111-local-traffic-priority.txt 7.5 KB

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  1. Filename: 111-local-traffic-priority.txt
  2. Title: Prioritizing local traffic over relayed traffic
  3. Author: Roger Dingledine
  4. Created: 14-Mar-2007
  5. Status: Closed
  6. Implemented-In: 0.2.0.x
  7. Overview:
  8. We describe some ways to let Tor users operate as a relay and enforce
  9. rate limiting for relayed traffic without impacting their locally
  10. initiated traffic.
  11. Motivation:
  12. Right now we encourage people who use Tor as a client to configure it
  13. as a relay too ("just click the button in Vidalia"). Most of these users
  14. are on asymmetric links, meaning they have a lot more download capacity
  15. than upload capacity. But if they enable rate limiting too, suddenly
  16. they're limited to the same download capacity as upload capacity. And
  17. they have to enable rate limiting, or their upstream pipe gets filled
  18. up, starts dropping packets, and now their net connection doesn't work
  19. even for non-Tor stuff. So they end up turning off the relaying part
  20. so they can use Tor (and other applications) again.
  21. So far this hasn't mattered that much: most of our fast relays are
  22. being operated only in relay mode, so the rate limiting makes sense
  23. for them. But if we want to be able to attract many more relays in
  24. the future, we need to let ordinary users act as relays too.
  25. Further, as we begin to deploy the blocking-resistance design and we
  26. rely on ordinary users to click the "Tor for Freedom" button, this
  27. limitation will become a serious stumbling block to getting volunteers
  28. to act as bridges.
  29. The problem:
  30. Tor implements its rate limiting on the 'read' side by only reading
  31. a certain number of bytes from the network in each second. If it has
  32. emptied its token bucket, it doesn't read any more from the network;
  33. eventually TCP notices and stalls until we resume reading. But if we
  34. want to have two classes of service, we can't know what class a given
  35. incoming cell will be until we look at it, at which point we've already
  36. read it.
  37. Some options:
  38. Option 1: read when our token bucket is full enough, and if it turns
  39. out that what we read was local traffic, then add the tokens back into
  40. the token bucket. This will work when local traffic load alternates
  41. with relayed traffic load; but it's a poor option in general, because
  42. when we're receiving both local and relayed traffic, there are plenty
  43. of cases where we'll end up with an empty token bucket, and then we're
  44. back where we were before.
  45. More generally, notice that our problem is easy when a given TCP
  46. connection either has entirely local circuits or entirely relayed
  47. circuits. In fact, even if they are both present, if one class is
  48. entirely idle (none of its circuits have sent or received in the past
  49. N seconds), we can ignore that class until it wakes up again. So it
  50. only gets complex when a single connection contains active circuits
  51. of both classes.
  52. Next, notice that local traffic uses only the entry guards, whereas
  53. relayed traffic likely doesn't. So if we're a bridge handling just
  54. a few users, the expected number of overlapping connections would be
  55. almost zero, and even if we're a full relay the number of overlapping
  56. connections will be quite small.
  57. Option 2: build separate TCP connections for local traffic and for
  58. relayed traffic. In practice this will actually only require a few
  59. extra TCP connections: we would only need redundant TCP connections
  60. to at most the number of entry guards in use.
  61. However, this approach has some drawbacks. First, if the remote side
  62. wants to extend a circuit to you, how does it know which TCP connection
  63. to send it on? We would need some extra scheme to label some connections
  64. "client-only" during construction. Perhaps we could do this by seeing
  65. whether any circuit was made via CREATE_FAST; but this still opens
  66. up a race condition where the other side sends a create request
  67. immediately. The only ways I can imagine to avoid the race entirely
  68. are to specify our preference in the VERSIONS cell, or to add some
  69. sort of "nope, not this connection, why don't you try another rather
  70. than failing" response to create cells, or to forbid create cells on
  71. connections that you didn't initiate and on which you haven't seen
  72. any circuit creation requests yet -- this last one would lead to a bit
  73. more connection bloat but doesn't seem so bad. And we already accept
  74. this race for the case where directory authorities establish new TCP
  75. connections periodically to check reachability, and then hope to hang
  76. up on them soon after. (In any case this issue is moot for bridges,
  77. since each destination will be one-way with respect to extend requests:
  78. either receiving extend requests from bridge users or sending extend
  79. requests to the Tor server, never both.)
  80. The second problem with option 2 is that using two TCP connections
  81. reveals that there are two classes of traffic (and probably quickly
  82. reveals which is which, based on throughput). Now, it's unclear whether
  83. this information is already available to the other relay -- he would
  84. easily be able to tell that some circuits are fast and some are rate
  85. limited, after all -- but it would be nice to not add even more ways to
  86. leak that information. Also, it's less clear that an external observer
  87. already has this information if the circuits are all bundled together,
  88. and for this case it's worth trying to protect it.
  89. Option 3: tell the other side about our rate limiting rules. When we
  90. establish the TCP connection, specify the different policy classes we
  91. have configured. Each time we extend a circuit, specify which policy
  92. class that circuit should be part of. Then hope the other side obeys
  93. our wishes. (If he doesn't, hang up on him.) Besides the design and
  94. coordination hassles involved in this approach, there's a big problem:
  95. our rate limiting classes apply to all our connections, not just
  96. pairwise connections. How does one server we're connected to know how
  97. much of our bucket has already been spent by another? I could imagine
  98. a complex and inefficient "ok, now you can send me those two more cells
  99. that you've got queued" protocol. I'm not sure how else we could do it.
  100. (Gosh. How could UDP designs possibly be compatible with rate limiting
  101. with multiple bucket sizes?)
  102. Option 4: put both classes of circuits over a single connection, and
  103. keep track of the last time we read or wrote a high-priority cell. If
  104. it's been less than N seconds, give the whole connection high priority,
  105. else give the whole connection low priority.
  106. Option 5: put both classes of circuits over a single connection, and
  107. play a complex juggling game by periodically telling the remote side
  108. what rate limits to set for that connection, so you end up giving
  109. priority to the right connections but still stick to roughly your
  110. intended bandwidthrate and relaybandwidthrate.
  111. Option 6: ?
  112. Prognosis:
  113. Nick really didn't like option 2 because of the partitioning questions.
  114. I've put option 4 into place as of Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha.
  115. In terms of implementation, it will be easy: just add a time_t to
  116. or_connection_t that specifies client_used (used by the initiator
  117. of the connection to rate limit it differently depending on how
  118. recently the time_t was reset). We currently update client_used
  119. in three places:
  120. - command_process_relay_cell() when we receive a relay cell for
  121. an origin circuit.
  122. - relay_send_command_from_edge() when we send a relay cell for
  123. an origin circuit.
  124. - circuit_deliver_create_cell() when send a create cell.
  125. We could probably remove the third case and it would still work,
  126. but hey.