privoxy in the bundles and replace it with polipo.
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+ - make the new tls handshake blocking-resistant.
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+ - figure out some way to collect feedback about what countries are using
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+ bridges, in a way that doesn't screw anonymity too much.
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+ - let tor dir mirrors proxy connections to the tor download site, so
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+ if you know a bridge you can fetch the tor software.
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+ - more strategies for distributing bridge addresses in a way that
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+ doesn't rely on knowing somebody who runs a bridge for you.
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+ - A way to adjust router status flags from the controller. (How do we
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+ prevent the authority from clobbering them soon afterward?)
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+ - Bridge authorities should do reachability testing but only on the
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+ purpose==bridge descriptors they have.
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+ - Clients should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers
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+ over last N seconds.
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+ - Investigate RAM use in Tor servers.
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+ - Start on the WSAENOBUFS solution.
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+
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Deferred from 0.2.0.x:
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- Proposals
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- 113: Simplifying directory authority administration
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@@ -268,8 +286,6 @@ Deferred from 0.2.0.x:
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client to use.
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- add an 'exit-address' line in the descriptor for servers that exit
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from something that isn't their published address.
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- - Clients should estimate their skew as median of skew from servers
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- over last N seconds.
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- More work on AvoidDiskWrites?
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- Features
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- Make a TCP DNSPort
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@@ -298,8 +314,6 @@ Deferred from 0.2.0.x:
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- Do we want to maintain our own set of entryguards that we use as
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next hop after the bridge? Open research question; let's say no
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for 0.2.0 unless we learn otherwise.
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- - Should do reachability testing but only on the purpose==bridge
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- descriptors we have.
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- Some mechanism for specifying that we want to stop using a cached
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bridge.
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- Build:
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@@ -331,7 +345,7 @@ Future versions:
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- Directory system
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- BEGIN_DIR items
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- - turn the received socks addr:port into a digest for setting .exit
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+ X turn the received socks addr:port into a digest for setting .exit
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- handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set.
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- Have a "Faster" status flag that means it. Fast2, Fast4, Fast8?
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- Add an option (related to AvoidDiskWrites) to disable directory
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@@ -364,7 +378,7 @@ Future versions:
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- Hidserv offerers shouldn't need to define a SocksPort
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- Server operation
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- - When we notice a 'Rejected: There is already a named server with
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+ X When we notice a 'Rejected: There is already a named server with
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this nickname' message... or maybe instead when we see in the
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networkstatuses that somebody else is Named with the name we
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want: warn the user, send a STATUS_SERVER message, and fall back
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@@ -377,8 +391,6 @@ Future versions:
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such errors recently, then don't warn about it.
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- Controller
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- - A way to adjust router flags from the controller. (How do we
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- prevent the authority from clobbering them soon afterward?)
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- Implement missing status events and accompanying getinfos
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- DIR_REACHABLE
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- BAD_DIR_RESPONSE (Unexpected directory response; maybe we're behind
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@@ -416,7 +428,6 @@ Future versions:
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(It's hard to support read > write, since we need better
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congestion control to avoid overfull buffers there. So,
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defer the whole thing.)
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- - Investigate RAM use in directory authorities.
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- Look into pulling serverdescs off buffers as they arrive.
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- Rate limit exit connections to a given destination -- this helps
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us play nice with websites when Tor users want to crawl them; it
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@@ -467,9 +478,6 @@ Future versions:
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connections, perhaps?
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- DoS protection: TLS puzzles, public key ops, bandwidth exhaustion.
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- - Bridges
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- - Tolerate clock skew on bridge relays.
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-
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- Needs thinking
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- Now that we're avoiding exits when picking non-exit positions,
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we need to consider how to pick nodes for internal circuits. If
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