tor-parallel-relay-conn/doc/spec/rend-spec.txt

$Id$

                    Tor Rendezvous Specification

0. Overview and preliminaries

   Read http://tor.eff.org/doc/design-paper/tor-design.html#sec:rendezvous
   before you read this specification. It will make more sense.

   Rendezvous points provide location-hidden services (server
   anonymity) for the onion routing network. With rendezvous points,
   Bob can offer a TCP service (say, a webserver) via the onion
   routing network, without revealing the IP of that service.

   Bob does this by anonymously advertising a public key for his
   service, along with a list of onion routers to act as "Introduction
   Points" for his service.  He creates forward circuits to those
   introduction points, and tells them about his public key.  To
   connect to Bob, Alice first builds a circuit to an OR to act as
   her "Rendezvous Point." She then connects to one of Bob's chosen
   introduction points, optionally provides authentication or
   authorization information, and asks it to tell him about her Rendezvous
   Point (RP).  If Bob chooses to answer, he builds a circuit to her
   RP, and tells it to connect him to Alice.  The RP joins their
   circuits together, and begins relaying cells.  Alice's 'BEGIN'
   cells are received directly by Bob's OP, which passes data to
   and from the local server implementing Bob's service.

   Below we describe a network-level specification of this service,
   along with interfaces to make this process transparent to Alice
   (so long as she is using an OP).

0.1. Notation, conventions and prerequisites

   In the specifications below, we use the same notation and terminology
   as in "tor-spec.txt".  The service specified here also requires the
   existence of an onion routing network as specified in that file.

        H(x) is a SHA1 digest of x.
        PKSign(SK,x) is a PKCS.1-padded RSA signature of x with SK.
        PKEncrypt(SK,x) is a PKCS.1-padded RSA encryption of x with SK.
        Public keys are all RSA, and encoded in ASN.1.
        All integers are stored in network (big-endian) order.
        All symmetric encryption uses AES in counter mode, except where
            otherwise noted.

   In all discussions, "Alice" will refer to a user connecting to a
   location-hidden service, and "Bob" will refer to a user running a
   location-hidden service.

   An OP is (as defined elsewhere) an "Onion Proxy" or Tor client.

   An OR is (as defined elsewhere) an "Onion Router" or Tor server.

   An "Introduction point" is a Tor server chosen to be Bob's medium-term
   'meeting place'.  A "Rendezvous point" is a Tor server chosen by Alice to
   be a short-term communication relay between her and Bob.  All Tor servers
   potentially act as introduction and rendezvous points.

0.2. Protocol outline

   1. Bob->Bob's OP: "Offer IP:Port as
      public-key-name:Port". [configuration]
      (We do not specify this step; it is left to the implementor of
      Bob's OP.)

   2. Bob's OP generates keypair and rendezvous service descriptor:
        "Meet public-key X at introduction point A, B, or C." (signed)

   3. Bob's OP->Introduction point via Tor: [introduction setup]
        "This pk is me."

   4. Bob's OP->directory service via Tor: publishes Bob's service
      descriptor [advertisement]

   5. Out of band, Alice receives a [x.y.]z.onion:port address.
      She opens a SOCKS connection to her OP, and requests
      x.y.z.onion:port.

   6. Alice's OP retrieves Bob's descriptor via Tor. [descriptor lookup.]

   7. Alice's OP chooses a rendezvous point, opens a circuit to that
      rendezvous point, and establishes a rendezvous circuit. [rendezvous
      setup.]

   8. Alice connects to the Introduction point via Tor, and tells it about
      her rendezvous point and optional authentication/authorization
      information.  (Encrypted to Bob.)  [Introduction 1]

   9. The Introduction point passes this on to Bob's OP via Tor, along the
      introduction circuit. [Introduction 2]

  10. Bob's OP decides whether to connect to Alice, and if so, creates a
      circuit to Alice's RP via Tor.  Establishes a shared circuit.
      [Rendezvous.]

  11. Alice's OP sends begin cells to Bob's OP.  [Connection]

0.3. Constants and new cell types

  Relay cell types
      32 -- RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO
      33 -- RELAY_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS
      34 -- RELAY_INTRODUCE1
      35 -- RELAY_INTRODUCE2
      36 -- RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1
      37 -- RELAY_RENDEZVOUS2
      38 -- RELAY_INTRO_ESTABLISHED
      39 -- RELAY_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED
      40 -- RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK

1. The Protocol

1.1. Bob configures his local OP.

   We do not specify a format for the OP configuration file.  However,
   OPs SHOULD allow Bob to provide more than one advertised service
   per OP, and MUST allow Bob to specify one or more virtual ports per
   service.  Bob provides a mapping from each of these virtual ports
   to a local IP:Port pair.

1.2. Bob's OP generates service descriptors.

   The first time the OP provides an advertised service, it generates
   a public/private keypair (stored locally).  Periodically, the OP
   generates and publishes a descriptor of type "V0".

   The "V0" descriptor contains:

         KL    Key length                            [2 octets]
         PK    Bob's public key                      [KL octets]
         TS    A timestamp                           [4 octets]
         NI    Number of introduction points         [2 octets]
         Ipt   A list of NUL-terminated ORs          [variable]
         SIG   Signature of above fields             [variable]

   KL is the length of PK, in octets.
   TS is the number of seconds elapsed since Jan 1, 1970.

   The members of Ipt may be either (a) nicknames, or (b) identity key
   digests, encoded in hex, and prefixed with a '$'.  Clients must
   accept both forms. Services must only generate the second form.
   Once 0.0.9.x is obsoleted, we can drop the first form.

   [It's ok for Bob to advertise 0 introduction points. He might want
    to do that if he previously advertised some introduction points,
    and now he doesn't have any. -RD]

1.2.1. Other descriptor formats we don't use.

   The V1 descriptor format was understood and accepted from
   0.1.1.5-alpha-cvs to 0.2.0.6-alpha-dev, but no Tors generated it and
   was removed:

         V     Format byte: set to 255               [1 octet]
         V     Version byte: set to 1                [1 octet]
         KL    Key length                            [2 octets]
         PK    Bob's public key                      [KL octets]
         TS    A timestamp                           [4 octets]
         PROTO Protocol versions: bitmask            [2 octets]
         NI    Number of introduction points         [2 octets]
         For each introduction point: (as in INTRODUCE2 cells)
             IP     Introduction point's address     [4 octets]
             PORT   Introduction point's OR port     [2 octets]
             ID     Introduction point identity ID   [20 octets]
             KLEN   Length of onion key              [2 octets]
             KEY    Introduction point onion key     [KLEN octets]
         SIG   Signature of above fields             [variable]

   A hypothetical "V1" descriptor, that has never been used but might
   be useful for historical reasons, contains:

         V     Format byte: set to 255               [1 octet]
         V     Version byte: set to 1                [1 octet]
         KL    Key length                            [2 octets]
         PK    Bob's public key                      [KL octets]
         TS    A timestamp                           [4 octets]
         PROTO Rendezvous protocol versions: bitmask [2 octets]
         NA    Number of auth mechanisms accepted    [1 octet]
         For each auth mechanism:
             AUTHT  The auth type that is supported  [2 octets]
             AUTHL  Length of auth data              [1 octet]
             AUTHD  Auth data                        [variable]
         NI    Number of introduction points         [2 octets]
         For each introduction point: (as in INTRODUCE2 cells)
             ATYPE  An address type (typically 4)    [1 octet]
             ADDR   Introduction point's IP address  [4 or 16 octets]
             PORT   Introduction point's OR port     [2 octets]
             AUTHT  The auth type that is supported  [2 octets]
             AUTHL  Length of auth data              [1 octet]
             AUTHD  Auth data                        [variable]
             ID     Introduction point identity ID   [20 octets]
             KLEN   Length of onion key              [2 octets]
             KEY    Introduction point onion key     [KLEN octets]
         SIG   Signature of above fields             [variable]

   AUTHT specifies which authentication/authorization mechanism is
   required by the hidden service or the introduction point. AUTHD
   is arbitrary data that can be associated with an auth approach.
   Currently only AUTHT of [00 00] is supported, with an AUTHL of 0.
   See section 2 of this document for details on auth mechanisms.

1.3. Bob's OP establishes his introduction points.

   The OP establishes a new introduction circuit to each introduction
   point.  These circuits MUST NOT be used for anything but rendezvous
   introduction.  To establish the introduction, Bob sends a
   RELAY_ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, containing:

        KL   Key length                             [2 octets]
        PK   Bob's public key                       [KL octets]
        HS   Hash of session info                   [20 octets]
        SIG  Signature of above information         [variable]

   [XXX011, need to add auth information here. -RD]

   To prevent replay attacks, the HS field contains a SHA-1 hash based on the
   shared secret KH between Bob's OP and the introduction point, as
   follows:
       HS = H(KH | "INTRODUCE")
   That is:
       HS = H(KH | [49 4E 54 52 4F 44 55 43 45])
   (KH, as specified in tor-spec.txt, is H(g^xy | [00]) .)

   Upon receiving such a cell, the OR first checks that the signature is
   correct with the included public key.  If so, it checks whether HS is
   correct given the shared state between Bob's OP and the OR.  If either
   check fails, the OP discards the cell; otherwise, it associates the
   circuit with Bob's public key, and dissociates any other circuits
   currently associated with PK.  On success, the OR sends Bob a
   RELAY_INTRO_ESTABLISHED cell with an empty payload.

1.4. Bob's OP advertises his service descriptor(s).

   Bob's OP opens a stream to each directory server's directory port via Tor.
   (He may re-use old circuits for this.)  Over this stream, Bob's OP makes
   an HTTP 'POST' request, to a URL "/tor/rendezvous/publish" relative to the
   directory server's root, containing as its body Bob's service descriptor.

   Bob should upload a service descriptor for each version format that
   is supported in the current Tor network.

   Upon receiving a descriptor, the directory server checks the signature,
   and discards the descriptor if the signature does not match the enclosed
   public key.  Next, the directory server checks the timestamp.  If the
   timestamp is more than 24 hours in the past or more than 1 hour in the
   future, or the directory server already has a newer descriptor with the
   same public key, the server discards the descriptor.  Otherwise, the
   server discards any older descriptors with the same public key and
   version format, and associates the new descriptor with the public key.
   The directory server remembers this descriptor for at least 24 hours
   after its timestamp.  At least every 18 hours, Bob's OP uploads a
   fresh descriptor.

1.5. Alice receives a x.y.z.onion address.

   When Alice receives a pointer to a location-hidden service, it is as a
   hostname of the form "z.onion" or "y.z.onion" or "x.y.z.onion", where
   z is a base-32 encoding of a 10-octet hash of Bob's service's public
   key, computed as follows:

         1. Let H = H(PK).
         2. Let H' = the first 80 bits of H, considering each octet from
            most significant bit to least significant bit.
         2. Generate a 16-character encoding of H', using base32 as defined
            in RFC 3548.

   (We only use 80 bits instead of the 160 bits from SHA1 because we
   don't need to worry about arbitrary collisions, and because it will
   make handling the url's more convenient.)

   The string "x", if present, is the base-32 encoding of the
   authentication/authorization required by the introduction point.
   The string "y", if present, is the base-32 encoding of the
   authentication/authorization required by the hidden service.
   Omitting a string is taken to mean auth type [00 00].
   See section 2 of this document for details on auth mechanisms.

   [Yes, numbers are allowed at the beginning.  See RFC 1123. -NM]

1.6. Alice's OP retrieves a service descriptor.

   Alice opens a stream to a directory server via Tor, and makes an HTTP GET
   request for the document '/tor/rendezvous/<z>', where '<z>' is replaced
   with the encoding of Bob's public key as described above. (She may re-use
   old circuits for this.) The directory replies with a 404 HTTP response if
   it does not recognize <z>, and otherwise returns Bob's most recently
   uploaded service descriptor.

   If Alice's OP receives a 404 response, it tries the other directory
   servers, and only fails the lookup if none recognize the public key hash.

   Upon receiving a service descriptor, Alice verifies with the same process
   as the directory server uses, described above in section 1.4.

   The directory server gives a 400 response if it cannot understand Alice's
   request.

   Alice should cache the descriptor locally, but should not use
   descriptors that are more than 24 hours older than their timestamp.
   [Caching may make her partitionable, but she fetched it anonymously,
    and we can't very well *not* cache it. -RD]

1.7. Alice's OP establishes a rendezvous point.

   When Alice requests a connection to a given location-hidden service,
   and Alice's OP does not have an established circuit to that service,
   the OP builds a rendezvous circuit.  It does this by establishing
   a circuit to a randomly chosen OR, and sending a
   RELAY_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell to that OR.  The body of that cell
   contains:

        RC   Rendezvous cookie    [20 octets]

   [XXX011 this looks like an auth mechanism. should we generalize here? -RD]

   The rendezvous cookie is an arbitrary 20-byte value, chosen randomly by
   Alice's OP.

   Upon receiving a RELAY_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell, the OR associates the
   RC with the circuit that sent it.  It replies to Alice with an empty
   RELAY_RENDEZVOUS_ESTABLISHED cell to indicate success.

   Alice's OP MUST NOT use the circuit which sent the cell for any purpose
   other than rendezvous with the given location-hidden service.

1.8. Introduction: from Alice's OP to Introduction Point

   Alice builds a separate circuit to one of Bob's chosen introduction
   points, and sends it a RELAY_INTRODUCE1 cell containing:

       Cleartext
          PK_ID  Identifier for Bob's PK      [20 octets]
       Encrypted to Bob's PK:
          RP     Rendezvous point's nickname  [20 octets]
          RC     Rendezvous cookie            [20 octets]
          g^x    Diffie-Hellman data, part 1 [128 octets]
        OR
          VER    Version byte: set to 1.        [1 octet]
          RP     Rendezvous point nick or ID  [42 octets]
          RC     Rendezvous cookie            [20 octets]
          g^x    Diffie-Hellman data, part 1 [128 octets]
        OR
          VER    Version byte: set to 2.        [1 octet]
          IP     Rendezvous point's address    [4 octets]
          PORT   Rendezvous point's OR port    [2 octets]
          ID     Rendezvous point identity ID [20 octets]
          KLEN   Length of onion key           [2 octets]
          KEY    Rendezvous point onion key [KLEN octets]
          RC     Rendezvous cookie            [20 octets]
          g^x    Diffie-Hellman data, part 1 [128 octets]

   PK_ID is the hash of Bob's public key.  RP is NUL-padded and
   terminated. In version 0, it must contain a nickname. In version 1,
   it must contain EITHER a nickname or an identity key digest that is
   encoded in hex and prefixed with a '$'.

   The hybrid encryption to Bob's PK works just like the hybrid
   encryption in CREATE cells (see tor-spec). Thus the payload of the
   version 0 RELAY_INTRODUCE1 cell on the wire will contain
   20+42+16+20+20+128=246 bytes, and the version 1 and version 2
   introduction formats have other sizes.

   Through Tor 0.2.0.6-alpha, clients only generated the v0 introduction
   format, whereas hidden services have understood and accepted v0,
   v1, and v2 since 0.1.1.x. As of Tor 0.2.0.7-alpha, clients switched
   to using the v2 intro format.

1.8.1. Other introduction formats we don't use.

    We briefly speculated about using the following format for the
    "encrypted to Bob's PK" part of the introduction, but no Tors have
    ever generated these.

          VER    Version byte: set to 3.           [1 octet]
          ATYPE  An address type (typically 4)     [1 octet]
          ADDR   Rendezvous point's IP address     [4 or 16 octets]
          PORT   Rendezvous point's OR port        [2 octets]
          AUTHT  The auth type that is supported   [2 octets]
          AUTHL  Length of auth data               [1 octet]
          AUTHD  Auth data                        [variable]
          ID     Rendezvous point identity ID    [20 octets]
          KLEN  Length of onion key               [2 octets]
          KEY    Rendezvous point onion key    [KLEN octets]
          RC     Rendezvous cookie               [20 octets]
          g^x    Diffie-Hellman data, part 1    [128 octets]

1.9. Introduction: From the Introduction Point to Bob's OP

   If the Introduction Point recognizes PK_ID as a public key which has
   established a circuit for introductions as in 1.3 above, it sends the body
   of the cell in a new RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell down the corresponding circuit.
   (If the PK_ID is unrecognized, the RELAY_INTRODUCE1 cell is discarded.)

   After sending the RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell, the OR replies to Alice with an
   empty RELAY_COMMAND_INTRODUCE_ACK cell.  If no RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell can
   be sent, the OR replies to Alice with a non-empty cell to indicate an
   error.  (The semantics of the cell body may be determined later; the
   current implementation sends a single '1' byte on failure.)

   When Bob's OP receives the RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell, it decrypts it with
   the private key for the corresponding hidden service, and extracts the
   rendezvous point's nickname, the rendezvous cookie, and the value of g^x
   chosen by Alice.

1.10. Rendezvous

   Bob's OP builds a new Tor circuit ending at Alice's chosen rendezvous
   point, and sends a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS1 cell along this circuit, containing:
       RC       Rendezvous cookie  [20 octets]
       g^y      Diffie-Hellman     [128 octets]
       KH       Handshake digest   [20 octets]

   (Bob's OP MUST NOT use this circuit for any other purpose.)

   If the RP recognizes RC, it relays the rest of the cell down the
   corresponding circuit in a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS2 cell, containing:

       g^y      Diffie-Hellman     [128 octets]
       KH       Handshake digest   [20 octets]

   (If the RP does not recognize the RC, it discards the cell and
   tears down the circuit.)

   When Alice's OP receives a RELAY_RENDEZVOUS2 cell on a circuit which
   has sent a RELAY_ESTABLISH_RENDEZVOUS cell but which has not yet received
   a reply, it uses g^y and H(g^xy) to complete the handshake as in the Tor
   circuit extend process: they establish a 60-octet string as
       K = SHA1(g^xy | [00]) | SHA1(g^xy | [01]) | SHA1(g^xy | [02])
   and generate
       KH = K[0..15]
       Kf = K[16..31]
       Kb = K[32..47]

   Subsequently, the rendezvous point passes relay cells, unchanged, from
   each of the two circuits to the other.  When Alice's OP sends
   RELAY cells along the circuit, it first encrypts them with the
   Kf, then with all of the keys for the ORs in Alice's side of the circuit;
   and when Alice's OP receives RELAY cells from the circuit, it decrypts
   them with the keys for the ORs in Alice's side of the circuit, then
   decrypts them with Kb.  Bob's OP does the same, with Kf and Kb
   interchanged.

1.11. Creating streams

   To open TCP connections to Bob's location-hidden service, Alice's OP sends
   a RELAY_BEGIN cell along the established circuit, using the special
   address "", and a chosen port.  Bob's OP chooses a destination IP and
   port, based on the configuration of the service connected to the circuit,
   and opens a TCP stream.  From then on, Bob's OP treats the stream as an
   ordinary exit connection.
   [ Except he doesn't include addr in the connected cell or the end
     cell. -RD]

   Alice MAY send multiple RELAY_BEGIN cells along the circuit, to open
   multiple streams to Bob.  Alice SHOULD NOT send RELAY_BEGIN cells for any
   other address along her circuit to Bob; if she does, Bob MUST reject them.

2. Authentication and authorization.

Foo.