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- /* Copyright (c) 2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
- /* See LICENSE for licensing information */
- /* Wrapper code for an ed25519 implementation. */
- #include "orconfig.h"
- #ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
- #include <sys/stat.h>
- #endif
- #include "crypto.h"
- #include "crypto_curve25519.h"
- #include "crypto_ed25519.h"
- #include "torlog.h"
- #include "util.h"
- #include "ed25519/ref10/ed25519_ref10.h"
- int
- ed25519_secret_key_generate(ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey_out,
- int extra_strong)
- {
- (void) extra_strong;
- if (ed25519_ref10_seckey(seckey_out->seckey) < 0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
- }
- int
- ed25519_public_key_generate(ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey_out,
- const ed25519_secret_key_t *seckey)
- {
- if (ed25519_ref10_pubkey(pubkey_out->pubkey, seckey->seckey) < 0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
- }
- /** Generate a new ed25519 keypair in <b>keypair_out</b>. If
- * <b>extra_strong</b> is set, try to mix some system entropy into the key
- * generation process. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
- int
- ed25519_keypair_generate(ed25519_keypair_t *keypair_out, int extra_strong)
- {
- (void) extra_strong;
- if (ed25519_ref10_keygen(keypair_out->pubkey.pubkey,
- keypair_out->seckey.seckey)<0)
- return -1;
- return 0;
- }
- /**
- * Set <b>signature_out</b> to a signature of the <b>len</b>-byte message
- * <b>msg</b>, using the secret and public key in <b>keypair</b>.
- */
- int
- ed25519_sign(ed25519_signature_t *signature_out,
- const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
- const ed25519_keypair_t *keypair)
- {
- uint8_t keys[64];
- uint8_t *tmp;
- uint64_t tmplen;
- /* XXXX Make crypto_sign in ref10 friendlier so we don't need this stupid
- * copying. */
- tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING - 64);
- tmplen = ((uint64_t)len) + 64;
- tmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
- memcpy(keys, keypair->seckey.seckey, 32);
- memcpy(keys+32, keypair->pubkey.pubkey, 32);
- if (ed25519_ref10_sign(tmp, &tmplen, msg, len, keys) < 0) {
- tor_free(tmp);
- return -1;
- }
- memcpy(signature_out->sig, tmp, 64);
- memwipe(keys, 0, sizeof(keys));
- tor_free(tmp);
- return 0;
- }
- /**
- * Check whether if <b>signature</b> is a valid signature for the
- * <b>len</b>-byte message in <b>msg</b> made with the key <b>pubkey</b>.
- *
- * Return 0 if the signature is valid; -1 if it isn't.
- */
- int
- ed25519_checksig(const ed25519_signature_t *signature,
- const uint8_t *msg, size_t len,
- const ed25519_public_key_t *pubkey)
- {
- uint8_t *smtmp;
- uint8_t *tmp;
- uint64_t tmplen;
- int r;
- tor_assert(len < SIZE_T_CEILING - 64);
- tmplen = len + 64;
- tmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
- smtmp = tor_malloc(tmplen);
- memcpy(smtmp, signature->sig, 64);
- memcpy(smtmp+64, msg, len);
- r = ed25519_ref10_open(tmp, &tmplen, smtmp, tmplen, pubkey->pubkey);
- tor_free(tmp);
- tor_free(smtmp);
- return r;
- }
- /** Validate every signature among those in <b>checkable</b>, which contains
- * exactly <b>n_checkable</b> elements. If <b>okay_out</b> is non-NULL, set
- * the i'th element of <b>okay_out</b> to 1 if the i'th element of
- * <b>checkable</b> is valid, and to 0 otherwise. Return 0 if every signature
- * was valid. Otherwise return -N, where N is the number of invalid
- * signatures.
- */
- int
- ed25519_checksig_batch(int *okay_out,
- const ed25519_checkable_t *checkable,
- int n_checkable)
- {
- int res, i;
- res = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
- const ed25519_checkable_t *ch = &checkable[i];
- int r = ed25519_checksig(&ch->signature, ch->msg, ch->len, ch->pubkey);
- if (r < 0)
- --res;
- if (okay_out)
- okay_out[i] = (r == 0);
- }
- #if 0
- const uint8_t **ms;
- size_t *lens;
- const uint8_t **pks;
- const uint8_t **sigs;
- int *oks;
- ms = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
- lens = tor_malloc(sizeof(size_t)*n_checkable);
- pks = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
- sigs = tor_malloc(sizeof(uint8_t*)*n_checkable);
- oks = okay_out ? okay_out : tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*n_checkable);
- for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
- ms[i] = checkable[i].msg;
- lens[i] = checkable[i].len;
- pks[i] = checkable[i].pubkey->pubkey;
- sigs[i] = checkable[i].signature.sig;
- oks[i] = 0;
- }
- ed25519_sign_open_batch_donna_fb(ms, lens, pks, sigs, n_checkable, oks);
- res = 0;
- for (i = 0; i < n_checkable; ++i) {
- if (!oks[i])
- --res;
- }
- tor_free(ms);
- tor_free(lens);
- tor_free(pks);
- if (! okay_out)
- tor_free(oks);
- #endif
- return res;
- }
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