tor-parallel-relay-conn/doc/spec/proposals/121-hidden-service-authentication.txt

Filename: 121-hidden-service-authentication.txt
Title: Hidden Service Authentication
Version: $LastChangedRevision$
Last-Modified: $LastChangedDate$
Author: Tobias Kamm, Thomas Lauterbach, Karsten Loesing, Ferdinand Rieger,
        Christoph Weingarten
Created: 10-Sep-2007
Status: Open

Change history:

  26-Sep-2007  Initial proposal for or-dev
  08-Dec-2007  Incorporated comments by Nick posted to or-dev on 10-Oct-2007
  15-Dec-2007  Rewrote complete proposal for better readability, modified
               authentication protocol, merged in personal notes
  24-Dec-2007  Replaced misleading term "authentication" by "authorization"
               and added some clarifications (comments by Sven Kaffille)

Overview:

  This proposal deals with a general infrastructure for performing
  authorization (not necessarily implying authentication) of requests to
  hidden services at three points: (1) when downloading and decrypting
  parts of the hidden service descriptor, (2) at the introduction point,
  and (3) at Bob's onion proxy before contacting the rendezvous point. A
  service provider will be able to restrict access to his service at these
  three points to authorized clients only. Further, the proposal contains a
  first instance of an authorization protocol for the presented
  infrastructure.

  This proposal is based on v2 hidden service descriptors as described in
  proposal 114 and introduced in version 0.2.0.10-alpha.

  The proposal is structured as follows: The next section motivates the
  integration of authorization mechanisms in the hidden service protocol.
  Then we describe a general infrastructure for authorization in hidden
  services, followed by a specific authorization protocol for this
  infrastructure. At the end we discuss a number of attacks and non-attacks
  as well as compatibility issues.

Motivation:

  The major part of hidden services does not require client authorization
  now and won't do so in the future. To the contrary, many clients would
  not want to be (pseudonymously) identifiable by the service (which
  is unavoidable to some extend), but rather use the service
  anonymously. These services are not addressed by this proposal.

  However, there may be certain services which are intended to be accessed
  by a limited set of clients only. A possible application might be a
  wiki or forum that should only be accessible for a closed user group.
  Another, less intuitive example might be a real-time communication
  service, where someone provides a presence and messaging service only to
  his buddies. Finally, a possible application would be a personal home
  server that should be remotely accessed by its owner.

  Performing authorization for a hidden service within the Tor network, as
  proposed here, offers a range of advantages compared to allowing all
  client connections in the first instance and deferring authorization to
  the transported protocol:

  (1) Reduced traffic: Unauthorized requests would be rejected as early as
  possible, thereby reducing the overall traffic in the network generated
  by establishing circuits and sending cells.

  (2) Better protection of service location: Unauthorized clients could not
  force Bob to create circuits to their rendezvous points, thus preventing
  the attack described by Øverlier and Syverson in their paper "Locating
  Hidden Servers" even without the need for guards.

  (3) Hiding activity: Apart from performing the actual authorization, a
  service provider could also hide the mere presence of his service from
  unauthorized clients when not providing hidden service descriptors to
  them and rejecting unauthorized requests already at the introduction
  point (ideally without leaking presence information at any of these
  points).

  (4) Better protection of introduction points: When providing hidden
  service descriptors to authorized clients only and encrypting the
  introduction points as described in proposal 114, the introduction points
  would be unknown to unauthorized clients and thereby protected from DoS
  attacks.

  (5) Protocol independence: Authorization could be performed for all
  transported protocols, regardless of their own capabilities to do so.

  (6) Ease of administration: A service provider running multiple hidden
  services would be able to configure access at a single place uniformly
  instead of doing so for all services separately.

  (7) Optional QoS support: Bob could adapt his node selection algorithm
  for building the circuit to Alice's rendezvous point depending on a
  previously guaranteed QoS level, thus providing better latency or
  bandwidth for selected clients.

  As a disadvantage of performing authorization within the Tor network can
  be seen that a hidden service cannot make use of authorization data in
  the transported protocol. Tor hidden services were designed to be
  independent of the transported protocol. Therefore it's only possible to
  either grant or deny access to the whole service, but not to specific
  resources of the service. 

  Authorization often implies authentication, i.e. proving one's identity.
  However, when performing authorization within the Tor network, untrusted
  points should not gain any useful information about the identities of
  communicating parties, neither server nor client. A crucial challenge is
  to remain anonymous towards directory servers and introduction points.
  However, trying to hide identity from the hidden service is a futile
  task, because a client would never know if he is the only authorized
  client and therefore perfectly identifiable. Therefore, hiding identity
  from the hidden service is not aimed by this proposal.

  The current implementation of hidden services does not provide any kind
  of authorization. The hidden service descriptor version 2, introduced by
  proposal 114, was designed to use a descriptor cookie for downloading and
  decrypting parts of the descriptor content, but this feature is not yet
  in use. Further, most relevant cell formats specified in rend-spec
  contain fields for authorization data, but those fields are neither
  implemented nor do they suffice entirely.

Details:

  1  General infrastructure for authorization to hidden services 

  We spotted three possible authorization points in the hidden service
  protocol:

    (1) when downloading and decrypting parts of the hidden service
        descriptor,
    (2) at the introduction point, and
    (3) at Bob's onion proxy before contacting the rendezvous point.

  The general idea of this proposal is to allow service providers to
  restrict access to all of these points to authorized clients only.

  1.1  Client authorization at directory

  Since the implementation of proposal 114 it is possible to combine a
  hidden service descriptor with a so-called descriptor cookie. If done so,
  the descriptor cookie becomes part of the descriptor ID, thus having an
  effect on the storage location of the descriptor. Someone who has learned
  about a service, but is not aware of the descriptor cookie, won't be able
  to determine the descriptor ID and download the current hidden service
  descriptor; he won't even know whether the service has uploaded a
  descriptor recently. Descriptor IDs are calculated as follows (see
  section 1.2 of rend-spec for the complete specification of v2 hidden
  service descriptors):

      descriptor-id =
          H(permanent-id | H(time-period | descriptor-cookie | replica))

  The second purpose of the descriptor cookie is to encrypt the list of
  introduction points, including optional authorization data. Hence, the
  hidden service directories won't learn any introduction information from
  storing a hidden service descriptor. This feature is implemented but
  unused at the moment, so that this proposal will harness the advantages
  of proposal 114.

  The descriptor cookie can be used for authorization by keeping it secret
  from everyone but authorized clients. A service could then decide whether
  to publish hidden service descriptors using that descriptor cookie later
  on. An authorized client being aware of the descriptor cookie would be
  able to download and decrypt the hidden service descriptor.

  The number of concurrently used descriptor cookies for one hidden service
  is not restricted. A service could use a single descriptor cookie for all
  users, a distinct cookie per user, or something in between, like one
  cookie per group of users. It is up to the specific protocol and how it
  is applied by a service provider. However, we advise to use a small
  number of descriptor cookies for efficiency reasons and for improving the
  ability to hide presence of a service (see security implications at the
  end of this document).

  Although this part of the proposal is meant to describe a general
  infrastructure for authorization, changing the way of using the
  descriptor cookie to look up hidden service descriptors, e.g. applying
  some sort of asymmetric crypto system, would require in-depth changes
  that would be incompatible to v2 hidden service descriptors. On the
  contrary, using another key for en-/decrypting the introduction point
  part of a hidden service descriptor, e.g. a different symmetric key or
  asymmetric encryption, would be easy to implement and compatible to v2
  hidden service descriptors as understood by hidden service directories
  (clients and servers would have to be upgraded anyway for using the new
  features).

  1.2  Client authorization at introduction point

  The next possible authorization point after downloading and decrypting
  a hidden service descriptor is the introduction point. It is important
  for authorization, because it bears the last chance of hiding presence
  of a hidden service from unauthorized clients. Further, performing
  authorization at the introduction point might reduce traffic in the
  network, because unauthorized requests would not be passed to the
  hidden service. This applies to those clients who are aware of a
  descriptor cookie and thereby of the hidden service descriptor, but do
  not have authorization data to pass the introduction point or access the
  service (such a situation might occur when authorization data for
  authorization at the directory is not issued on a per-user base as
  opposed to authorization data for authorization at the introduction
  point).

  It is important to note that the introduction point must be considered
  untrustworthy, and therefore cannot replace authorization at the hidden
  service itself. Nor should the introduction point learn any sensitive
  identifiable information from either server or client.

  In order to perform authorization at the introduction point, three
  message formats need to be modified: (1) v2 hidden service descriptors,
  (2) ESTABLISH_INTRO cells, and (3) INTRODUCE1 cells.

  A v2 hidden service descriptor needs to contain authorization data that
  is introduction-point-specific and sometimes also authorization data
  that is introduction-point-independent. Therefore, v2 hidden service
  descriptors as specified in section 1.2 of rend-spec already contain two
  reserved fields "intro-authorization" and "service-authorization"
  (originally, the names of these fields were "...-authentication")
  containing an authorization type number and arbitrary authorization
  data. We propose that authorization data consists of base64 encoded
  objects of arbitrary length, surrounded by "-----BEGIN MESSAGE-----" and
  "-----END MESSAGE-----". This will increase the size of hidden service
  descriptors, which however is possible, as there is no strict upper
  limit.

  The current ESTABLISH_INTRO cells as described in section 1.3 of
  rend-spec don't contain either authorization data or version
  information. Therefore, we propose a new version 1 of the ESTABLISH_INTRO
  cells adding these two issues as follows:

     V      Format byte: set to 255               [1 octet]
     V      Version byte: set to 1                [1 octet]
     KL     Key length                           [2 octets]
     PK     Bob's public key                    [KL octets]
     HS     Hash of session info                [20 octets]
     AUTHT  The auth type that is supported       [1 octet]
     AUTHL  Length of auth data                  [2 octets]
     AUTHD  Auth data                            [variable]
     SIG    Signature of above information       [variable]

  From the format it is possible to determine the maximum allowed size for
  authorization data: given the fact that cells are 512 octets long, of
  which 498 octets are usable (see section 6.1 of tor-spec), and assuming
  1024 bit = 128 octet long keys, there are 215 octets left for
  authorization data. Hence, authorization protocols are bound to use no
  more than these 215 octets, regardless of the number of clients that
  shall be authenticated at the introduction point. Otherwise, one would
  need to send multiple ESTABLISH_INTRO cells or split them up, what we do
  not specify here.

  In order to understand a v1 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, the implementation of
  a relay must have a certain Tor version, which would probably be some
  0.2.1.x. Hidden services need to be able to distinguish relays being
  capable of understanding the new v1 cell formats and perform
  authorization. We propose to use the version number that is contained in
  networkstatus documents to find capable introduction points.

  The current INTRODUCE1 cells as described in section 1.8 of rend-spec is
  not designed to carry authorization data and has no version number, too.
  We propose the following version 1 of INTRODUCE1 cells:

  Cleartext
     V      Version byte: set to 1                [1 octet]
     PK_ID  Identifier for Bob's PK             [20 octets]
     AUTHT  The auth type that is supported       [1 octet]
     AUTHL  Length of auth data                  [2 octets]
     AUTHD  Auth data                            [variable]
  Encrypted to Bob's PK:
     (RELAY_INTRODUCE2 cell)

  The maximum length of contained authorization data depends on the length
  of the contained INTRODUCE2 cell. A calculation follows below when
  describing the INTRODUCE2 cell format we propose to use.

  Unfortunately, v0 INTRODUCE1 cells consist only of a fixed-size,
  seemingly random PK_ID, followed by the encrypted INTRODUCE2 cell. This
  makes it impossible to distinguish v0 INTRODUCE1 cells from any later
  format. In particular, it is not possible to introduce some kind of
  format and version byte for newer versions of this cell. That's probably
  where the comment "[XXX011 want to put intro-level auth info here, but no
  version. crap. -RD]" that was part of rend-spec some time ago comes from.

  Processing of v1 INTRODUCE1 cells therefore requires knowledge about the
  context in which they are used. As a result, we propose that when
  receiving a v1 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, an introduction point only accepts
  v1 INTRODUCE1 cells later on. Hence, the same introduction point cannot
  be used to accept both v0 and v1 INTRODUCE1 cells for the same service.
  (Another solution would be to distinguish v0 and v1 INTRODUCE1 cells by
  their size, as v0 INTRODUCE1 cells can only have specific cell sizes,
  depending on the version of the contained INTRODUCE2 cell; however, this
  approach does not appear very clean.)

  1.3  Client authorization at hidden service

  The time when a hidden service receives an INTRODUCE2 cell constitutes
  the last possible authorization point during the hidden service
  protocol. Performing authorization here is easier than at the other two
  authorization points, because there are no possibly untrusted entities
  involved.

  In general, a client that is successfully authorized at the introduction
  point should be granted access at the hidden service, too. Otherwise, the
  client would receive a positive INTRODUCE_ACK cell from the introduction
  point and conclude that it may connect to the service, but the request
  will be dropped without notice. This would appear as a failure to
  clients. Therefore, the number of cases in which a client successfully
  passes the introduction point, but fails at the hidden service should be
  zero. However, this does not lead to the conclusion, that the
  authorization data used at the introduction point and the hidden service
  must be the same, but only that both authorization data should lead to
  the same authorization result.

  Authorization data is transmitted from client to server via an
  INTRODUCE2 cell that is forwarded by the introduction point. There are
  versions 0 to 2 specified in section 1.8 of rend-spec, but none of these
  contains fields for carrying authorization data. We propose a slightly
  modified version of v3 INTRODUCE2 cells that is specified in section
  1.8.1 and which is not implemented as of December 2007. The only change
  is to switch the lengths of AUTHT and AUTHL, which we assume to be a typo
  in current rend-spec. The proposed format of v3 INTRODUCE2 cells is as
  follows:

     VER    Version byte: set to 3.               [1 octet]
     ATYPE  An address type (typically 4)         [1 octet]
     ADDR   Rendezvous point's IP address  [4 or 16 octets]
     PORT   Rendezvous point's OR port           [2 octets]
     AUTHT  The auth type that is supported       [1 octet]
     AUTHL  Length of auth data                  [2 octets]
     AUTHD  Auth data                            [variable]
     ID     Rendezvous point identity ID        [20 octets]
     KLEN   Length of onion key                  [2 octets]
     KEY    Rendezvous point onion key        [KLEN octets]
     RC     Rendezvous cookie                   [20 octets]
     g^x    Diffie-Hellman data, part 1        [128 octets]

  The maximum possible length of authorization data is related to the
  enclosing INTRODUCE1 cell. A v3 INTRODUCE2 cell with IPv6 address and
  1024 bit = 128 octets long public keys without any authorization data
  occupies 321 octets, plus 58 octets for hybrid public key encryption (see
  section 5.1 of tor-spec on hybrid encryption of CREATE cells). The
  surrounding v1 INTRODUCE1 cell requires 24 octets. This leaves only 95
  of the 498 available octets free, which must be shared between
  authorization data to the introduction point _and_ to the hidden
  service.

  When receiving a v3 INTRODUCE2 cell, Bob checks whether a client has
  provided valid authorization data to him. He will only then build a
  circuit to the provided rendezvous point and otherwise will drop the
  cell.

  There might be several attacks based on the idea of replaying existing
  cells to the hidden service. In particular, someone (the introduction
  point or an evil authenticated client) might replay valid INTRODUCE2
  cells to make the hidden service build an arbitrary number of circuits to
  (maybe long gone) rendezvous points. Therefore, we propose that hidden
  services maintain a history of received INTRODUCE2 cells within the last
  hour and only accept INTRODUCE2 cells matching the following rules:

    (1) a maximum of 3 cells coming from the same client and containing the
        same rendezvous cookie, and
    (2) a maximum of 10 cells coming from the same client with different
        rendezvous cookies.

  This allows a client to retry connection establishment using the same
  rendezvous point for 3 times and a total number of 10 connection
  establishments (not requests in the transported protocol) per hour.

  1.4  Summary of authorization data fields

  In summary, the proposed descriptor format and cell formats provide the
  following fields for carrying authorization data:

  (1) The v2 hidden service descriptor contains:
      - a descriptor cookie that is used for the lookup process, and
      - an arbitrary encryption schema to ensure authorization to access
        introduction information (currently symmetric encryption with the
        descriptor cookie).

  (2) For performing authorization at the introduction point we can use:
      - the fields intro-authorization and service-authorization in
        hidden service descriptors,
      - a maximum of 215 octets in the ESTABLISH_INTRO cell, and
      - one part of 95 octets in the INTRODUCE1 cell.

  (3) For performing authorization at the hidden service we can use:
      - the fields intro-authorization and service-authorization in
        hidden service descriptors,
      - the other part of 95 octets in the INTRODUCE2 cell.

  It will also still be possible to access a hidden service without any
  authorization or only use a part of the authorization infrastructure.
  However, this requires to consider all parts of the infrastructure. For
  example, authorization at the introduction point relying on confidential
  intro-authorization data transported in the hidden service descriptor
  cannot be performed without using an encryption schema for introduction
  information.

  1.5  Managing authorization data at servers and clients

  In order to provide authorization data at the hidden server and the
  authenticated clients, we propose to use files---either the tor
  configuration file or separate files. In the latter case a hidden server
  would use one file per provided service, and a client would use one file
  per server she wants to access. The exact format of these special files
  depends on the authorization protocol used.

  Currently, rend-spec contains the proposition to encode client-side
  authorization data in the URL, like in x.y.z.onion. This was never used
  and is also a bad idea, because in case of HTTP the requested URL may be
  contained in the Host and Referer fields.

  2  An authorization protocol based on group and user passwords

  In the following we discuss an authorization protocol for the proposed
  authorization architecture that performs authorization at all three
  proposed authorization points. The protocol relies on two symmetrically
  shared keys: a group key and a user key. The reason for this separation
  as compared to using a single key for each user is the fact that the
  number of descriptor cookies should be limited, so that the group key
  will be used for authenticating at the directory, whereas two keys
  derived from the user key will be used for performing authorization at
  the introduction and the hidden service.

  2.1  Client authorization at directory

  The server creates groups of users that shall be able to access his
  service. He provides all users of a certain group with the same group key
  which is a password of arbitrary length.

  The group key is used as input to derive a 128 bit descriptor cookie from
  it. We propose to apply a secure hash function and use the first 128 bits
  of output:

     descriptor-cookie = H(group-key)

  Hence, there will be a distinct hidden service descriptor for every group
  of users. All descriptors contain the same introduction points and the
  authorization data required by the users of the given group. Whenever a
  server decides to remove authorization for a group, he can simply stop
  publishing hidden service descriptors using the descriptor cookie.

  2.2  Client authorization at introduction point

  The idea for authenticating at the introduction point is borrowed from
  authorization at the rendezvous point using a rendezvous cookie. A
  rendezvous cookie is created by the client and encrypted for the server
  in order to authenticate the server at the rendezvous point. Likewise,
  the so-called introduction cookie is created by the server and encrypted
  for the client in order to authenticate the client at the introduction
  point.

  More precise, the server creates a new introduction cookie when
  establishing an introduction point and includes it in the ESTABLISH_INTRO
  cell that it sends to the introduction point. This introduction cookie
  will be used by all clients during the complete time of using this
  introduction point. The server then encrypts the introduction cookie for
  all authorized clients (as described in the next paragraph) and includes
  it in the introduction-point-specific part of the hidden service
  descriptor. A client reads and decrypts the introduction cookie from the
  hidden service descriptor and includes it in the INTRODUCE1 cell that it
  sends to the introduction point. The introduction point can then compare
  the introduction cookie included in the INTRODUCE1 cell with the value
  that it previously received in the ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. If both values
  match, the introduction point passes the INTRODUCE2 cell to the hidden
  service.

  For the sake of simplicity, the size of an introduction cookie should be
  only 16 bytes so that they can be encrypted using AES-128 without using
  a block mode. Although rendezvous cookies are 20 bytes long, the 16 bytes
  of an introduction cookie should still provide similar, or at least
  sufficient security.

  Encryption of the introduction cookie is done on a per user base. Every
  client shares a password of arbitrary length with the server, which is
  the so-called user key. The server derives a symmetric key from the
  client's user key by applying a secure hash function and using the first
  128 bits of output as follows:

     encryption-key = H(user-key | "INTRO")

  It is important that the encryption key does not allow any inference on
  the user key, because the latter will also be used for authorization at
  the hidden service. This is ensured by applying the secure one-way
  function H.

  The 16 bytes long, symmetrically encrypted introduction cookies are
  encoded in binary form in the authorization data object of a hidden
  service descriptor. Additionally, for every client there is a 20 byte
  long client identifier that is also derived from the user key, so that
  the client can identify which value to decrypt. The client identifier is
  determined as follows:

     client-id = H(user-key | "CLIENT")

  The authorization data encoded to the hidden service descriptor consists
  of the concatenation of pairs consisting of 20 byte client identifiers
  and 16 byte encrypted introduction cookies. The authorization type
  number for the encrypted introduction cookies as well as for
  ESTABLISH_INTRO and INTRODUCE1 cells is "1".

  2.3  Client authorization at hidden service

  Authorization at the hidden service also makes use of the user key,
  because whoever is authorized to pass the introduction point shall be
  authorized to access the hidden service. Therefore, the server and client
  derive a common value from the user key, which is called service cookie
  and which is 20 bytes long:

     service-cookie = H(user-key | "SERVICE")

  The client is supposed to include this service cookie, preceded by the 20
  bytes long client ID, in INTRODUCE2 cells that it sends to the server.
  The server compares authorization data of incoming INTRODUCE2 cells with
  the locally stored value that it would expect. The authorization type
  number of this protocol for INTRODUCE2 cells is "1".

  Passing a derived value of a client's user key will make clients
  identifiable to the hidden service. Although there might be ways to limit
  identifiability, an authorized client can never be sure that he stays
  anonymous to the hidden service. For example, if we created a service
  cookie that is the same for all users and encrypted it for all users, and
  if we further included a checksum of this service cookie in the
  descriptor to prove that all users have the same value, a client would
  never know if he is the only valid user contained in this descriptor,
  with the other users only be fakes created by the hidden service.
  Therefore, we did not make attempts to hide a client's identity from a
  hidden service. Another reason was that we would not be able to apply a
  connection limit of 10 requests per hour and user that helps prevent some
  threats.

  2.4  Providing authorization data

  The authorization data that needs to be provided by servers consists of
  a number of group keys, each having a number of user keys assigned. These
  data items could be provided by two new configuration options
  "HiddenServiceAuthGroup group-name group-key" and "HiddenServiceAuthUser
  user-name user-key" with the semantics that a group contains all users
  directly following the group key definition and before reaching the next
  group key definition for a hidden service.

  On client side, authorization data also consists of a group and a user
  key. Therefore, a new configuration option "HiddenServiceAuthClient
  onion-address group-key user-key" could be introduced that could be
  written to any place in the configuration file. Whenever the user would
  try to access the given onion address, the given group and user key
  would be used for authorization.

Security implications:

  In the following we want to discuss attacks and non-attacks by dishonest
  entities in the presented infrastructure and specific protocol. These
  security implications would have to be verified once more when adding
  another protocol. The dishonest entities (theoretically) include the
  hidden server itself, the authenticated clients, hidden service directory
  nodes, introduction points, and rendezvous points. The relays that are
  part of circuits used during protocol execution, but never learn about
  the exchanged descriptors or cells by design, are not considered.
  Obviously, this list makes no claim to be complete. The discussed attacks
  are sorted by the difficulty to perform them, in ascending order,
  starting with roles that everyone could attempt to take and ending with
  partially trusted entities abusing the trust put in them.

  (1) A hidden service directory could attempt to conclude presence of a
  server from the existence of a locally stored hidden service descriptor:
  This passive attack is possible, because descriptors need to contain a
  publicly visible signature of the server (see proposal 114 for a more
  extensive discussion of the v2 descriptor format). A possible protection
  would be to reduce the number of concurrently used descriptor cookies and
  increase the number of hidden service directories in the network.

  (2) A hidden service directory could try to break the descriptor cookies
  of locally stored descriptors: This attack can be performed offline. The
  only useful countermeasure against it might be using safe passwords that
  are generated by Tor.

  (3) An introduction point could try to identify the pseudonym of the
  hidden service on behalf of which it operates: This is impossible by
  design, because the service uses a fresh public key for every
  establishment of an introduction point (see proposal 114) and the
  introduction point receives a fresh introduction cookie, so that there is
  no identifiable information about the service that the introduction point
  could learn. The introduction point cannot even tell if client accesses
  belong to the same client or not, nor can it know the total number of
  authorized clients. The only information might be the pattern of
  anonymous client accesses, but that is hardly enough to reliably identify
  a specific server.

  (4) An introduction point could want to learn the identities of accessing
  clients: This is also impossible by design, because all clients use the
  same introduction cookie for authorization at the introduction point.

  (5) An introduction point could try to replay a correct INTRODUCE1 cell
  to other introduction points of the same service, e.g. in order to force
  the service to create a huge number of useless circuits: This attack is
  not possible by design, because INTRODUCE1 cells need to contain an
  introduction cookie that is different for every introduction point.

  (6) An introduction point could attempt to replay a correct INTRODUCE2
  cell to the hidden service, e.g. for the same reason as in the last
  attack: This attack is very limited by the fact that a server will only
  accept 3 INTRODUCE2 cells containing the same rendezvous cookie and drop
  all further replayed cells.

  (7) An introduction point could block client requests by sending either
  positive or negative INTRODUCE_ACK cells back to the client, but without
  forwarding INTRODUCE2 cells to the server: This attack is an annoyance
  for clients, because they might wait for a timeout to elapse until trying
  another introduction point. However, this attack is not introduced by
  performing authorization and it cannot be targeted towards a specific
  client. A countermeasure might be for the server to periodically perform
  introduction requests to his own service to see if introduction points
  are working correctly.

  (8) The rendezvous point could attempt to identify either server or
  client: No, this remains impossible as it was before, because the
  rendezvous cookie does not contain any identifiable information.

  (9) An authenticated client could try to break the encryption keys of the
  other authenticated clients that have their introduction cookies
  encrypted in the hidden service descriptor: This known-plaintext attack
  can be performed offline. The only useful countermeasure against it could
  be safe passwords that are generated by Tor. However, the attack would
  not be very useful as long as encryption keys do not reveal information
  on the contained user key.

  (10) An authenticated client could swamp the server with valid INTRODUCE1
  and INTRODUCE2 cells, e.g. in order to force the service to create
  useless circuits to rendezvous points; as opposed to an introduction
  point replaying the same INTRODUCE2 cell, a client could include a new
  rendezvous cookie for every request: The countermeasure for this attack
  is the restriction to 10 connection establishments per client and hour.

  (11) An authenticated client could attempt to break the service cookie of
  another authenticated client to obtain access at the hidden service: This
  requires a brute-force online attack. There are no countermeasures
  provided, but the question arises whether the outcome of this attack is
  worth the cost. The service cookie from one authenticated client is as
  good as from another, with the only exception of possible better QoS
  properties of certain clients.

Compatibility:

  An implementation of this proposal would require changes to hidden
  servers and clients to process authorization data and encode and
  understand the new formats. However, both servers and clients would
  remain compatible to regular hidden services without authorization.

  Further, the implementation of introduction points would have to be
  changed, so that they understand the new cell versions and perform
  authorization. But again, the new introduction points would remain
  compatible to the existing hidden service protocol.