tor-parallel-relay-conn/doc/incentives.txt

                 Tor Incentives Design Brainstorms

1. Goals: what do we want to achieve with an incentive scheme?

1.1. Encourage users to provide good relay service (throughput, latency).
1.2. Encourage users to allow traffic to exit the Tor network from
     their node.

2. Approaches to learning who should get priority.

2.1. "Hard" or quantitative reputation tracking.

   In this design, we track the number of bytes and throughput in and
   out of nodes we interact with. When a node asks to send or receive
   bytes, we provide service proportional to our current record of the
   node's value. One approach is to let each circuit be either a normal
   circuit or a premium circuit, and nodes can "spend" their value by
   sending and receiving bytes on premium circuits: see section 4.1 for
   details of this design. Another approach (section 4.2) would treat
   all traffic from the node with the same priority class, and so nodes
   that provide resources will get and provide better service on average.

2.2. "Soft" or qualitative reputation tracking.

   Rather than accounting for every byte (if I owe you a byte, I don't
   owe it anymore once you've spent it), instead I keep a general opinion
   about each server: my opinion increases when they do good work for me,
   and it decays with time, but it does not decrease as they send traffic.
   Therefore we reward servers who provide value to the system without
   nickle and diming them at each step. We also let them benefit from
   relaying traffic for others without having to "reserve" some of the
   payment for their own use. See section 4.3 for a possible design.

2.3. Centralized opinions from the reputation servers.

   The above approaches are complex and we don't have all the answers
   for them yet. A simpler approach is just to let some central set
   of trusted servers (say, the Tor directory servers) measure whether
   people are contributing to the network, and provide a signal about
   which servers should be rewarded. They can even do the measurements
   via Tor so servers can't easily perform only when they're being
   tested. See section 4.4.

2.4. Reputation servers that aggregate opinions.

   The option above has the directory servers doing all of the
   measurements. This doesn't scale. We can set it up so we have "deputy
   testers" -- trusted other nodes that do performance testing and report
   their results. If we want to be really adventurous, we could even
   accept claims from every Tor user and build a complex weighting /
   reputation system to decide which claims are "probably" right.

3. Related issues we need to keep in mind.

3.1. Relay and exit needs to be easy and usable.

   Implicit in all of the above designs is the need to make it easy to
   run a Tor server out of the box. We need to make it stable on all
   common platforms (including XP), it needs to detect its available
   bandwidth and not overreach that, and it needs to help the operator
   through opening up ports on his firewall. Then we need a slick GUI
   that lets people click a button or two rather than editing text files.

   Once we've done all this, we'll need to face the big question: is
   most of the barrier to growth caused by the unusability of the current
   software? If so, are the rest of these incentive schemes superfluous?

3.2. The network effect: how many nodes will you interact with?

   One of the concerns with pairwise reputation systems is that as the
   network gets thousands of servers, the chance that you're going to
   interact with a given server decreases. So if in 90% of interactions
   you're acting for the first time, the "local" incentive schemes above
   are going to degrade. This doesn't mean they're pointless -- it just
   means we need to be aware that this is a limitation, and plan in the
   background for what step to take next.

3.3. Guard nodes

   As of Tor 0.1.1.11, Tor users pick from a small set of semi-permanent
   "guard nodes" for their first hop of each circuit. This seems to have
   a big impact on pairwise reputation systems since you will only be
   cashing in on your reputation to a few people, and it is unlikely
   that a given pair of nodes will both use the other as guard nodes.

   What does this imply? For one, it means that we don't care at all
   about the opinions of most of the servers out there -- we should
   focus on keeping our guard nodes happy with us.

   One conclusion from that is that our design needs to judge performance
   not just through direct interaction (beginning of the circuit) but
   also through indirect interaction (middle of the circuit). That way
   you can never be sure when your guards are measuring you.

3.4. Restricted topology: benefits and roadmap.

   As the Tor network continues to grow, we will make design changes
   to the network topology so that each node does not need to maintain
   connections to an unbounded number of other nodes.

   A special case here is the social network.

3.5. Profit-maximizing vs. Altruism.

   There are some interesting game theory questions here.

   First, in a volunteer culture, success is measured in public utility
   or in public esteem. If we add a reward mechanism, there's a risk that
   reward-maximizing behavior will surpass utility- or esteem-maximizing
   behavior.

   Specifically, if most of our servers right now are relaying traffic
   for the good of the community, we may actually *lose* those volunteers
   if we turn the act of relaying traffic into a selfish act.

   I am not too worried about this issue for now, since we're aiming
   for an incentive scheme so effective that it produces thousands of
   new servers.

4. Sample designs.

4.1. Two classes of service for circuits.

4.2. Treat all the traffic from the node with the same service;
     hard reputation system.

4.3. Treat all the traffic from the node with the same service;
     soft reputation system.

4.4. Centralized opinions from the reputation servers.

5. Types of attacks.

5.1. Anonymity attacks: