tor-parallel-relay-conn/doc/spec/proposals/107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt

Filename: 107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt
Title: Uptime Sanity Checking
Version:
Last-Modified:
Author: Kevin Buaer and Damon McCoy
Created: 8-March-2007
Status: Open

Overview:

   This document describes how to cap the uptime that is used when computing
   which routers are maked as stable such that highly stable routers cannot
   be displaced by malicious routers that report extremely high uptime
   values.

   This is similar to how bandwidth is capped at 1.5MB/s.

Motivation:

   It has been pointed out that an attacker can displace all stable nodes and
   entry guard nodes by reporting high uptimes. This is an easy fix that will
   prevent highly stable nodes from being displaced.

Security implications:

   It should decrease the effectiveness of routing attacks that report high
   uptimes while not impacting the normal routing algorithms.

Specification:

   We propose that uptime be capped at two months.  Currently there are
   approximetly 50 nodes with this amount of uptime, and the average uptime
   is around 9 days. This cap would prevent these 50 nodes from being
   displaced by an attacker.

Compatibility:

   There should be no compatiblity issues due to uptime capping.

Implementation:

   #define MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME 60*24*60*60
  dirserv.c
  1448: *up = (uint32_t) real_uptime(ri, now);
        if(*up > MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME) {
          *up = MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME;
        }