tor-design.tex 102 KB

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  1. \documentclass[times,10pt,twocolumn]{article}
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  27. \begin{document}
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  34. \title{Tor: The Second-Generation Onion Router}
  35. % Putting the 'Private' back in 'Virtual Private Network'
  36. %\author{Roger Dingledine \\ The Free Haven Project \\ arma@freehaven.net \and
  37. %Nick Mathewson \\ The Free Haven Project \\ nickm@freehaven.net \and
  38. %Paul Syverson \\ Naval Research Lab \\ syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil}
  39. \maketitle
  40. \thispagestyle{empty}
  41. \begin{abstract}
  42. We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication
  43. system. This second-generation Onion Routing system addresses limitations
  44. in the original design. We add perfect forward secrecy, congestion
  45. control, directory servers, integrity checking, variable exit policies,
  46. and a practical design for rendezvous points. Tor works on the real-world
  47. Internet, requires no special privileges or kernel modifications, requires
  48. little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and provides a
  49. reasonable trade-off between anonymity, usability, and efficiency. We
  50. close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication systems.
  51. \end{abstract}
  52. %\begin{center}
  53. %\textbf{Keywords:} anonymity, peer-to-peer, remailer, nymserver, reply block
  54. %\end{center}
  55. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  56. \Section{Overview}
  57. \label{sec:intro}
  58. Onion Routing is a distributed overlay network designed to anonymize
  59. low-latency TCP-based applications such as web browsing, secure shell,
  60. and instant messaging. Clients choose a path through the network and
  61. build a \emph{virtual circuit}, in which each node (or ``onion router'')
  62. in the path knows its
  63. predecessor and successor, but no other nodes in the circuit.
  64. Traffic flowing down the circuit
  65. is sent in fixed-size \emph{cells}, which are unwrapped by a symmetric key
  66. at each node (like the layers of an onion) and relayed downstream. The
  67. original Onion Routing project published several design and analysis
  68. papers
  69. \cite{or-ih96,or-jsac98,or-discex00,or-pet00}. While
  70. a wide area Onion Routing network was deployed for some weeks,
  71. the only long-running and publicly accessible
  72. implementation of the original design was a fragile proof-of-concept
  73. that ran on a single machine. Even this simple deployment processed tens
  74. of thousands of connections daily from thousands of users worldwide. But
  75. many critical design and deployment issues were never resolved, and the
  76. design has not been updated in several years. Here we describe Tor, a
  77. protocol for asynchronous, loosely federated onion routers that provides
  78. the following improvements over the old Onion Routing design:
  79. \begin{tightlist}
  80. \item \textbf{Perfect forward secrecy:} The original Onion Routing
  81. design was vulnerable to a single hostile node recording traffic and later
  82. compromising successive nodes in the circuit and forcing them to
  83. decrypt it.
  84. Rather than using a single onion to lay each circuit,
  85. Tor now uses an incremental or \emph{telescoping}
  86. path-building design, where the initiator negotiates session keys with
  87. each successive hop in the circuit. Once these keys are deleted,
  88. subsequently compromised nodes cannot decrypt old traffic.
  89. As a side benefit, onion replay detection is no longer
  90. necessary, and the process of building circuits is more reliable, since
  91. the initiator knows when a hop fails and can then try extending to a new node.
  92. \item \textbf{Separation of protocol cleaning from anonymity:}
  93. The original Onion Routing design required a separate ``application
  94. proxy'' for each
  95. supported application protocol---most
  96. of which were never written, so many applications were never supported.
  97. Tor uses the standard and near-ubiquitous SOCKS
  98. \cite{socks4} proxy interface, allowing us to support most TCP-based
  99. programs without modification. This design change allows Tor to
  100. use the filtering features of privacy-enhancing
  101. application-level proxies such as Privoxy \cite{privoxy} without having to
  102. incorporate those features itself.
  103. \item \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} The original
  104. Onion Routing design built a separate circuit for each application-level
  105. request.
  106. This hurt performance by requiring multiple public key operations for
  107. every request, and also presented
  108. a threat to anonymity from building so many different circuits; see
  109. Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}.
  110. Tor multiplexes multiple TCP streams along each virtual
  111. circuit, to improve efficiency and anonymity.
  112. \item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band signalling
  113. within the circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway
  114. down the circuit. This novel approach allows both for long-range
  115. padding to frustrate traffic shape and volume attacks at the initiator
  116. \cite{defensive-dropping}, and, because circuits are used by more than one
  117. application, allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus
  118. frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the end
  119. of the circuit.
  120. \item \textbf{No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping:} The original
  121. Onion Routing design called for batching and reordering the cells arriving
  122. from each circuit. It also included padding between onion routers and,
  123. in a later design, between onion
  124. proxies (that is, users) and onion routers \cite{or-ih96,or-jsac98}.
  125. The trade-off between padding protection and cost was discussed, but no
  126. general padding scheme was suggested. In
  127. \cite{or-pet00} it was theorized \emph{traffic shaping} would generally
  128. be used, but details were not provided.
  129. Recent research \cite{econymics} and deployment
  130. experience \cite{freedom21-security} suggest that this level of resource
  131. use is not practical or economical; and even full link padding is still
  132. vulnerable \cite{defensive-dropping}. Thus, until we have a proven and
  133. convenient design for traffic shaping or low-latency mixing that
  134. will improve anonymity against a realistic adversary, we leave these
  135. strategies out.
  136. \item \textbf{Congestion control:} Earlier anonymity designs do not
  137. address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches to load
  138. balancing and flow control in overlay networks involve inter-node control
  139. communication and global views of traffic. Tor's decentralized congestion
  140. control uses end-to-end acks to maintain reasonable anonymity while
  141. allowing nodes
  142. at the edges of the network to detect congestion or flooding attacks
  143. and send less data until the congestion subsides.
  144. \item \textbf{Directory servers:} The original Onion Routing design
  145. planned to flood link-state information through the network---an
  146. approach that can be unreliable and
  147. open to partitioning attacks or outright deception. Tor takes a simplified
  148. view toward distributing link-state information. Certain more trusted
  149. onion routers also act as directory servers: they provide signed
  150. \emph{directories} that describe known routers and their availability.
  151. Users periodically download these directories via HTTP.
  152. \item \textbf{End-to-end integrity checking:} The original Onion Routing
  153. design did no integrity checking on data. Any onion router on the circuit
  154. could change the contents of data cells as they passed by---for example, to
  155. alter a
  156. connection request on the fly so it would connect to a different
  157. webserver, or to
  158. `tag' encrypted traffic and look for corresponding corrupted traffic
  159. at the network
  160. edges \cite{minion-design}. Tor hampers these attacks by checking data
  161. integrity before it leaves the network.
  162. \item \textbf{Improved robustness to failed nodes:} A failed node in
  163. the old design
  164. meant that circuit-building failed, but thanks to Tor's step-by-step
  165. circuit building, users can notice failed
  166. nodes while building circuits and route around them. Additionally,
  167. liveness information from directories allows users to avoid
  168. unreliable nodes in the first place.
  169. \item \textbf{Variable exit policies:} Tor provides a consistent
  170. mechanism for
  171. each node to specify and advertise a policy describing the hosts and
  172. ports to which it will connect. These exit policies
  173. are critical in a volunteer-based distributed infrastructure, because
  174. each operator is comfortable with allowing different types of traffic
  175. to exit the Tor network from his node.
  176. \item \textbf{Implementable in user-space:} Unlike other anonymity systems
  177. like Freedom \cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor only attempts to anonymize TCP
  178. streams. Thus it does not require patches to an operating system's network
  179. stack (or built-in support) to operate. Although this approach is less
  180. flexible, it has proven valuable to Tor's portability and deployability.
  181. \item \textbf{Rendezvous points and location-protected servers:}
  182. Tor provides an integrated mechanism for responder anonymity via
  183. location-protected servers. Previous Onion Routing designs included
  184. long-lived ``reply onions'' that could be used to build virtual circuits
  185. to a hidden server, but these reply onions did not provide forward
  186. security, and would become useless if any node in
  187. the path went down or rotated its keys.
  188. In Tor, clients negotiate {\it
  189. rendezvous points} to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no
  190. longer required.
  191. \end{tightlist}
  192. We have implemented most of the above features. Our source code is
  193. available under a free license, and we believe it to be
  194. unencumbered by patents. We have
  195. recently begun deploying a widespread alpha network to test
  196. the design in practice, to get more experience with usability and users,
  197. and to provide a research platform for experimenting with new ideas.
  198. We review previous work in Section~\ref{sec:related-work}, describe
  199. our goals and assumptions in Section~\ref{sec:assumptions},
  200. and then address the above list of improvements in
  201. Sections~\ref{sec:design}-\ref{sec:rendezvous}. We
  202. summarize in Section~\ref{sec:analysis}
  203. how our design stands up to known attacks, and conclude with a list of
  204. open problems in Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity} and future
  205. work for the Onion Routing project in Section~\ref{sec:conclusion}.
  206. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  207. \Section{Related work}
  208. \label{sec:related-work}
  209. Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's Mix-Net design
  210. \cite{chaum-mix}. Chaum
  211. proposed hiding the correspondence between sender and recipient by
  212. wrapping messages in layers of public key cryptography, and relaying them
  213. through a path composed of ``Mixes.'' These mixes in turn decrypt, delay,
  214. and re-order messages, before relaying them along the sender-selected
  215. path towards their destinations.
  216. Subsequent relay-based anonymity designs have diverged in two
  217. principal directions. Some have attempted to maximize anonymity at
  218. the cost of introducing comparatively large and variable latencies,
  219. including Babel \cite{babel}, Mixmaster \cite{mixmaster-spec}, and
  220. Mixminion \cite{minion-design}. Because of this
  221. decision, these \emph{high-latency} networks are well-suited for anonymous
  222. email, but introduce too much lag for interactive tasks such as web browsing,
  223. internet chat, or SSH connections.
  224. Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that
  225. attempt to anonymize interactive network traffic. These systems handle
  226. a variety of bidirectional protocols. They also provide more convenient
  227. mail delivery than the high-latency fire-and-forget anonymous email
  228. networks, because the remote mail server provides explicit delivery
  229. confirmation. But because these designs typically
  230. involve many packets that must be delivered quickly, it is
  231. difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the
  232. communication from correlating the timing and volume
  233. of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These
  234. protocols are also vulnerable against active attacks in which an
  235. adversary introduces timing patterns into traffic entering the network, and
  236. looks
  237. for correlated patterns among exiting traffic.
  238. Although some work has been done to frustrate
  239. these attacks,\footnote{
  240. The most common approach is to pad and limit communication to a constant
  241. rate, or to limit
  242. the variation in traffic shape. Doing so can have prohibitive bandwidth
  243. costs and/or performance limitations.
  244. } most designs protect primarily against traffic analysis rather than traffic
  245. confirmation \cite{or-jsac98}---that is, they assume that the attacker is
  246. attempting to learn who is talking to whom, not to confirm a prior suspicion
  247. about who is talking to whom.
  248. The simplest low-latency designs are single-hop proxies such as the
  249. Anonymizer \cite{anonymizer}, wherein a single trusted server strips the
  250. data's origin before relaying it. These designs are easy to
  251. analyze, but require end-users to trust the anonymizing proxy.
  252. Concentrating the traffic to a single point increases the anonymity set
  253. (the set of people a given user is hiding among), but it can make traffic
  254. analysis easier: an adversary need only eavesdrop on the proxy to observe
  255. the entire system.
  256. More complex are distributed-trust, circuit-based anonymizing systems.
  257. In these designs, a user establishes one or more medium-term bidirectional
  258. end-to-end circuits, and tunnels TCP streams in fixed-size cells.
  259. Establishing circuits is computationally expensive and typically
  260. requires public-key
  261. cryptography, whereas relaying cells is comparatively inexpensive and
  262. typically requires only symmetric encryption.
  263. Because a circuit crosses several servers, and each server only knows
  264. the adjacent servers in the circuit, no single server can link a
  265. user to her communication partners.
  266. The Java Anon Proxy (also known as JAP or Web MIXes) uses fixed shared
  267. routes known as \emph{cascades}. As with a single-hop proxy, this
  268. approach aggregates users into larger anonymity sets, but again an
  269. attacker only needs to observe both ends of the cascade to bridge all
  270. the system's traffic. The Java Anon Proxy's design provides
  271. protection by padding between end users and the head of the cascade
  272. \cite{web-mix}. However, it is not demonstrated whether the current
  273. implementation's padding policy improves anonymity.
  274. PipeNet \cite{back01, pipenet}, another low-latency design proposed at
  275. about the same time as the original Onion Routing design, provided
  276. stronger anonymity at the cost of allowing a single user to shut
  277. down the network simply by not sending. Low-latency anonymous
  278. communication has also been designed for other environments such as
  279. ISDN \cite{isdn-mixes}.
  280. In P2P designs like Tarzan \cite{tarzan:ccs02} and MorphMix
  281. \cite{morphmix:fc04}, all participants both generate traffic and relay
  282. traffic for others. These systems aim to prevent a peer
  283. or observer from knowing whether a given peer originated a request
  284. or just relayed it from another peer. While Tarzan and MorphMix use
  285. layered encryption as above, Crowds \cite{crowds-tissec} simply assumes
  286. an adversary who cannot observe the initiator: it uses no public-key
  287. encryption, so nodes on a circuit can read that circuit's traffic.
  288. Hordes \cite{hordes-jcs} is based on Crowds but also uses multicast
  289. responses to hide the initiator. Herbivore \cite{herbivore} and P5
  290. \cite{p5} go even further, requiring broadcast. They make anonymity
  291. and efficiency trade-offs to make broadcast more practical.
  292. These systems are designed primarily for communication between peers,
  293. although Herbivore users can make external connections by
  294. requesting a peer to serve as a proxy.
  295. Systems like Freedom and the original Onion Routing build the circuit
  296. all at once, using a layered ``onion'' of public-key encrypted messages,
  297. each layer of which provides a set of session keys and the address of the
  298. next server in the circuit. Tor as described herein, Tarzan, MorphMix,
  299. Cebolla \cite{cebolla}, and AnonNet \cite{anonnet} build the circuit
  300. in stages, extending it one hop at a time.
  301. Section~\ref{subsubsec:constructing-a-circuit} describes how this
  302. approach makes perfect forward secrecy feasible.
  303. Circuit-based anonymity designs must choose which protocol layer
  304. to anonymize. They may choose to intercept IP packets directly, and
  305. relay them whole (stripping the source address) along the circuit
  306. \cite{freedom2-arch,tarzan:ccs02}. Alternatively, like
  307. Tor, they may accept TCP streams and relay the data in those streams
  308. along the circuit, ignoring the breakdown of that data into TCP frames
  309. \cite{morphmix:fc04,anonnet}. Finally, they may accept application-level
  310. protocols (such as HTTP) and relay the application requests themselves
  311. along the circuit.
  312. Making this protocol-layer decision requires a compromise between flexibility
  313. and anonymity. For example, a system that understands HTTP can strip
  314. identifying information from those requests, can take advantage of caching
  315. to limit the number of requests that leave the network, and can batch
  316. or encode those requests in order to minimize the number of connections.
  317. On the other hand, an IP-level anonymizer can handle nearly any protocol,
  318. even ones unforeseen by their designers (though these systems require
  319. kernel-level modifications to some operating systems, and so are more
  320. complex and less portable). TCP-level anonymity networks like Tor present
  321. a middle approach: they are fairly application neutral (so long as the
  322. application supports, or can be tunneled across, TCP), but by treating
  323. application connections as data streams rather than raw TCP packets,
  324. they avoid the well-known inefficiencies of tunneling TCP over TCP
  325. \cite{tcp-over-tcp-is-bad}.
  326. Distributed-trust anonymizing systems need to prevent attackers from
  327. adding too many servers and thus compromising too many user paths.
  328. Tor relies on a small set of well-known directory servers, run by
  329. independent parties, to make decisions about which nodes can
  330. join. Tarzan and MorphMix allow unknown users to run servers, and use
  331. a limited resource (like IP addresses) to prevent an attacker from
  332. controlling too much of the network. Crowds suggests requiring
  333. written, notarized requests from potential crowd members.
  334. Anonymous communication is essential for censorship-resistant
  335. systems like Eternity \cite{eternity}, Free~Haven \cite{freehaven-berk},
  336. Publius \cite{publius}, and Tangler \cite{tangler}. Tor's rendezvous
  337. points enable connections between mutually anonymous entities; they
  338. are a building block for location-hidden servers, which are needed by
  339. Eternity and Free~Haven.
  340. % didn't include rewebbers. No clear place to put them, so I'll leave
  341. % them out for now. -RD
  342. \Section{Design goals and assumptions}
  343. \label{sec:assumptions}
  344. \SubSection{Goals}
  345. Like other low-latency anonymity designs, Tor seeks to frustrate
  346. attackers from linking communication partners, or from linking
  347. multiple communications to or from a single user. Within this
  348. main goal, however, several design considerations have directed
  349. Tor's evolution.
  350. \textbf{Deployability:} The design must be one that can be implemented,
  351. deployed, and used in the real world. This requirement precludes designs
  352. that are expensive to run (for example, by requiring more bandwidth
  353. than volunteers are willing to provide); designs that place a heavy
  354. liability burden on operators (for example, by allowing attackers to
  355. implicate onion routers in illegal activities); and designs that are
  356. difficult or expensive to implement (for example, by requiring kernel
  357. patches, or separate proxies for every protocol). This requirement also
  358. precludes systems in which non-anonymous parties (such as websites)
  359. must run our software. (We do not meet this goal for the current
  360. rendezvous design,
  361. however; see Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous}.)
  362. \textbf{Usability:} A hard-to-use system has fewer users---and because
  363. anonymity systems hide users among users, a system with fewer users
  364. provides less anonymity. Usability is thus not only a convenience for Tor:
  365. it is a security requirement \cite{econymics,back01}. Tor should
  366. therefore not
  367. require modifying applications; should not introduce prohibitive delays;
  368. and should require the user to make as few configuration decisions
  369. as possible.
  370. \textbf{Flexibility:} The protocol must be flexible and well-specified,
  371. so that it can serve as a test-bed for future research in low-latency
  372. anonymity systems. Many of the open problems in low-latency anonymity
  373. networks, such as generating dummy traffic or preventing Sybil attacks
  374. \cite{sybil}, may be solvable independently from the issues solved by
  375. Tor. Hopefully future systems will not need to reinvent Tor's design.
  376. (But note that while a flexible design benefits researchers,
  377. there is a danger that differing choices of extensions will make users
  378. distinguishable. Experiments should be run on a separate network.)
  379. \textbf{Simple design:} The protocol's design and security
  380. parameters must be well-understood. Additional features impose implementation
  381. and complexity costs; adding unproven techniques to the design threatens
  382. deployability, readability, and ease of security analysis. Tor aims to
  383. deploy a simple and stable system that integrates the best well-understood
  384. approaches to protecting anonymity.
  385. \SubSection{Non-goals}
  386. \label{subsec:non-goals}
  387. In favoring simple, deployable designs, we have explicitly deferred
  388. several possible goals, either because they are solved elsewhere, or because
  389. their solution is an open research problem.
  390. \textbf{Not Peer-to-peer:} Tarzan and MorphMix aim to scale to completely
  391. decentralized peer-to-peer environments with thousands of short-lived
  392. servers, many of which may be controlled by an adversary. This approach
  393. is appealing, but still has many open problems
  394. \cite{tarzan:ccs02,morphmix:fc04}.
  395. \textbf{Not secure against end-to-end attacks:} Tor does not claim
  396. to provide a definitive solution to end-to-end timing or intersection
  397. attacks. Some approaches, such as running an onion router, may help;
  398. see Section~\ref{sec:analysis} for more discussion.
  399. \textbf{No protocol normalization:} Tor does not provide \emph{protocol
  400. normalization} like Privoxy or the Anonymizer. For complex and variable
  401. protocols such as HTTP, Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such
  402. as Privoxy to hide differences between clients, and expunge protocol
  403. features that leak identity. Similarly, Tor does not currently integrate
  404. tunneling for non-stream-based protocols like UDP; this too must be
  405. provided by an external service.
  406. % Actually, tunneling udp over tcp is probably horrible for some apps.
  407. % Should this get its own non-goal bulletpoint? The motivation for
  408. % non-goal-ness would be burden on clients / portability. -RD
  409. % No, leave it as is. -RD
  410. \textbf{Not steganographic:} Tor does not try to conceal which users are
  411. sending or receiving communications; it only tries to conceal with whom
  412. they communicate.
  413. \SubSection{Threat Model}
  414. \label{subsec:threat-model}
  415. A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when
  416. analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical
  417. low-latency systems, Tor does not protect against such a strong
  418. adversary. Instead, we assume an adversary who can observe some fraction
  419. of network traffic; who can generate, modify, delete, or delay traffic
  420. on the network; who can operate onion routers of its own; and who can
  421. compromise some fraction of the onion routers on the network.
  422. In low-latency anonymity systems that use layered encryption, the
  423. adversary's typical goal is to observe both the initiator and the
  424. receiver. Passive attackers can confirm a suspicion that Alice is
  425. talking to Bob if the timing and volume patterns of the traffic on the
  426. connection are distinct enough; active attackers can induce timing
  427. signatures on the traffic to \emph{force} distinct patterns. Tor provides
  428. some defenses against these \emph{traffic confirmation} attacks, for
  429. example by encouraging users to run their own onion routers, but it does
  430. not provide complete protection. Rather, we aim to prevent \emph{traffic
  431. analysis} attacks, where the adversary uses traffic patterns to learn
  432. which points in the network he should attack.
  433. Our adversary might try to link an initiator Alice with any of her
  434. communication partners, or he might try to build a profile of Alice's
  435. behavior. He might mount passive attacks by observing the edges of the
  436. network and correlating traffic entering and leaving the network---either
  437. by relationships in packet timing; relationships in the volume
  438. of data sent; or relationships in any externally visible user-selected
  439. options. The adversary can also mount active attacks by compromising
  440. routers or keys; by replaying traffic; by selectively denying service
  441. to trustworthy routers to encourage users to send their traffic through
  442. compromised routers, or denying service to users to see if the traffic
  443. elsewhere in the
  444. network stops; or by introducing patterns into traffic that can later be
  445. detected. The adversary might attack the directory servers to give users
  446. differing views of network state. Additionally, he can try to decrease
  447. the network's reliability by attacking nodes or by performing antisocial
  448. activities from reliable servers and trying to get them taken down;
  449. making the network unreliable flushes users to other less anonymous
  450. systems, where they may be easier to attack.
  451. We consider each of these attacks in more detail below, and summarize
  452. in Section~\ref{sec:attacks} how well the Tor design defends against
  453. each of them.
  454. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  455. \Section{The Tor Design}
  456. \label{sec:design}
  457. The Tor network is an overlay network; each node is called an onion router
  458. (OR). Onion routers run as normal user-level processes without needing
  459. any special
  460. privileges. Currently, each OR maintains a long-term TLS \cite{TLS}
  461. connection to every other
  462. OR. (We examine some ways to relax this clique-topology assumption in
  463. Section~\ref{subsec:restricted-routes}.) A subset of the ORs also act as
  464. directory servers, tracking which routers are in the network;
  465. see Section~\ref{subsec:dirservers} for directory server details.
  466. Each user
  467. runs local software called an onion proxy (OP) to fetch directories,
  468. establish paths (called \emph{virtual circuits}) across the network,
  469. and handle connections from user applications. These onion proxies accept
  470. TCP streams and multiplex them across the virtual circuit. The onion
  471. router on the other side
  472. % I don't mean other side, I mean wherever it is on the circuit. But
  473. % don't want to introduce complexity this early? Hm. -RD
  474. of the circuit connects to the destinations of
  475. the TCP streams and relays data.
  476. Each onion router uses three public keys: a long-term identity key, a
  477. short-term onion key, and a short-term link key. The identity
  478. (signing) key is used to sign TLS certificates, to sign its router
  479. descriptor (a summary of its keys, address, bandwidth, exit policy,
  480. etc), and to sign directories if it is a directory server. Changing
  481. the identity key of a router is considered equivalent to creating a
  482. new router. The onion (decryption) key is used for decrypting requests
  483. from users to set up a circuit and negotiate ephemeral keys. Finally,
  484. link keys are used by the TLS protocol when communicating between
  485. onion routers. Both short-term keys are rotated periodically and
  486. independantly, to limit the impact of compromised keys.
  487. Section~\ref{subsec:cells} discusses the structure of the fixed-size
  488. \emph{cells} that are the unit of communication in Tor. We describe
  489. in Section~\ref{subsec:circuits} how virtual circuits are
  490. built, extended, truncated, and destroyed. Section~\ref{subsec:tcp}
  491. describes how TCP streams are routed through the network, and finally
  492. Section~\ref{subsec:congestion} talks about congestion control and
  493. fairness issues.
  494. \SubSection{Cells}
  495. \label{subsec:cells}
  496. ORs communicate with one another, and with users' OPs, via TLS
  497. connections with ephemeral keys. This prevents an attacker from
  498. impersonating an OR, conceals the contents of the connection with
  499. perfect forward secrecy, and prevents an attacker from modifying data
  500. on the wire.
  501. Traffic passes along these connections in fixed-size cells. Each cell
  502. is 256 bytes (but see Section~\ref{sec:conclusion} for a discussion of
  503. allowing large cells and small cells on the same network), and
  504. consists of a header and a payload. The header includes a circuit
  505. identifier (circID) that specifies which circuit the cell refers to
  506. (many circuits are be multiplexed over the single TLS connection), and
  507. a command to describe what to do with the cell's payload. (Circuit
  508. identifiers are connection-specific; a single circuit has a different
  509. circID on each connection it uses.)
  510. % XXX Say that each OR can have many circuits with same circID, so
  511. % XXX long as they're on different connections, and that ORs know
  512. % XXX which circIDs/connection pairs are linked by a circuit.
  513. Based on their command, cells are either \emph{control} cells, which are
  514. always interpreted by the node that receives them, or \emph{relay} cells,
  515. which carry end-to-end stream data. The controls cells commands are:
  516. \emph{padding} (currently used for keepalive, but also usable for link
  517. padding); \emph{create} or \emph{created} (used to set up a new circuit);
  518. and \emph{destroy} (to tear down a circuit).
  519. Relay cells have an additional header (the relay header) after the
  520. cell header, containing the stream identifier (many streams can
  521. be multiplexed over a circuit); an end-to-end checksum for integrity
  522. checking; the length of the relay payload; and a relay command.
  523. % XXX Mention _here_ that relay headers are {en|de}crypted as they
  524. % XXX progress along the circuit.
  525. The
  526. relay commands are: \emph{relay
  527. data} (for data flowing down the stream), \emph{relay begin} (to open a
  528. stream), \emph{relay end} (to close a stream cleanly), \emph{relay
  529. teardown} (to close a broken stream), \emph{relay connected}
  530. (to notify the OP that a relay begin has succeeded), \emph{relay
  531. extend} and \emph{relay extended} (to extend the circuit by a hop,
  532. and to acknowledge), \emph{relay truncate} and \emph{relay truncated}
  533. (to tear down only part of the circuit, and to acknowledge), \emph{relay
  534. sendme} (used for congestion control), and \emph{relay drop} (used to
  535. implement long-range dummies).
  536. We describe each of these cell types and commands in more detail below.
  537. \SubSection{Circuits and streams}
  538. \label{subsec:circuits}
  539. % I think when we say ``the user,'' maybe we should say ``the user's OP.''
  540. The original Onion Routing design built one circuit for each
  541. TCP stream. Because building a circuit can take several tenths of a
  542. second (due to public-key cryptography delays and network latency),
  543. this design imposed high costs on applications like web browsing that
  544. open many TCP streams.
  545. In Tor, each circuit can be shared by many TCP streams. To avoid
  546. delays, users construct circuits preemptively. To limit linkability
  547. among their streams, users' OPs build a new circuit
  548. periodically if the previous one has been used,
  549. and expire old used circuits that no longer have any open streams.
  550. OPs consider making a new circuit once a minute: thus
  551. even heavy users spend a negligible amount of time and CPU in
  552. building circuits, but only a limited number of requests can be linked
  553. to each other through a given exit node. Also, because circuits are built
  554. in the background, OPs can recover from failed circuit creation
  555. without delaying streams and thereby harming user experience.
  556. \subsubsection{Constructing a circuit}
  557. \label{subsubsec:constructing-a-circuit}
  558. %XXXX Discuss what happens with circIDs here.
  559. Users construct a circuit incrementally, negotiating a symmetric key with
  560. each OR on the circuit, one hop at a time. To begin creating a new
  561. circuit, the user
  562. (call her Alice) sends a \emph{create} cell to the first node in her
  563. chosen path. This cell's payload contains the first half of the
  564. Diffie-Hellman handshake ($g^x$), encrypted to the onion key of the OR (call
  565. him Bob). Bob responds with a \emph{created} cell containing the second
  566. half of the DH handshake, along with a hash of the negotiated key
  567. $K=g^{xy}$.
  568. Once the circuit has been established, Alice and Bob can send one
  569. another relay cells encrypted with the negotiated
  570. key.\footnote{Actually, the negotiated key is used to derive two
  571. symmetric keys: one for each direction.} More detail is given in
  572. the next section.
  573. To extend the circuit further, Alice sends a \emph{relay extend} cell
  574. to Bob, specifying the address of the next OR (call her Carol), and
  575. an encrypted $g^{x_2}$ for her. Bob copies the half-handshake into a
  576. \emph{create} cell, and passes it to Carol to extend the circuit.
  577. When Carol responds with a \emph{created} cell, Bob wraps the payload
  578. into a \emph{relay extended} cell and passes it back to Alice. Now
  579. the circuit is extended to Carol, and Alice and Carol share a common key
  580. $K_2 = g^{x_2 y_2}$.
  581. In order to extend the circuit to a third node or beyond, Alice
  582. proceeds as above, always telling the last node in the circuit to
  583. extend one hop further.
  584. % XXX Briefly mention path selection.
  585. This circuit-level handshake protocol achieves unilateral entity
  586. authentication (Alice knows she's handshaking with Bob/Carol, but
  587. Bob/Carol doesn't care who is opening the circuit---Alice has no key
  588. and is trying to remain anonymous) and unilateral key authentication
  589. (Alice and Bob/Carol agree on a key, and Alice knows Bob/Carol is the
  590. only other person who should know it). It also achieves forward
  591. secrecy and key freshness. Formally, the protocol is as follows
  592. (Where $E_{PK_{Bob}}(\cdot)$ is encryption with Bob's public key,
  593. $H$ is a secure hash function, and $|$ is concatenation.)
  594. \begin{equation}
  595. \begin{aligned}
  596. \mathrm{Alice} \rightarrow \mathrm{Bob}&: E_{PK_{Bob}}(g^x) \\
  597. \mathrm{Bob} \rightarrow \mathrm{Alice}&: g^y, H(K | \mathrm{``handshake"}) \\
  598. \end{aligned}
  599. \end{equation}
  600. In the second step, Bob proves that it was he who who received $g^x$,
  601. and who came up with $y$. We use PK encryption in the first step
  602. (rather than, say, using the first two steps of STS, which has a
  603. signature in the second step) because a single cell is too small to
  604. hold both a public key and a signature. Preliminary analysis with the
  605. NRL protocol analyzer \cite{meadows96} shows the above protocol to be
  606. secure (including providing PFS) under the traditional Dolev-Yao
  607. model.
  608. \subsubsection{Relay cells}
  609. Once Alice has established the circuit (so she shares keys with each
  610. OR on the circuit), she can send relay cells.
  611. % XXX Describe _here_ what happens with relay cells that are not
  612. % XXX targeted at a given node; how they're decrypted; how they're
  613. % XXX encrypted. The easiest expository order should probably be: What ORs
  614. % XXX Do With Unrecognized Streams; What Alice Does To Build Relay
  615. % XXX Cells; What ORs Do With Streams They Recognize.
  616. Recall that every relay header has a stream ID in the relay header
  617. that indicates to
  618. which stream the cell belongs.
  619. This stream ID allows a relay cell to be addressed to any of the ORs
  620. on the circuit. To
  621. construct a relay cell addressed to a given OR, Alice iteratively
  622. encrypts the cell payload (that is, the relay header and payload)
  623. with the symmetric key of each hop up to that OR. Then, at each hop
  624. down the circuit, the OR decrypts the cell payload and checks whether
  625. it recognizes the stream ID. A stream ID is recognized either if it
  626. is an already open stream at that OR, or if it is equal to zero. The
  627. zero stream ID is treated specially, and is used for control messages,
  628. e.g. starting a new stream. If the stream ID is unrecognized, the OR
  629. passes the relay cell downstream. This \emph{leaky pipe} circuit topology
  630. allows Alice's streams to exit at different ORs on a single circuit.
  631. Alice may choose different exit points because of their exit policies,
  632. or to keep the ORs from knowing that two streams
  633. originate at the same person.
  634. To tear down a whole circuit, Alice sends a \emph{destroy} control
  635. cell. Each OR
  636. in the circuit receives the \emph{destroy} cell, closes all open streams on
  637. that circuit, and passes a new \emph{destroy} cell forward. But since circuits
  638. can be built incrementally, they can also be torn down incrementally:
  639. Alice can instead send a relay truncate cell to a node along the circuit. That
  640. node will send a \emph{destroy} cell forward, and reply with an acknowledgment
  641. (a \emph{relay truncated} cell). Alice might truncate her circuit so
  642. she can extend it
  643. to different nodes without signaling to the first few nodes (or somebody
  644. observing them) that she is changing her circuit. That is, nodes in the
  645. middle of a truncated are not even aware when the circuit is
  646. truncated, because they see only the encrypted relay cells.
  647. Similarly, if a node on the circuit goes down,
  648. the adjacent node can send a \emph{relay truncated} cell back to
  649. Alice. Thus the
  650. ``break a node and see which circuits go down'' attack is weakened.
  651. \SubSection{Opening and closing streams}
  652. \label{subsec:tcp}
  653. When Alice's application wants to open a TCP connection to a given
  654. address and port, it asks the OP (via SOCKS) to make the connection. The
  655. OP chooses the newest open circuit (or creates one if none is available),
  656. chooses a suitable OR on that circuit to be the exit node (usually the
  657. last node, but maybe others due to exit policy conflicts; see
  658. Section~\ref{sec:exit-policies}), chooses a new random stream ID for
  659. this stream,
  660. and delivers a relay begin cell to that exit node. It uses a stream ID
  661. of zero for the begin cell (so the OR will recognize it), and the relay
  662. payload lists the new stream ID and the destination address and port.
  663. Once the exit node completes the connection to the remote host, it
  664. responds with a relay connected cell through the circuit. Upon receipt,
  665. the OP notifies the application that it can begin talking.
  666. There's a catch to using SOCKS, though -- some applications hand the
  667. alphanumeric address to the proxy, while others resolve it into an IP
  668. address first and then hand the IP to the proxy. When the application
  669. does the DNS resolution first, Alice broadcasts her destination. Common
  670. applications like Mozilla and ssh have this flaw.
  671. In the case of Mozilla, we're fine: the filtering web proxy called Privoxy
  672. does the SOCKS call safely, and Mozilla talks to Privoxy safely. But a
  673. portable general solution, such as for ssh, is an open problem. We can
  674. modify the local nameserver, but this approach is invasive, brittle, and
  675. not portable. We can encourage the resolver library to do resolution
  676. via TCP rather than UDP, but this approach is hard to do right, and also
  677. has portability problems. We can provide a tool similar to \emph{dig} that
  678. can do a private lookup through the Tor network. Our current answer is to
  679. encourage the use of privacy-aware proxies like Privoxy wherever possible,
  680. Ending a Tor stream is analogous to ending a TCP stream: it uses a
  681. two-step handshake for normal operation, or a one-step handshake for
  682. errors. If one side of the stream closes abnormally, that node simply
  683. sends a relay teardown cell, and tears down the stream. If one side
  684. of the stream closes the connection normally, that node sends a relay
  685. end cell down the circuit. When the other side has sent back its own
  686. relay end, the stream can be torn down. This two-step handshake allows
  687. for TCP-based applications that, for example, close a socket for writing
  688. but are still willing to read. Remember that all relay cells use layered
  689. encryption, so only the destination OR knows what type of relay cell
  690. it is.
  691. \SubSection{Integrity checking on streams}
  692. Because the old Onion Routing design used a stream cipher, traffic was
  693. vulnerable to a malleability attack: even though the attacker could not
  694. decrypt cells, he could make changes to an encrypted
  695. cell to create corresponding changes to the data leaving the network.
  696. (Even an external adversary could do this, despite link encryption!)
  697. This weakness allowed an adversary to change a padding cell to a destroy
  698. cell; change the destination address in a relay begin cell to the
  699. adversary's webserver; or change a user on an ftp connection from
  700. typing ``dir'' to typing ``delete~*''. Any node or external adversary
  701. along the circuit could introduce such corruption in a stream.
  702. Tor prevents external adversaries from mounting this attack simply by
  703. using TLS. Addressing the insider malleability attack, however, is
  704. more complex.
  705. We could do integrity checking of the relay cells at each hop, either
  706. by including hashes or by using a cipher mode like EAX \cite{eax},
  707. but we don't want the added message-expansion overhead at each hop, and
  708. we don't want to leak the path length or pad to some max path length.
  709. Because we've already accepted that our design is vulnerable to end-to-end
  710. timing attacks, we can perform integrity checking only at the edges of
  711. the circuit without introducing any new anonymity attacks. When Alice
  712. negotiates a key
  713. with each hop, they both start a SHA-1 with some derivative of that key,
  714. % Not just the exit hop, but each hop: any hop can be an exit node. -RD
  715. thus starting out with randomness that only the two of them know. From
  716. then on they each incrementally add to the SHA-1 all the data bytes
  717. entering or exiting from the circuit, and each such relay cell includes
  718. the first 4 bytes of the current value of the hash.
  719. The attacker must be able to guess all previous bytes between Alice
  720. and Bob on that circuit (including the pseudorandomness from the key
  721. negotiation), plus the bytes in the current cell, to remove or modify the
  722. cell. Attacks on SHA-1 where the adversary can incrementally add to a
  723. hash to produce a new valid hash don't work,
  724. because all hashes are end-to-end encrypted across the circuit.
  725. The computational overhead isn't so bad, compared to doing an AES
  726. crypt at each hop in the circuit. We use only four bytes per cell to
  727. minimize overhead; the chance that an adversary will correctly guess a
  728. valid hash, plus the payload the current cell, is acceptly low, given
  729. that Alice or Bob tear down the circuit if they receive a bad hash.
  730. \SubSection{Rate limiting and fairness}
  731. Volunteers are generally more willing to run services that can limit
  732. their bandwidth usage. To accomodate them, Tor servers use a token
  733. bucket approach to limit the number of bytes they
  734. % XXX cite token bucket?
  735. receive. Tokens are added to the bucket each second (when the bucket is
  736. full, new tokens are discarded.) Each token represents permission to
  737. receive one byte from the network---to receive a byte, the connection
  738. must remove a token from the bucket. Thus if the bucket is empty, that
  739. connection must wait until more tokens arrive. The number of tokens we
  740. add enforces a long-term average rate of incoming bytes, while still
  741. permitting short-term bursts above the allowed bandwidth. Current bucket
  742. sizes are set to ten seconds worth of traffic.
  743. Further, we want to avoid starving any Tor streams. Entire circuits
  744. could starve if we read greedily from connections and one connection
  745. uses all the remaining bandwidth. We solve this by dividing the number
  746. of tokens in the bucket by the number of connections that want to read,
  747. and reading at most that number of bytes from each connection. We iterate
  748. this procedure until the number of tokens in the bucket is under some
  749. threshold (eg 10KB), at which point we greedily read from connections.
  750. Because the Tor protocol generates roughly the same number of outgoing
  751. bytes as incoming bytes, it is sufficient in practice to rate-limit
  752. incoming bytes.
  753. % Is it? Fun attack: I send you lots of 1-byte-at-a-time TCP frames.
  754. % In response, you send lots of 256 byte cells. Can I use this to
  755. % make you exceed your outgoing bandwidth limit by a factor of 256? -NM
  756. % Can we resolve this by, when reading from edge connections, rounding up
  757. % the bytes read (wrt buckets) to the nearest multiple of 256? -RD
  758. Further, inspired by Rennhard et al's design in \cite{anonnet}, a
  759. circuit's edges heuristically distinguish interactive streams from bulk
  760. streams by comparing the frequency with which they supply cells. We can
  761. provide good latency for interactive streams by giving them preferential
  762. service, while still getting good overall throughput to the bulk
  763. streams. Such preferential treatment presents a possible end-to-end
  764. attack, but an adversary who can observe both
  765. ends of the stream can already learn this information through timing
  766. attacks.
  767. \SubSection{Congestion control}
  768. \label{subsec:congestion}
  769. Even with bandwidth rate limiting, we still need to worry about
  770. congestion, either accidental or intentional. If enough users choose the
  771. same OR-to-OR connection for their circuits, that connection can become
  772. saturated. For example, an adversary could make a large HTTP PUT request
  773. through the onion routing network to a webserver he runs, and then
  774. refuse to read any of the bytes at the webserver end of the
  775. circuit. Without some congestion control mechanism, these bottlenecks
  776. can propagate back through the entire network. We describe our
  777. responses below.
  778. \subsubsection{Circuit-level}
  779. To control a circuit's bandwidth usage, each OR keeps track of two
  780. windows. The \emph{package window} tracks how many relay data cells the OR is
  781. allowed to package (from outside streams) for transmission back to the OP,
  782. and the \emph{deliver window} tracks how many relay data cells it is willing
  783. to deliver to streams outside the network. Each window is initialized
  784. (say, to 1000 data cells). When a data cell is packaged or delivered,
  785. the appropriate window is decremented. When an OR has received enough
  786. data cells (currently 100), it sends a relay sendme cell towards the OP,
  787. with stream ID zero. When an OR receives a relay sendme cell with stream
  788. ID zero, it increments its packaging window. Either of these cells
  789. increments the corresponding window by 100. If the packaging window
  790. reaches 0, the OR stops reading from TCP connections for all streams
  791. on the corresponding circuit, and sends no more relay data cells until
  792. receiving a relay sendme cell.
  793. The OP behaves identically, except that it must track a packaging window
  794. and a delivery window for every OR in the circuit. If a packaging window
  795. reaches 0, it stops reading from streams destined for that OR.
  796. \subsubsection{Stream-level}
  797. The stream-level congestion control mechanism is similar to the
  798. circuit-level mechanism above. ORs and OPs use relay sendme cells
  799. to implement end-to-end flow control for individual streams across
  800. circuits. Each stream begins with a package window (e.g. 500 cells),
  801. and increments the window by a fixed value (50) upon receiving a relay
  802. sendme cell. Rather than always returning a relay sendme cell as soon
  803. as enough cells have arrived, the stream-level congestion control also
  804. has to check whether data has been successfully flushed onto the TCP
  805. stream; it sends a relay sendme only when the number of bytes pending
  806. to be flushed is under some threshold (currently 10 cells worth).
  807. Currently, non-data relay cells do not affect the windows. Thus we
  808. avoid potential deadlock issues, e.g. because a stream can't send a
  809. relay sendme cell because its packaging window is empty.
  810. % XXX Bad heading
  811. \subsubsection{Needs more research}
  812. We don't need to reimplement full TCP windows (with sequence numbers,
  813. the ability to drop cells when we're full and retransmit later, etc),
  814. because the TCP streams already guarantee in-order delivery of each
  815. cell. But we need to investigate further the effects of the current
  816. parameters on throughput and latency, while also keeping privacy in mind;
  817. see Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity} for more discussion.
  818. \Section{Other design decisions}
  819. \SubSection{Resource management and denial-of-service}
  820. \label{subsec:dos}
  821. Providing Tor as a public service provides many opportunities for an
  822. attacker to mount denial-of-service attacks against the network. While
  823. flow control and rate limiting (discussed in
  824. Section~\ref{subsec:congestion}) prevent users from consuming more
  825. bandwidth than routers are willing to provide, opportunities remain for
  826. users to
  827. consume more network resources than their fair share, or to render the
  828. network unusable for other users.
  829. First of all, there are several CPU-consuming denial-of-service
  830. attacks wherein an attacker can force an OR to perform expensive
  831. cryptographic operations. For example, an attacker who sends a
  832. \emph{create} cell full of junk bytes can force an OR to perform an RSA
  833. decrypt. Similarly, an attacker can
  834. fake the start of a TLS handshake, forcing the OR to carry out its
  835. (comparatively expensive) half of the handshake at no real computational
  836. cost to the attacker.
  837. Several approaches exist to address these attacks. First, ORs may
  838. require clients to solve a puzzle \cite{puzzles-tls} while beginning new
  839. TLS handshakes or accepting \emph{create} cells. So long as these
  840. tokens are easy to verify and computationally expensive to produce, this
  841. approach limits the attack multiplier. Additionally, ORs may limit
  842. the rate at which they accept create cells and TLS connections, so that
  843. the computational work of processing them does not drown out the (comparatively
  844. inexpensive) work of symmetric cryptography needed to keep cells
  845. flowing. This rate limiting could, however, allow an attacker
  846. to slow down other users when they build new circuits.
  847. % What about link-to-link rate limiting?
  848. Attackers also have an opportunity to attack the Tor network by mounting
  849. attacks on its hosts and network links. Disrupting a single circuit or
  850. link breaks all currently open streams passing along that part of the
  851. circuit. Indeed, this same loss of service occurs when a router crashes
  852. or its operator restarts it. The current Tor design treats such attacks
  853. as intermittent network failures, and depends on users and applications
  854. to respond or recover as appropriate. A future design could use an
  855. end-to-end TCP-like acknowledgment protocol, so that no streams are
  856. lost unless the entry or exit point itself is disrupted. This solution
  857. would require more buffering at the network edges, however, and the
  858. performance and anonymity implications from this extra complexity still
  859. require investigation.
  860. \SubSection{Exit policies and abuse}
  861. \label{subsec:exitpolicies}
  862. Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor deployment. Anonymity
  863. presents would-be vandals and abusers with an opportunity to hide
  864. the origins of their activities. Attackers can harm the Tor network by
  865. implicating exit servers for their abuse. Also, applications that commonly
  866. use IP-based authentication (such as institutional mail or web servers)
  867. can be fooled by the fact that anonymous connections appear to originate
  868. at the exit OR.
  869. We stress that Tor does not enable any new class of abuse. Spammers
  870. and other attackers already have access to thousands of misconfigured
  871. systems worldwide, and the Tor network is far from the easiest way
  872. to launch these antisocial or illegal attacks. Indeed, Tor's limited
  873. anonymity may be a benefit here, because large determined adversaries
  874. may still be able to track down criminals. In any case, because the
  875. %XXX
  876. onion routers can easily be mistaken for the originators of the abuse,
  877. and the volunteers who run them may not want to deal with the hassle of
  878. repeatedly explaining anonymity networks, we must block or limit attacks
  879. and other abuse that travel through the Tor network.
  880. To mitigate abuse issues, in Tor, each onion router's \emph{exit policy}
  881. describes to which external addresses and ports the router will permit
  882. stream connections. On one end of the spectrum are \emph{open exit}
  883. nodes that will connect anywhere. On the other end are \emph{middleman}
  884. nodes that only relay traffic to other Tor nodes, and \emph{private exit}
  885. nodes that only connect to a local host or network. Using a private
  886. exit (if one exists) is a more secure way for a client to connect to a
  887. given host or network---an external adversary cannot eavesdrop traffic
  888. between the private exit and the final destination, and so is less sure of
  889. Alice's destination and activities. Most onion routers will function as
  890. \emph{restricted exits} that permit connections to the world at large,
  891. but prevent access to certain abuse-prone addresses and services. In
  892. general, nodes can require a variety of forms of traffic authentication
  893. \cite{or-discex00}.
  894. %The abuse issues on closed (e.g. military) networks are different
  895. %from the abuse on open networks like the Internet. While these IP-based
  896. %access controls are still commonplace on the Internet, on closed networks,
  897. %nearly all participants will be honest, and end-to-end authentication
  898. %can be assumed for important traffic.
  899. Many administrators will use port restrictions to support only a
  900. limited set of well-known services, such as HTTP, SSH, or AIM.
  901. This is not a complete solution, since abuse opportunities for these
  902. protocols are still well known. Nonetheless, the benefits are real,
  903. since administrators seem used to the concept of port 80 abuse not
  904. coming from the machine's owner.
  905. A further solution may be to use proxies to clean traffic for certain
  906. protocols as it leaves the network. For example, much abusive HTTP
  907. behavior (such as exploiting buffer overflows or well-known script
  908. vulnerabilities) can be detected in a straightforward manner.
  909. Similarly, one could run automatic spam filtering software (such as
  910. SpamAssassin) on email exiting the OR network.
  911. ORs may also choose to rewrite exiting traffic in order to append
  912. headers or other information to indicate that the traffic has passed
  913. through an anonymity service. This approach is commonly used
  914. by email-only anonymity systems. When possible, ORs can also
  915. run on servers with hostnames such as {\it anonymous}, to further
  916. alert abuse targets to the nature of the anonymous traffic.
  917. A mixture of open and restricted exit nodes will allow the most
  918. flexibility for volunteers running servers. But while many
  919. middleman nodes help provide a large and robust network,
  920. having only a few exit nodes reduces the number of points
  921. an adversary needs to monitor for traffic analysis, and places a
  922. greater burden on the exit nodes. This tension can be seen in the
  923. Java Anon Proxy
  924. cascade model, wherein only one node in each cascade needs to handle
  925. abuse complaints---but an adversary only needs to observe the entry
  926. and exit of a cascade to perform traffic analysis on all that
  927. cascade's users. The Hydra model (many entries, few exits) presents a
  928. different compromise: only a few exit nodes are needed, but an
  929. adversary needs to work harder to watch all the clients; see
  930. Section~\ref{sec:conclusion}.
  931. Finally, we note that exit abuse must not be dismissed as a peripheral
  932. issue: when a system's public image suffers, it can reduce the number
  933. and diversity of that system's users, and thereby reduce the anonymity
  934. of the system itself. Like usability, public perception is also a
  935. security parameter. Sadly, preventing abuse of open exit nodes is an
  936. unsolved problem, and will probably remain an arms race for the
  937. forseeable future. The abuse problems faced by Princeton's CoDeeN
  938. project \cite{darkside} give us a glimpse of likely issues.
  939. \SubSection{Directory Servers}
  940. \label{subsec:dirservers}
  941. First-generation Onion Routing designs \cite{freedom2-arch,or-jsac98} used
  942. in-band network status updates: each router flooded a signed statement
  943. to its neighbors, which propagated it onward. But anonymizing networks
  944. have different security goals than typical link-state routing protocols.
  945. For example, delays (accidental or intentional)
  946. that can cause different parts of the network to have different pictures
  947. of link-state and topology are not only inconvenient---they give
  948. attackers an opportunity to exploit differences in client knowledge.
  949. We also worry about attacks to deceive a
  950. client about the router membership list, topology, or current network
  951. state. Such \emph{partitioning attacks} on client knowledge help an
  952. adversary to efficiently deploy resources
  953. when attacking a target.
  954. Tor uses a small group of redundant, well-known onion routers to
  955. track changes in network topology and node state, including keys and
  956. exit policies. Each such \emph{directory server} also acts as an HTTP
  957. server, so participants can fetch current network state and router
  958. lists (a \emph{directory}), and so other onion routers can upload
  959. their router descriptors. Onion routers periodically publish signed
  960. statements of their state to each directory server, which combines this
  961. state information with its own view of network liveness, and generates
  962. a signed description of the entire network state. Client software is
  963. pre-loaded with a list of the directory servers and their keys; it uses
  964. this information to bootstrap each client's view of the network.
  965. When a directory server receives a signed statement from an onion
  966. router, it recognizes the onion router by its identity key. Directory
  967. servers do not automatically advertise unrecognized ORs. (If they did,
  968. an adversary could take over the network by creating many servers
  969. \cite{sybil}.) Instead, new nodes must be approved by the directory
  970. server administrator before they are included. Mechanisms for automated
  971. node approval are an area of active research, and are discussed more
  972. in Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}.
  973. Of course, a variety of attacks remain. An adversary who controls
  974. a directory server can track certain clients by providing different
  975. information---perhaps by listing only nodes under its control, or by
  976. informing only certain clients about a given node. Even an external
  977. adversary can exploit differences in client knowledge: clients who use
  978. a node listed on one directory server but not the others are vulnerable.
  979. Thus these directory servers must be synchronized and redundant.
  980. Valid directories are those signed by a threshold of the directory
  981. servers.
  982. The directory servers in Tor are modeled after those in Mixminion
  983. \cite{minion-design}, but our situation is easier. First, we make the
  984. simplifying assumption that all participants agree on the set of
  985. directory servers. Second, while Mixminion needs to predict node
  986. behavior, Tor only needs a threshold consensus of the current
  987. state of the network.
  988. Tor directory servers build a consensus directory through a simple
  989. four-round broadcast protocol. In round one, each server dates and
  990. signs its current opinion, and broadcasts it to the other directory
  991. servers; then in round two, each server rebroadcasts all the signed
  992. opinions it has received. At this point all directory servers check
  993. to see whether any server has signed multiple opinions in the same
  994. period. Such a server is either broken or cheating, so the protocol
  995. stops and notifies the administrators, who either remove the cheater
  996. or wait for the broken server to be fixed. If there are no
  997. discrepancies, each directory server then locally computes an algorithm
  998. (described below)
  999. on the set of opinions, resulting in a uniform shared directory. In
  1000. round three servers sign this directory and broadcast it; and finally
  1001. in round four the servers rebroadcast the directory and all the
  1002. signatures. If any directory server drops out of the network, its
  1003. signature is not included on the final directory.
  1004. The rebroadcast steps ensure that a directory server is heard by
  1005. either all of the other servers or none of them, even when some links
  1006. are down (assuming that any two directory servers can talk directly or
  1007. via a third). Broadcasts are feasible because there are relatively few
  1008. directory servers (currently 3, but we expect as many as 9 as the network
  1009. scales). Computing the shared directory locally is a straightforward
  1010. threshold voting process: we include an OR if a majority of directory
  1011. servers believe it to be good.
  1012. To avoid attacks where a router connects to all the directory servers
  1013. but refuses to relay traffic from other routers, the directory servers
  1014. must build circuits and use them to anonymously test router reliability
  1015. \cite{mix-acc}.
  1016. Using directory servers is simpler and more flexible than flooding.
  1017. For example, flooding complicates the analysis when we
  1018. start experimenting with non-clique network topologies. And because
  1019. the directories are signed, they can be cached by other onion routers.
  1020. Thus directory servers are not a performance
  1021. bottleneck when we have many users, and do not aid traffic analysis by
  1022. forcing clients to periodically announce their existence to any
  1023. central point.
  1024. \Section{Rendezvous points: location privacy}
  1025. \label{sec:rendezvous}
  1026. Rendezvous points are a building block for \emph{location-hidden
  1027. services} (also known as ``responder anonymity'') in the Tor
  1028. network. Location-hidden services allow Bob to offer a TCP
  1029. service, such as a webserver, without revealing its IP.
  1030. We are also motivated by protection against distributed DoS attacks:
  1031. attackers are forced to attack the onion routing network as a whole
  1032. rather than just Bob's IP.
  1033. Our design for location-hidden servers has the following goals.
  1034. \textbf{Flood-proof:} An attacker should not be able to flood Bob
  1035. with traffic simply by sending many requests to talk to Bob. Thus,
  1036. Bob needs a way to filter incoming requests. \textbf{Robust:} Bob
  1037. should be able to maintain a long-term pseudonymous identity even
  1038. in the presence of router failure. Thus, Bob's service must not be
  1039. tied to a single OR, and Bob must be able to tie his service to new
  1040. ORs. \textbf{Smear-resistant:} An attacker should not be able to use
  1041. rendezvous points to smear an OR. That is, if a social attacker tries
  1042. to host a location-hidden service that is illegal or disreputable, it
  1043. should not appear---even to a casual observer---that the OR is hosting
  1044. that service. \textbf{Application-transparent:} Although we are willing to
  1045. require users to run special software to access location-hidden servers,
  1046. we are not willing to require them to modify their applications.
  1047. \subsection{Rendezvous design}
  1048. We provide location-hiding for Bob by allowing him to advertise
  1049. several onion routers (his \emph{Introduction Points}) as his public
  1050. location. (He may do this on any robust efficient distributed
  1051. key-value lookup system with authenticated updates, such as CFS
  1052. \cite{cfs:sosp01}\footnote{
  1053. Each onion router could run a node in this lookup
  1054. system; also note that as a stopgap measure, we can start by running a
  1055. simple lookup system on the directory servers.})
  1056. Alice, the client, chooses a node for her
  1057. \emph{Meeting Point}. She connects to one of Bob's introduction
  1058. points, informs him about her rendezvous point, and then waits for him
  1059. to connect to the rendezvous point. This extra level of indirection
  1060. helps Bob's introduction points avoid problems associated with serving
  1061. unpopular files directly, as could occur, for example, if Bob chooses
  1062. an introduction point in Texas to serve anti-ranching propaganda,
  1063. or if Bob's service tends to get attacked by network vandals.
  1064. The extra level of indirection also allows Bob to respond to some requests
  1065. and ignore others.
  1066. The steps of a rendezvous as follows. These steps are performed on
  1067. behalf of Alice and Bob by their local onion proxies, which they both
  1068. must run; application integration is described more fully below.
  1069. \begin{tightlist}
  1070. \item Bob chooses some introduction ppoints, and advertises them via
  1071. CFS (or some other distributed key-value publication system).
  1072. \item Bob establishes a Tor virtual circuit to each of his
  1073. Introduction Points, and waits.
  1074. \item Alice learns about Bob's service out of band (perhaps Bob told her,
  1075. or she found it on a website). She looks up the details of Bob's
  1076. service from CFS.
  1077. \item Alice chooses an OR to serve as a Rendezvous Point (RP) for this
  1078. transaction. She establishes a virtual circuit to her RP, and
  1079. tells it to wait for connections. %[XXX how?]
  1080. \item Alice opens an anonymous stream to one of Bob's Introduction
  1081. Points, and gives it message (encrypted for Bob) which tells him
  1082. about herself, her chosen RP, and the first half of an ephemeral
  1083. key handshake. The Introduction Point sends the message to Bob.
  1084. \item Bob may decide to ignore Alice's request. %[XXX Based on what?]
  1085. Otherwise, he creates a new virtual circuit to Alice's RP, and
  1086. authenticates himself. %[XXX how?]
  1087. \item If the authentication is successful, the RP connects Alice's
  1088. virtual circuit to Bob's. Note that RP can't recognize Alice,
  1089. Bob, or the data they transmit (they share a session key).
  1090. \item Alice now sends a Begin cell along the circuit. It arrives at Bob's
  1091. onion proxy. Bob's onion proxy connects to Bob's webserver.
  1092. \item An anonymous stream has been established, and Alice and Bob
  1093. communicate as normal.
  1094. \end{tightlist}
  1095. %[XXX We need to modify the above to refer people down to these next
  1096. % paragraphs. -NM]
  1097. When establishing an introduction point, Bob provides the onion router
  1098. with a public ``introduction'' key. The hash of this public key
  1099. identifies a unique service, and (since Bob is required to sign his
  1100. messages) prevents anybody else from usurping Bob's introduction point
  1101. in the future. Bob uses the same public key when establishing the other
  1102. introduction points for that service.
  1103. The message that Alice gives the introduction point includes a hash of Bob's
  1104. public key to identify the service, an optional initial authentication
  1105. token (the introduction point can do prescreening, eg to block replays),
  1106. and (encrypted to Bob's public key) the location of the rendezvous point,
  1107. a rendezvous cookie Bob should tell RP so he gets connected to
  1108. Alice, an optional authentication token so Bob can choose whether to respond,
  1109. and the first half of a DH key exchange. When Bob connects to RP
  1110. and gets connected to Alice's pipe, his first cell contains the
  1111. other half of the DH key exchange.
  1112. The authentication tokens can be used to provide selective access to users
  1113. proportional to how important it is that they main uninterrupted access
  1114. to the service. During normal situations, Bob's service might simply be
  1115. offered directly from mirrors; Bob can also give out authentication cookies
  1116. to high-priority users. If those mirrors are knocked down by
  1117. distributed DoS attacks,
  1118. those users can switch to accessing Bob's service via the Tor
  1119. rendezvous system.
  1120. \SubSection{Integration with user applications}
  1121. For each service Bob offers, he configures his local onion proxy to know
  1122. the local IP and port of the server, a strategy for authorizing Alices,
  1123. and a public key. Bob publishes
  1124. the public key, an expiration
  1125. time (``not valid after''), and the current introduction points for
  1126. his
  1127. service into CFS, all indexed by the hash of the public key
  1128. Note that Bob's webserver is unmodified, and doesn't even know
  1129. that it's hidden behind the Tor network.
  1130. Because Alice's applications must work unchanged, her client interface
  1131. remains a SOCKS proxy. Thus we must encode all of the necessary
  1132. information into the fully qualified domain name Alice uses when
  1133. establishing her connections. Location-hidden services use a virtual
  1134. top level domain called `.onion': thus hostnames take the form
  1135. x.y.onion where x is the authentication cookie, and y encodes the hash
  1136. of PK. Alice's onion proxy examines hostnames and recognizes when
  1137. they're destined for a hidden server. If so, it decodes the PK and
  1138. starts the rendezvous as described in the table above.
  1139. \subsection{Previous rendezvous work}
  1140. Ian Goldberg developed a similar notion of rendezvous points for
  1141. low-latency anonymity systems \cite{ian-thesis}. His ``service tags''
  1142. play the same role in his design as the hashes of services' public
  1143. keys play in ours. We use public key hashes so that they can be
  1144. self-authenticating, and so the client can recognize the same service
  1145. with confidence later on. His design also differs from ours in the
  1146. following ways: First, Goldberg suggests that the client should
  1147. manually hunt down a current location of the service via Gnutella;
  1148. whereas our use of CFS makes lookup faster, more robust, and
  1149. transparent to the user. Second, in Tor the client and server
  1150. negotiate ephemeral keys via Diffie-Hellman, so at no point in the
  1151. path is the plaintext exposed. Third, our design tries to minimize the
  1152. exposure associated with running the service, so as to make volunteers
  1153. more willing to offer introduction and rendezvous point services.
  1154. Tor's introduction points do not output any bytes to the clients, and
  1155. the rendezvous points don't know the client, the server, or the data
  1156. being transmitted. The indirection scheme is also designed to include
  1157. authentication/authorization---if the client doesn't include the right
  1158. cookie with its request for service, the server need not even
  1159. acknowledge its existence.
  1160. \Section{Analysis}
  1161. \label{sec:analysis}
  1162. In this section, we discuss how well Tor meets our stated design goals
  1163. and its resistance to attacks.
  1164. \SubSection{Meeting Basic Goals}
  1165. % None of these seem to say very much. Should this subsection be removed?
  1166. \begin{tightlist}
  1167. \item [Basic Anonymity:] Because traffic is encrypted, changing in
  1168. appearance, and can flow from anywhere to anywhere within the
  1169. network, a simple observer that cannot see both the initiator
  1170. activity and the corresponding activity where the responder talks to
  1171. the network will not be able to link the initiator and responder.
  1172. Nor is it possible to directly correlate any two communication
  1173. sessions as coming from a single source without additional
  1174. information. Resistance to more sophisticated anonymity threats is
  1175. discussed below.
  1176. \item[Deployability:] Tor requires no specialized hardware. Tor
  1177. requires no kernel modifications; it runs in user space (currently
  1178. on Linux, various BSDs, and Windows). All of these imply a low
  1179. technical barrier to running a Tor node. There is an assumption that
  1180. Tor nodes have good relatively persistent net connectivity
  1181. (currently T1 or better);
  1182. % Is that reasonable to say? We haven't really discussed it -P.S.
  1183. % Roger thinks otherwise; he will fix this. -NM
  1184. however, there is no padding overhead, and operators can limit
  1185. bandwidth on any link. Tor is freely available under the modified
  1186. BSD license, and operators are able to choose their own exit
  1187. policies, thus reducing legal and social barriers to
  1188. running a node.
  1189. \item[Usability:] As noted, Tor runs in user space. So does the onion
  1190. proxy, which is comparatively easy to install and run. SOCKS-aware
  1191. applications require nothing more than to be pointed at the onion
  1192. proxy; other applications can be redirected to use SOCKS for their
  1193. outgoing TCP connections by drop-in libraries such as tsocks.
  1194. \item[Flexibility:] Tor's design and implementation is fairly modular,
  1195. so that, for example, a scalable P2P replacement for the directory
  1196. servers would not substantially impact other aspects of the system.
  1197. Tor runs on top of TCP, so design options that could not easily do
  1198. so would be difficult to test on the current network. However, most
  1199. low-latency protocols are designed to run over TCP. We are currently
  1200. working with the designers of MorphMix to render our two systems
  1201. interoperable. So for, this seems to be relatively straightforward.
  1202. Interoperability will allow testing and direct comparison of the two
  1203. rather different designs.
  1204. \item[Simple design:] Tor opts for practicality when there is no
  1205. clear resolution of anonymity trade-offs or practical means to
  1206. achieve resolution. Thus, we do not currently pad or mix; although
  1207. it would be easy to add either of these. Indeed, our system allows
  1208. long-range and variable padding if this should ever be shown to have
  1209. a clear advantage. Similarly, we do not currently attempt to
  1210. resolve such issues as Sybil attacks to dominate the network except
  1211. by such direct means as personal familiarity of director operators
  1212. with all node operators.
  1213. \end{tightlist}
  1214. \SubSection{Attacks and Defenses}
  1215. \label{sec:attacks}
  1216. Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our
  1217. design withstands them.
  1218. \subsubsection*{Passive attacks}
  1219. \begin{tightlist}
  1220. \item \emph{Observing user traffic patterns.} Observations of connection
  1221. between an end user and a first onion router will not reveal to whom
  1222. the user is connecting or what information is being sent. It will
  1223. reveal patterns of user traffic (both sent and received). Simple
  1224. profiling of user connection patterns is not generally possible,
  1225. however, because multiple application connections (streams) may be
  1226. operating simultaneously or in series over a single circuit. Thus,
  1227. further processing is necessary to try to discern even these usage
  1228. patterns.
  1229. \item \emph{Observing user content.} At the user end, content is
  1230. encrypted; however, connections from the network to arbitrary
  1231. websites may not be. Further, a responding website may itself be
  1232. considered an adversary. Filtering content is not a primary goal of
  1233. Onion Routing; nonetheless, Tor can directly make use of Privoxy and
  1234. related filtering services via SOCKS and thus anonymize their
  1235. application data streams.
  1236. \item \emph{Option distinguishability.} Configuration options can be a
  1237. source of distinguishable patterns. In general there is economic
  1238. incentive to allow preferential services \cite{econymics}, and some
  1239. degree of configuration choice can be a factor in attracting many users
  1240. to provide anonymity. So far, however, we have
  1241. not found a compelling use case in Tor for any client-configurable
  1242. options. Thus, clients are currently distinguishable only by their
  1243. behavior.
  1244. \item \emph{End-to-end Timing correlation.} Tor only minimally hides
  1245. end-to-end timing correlations. If an attacker can watch patterns of
  1246. traffic at the initiator end and the responder end, then he will be
  1247. able to confirm the correspondence with high probability. The
  1248. greatest protection currently against such confirmation is if the
  1249. connection between the onion proxy and the first Tor node is hidden,
  1250. possibly because it is local or behind a firewall. This approach
  1251. requires an observer to separate traffic originating the onion
  1252. router from traffic passes through it. We still do not, however,
  1253. predict this approach to be a large problem for an attacker who can
  1254. observe traffic at both ends of an application connection.
  1255. \item \emph{End-to-end Size correlation.} Simple packet counting
  1256. without timing consideration will also be effective in confirming
  1257. endpoints of a connection through Onion Routing; although slightly
  1258. less so. This is because, even without padding, the leaky pipe
  1259. topology means different numbers of packets may enter one end of a
  1260. circuit than exit at the other.
  1261. \item \emph{Website fingerprinting.} All the above passive
  1262. attacks that are at all effective are traffic confirmation attacks.
  1263. This puts them outside our general design goals. There is also
  1264. a passive traffic analysis attack that is potentially effective.
  1265. Instead of searching exit connections for timing and volume
  1266. correlations it is possible to build up a database of
  1267. ``fingerprints'' containing file sizes and access patterns for many
  1268. interesting websites. If one now wants to
  1269. monitor the activity of a user, it may be possible to confirm a
  1270. connection to a site simply by consulting the database. This attack has
  1271. been shown to be effective against SafeWeb \cite{hintz-pet02}. Onion
  1272. Routing is not as vulnerable as SafeWeb to this attack: There is the
  1273. possibility that multiple streams are exiting the circuit at
  1274. different places concurrently. Also, fingerprinting will be limited to
  1275. the granularity of cells, currently 256 bytes. Larger cell sizes
  1276. and/or minimal padding schemes that group websites into large sets
  1277. are possible responses. But this remains an open problem. Link
  1278. padding or long-range dummies may also make fingerprints harder to
  1279. detect. (Note that
  1280. such fingerprinting should not be confused with the latency attacks
  1281. of \cite{back01}. Those require a fingerprint of the latencies of
  1282. all circuits through the network, combined with those from the
  1283. network edges to the targeted user and the responder website. While
  1284. these are in principal feasible and surprises are always possible,
  1285. these constitute a much more complicated attack, and there is no
  1286. current evidence of their practicality.)
  1287. \item \emph{Content analysis.} Tor explicitly provides no content
  1288. rewriting for any protocol at a higher level than TCP. When
  1289. protocol cleaners are available, however (as Privoxy is for HTTP),
  1290. Tor can integrate them in order to address these attacks.
  1291. \end{tightlist}
  1292. \subsubsection*{Active attacks}
  1293. \begin{tightlist}
  1294. \item \emph{Key compromise.} We consider the impact of a compromise
  1295. for each type of key in turn, from the shortest- to the
  1296. longest-lived. If a circuit session key is compromised, the
  1297. attacker can unwrap a single layer of encryption from the relay
  1298. cells traveling along that circuit. (Only nodes on the circuit can
  1299. see these cells.) If a TLS session key is compromised, an attacker
  1300. can view all the cells on TLS connection until the key is
  1301. renegotiated. (These cells are themselves encrypted.) If a TLS
  1302. private key is compromised, the attacker can fool others into
  1303. thinking that he is the affected OR, but still cannot accept any
  1304. connections. If an onion private key is compromised, the attacker
  1305. can impersonate the OR in circuits, but only if the attacker has
  1306. also compromised the OR's TLS private key, or is running the
  1307. previous OR in the circuit. (This compromise affects newly created
  1308. circuits, but because of perfect forward secrecy, the attacker
  1309. cannot hijack old circuits without compromising their session keys.)
  1310. In any case, an attacker can only take advantage of a compromise in
  1311. these mid-term private keys until they expire. Only by
  1312. compromising a node's identity key can an attacker replace that
  1313. node indefinitely, by sending new forged mid-term keys to the
  1314. directories. Finally, an attacker who can compromise a
  1315. \emph{directory's} identity key can influence every client's view
  1316. of the network---but only to the degree made possible by gaining a
  1317. vote with the rest of the the directory servers.
  1318. \item \emph{Iterated compromise.} A roving adversary who can
  1319. compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coersion, or extralegal
  1320. coersion) could march down length of a circuit compromising the
  1321. nodes until he reaches the end. Unless the adversary can complete
  1322. this attack within the lifetime of the circuit, however, the ORs
  1323. will have discarded the necessary information before the attack can
  1324. be completed. (Thanks to the perfect forward secrecy of session
  1325. keys, the attacker cannot cannot force nodes to decrypt recorded
  1326. traffic once the circuits have been closed.) Additionally, building
  1327. circuits that cross jurisdictions can make legal coercion
  1328. harder---this phenomenon is commonly called ``jurisdictional
  1329. arbitrage.'' The Java Anon Proxy project recently experienced this
  1330. issue, when
  1331. the German government successfully ordered them to add a backdoor to
  1332. all of their nodes \cite{jap-backdoor}.
  1333. \item \emph{Run a recipient.} By running a Web server, an adversary
  1334. trivially learns the timing patterns of those connecting to it, and
  1335. can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses. This can greatly
  1336. facilitate end-to-end attacks: If the adversary can induce certain
  1337. users to connect to connect to his webserver (perhaps by providing
  1338. content targeted at those users), she now holds one end of their
  1339. connection. Additonally, here is a danger that the application
  1340. protocols and associated programs can be induced to reveal
  1341. information about the initiator. This is not directly in Onion
  1342. Routing's protection area, so we are dependent on Privoxy and
  1343. similar protocol cleaners to solve the problem.
  1344. \item \emph{Run an onion proxy.} It is expected that end users will
  1345. nearly always run their own local onion proxy. However, in some
  1346. settings, it may be necessary for the proxy to run
  1347. remotely---typically, in an institutional setting where it was
  1348. necessary to monitor the activity of those connecting to the proxy.
  1349. The drawback, of course, is that if the onion proxy is compromised,
  1350. then all future connections through it are completely compromised.
  1351. \item \emph{DoS non-observed nodes.} An observer who can observe some
  1352. of the Tor network can increase the value of this traffic analysis
  1353. if it can attack non-observed nodes to shut them down, reduce
  1354. their reliability, or persuade users that they are not trustworthy.
  1355. The best defense here is robustness.
  1356. \item \emph{Run a hostile node.} In addition to the abilties of a
  1357. local observer, an isolated hostile node can create circuits through
  1358. itself, or alter traffic patterns, in order to affect traffic at
  1359. other nodes. Its ability to directly DoS a neighbor is now limited
  1360. by bandwidth throttling. Nonetheless, in order to compromise the
  1361. anonymity of the endpoints of a circuit by its observations, a
  1362. hostile node is only significant if it is immediately adjacent to
  1363. that endpoint.
  1364. \item \emph{Run multiple hostile nodes.} If an adversary is able to
  1365. run multiple ORs, and is able to persuade the directory servers
  1366. that those ORs are trustworthy and independant, then occasionally
  1367. some user will choose one of those ORs for the start and another of
  1368. those ORs as the end of a circuit. When this happens, the user's
  1369. anonymity is compromised for those circuits. If an adversary can
  1370. control $m$ out of $N$ nodes, he should be able to correlate at most
  1371. $\frac{m}{N}$ of the traffic in this way---although an adersary
  1372. could possibly attract a disproportionately large amount of traffic
  1373. by running an exit node with an unusually permisssive exit policy.
  1374. \item \emph{Compromise entire path.} Anyone compromising both
  1375. endpoints of a circuit can confirm this with high probability. If
  1376. the entire path is compromised, this becomes a certainty; however,
  1377. the added benefit to the adversary of such an attack is small in
  1378. relation to the difficulty.
  1379. \item \emph{Run a hostile directory server.} Directory servers control
  1380. admission to the network. However, because the network directory
  1381. must be signed by a majority of servers, the threat of a single
  1382. hostile server is minimized.
  1383. \item \emph{Selectively DoS a Tor node.} As noted, neighbors are
  1384. bandwidth limited; however, it is possible to open up sufficient
  1385. circuits that converge at a single onion router to
  1386. overwhelm its network connection, its ability to process new
  1387. circuits, or both.
  1388. %OK so I noticed that twins are completely removed from the paper above,
  1389. % but it's after 5 so I'll leave that problem to you guys. -PS
  1390. \item \emph{Introduce timing into messages.} This is simply a stronger
  1391. version of passive timing attacks already discussed above.
  1392. \item \emph{Tagging attacks.} A hostile node could try to ``tag'' a
  1393. cell by altering it. This would render it unreadable, but if the
  1394. connection is, for example, an unencrypted request to a Web site,
  1395. the garbled content coming out at the appropriate time could confirm
  1396. the association. However, integrity checks on cells prevent
  1397. this attack from succeeding.
  1398. \item \emph{Replace contents of unauthenticated protocols.} When a
  1399. relaying an unauthenticated protocol like HTTP, a hostile exit node
  1400. can impersonate the target server. Thus, whenever possible, clients
  1401. should prefer protocols with end-to-end authentication.
  1402. \item \emph{Replay attacks.} Some anonymity protocols are vulnerable
  1403. to replay attacks. Tor is not; replaying one side of a handshake
  1404. will result in a different negotiated session key, and so the rest
  1405. of the recorded session can't be used.
  1406. % ``NonSSL Anonymizer''?
  1407. \item \emph{Smear attacks.} An attacker could use the Tor network to
  1408. engage in socially dissapproved acts, so as to try to bring the
  1409. entire network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down.
  1410. Exit policies can help reduce the possibilities for abuse, but
  1411. ultimately, the network will require volunteers who can tolerate
  1412. some political heat.
  1413. \item \emph{Distribute hostile code.} An attacker could trick users
  1414. into running subverted Tor software that did not, in fact, anonymize
  1415. their connections---or worse, trick ORs into running weakened
  1416. software that provided users with less anonymity. We address this
  1417. problem (but do not solve it completely) by signing all Tor releases
  1418. with an official public key, and including an entry the directory
  1419. describing which versions are currently believed to be secure. To
  1420. prevent an attacker from subverting the official release itself
  1421. (through threats, bribery, or insider attacks), we provide all
  1422. releases in source code form, encourage source audits, and
  1423. frequently warn our users never to trust any software (even from
  1424. us!) that comes without source.
  1425. \end{tightlist}
  1426. \subsubsection*{Directory attacks}
  1427. \begin{tightlist}
  1428. \item \emph{Destroy directory servers.} If a single directory
  1429. server drops out of operation, the others still arrive at a final
  1430. directory. So long as any directory servers remain in operation,
  1431. they will still broadcast their views of the network and generate a
  1432. consensus directory. (If more than half are destroyed, this
  1433. directory will not, however, have enough signatures for clients to
  1434. use it automatically; human intervention will be necessary for
  1435. clients to decide whether to trust the resulting directory.)
  1436. \item \emph{Subvert a directory server.} By taking over a directory
  1437. server, an attacker can influence (but not control) the final
  1438. directory. Since ORs are included or excluded by majority vote,
  1439. the corrupt directory can at worst cast a tie-breaking vote to
  1440. decide whether to include marginal ORs. How often such marginal
  1441. cases will occur in practice, however, remains to be seen.
  1442. \item \emph{Subvert a majority of directory servers.} If the
  1443. adversary controls more than half of the directory servers, he can
  1444. decide on a final directory, and thus can include as many
  1445. compromised ORs in the final directory as he wishes. Other than
  1446. trying to ensure that directory server operators are truly
  1447. independent and resistant to attack, Tor does not address this
  1448. possibility.
  1449. \item \emph{Encourage directory server dissent.} The directory
  1450. agreement protocol requires that directory server operators agree on
  1451. the list of directory servers. An adversary who can persuade some
  1452. of the directory server operators to distrust one another could
  1453. split the quorum into mutually hostile camps, thus partitioning
  1454. users based on which directory they used. Tor does not address
  1455. this attack.
  1456. \item \emph{Trick the directory servers into listing a hostile OR.}
  1457. Our threat model explicitly assumes directory server operators will
  1458. be able to filter out most hostile ORs. If this is not true, an
  1459. attacker can flood the directory with compromised servers.
  1460. \item \emph{Convince the directories that a malfunctioning OR is
  1461. working.} In the current Tor implementation, directory servers
  1462. assume that if they can start a TLS connection to an an OR, that OR
  1463. must be running correctly. It would be easy for a hostile OR to
  1464. subvert this test by only accepting TLS connections from ORs, and
  1465. ignoring all cells. Thus, directory servers must actively test ORs
  1466. by building circuits and streams as appropriate. The benefits and
  1467. hazards of a similar approach are discussed in \cite{mix-acc}.
  1468. \end{tightlist}
  1469. \subsubsection*{Attacks against rendezvous points}
  1470. \begin{tightlist}
  1471. \item \emph{Make many introduction requests.} An attacker could
  1472. attempt to deny Bob service by flooding his Introduction Point with
  1473. requests. Because the introduction point can block requests that
  1474. lack authentication tokens, however, Bob can restrict the volume of
  1475. requests he receives, or require a certain amount of computation for
  1476. every request he receives.
  1477. \item \emph{Attack an introduction point.} An attacker could try to
  1478. disrupt a location-hidden service by disabling its introduction
  1479. point. But because a service's identity is attached to its public
  1480. key, not its introduction point, the service can simply re-advertise
  1481. itself at a different introduction point.
  1482. \item \emph{Compromise an introduction point.} If an attacker controls
  1483. an introduction point for a service, it can flood the service with
  1484. introduction requests, or prevent valid introduction requests from
  1485. reaching the hidden server. The server will notice a flooding
  1486. attempt if it receives many introduction requests. To notice
  1487. blocking of valid requests, however, the hidden server should
  1488. periodically test the introduction point by sending its introduction
  1489. requests, and making sure it receives them.
  1490. \item \emph{Compromise a rendezvous point.} Controlling a rendezvous
  1491. point gains an attacker no more than controlling any other OR along
  1492. a circuit, since all data passing along the rendezvous is protected
  1493. by the session key shared by the client and server.
  1494. \end{tightlist}
  1495. \Section{Open Questions in Low-latency Anonymity}
  1496. \label{sec:maintaining-anonymity}
  1497. % There must be a better intro than this! -NM
  1498. In addition to the open problems discussed in
  1499. Section~\ref{subsec:non-goals}, many other questions remain to be
  1500. solved by future research before we can be truly confident that we
  1501. have built a secure low-latency anonymity service.
  1502. Many of these open issues are questions of balance. For example,
  1503. how often should users rotate to fresh circuits? Too-frequent
  1504. rotation is inefficient and expensive, but too-infrequent rotation
  1505. makes the user's traffic linkable. Instead of opening a fresh
  1506. circuit; clients can also limit linkability exit from a middle point
  1507. of the circuit, or by truncating and re-extending the circuit, but
  1508. more analysis is needed to determine the proper trade-off.
  1509. %[XXX mention predecessor attacks?]
  1510. A similar question surrounds timing of directory operations:
  1511. how often should directories be updated? With too-infrequent
  1512. updates clients receive an inaccurate picture of the network; with
  1513. too-frequent updates the directory servers are overloaded.
  1514. %do different exit policies at different exit nodes trash anonymity sets,
  1515. %or not mess with them much?
  1516. %
  1517. %% Why would they? By routing traffic to certain nodes preferentially?
  1518. %[XXX Choosing paths and path lengths: I'm not writing this bit till
  1519. % Arma's pathselection stuff is in. -NM]
  1520. %%%% Roger said that he'd put a path selection paragraph into section
  1521. %%%% 4 that would replace this.
  1522. %
  1523. %I probably should have noted that this means loops will be on at least
  1524. %five hop routes, which should be rare given the distribution. I'm
  1525. %realizing that this is reproducing some of the thought that led to a
  1526. %default of five hops in the original onion routing design. There were
  1527. %some different assumptions, which I won't spell out now. Note that
  1528. %enclave level protections really change these assumptions. If most
  1529. %circuits are just two hops, then just a single link observer will be
  1530. %able to tell that two enclaves are communicating with high probability.
  1531. %So, it would seem that enclaves should have a four node minimum circuit
  1532. %to prevent trivial circuit insider identification of the whole circuit,
  1533. %and three hop minimum for circuits from an enclave to some nonclave
  1534. %responder. But then... we would have to make everyone obey these rules
  1535. %or a node that through timing inferred it was on a four hop circuit
  1536. %would know that it was probably carrying enclave to enclave traffic.
  1537. %Which... if there were even a moderate number of bad nodes in the
  1538. %network would make it advantageous to break the connection to conduct
  1539. %a reformation intersection attack. Ahhh! I gotta stop thinking
  1540. %about this and work on the paper some before the family wakes up.
  1541. %On Sat, Oct 25, 2003 at 06:57:12AM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
  1542. %> Which... if there were even a moderate number of bad nodes in the
  1543. %> network would make it advantageous to break the connection to conduct
  1544. %> a reformation intersection attack. Ahhh! I gotta stop thinking
  1545. %> about this and work on the paper some before the family wakes up.
  1546. %This is the sort of issue that should go in the 'maintaining anonymity
  1547. %with tor' section towards the end. :)
  1548. %Email from between roger and me to beginning of section above. Fix and move.
  1549. Throughout this paper, we have assumed that end-to-end traffic
  1550. analysis will immediately and automatically defeat a low-latency
  1551. anonymity system. Even high-latency anonymity
  1552. systems can be vulnerable to end-to-end traffic analysis, if the
  1553. traffic volumes are high enough, and if users' habits are sufficiently
  1554. distinct \cite{limits-open,statistical-disclosure}. \emph{Can
  1555. anything be donw to make low-latency systems resist these attacks as
  1556. well as high-latency systems?}
  1557. Tor already makes some effort to conceal the starts and
  1558. ends of streams by wrapping all long-range control commands in
  1559. identical-looking relay cells, but more analysis is needed. Link
  1560. padding could frustrate passive observers who count packets; long-range
  1561. padding could work against observers who own the first hop in a
  1562. circuit. But more research needs to be done in order to find an
  1563. efficient and practical approach. Volunteers prefer not to run
  1564. constant-bandwidth padding; but more sophisticated traffic shaping
  1565. approaches remain somewhat unanalyzed.
  1566. %[XXX is this so?]
  1567. Recent work
  1568. on long-range padding \cite{defensive-dropping} shows promise. One
  1569. could also try to reduce correlation in packet timing by batching and
  1570. re-ordering packets, but it is unclear whether this could improve
  1571. anonymity without introducing so much latency as to render the
  1572. network unusable.
  1573. Even if passive timing attacks were wholly solved, active timing
  1574. attacks would remain. \emph{What can
  1575. be done to address attackers who can introduce timing patterns into
  1576. a user's traffic?} % [XXX mention likely approaches]
  1577. %%% I think we cover this by framing the problem as ``Can we make
  1578. %%% end-to-end characteristics of low-latency systems as good as
  1579. %%% those of high-latency systems?'' Eliminating long-term
  1580. %%% intersection is a hard problem.
  1581. %
  1582. %Even regardless of link padding from Alice to the cloud, there will be
  1583. %times when Alice is simply not online. Link padding, at the edges or
  1584. %inside the cloud, does not help for this.
  1585. In order to scale to large numbers of users, and to prevent an
  1586. attacker from observing the whole network at once, it may be necessary
  1587. for low-latency anonymity systems to support far more servers than Tor
  1588. currently anticipates. This introduces several issues. First, if
  1589. approval by a centralized set of directory servers is no longer
  1590. feasible, what mechanism should be used to prevent adversaries from
  1591. signing up many spurious servers?
  1592. Second, if clients can no longer have a complete
  1593. picture of the network at all times, how can should they perform
  1594. discovery while preventing attackers from manipulating or exploiting
  1595. gaps in client knowledge? Third, if there are too many servers
  1596. for every server to constantly communicate with every other, what kind
  1597. of non-clique topology should the network use? Restricted-route
  1598. topologies promise comparable anonymity with better scalability
  1599. \cite{danezis-pets03}, but whatever topology we choose, we need some
  1600. way to keep attackers from manipulating their position within it.
  1601. Fourth, since no centralized authority is tracking server reliability,
  1602. How do we prevent unreliable servers from rendering the network
  1603. unusable? Fifth, do clients receive so much anonymity benefit from
  1604. running their own servers that we should expect them all to do so, or
  1605. do we need to find another incentive structure to motivate them?
  1606. (Tarzan and MorphMix present possible solutions.)
  1607. % [[ XXX how to approve new nodes (advogato, sybil, captcha (RTT));]
  1608. Alternatively, it may be the case that one of these problems proves
  1609. intractable, or that the drawbacks to many-server systems prove
  1610. greater than the benefits. Nevertheless, we may still do well to
  1611. consider non-clique topologies. A cascade topology may provide more
  1612. defense against traffic confirmation confirmation.
  1613. % XXX Why would it? Cite. -NM
  1614. Does the hydra (many inputs, few outputs) topology work
  1615. better? Are we going to get a hydra anyway because most nodes will be
  1616. middleman nodes?
  1617. As mentioned in Section~\ref{subsec:dos}, Tor could improve its
  1618. robustness against node failure by buffering transmitted stream data
  1619. at the network's edges until the data has been acknowledged by the
  1620. other end of the stream. The efficacy of this approach remains to be
  1621. tested, however, and there may be more effective means for ensuring
  1622. reliable connections in the presence of unreliable nodes.
  1623. %%% Keeping this original paragraph for a little while, since it
  1624. %%% is not the same as what's written there now.
  1625. %
  1626. %Because Tor depends on TLS and TCP to provide a reliable transport,
  1627. %when one of the servers goes down, all the circuits (and thus streams)
  1628. %traveling over that server must break. This reduces anonymity because
  1629. %everybody needs to reconnect right then (does it? how much?) and
  1630. %because exit connections all break at the same time, and it also harms
  1631. %usability. It seems the problem is even worse in a peer-to-peer
  1632. %environment, because so far such systems don't really provide an
  1633. %incentive for nodes to stay connected when they're done browsing, so
  1634. %we would expect a much higher churn rate than for onion routing.
  1635. %there ways of allowing streams to survive the loss of a node in the
  1636. %path?
  1637. % Roger or Paul suggested that we say something about incentives,
  1638. % too, but I think that's a better candidate for our future work
  1639. % section. After all, we will doubtlessly learn very much about why
  1640. % people do or don't run and use Tor in the near future. -NM
  1641. %We should run a squid at each exit node, to provide comparable anonymity
  1642. %to private exit nodes for cache hits, to speed everything up, and to
  1643. %have a buffer for funny stuff coming out of port 80.
  1644. % on the other hand, it hampers PFS, because ORs have pages in the cache.
  1645. %I previously elsewhere suggested bulk transfer proxies to carve
  1646. %up big things so that they could be downloaded in less noticeable
  1647. %pieces over several normal looking connections. We could suggest
  1648. %similarly one or a handful of squid nodes that might serve up
  1649. %some of the more sensitive but common material, especially if
  1650. %the relevant sites didn't want to or couldn't run their own OR.
  1651. %This would be better than having everyone run a squid which would
  1652. %just help identify after the fact the different history of that
  1653. %node's activity. All this kind of speculation needs to move to
  1654. %future work section I guess. -PS]
  1655. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  1656. \Section{Future Directions}
  1657. \label{sec:conclusion}
  1658. Tor brings together many innovations into
  1659. a unified deployable system. But there are still several attacks that
  1660. work quite well, as well as a number of sustainability and run-time
  1661. issues remaining to be ironed out. In particular:
  1662. % Many of these (Scalability, cover traffic, morphmix)
  1663. % are duplicates from open problems.
  1664. %
  1665. \begin{tightlist}
  1666. \item \emph{Scalability:} Tor's emphasis on design simplicity and
  1667. deployability has led us to adopt a clique topology, a
  1668. semi-centralized model for directories and trusts, and a
  1669. full-network-visibility model for client knowledge. None of these
  1670. properties will scale to more than a few hundred servers, at most.
  1671. Promising approaches to better scalability exist (see
  1672. Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}), but more deployment
  1673. experience would be helpful in learning the relative importance of
  1674. these bottlenecks.
  1675. \item \emph{Cover traffic:} Currently we avoid cover traffic because
  1676. of its clear costs in performance and bandwidth, and because its
  1677. security benefits have not well understood. With more research
  1678. \cite{SS03,defensive-dropping}, the price/value ratio may change,
  1679. both for link-level cover traffic and also long-range cover traffic.
  1680. \item \emph{Better directory distribution:} Even with the threshold
  1681. directory agreement algorithm described in Section~\ref{subsec:dirservers},
  1682. the directory servers are still trust bottlenecks. We must find more
  1683. decentralized yet practical ways to distribute up-to-date snapshots of
  1684. network status without introducing new attacks. Also, directory
  1685. retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently
  1686. download a description of the entire network state every 15
  1687. minutes. As the state grows larger and clients more numerous, we
  1688. may need to move to a solution in which clients only receive
  1689. incremental updates to directory state, or where directories are
  1690. cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers.
  1691. \item \emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While
  1692. Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous
  1693. points and location-hidden servers, these feature has not yet been
  1694. implemented. While doing so, will likely encounter additional
  1695. issues, both in terms of usability and anonymity, that must be
  1696. resolved.
  1697. \item \emph{Further specification review:} Although we have a public,
  1698. byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, this protocol has
  1699. not received extensive external review. We hope that as Tor
  1700. becomes more widely deployed, more people will become interested in
  1701. examining our specification.
  1702. \item \emph{Wider-scale deployment:} The original goal of Tor was to
  1703. gain experience in deploying an anonymizing overlay network, and
  1704. learn from having actual users. We are now at the point in design
  1705. and development where we can start deploying a wider network. Once
  1706. we have are ready for actual users, we will doubtlessly be better
  1707. able to evaluate some of our design decisions, including our
  1708. robustness/latency trade-offs, our performance trade-offs (including
  1709. cell size), our abuse-prevention mechanisms, and
  1710. our overall usability.
  1711. % XXX large and small cells on same network.
  1712. % XXX work with morphmix spec
  1713. \end{tightlist}
  1714. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  1715. %% commented out for anonymous submission
  1716. %\Section{Acknowledgments}
  1717. % Peter Palfrader, Geoff Goodell, Adam Shostack, Joseph Sokol-Margolis
  1718. % for editing and comments
  1719. % Bram Cohen for congestion control discussions
  1720. % Adam Back for suggesting telescoping circuits
  1721. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  1722. \bibliographystyle{latex8}
  1723. \bibliography{tor-design}
  1724. \end{document}
  1725. % Style guide:
  1726. % U.S. spelling
  1727. % avoid contractions (it's, can't, etc.)
  1728. % prefer ``for example'' or ``such as'' to e.g.
  1729. % prefer ``that is'' to i.e.
  1730. % 'mix', 'mixes' (as noun)
  1731. % 'mix-net'
  1732. % 'mix', 'mixing' (as verb)
  1733. % 'middleman' [Not with a hyphen; the hyphen has been optional
  1734. % since Middle English.]
  1735. % 'nymserver'
  1736. % 'Cypherpunk', 'Cypherpunks', 'Cypherpunk remailer'
  1737. % 'Onion Routing design', 'onion router' [note capitalization]
  1738. % 'SOCKS'
  1739. % Try not to use \cite as a noun.
  1740. % 'Authorizating' sounds great, but it isn't a word.
  1741. % 'First, second, third', not 'Firstly, secondly, thirdly'.
  1742. % 'circuit', not 'channel'
  1743. % Typography: no space on either side of an em dash---ever.
  1744. % Hyphens are for multi-part words; en dashs imply movement or
  1745. % opposition (The Alice--Bob connection); and em dashes are
  1746. % for punctuation---like that.
  1747. % A relay cell; a control cell; a \emph{create} cell; a
  1748. % \emph{relay truncated} cell. Never ``a \emph{relay truncated}.''
  1749. %
  1750. % 'Substitute ``Damn'' every time you're inclined to write ``very;'' your
  1751. % editor will delete it and the writing will be just as it should be.'
  1752. % -- Mark Twain