tor-design.tex 109 KB

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  27. \begin{document}
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  34. \title{Tor: Design of a Second-Generation Onion Router}
  35. %\author{Roger Dingledine \\ The Free Haven Project \\ arma@freehaven.net \and
  36. %Nick Mathewson \\ The Free Haven Project \\ nickm@freehaven.net \and
  37. %Paul Syverson \\ Naval Research Lab \\ syverson@itd.nrl.navy.mil}
  38. \maketitle
  39. \thispagestyle{empty}
  40. \begin{abstract}
  41. We present Tor, a circuit-based low-latency anonymous communication
  42. system. Tor is the successor to Onion Routing
  43. and addresses many limitations in the original Onion Routing design.
  44. Tor works in a real-world Internet environment,
  45. % it's user-space too
  46. requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and
  47. provides a reasonable tradeoff between anonymity and usability/efficiency
  48. %protects against known anonymity-breaking attacks as well
  49. %as or better than other systems with similar design parameters.
  50. % and we present a big list of open problems at the end
  51. % and we present a new practical design for rendezvous points
  52. \end{abstract}
  53. %\begin{center}
  54. %\textbf{Keywords:} anonymity, peer-to-peer, remailer, nymserver, reply block
  55. %\end{center}
  56. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  57. \Section{Overview}
  58. \label{sec:intro}
  59. Onion Routing is a distributed overlay network designed to anonymize
  60. low-latency TCP-based applications such as web browsing, secure shell,
  61. and instant messaging. Clients choose a path through the network and
  62. build a \emph{virtual circuit}, in which each node (or ``onion router'')
  63. in the path knows its
  64. predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down the circuit
  65. is sent in fixed-size \emph{cells}, which are unwrapped by a symmetric key
  66. at each node (like the layers of an onion) and relayed downstream. The
  67. original Onion Routing project published several design and analysis
  68. papers
  69. \cite{or-ih96,or-jsac98,or-discex00,or-pet00}. While
  70. a wide area Onion Routing network was deployed for some weeks,
  71. the only long-running and publicly accessible
  72. implementation was a fragile proof-of-concept that ran on a single
  73. machine.
  74. % (which nonetheless processed several tens of thousands of connections
  75. %daily from thousands of global users).
  76. %%Do we really want to say this? It softens our motivation for the paper. -RD
  77. %
  78. % In general, I try to emphasize rather than understate past
  79. % accomplishments so I am giving an accurate comparison,
  80. % which strengthens the claims in the paper. This is true whether
  81. % it is my work or someone else's.
  82. % This is also the only experimental basic viability result we
  83. % can point to for Onion Routing in general at this point. -PS
  84. Many critical design and deployment issues were never resolved,
  85. and the design has not been updated in several years.
  86. Here we describe Tor, a protocol for asynchronous, loosely
  87. federated onion routers that provides the following improvements over
  88. the old Onion Routing design:
  89. \begin{tightlist}
  90. \item \textbf{Perfect forward secrecy:} The original Onion Routing
  91. design was vulnerable to a single hostile node recording traffic and later
  92. compromising successive nodes in the circuit and forcing them to
  93. decrypt it.
  94. Rather than using a single onion to lay each circuit,
  95. Tor now uses an incremental or \emph{telescoping}
  96. path-building design, where the initiator negotiates session keys with
  97. each successive hop in the circuit. Once these keys are deleted,
  98. subsequently compromised nodes cannot decrypt old traffic.
  99. As a side benefit, onion replay detection is no longer
  100. necessary, and the process of building circuits is more reliable, since
  101. the initiator knows when a hop fails and can then try extending to a new node.
  102. % Perhaps mention that not all of these are things that we invented. -NM
  103. \item \textbf{Separation of protocol cleaning from anonymity:}
  104. The original Onion Routing design required a separate ``application
  105. proxy'' for each
  106. supported application protocol---most
  107. of which were never written, so many applications were never supported.
  108. Tor uses the standard and near-ubiquitous SOCKS
  109. \cite{socks4,socks5} proxy interface, allowing us to support most TCP-based
  110. programs without modification. This design change allows Tor to
  111. use the filtering features of privacy-enhancing
  112. application-level proxies such as Privoxy \cite{privoxy} without having to
  113. incorporate those features itself.
  114. \item \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} The original
  115. Onion Routing design built a separate circuit for each application-level
  116. request.
  117. This hurt performance by requiring multiple public key operations for
  118. every request, and also presented
  119. a threat to anonymity from building so many different circuits; see
  120. Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}.
  121. Tor multiplexes multiple TCP streams along each virtual
  122. circuit, to improve efficiency and anonymity.
  123. \item \textbf{No mixing, padding, or traffic shaping:} The original
  124. Onion Routing design called for batching and reordering the cells arriving
  125. from each circuit and the ability to do padding between onion routers and,
  126. in a later design, between onion
  127. proxies (that is, users) and onion routers \cite{or-ih96,or-jsac98}.
  128. The tradeoff between padding protection and cost was discussed, but no
  129. general padding scheme was suggested. In
  130. \cite{or-pet00} it was theorized \emph{traffic shaping} would generally
  131. be used, but details were not provided.
  132. Recent research \cite{econymics} and deployment
  133. experience \cite{freedom21-security} suggest that this level of resource
  134. use is not practical or economical; and even full link padding is still
  135. vulnerable \cite{defensive-dropping}. Thus, until we have a proven and
  136. convenient design for traffic shaping or low-latency mixing that
  137. will improve anonymity against a realistic adversary, we leave these
  138. strategies out.
  139. \item \textbf{Leaky-pipe circuit topology:} Through in-band
  140. signalling within the
  141. circuit, Tor initiators can direct traffic to nodes partway down the
  142. circuit. This allows for long-range padding to frustrate traffic
  143. shape and volume attacks at the initiator \cite{defensive-dropping}.
  144. Because circuits are used by more than one application, it also
  145. allows traffic to exit the circuit from the middle---thus
  146. frustrating traffic shape and volume attacks based on observing the
  147. end of the circuit.
  148. \item \textbf{Congestion control:} Earlier anonymity designs do not
  149. address traffic bottlenecks. Unfortunately, typical approaches to load
  150. balancing and flow control in overlay networks involve inter-node control
  151. communication and global views of traffic. Tor's decentralized congestion
  152. control uses end-to-end acks to maintain reasonable anonymity while
  153. allowing nodes
  154. at the edges of the network to detect congestion or flooding attacks
  155. and send less data until the congestion subsides.
  156. \item \textbf{Directory servers:} The original Onion Routing design
  157. planned to flood link-state information through the network---an
  158. approach which can be unreliable and
  159. open to partitioning attacks or outright deception. Tor takes a simplified
  160. view towards distributing link-state information. Certain more trusted
  161. onion routers also act as directory servers: they provide signed
  162. \emph{directories} which describe the routers they know about and mark
  163. those that
  164. are currently up. Users periodically download these directories via HTTP.
  165. \item \textbf{End-to-end integrity checking:} The original Onion Routing
  166. design did no integrity checking on data. Any onion router on the circuit
  167. could change the contents of cells as they pass by---for example, to
  168. redirect a
  169. connection on the fly so it connects to a different webserver, or to
  170. tag encrypted traffic and look for the tagged traffic at the network
  171. edges \cite{minion-design}. Tor hampers these attacks by checking data
  172. integrity before it leaves the network.
  173. \item \textbf{Robustness to failed nodes:} A failed node in the old design
  174. meant that circuit-building failed, but thanks to Tor's step-by-step
  175. circuit building, users can notice failed
  176. nodes while building circuits and route around them. Additionally,
  177. liveness information from directories allows users to avoid
  178. unreliable nodes in the first place.
  179. %We further provide a
  180. %simple mechanism that allows connections to be established despite recent
  181. %node failure or slightly dated information from a directory server. Tor
  182. %permits onion routers to have \emph{router twins} --- nodes that share
  183. %the same private decryption key. Note that because connections now have
  184. %perfect forward secrecy, an onion router still cannot read the traffic
  185. %on a connection established through its twin even while that connection
  186. %is active. Also, which nodes are twins can change dynamically depending
  187. %on current circumstances, and twins may or may not be under the same
  188. %administrative authority.
  189. %
  190. %[Commented out; Router twins provide no real increase in robustness
  191. %to failed nodes. If a non-twinned node goes down, the
  192. %circuit-builder notices this and routes around it. Circuit-building
  193. %is offline, so there shouldn't even be a latency hit. -NM]
  194. \item \textbf{Variable exit policies:} Tor provides a consistent
  195. mechanism for
  196. each node to specify and advertise a policy describing the hosts and
  197. ports to which it will connect. These exit policies
  198. are critical in a volunteer-based distributed infrastructure, because
  199. each operator is comfortable with allowing different types of traffic
  200. to exit the Tor network from his node.
  201. \item \textbf{Implementable in user-space:} Unlike other anonymity systems
  202. like Freedom \cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor only attempts to anonymize TCP
  203. streams. Thus it does not require patches to an operating system's network
  204. stack (or built-in support) to operate. Although this approach is less
  205. flexible, it has proven valuable to Tor's portability and deployability.
  206. \item \textbf{Rendezvous points and location-protected servers:}
  207. Tor provides an integrated mechanism for responder anonymity via
  208. location-protected servers. Previous Onion Routing designs included
  209. long-lived ``reply onions'' which could be used to build virtual circuits
  210. to a hidden server, but a reply onion becomes useless if any node in
  211. the path goes down or rotates its keys, and it also does not provide
  212. forward security. In Tor's current design, clients negotiate {\it
  213. rendezvous points} to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no
  214. longer required.
  215. \end{tightlist}
  216. We have implemented most of the above features. Our source code is
  217. available under a free license, and is not encumbered by patents. We have
  218. recently begun deploying a widespread alpha network to see how well the
  219. design works in practice, to get more experience with usability and users,
  220. and to provide a research platform for experimenting with new ideas.
  221. We review previous work in Section~\ref{sec:related-work}, describe
  222. our goals and assumptions in Section~\ref{sec:assumptions},
  223. and then address the above list of improvements in
  224. Sections~\ref{sec:design}-\ref{sec:rendezvous}. We
  225. summarize in Section \ref{sec:analysis}
  226. how our design stands up to known attacks, and conclude with a list of
  227. open problems.
  228. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  229. \Section{Related work}
  230. \label{sec:related-work}
  231. Modern anonymity designs date to Chaum's Mix-Net\cite{chaum-mix} design of
  232. 1981. Chaum proposed hiding sender-recipient linkability by wrapping
  233. messages in layers of public key cryptography, and relaying them
  234. through a path composed of ``Mixes.'' These mixes in turn decrypt, delay,
  235. and re-order messages, before relaying them along the sender-selected
  236. path towards their destinations.
  237. Subsequent relay-based anonymity designs have diverged in two
  238. principal directions. Some have attempted to maximize anonymity at
  239. the cost of introducing comparatively large and variable latencies,
  240. for example, Babel\cite{babel}, Mixmaster\cite{mixmaster-spec}, and
  241. Mixminion\cite{minion-design}. Because of this
  242. trade-off, these \emph{high-latency} networks are well-suited for anonymous
  243. email, but introduce too much lag for interactive tasks such as web browsing,
  244. internet chat, or SSH connections.
  245. Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that attempt
  246. to anonymize interactive network traffic. Because these protocols typically
  247. involve a large number of packets that must be delivered quickly, it is
  248. difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the
  249. communication from correlating the timing and volume
  250. of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These
  251. protocols are also vulnerable against active attacks in which an
  252. adversary introduces timing patterns into traffic entering the network, and
  253. looks
  254. for correlated patterns among exiting traffic.
  255. Although some work has been done to frustrate
  256. these attacks,\footnote{
  257. The most common approach is to pad and limit communication to a constant
  258. rate, or to limit
  259. the variation in traffic shape. Doing so can have prohibitive bandwidth
  260. costs and/or performance limitations.
  261. } most designs protect primarily against traffic analysis rather than traffic
  262. confirmation \cite{or-jsac98}---that is, they assume that the attacker is
  263. attempting to learn who is talking to whom, not to confirm a prior suspicion
  264. about who is talking to whom.
  265. The simplest low-latency designs are single-hop proxies such as the
  266. Anonymizer \cite{anonymizer}, wherein a single trusted server strips the
  267. data's origin before relaying it. These designs are easy to
  268. analyze, but require end-users to trust the anonymizing proxy.
  269. Concentrating the traffic to a single point increases the anonymity set
  270. (the set of people a given user is hiding among), but it can make traffic
  271. analysis easier: an adversary need only eavesdrop on the proxy to observe
  272. the entire system.
  273. More complex are distributed-trust, circuit-based anonymizing systems. In
  274. these designs, a user establishes one or more medium-term bidirectional
  275. end-to-end tunnels to exit servers, and uses those tunnels to deliver
  276. low-latency packets to and from one or more destinations per
  277. tunnel. %XXX reword
  278. Establishing tunnels is expensive and typically
  279. requires public-key cryptography, whereas relaying packets along a tunnel is
  280. comparatively inexpensive. Because a tunnel crosses several servers, no
  281. single server can link a user to her communication partners.
  282. In some distributed-trust systems, such as the Java Anon Proxy (also known
  283. as JAP or Web MIXes), users build their tunnels along a fixed shared route
  284. or \emph{cascade}. As with a single-hop proxy, this approach aggregates
  285. users into larger anonymity sets, but again an attacker only needs to
  286. observe both ends of the cascade to bridge all the system's traffic.
  287. The Java Anon Proxy's design seeks to prevent this by padding
  288. between end users and the head of the cascade \cite{web-mix}. However, the
  289. current implementation does no padding and thus remains vulnerable
  290. to both active and passive bridging.
  291. %XXX fix, yes it does, sort of.
  292. PipeNet \cite{back01, pipenet}, another low-latency design proposed at
  293. about the same time as the original Onion Routing design, provided
  294. stronger anonymity at the cost of allowing a single user to shut
  295. down the network simply by not sending. Low-latency anonymous
  296. communication has also been designed for other environments such as
  297. ISDN \cite{isdn-mixes}.
  298. In P2P designs like Tarzan \cite{tarzan:ccs02} and MorphMix
  299. \cite{morphmix:fc04}, all participants both generate traffic and relay
  300. traffic for others. Rather than aiming to hide the originator within a
  301. group of other originators, these systems instead aim to prevent a peer
  302. or observer from knowing whether a given peer originated the request
  303. or just relayed it from another peer. While Tarzan and MorphMix use
  304. layered encryption as above, Crowds \cite{crowds-tissec} simply assumes
  305. an adversary who cannot observe the initiator: it uses no public-key
  306. encryption, so nodes on a circuit can read that circuit's traffic. The
  307. anonymity of the initiator relies on filtering all identifying information
  308. from the data stream.
  309. Hordes \cite{hordes-jcs} is based on Crowds but also uses multicast
  310. responses to hide the initiator. Herbivore \cite{herbivore} and P5
  311. \cite{p5} go even further, requiring broadcast. Each uses broadcast
  312. in different ways, and trade-offs are made to make broadcast more
  313. practical. Both Herbivore and P5 are designed primarily for communication
  314. between peers, although Herbivore permits external connections by
  315. requesting a peer to serve as a proxy. Allowing easy connections to
  316. nonparticipating responders or recipients is important for usability,
  317. for example so users can visit nonparticipating Web sites or exchange
  318. mail with nonparticipating recipients.
  319. Systems like Freedom and the original Onion Routing build the circuit
  320. all at once, using a layered ``onion'' of public-key encrypted messages,
  321. each layer of which provides a set of session keys and the address of the
  322. next server in the circuit. Tor as described herein, Tarzan, MorphMix,
  323. Cebolla \cite{cebolla}, and AnonNet \cite{anonnet} build the circuit
  324. in stages, extending it one hop at a time. This approach makes perfect
  325. forward secrecy feasible.
  326. Distributed-trust anonymizing systems need to prevent attackers from
  327. adding too many servers and thus compromising too many user paths.
  328. Tor relies on a centrally maintained set of well-known servers. Tarzan
  329. and MorphMix allow unknown users to run servers, and limit an attacker
  330. from becoming too much of the network based on a limited resource such
  331. as number of IPs controlled. Crowds suggests requiring written, notarized
  332. requests from potential crowd members.
  333. Anonymous communication is an essential component of censorship-resistant
  334. systems like Eternity \cite{eternity}, Free Haven \cite{freehaven-berk},
  335. Publius \cite{publius}, and Tangler \cite{tangler}. Tor's rendezvous
  336. points enable connections between mutually anonymous entities; they
  337. are a building block for location-hidden servers, which are needed by
  338. Eternity and Free Haven.
  339. % didn't include rewebbers. No clear place to put them, so I'll leave
  340. % them out for now. -RD
  341. \Section{Design goals and assumptions}
  342. \label{sec:assumptions}
  343. \SubSection{Goals}
  344. Like other low-latency anonymity designs, Tor seeks to frustrate
  345. attackers from linking communication partners, or from linking
  346. multiple communications to or from a single point. Within this
  347. main goal, however, several design considerations have directed
  348. Tor's evolution.
  349. \begin{tightlist}
  350. \item[Deployability:] The design must be one which can be implemented,
  351. deployed, and used in the real world. This requirement precludes designs
  352. that are expensive to run (for example, by requiring more bandwidth than
  353. volunteers are willing to provide); designs that place a heavy liability
  354. burden on operators (for example, by allowing attackers to implicate onion
  355. routers in illegal activities); and designs that are difficult or expensive
  356. to implement (for example, by requiring kernel patches, or separate proxies
  357. for every protocol). This requirement also precludes systems in which
  358. users who do not benefit from anonymity are required to run special
  359. software in order to communicate with anonymous parties.
  360. % Our rendezvous points require clients to use our software to get to
  361. % the location-hidden servers.
  362. % Or at least, they require somebody near the client-side running our
  363. % software. We haven't worked out the details of keeping it transparent
  364. % for Alice if she's using some other http proxy somewhere. I guess the
  365. % external http proxy should route through a Tor client, which automatically
  366. % translates the foo.onion address? -RD
  367. %
  368. % 1. Such clients do benefit from anonymity: they can reach the server.
  369. % Recall that our goal for location hidden servers is to continue to
  370. % provide service to priviliged clients when a DoS is happening or
  371. % to provide access to a location sensitive service. I see no contradiction.
  372. % 2. A good idiot check is whether what we require people to download
  373. % and use is more extreme than downloading the anonymizer toolbar or
  374. % privacy manager. I don't think so, though I'm not claiming we've already
  375. % got the installation and running of a client down to that simplicity
  376. % at this time. -PS
  377. \item[Usability:] A hard-to-use system has fewer users---and because
  378. anonymity systems hide users among users, a system with fewer users
  379. provides less anonymity. Usability is not only a convenience for Tor:
  380. it is a security requirement \cite{econymics,back01}. Tor
  381. should work with most of a user's unmodified applications; shouldn't
  382. introduce prohibitive delays; and should require the user to make as few
  383. configuration decisions as possible.
  384. \item[Flexibility:] The protocol must be flexible and
  385. well-specified, so that it can serve as a test-bed for future research in
  386. low-latency anonymity systems. Many of the open problems in low-latency
  387. anonymity networks (such as generating dummy traffic, or preventing
  388. pseudospoofing attacks) may be solvable independently from the issues
  389. solved by Tor; it would be beneficial if future systems were not forced to
  390. reinvent Tor's design decisions. (But note that while a flexible design
  391. benefits researchers, there is a danger that differing choices of
  392. extensions will render users distinguishable. Thus, experiments
  393. on extensions should be limited and should not significantly affect
  394. the distinguishability of ordinary users.
  395. % To run an experiment researchers must file an
  396. % anonymity impact statement -PS
  397. of implementations should
  398. not permit different protocol extensions to coexist in a single deployed
  399. network.)
  400. \item[Conservative design:] The protocol's design and security parameters
  401. must be conservative. Because additional features impose implementation
  402. and complexity costs, Tor should include as few speculative features as
  403. possible. (We do not oppose speculative designs in general; however, it is
  404. our goal with Tor to embody a solution to the problems in low-latency
  405. anonymity that we can solve today before we plunge into the problems of
  406. tomorrow.)
  407. % This last bit sounds completely cheesy. Somebody should tone it down. -NM
  408. \end{tightlist}
  409. \SubSection{Non-goals}
  410. \label{subsec:non-goals}
  411. In favoring conservative, deployable designs, we have explicitly deferred
  412. a number of goals. Many of these goals are desirable in anonymity systems,
  413. but we choose to defer them either because they are solved elsewhere,
  414. or because they present an area of active research lacking a generally
  415. accepted solution.
  416. \begin{tightlist}
  417. \item[Not Peer-to-peer:] Tarzan and MorphMix aim to
  418. scale to completely decentralized peer-to-peer environments with thousands
  419. of short-lived servers, many of which may be controlled by an adversary.
  420. Because of the many open problems in this approach, Tor uses a more
  421. conservative design.
  422. \item[Not secure against end-to-end attacks:] Tor does not claim to provide a
  423. definitive solution to end-to-end timing or intersection attacks. Some
  424. approaches, such as running an onion router, may help; see
  425. Section~\ref{sec:analysis} for more discussion.
  426. \item[No protocol normalization:] Tor does not provide \emph{protocol
  427. normalization} like Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients
  428. indistinguishable when they use complex and variable protocols such as HTTP,
  429. Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such as Privoxy to hide
  430. differences between clients, expunge protocol features that leak identity,
  431. and so on. Similarly, Tor does not currently integrate tunneling for
  432. non-stream-based protocols like UDP; this too must be provided by
  433. an external service.
  434. % Actually, tunneling udp over tcp is probably horrible for some apps.
  435. % Should this get its own non-goal bulletpoint? The motivation for
  436. % non-goal-ness would be burden on clients / portability.
  437. \item[Not steganographic:] Tor does not try to conceal which users are
  438. sending or receiving communications; it only tries to conceal whom they are
  439. communicating with.
  440. \end{tightlist}
  441. \SubSection{Threat Model}
  442. \label{subsec:threat-model}
  443. A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when
  444. analyzing theoretical anonymity designs. But like all practical low-latency
  445. systems, Tor is not secure against this adversary. Instead, we assume an
  446. adversary that is weaker than global with respect to distribution, but that
  447. is not merely passive. Our threat model expands on that from
  448. \cite{or-pet00}.
  449. %%%% This is really keen analytical stuff, but it isn't our threat model:
  450. %%%% we just go ahead and assume a fraction of hostile nodes for
  451. %%%% convenience. -NM
  452. %
  453. %% The basic adversary components we consider are:
  454. %% \begin{tightlist}
  455. %% \item[Observer:] can observe a connection (e.g., a sniffer on an
  456. %% Internet router), but cannot initiate connections. Observations may
  457. %% include timing and/or volume of packets as well as appearance of
  458. %% individual packets (including headers and content).
  459. %% \item[Disrupter:] can delay (indefinitely) or corrupt traffic on a
  460. %% link. Can change all those things that an observer can observe up to
  461. %% the limits of computational ability (e.g., cannot forge signatures
  462. %% unless a key is compromised).
  463. %% \item[Hostile initiator:] can initiate (or destroy) connections with
  464. %% specific routes as well as vary the timing and content of traffic
  465. %% on the connections it creates. A special case of the disrupter with
  466. %% additional abilities appropriate to its role in forming connections.
  467. %% \item[Hostile responder:] can vary the traffic on the connections made
  468. %% to it including refusing them entirely, intentionally modifying what
  469. %% it sends and at what rate, and selectively closing them. Also a
  470. %% special case of the disrupter.
  471. %% \item[Key breaker:] can break the key used to encrypt connection
  472. %% initiation requests sent to a Tor-node.
  473. %% % Er, there are no long-term private decryption keys. They have
  474. %% % long-term private signing keys, and medium-term onion (decryption)
  475. %% % keys. Plus short-term link keys. Should we lump them together or
  476. %% % separate them out? -RD
  477. %% %
  478. %% % Hmmm, I was talking about the keys used to encrypt the onion skin
  479. %% % that contains the public DH key from the initiator. Is that what you
  480. %% % mean by medium-term onion key? (``Onion key'' used to mean the
  481. %% % session keys distributed in the onion, back when there were onions.)
  482. %% % Also, why are link keys short-term? By link keys I assume you mean
  483. %% % keys that neighbor nodes use to superencrypt all the stuff they send
  484. %% % to each other on a link. Did you mean the session keys? I had been
  485. %% % calling session keys short-term and everything else long-term. I
  486. %% % know I was being sloppy. (I _have_ written papers formalizing
  487. %% % concepts of relative freshness.) But, there's some questions lurking
  488. %% % here. First up, I don't see why the onion-skin encryption key should
  489. %% % be any shorter term than the signature key in terms of threat
  490. %% % resistance. I understand that how we update onion-skin encryption
  491. %% % keys makes them depend on the signature keys. But, this is not the
  492. %% % basis on which we should be deciding about key rotation. Another
  493. %% % question is whether we want to bother with someone who breaks a
  494. %% % signature key as a particular adversary. He should be able to do
  495. %% % nearly the same as a compromised tor-node, although they're not the
  496. %% % same. I reworded above, I'm thinking we should leave other concerns
  497. %% % for later. -PS
  498. %% \item[Hostile Tor node:] can arbitrarily manipulate the
  499. %% connections under its control, as well as creating new connections
  500. %% (that pass through itself).
  501. %% \end{tightlist}
  502. %
  503. %% All feasible adversaries can be composed out of these basic
  504. %% adversaries. This includes combinations such as one or more
  505. %% compromised Tor-nodes cooperating with disrupters of links on which
  506. %% those nodes are not adjacent, or such as combinations of hostile
  507. %% outsiders and link observers (who watch links between adjacent
  508. %% Tor-nodes). Note that one type of observer might be a Tor-node. This
  509. %% is sometimes called an honest-but-curious adversary. While an observer
  510. %% Tor-node will perform only correct protocol interactions, it might
  511. %% share information about connections and cannot be assumed to destroy
  512. %% session keys at end of a session. Note that a compromised Tor-node is
  513. %% stronger than any other adversary component in the sense that
  514. %% replacing a component of any adversary with a compromised Tor-node
  515. %% results in a stronger overall adversary (assuming that the compromised
  516. %% Tor-node retains the same signature keys and other private
  517. %% state-information as the component it replaces).
  518. First, we assume that a threshold of directory servers are honest,
  519. reliable, accurate, and trustworthy.
  520. %% the rest of this isn't needed, if dirservers do threshold concensus dirs
  521. % To augment this, users can periodically cross-check
  522. %directories from each directory server (trust, but verify).
  523. %, and that they always have access to at least one directory server that they trust.
  524. Second, we assume that somewhere between ten percent and twenty
  525. percent\footnote{In some circumstances---for example, if the Tor network is
  526. running on a hardened network where all operators have had background
  527. checks---the number of compromised nodes could be much lower.}
  528. of the Tor nodes accepted by the directory servers are compromised, hostile,
  529. and collaborating in an off-line clique. These compromised nodes can
  530. arbitrarily manipulate the connections that pass through them, as well as
  531. creating new connections that pass through themselves. They can observe
  532. traffic, and record it for later analysis. Honest participants do not know
  533. which servers these are.
  534. (In reality, many adversaries might have `bad' servers that are not
  535. fully compromised but simply under observation, or that have had their keys
  536. compromised. But for the sake of analysis, we ignore, this possibility,
  537. since the threat model we assume is strictly stronger.)
  538. % This next paragraph is also more about analysis than it is about our
  539. % threat model. Perhaps we can say, ``users can connect to the network and
  540. % use it in any way; we consider abusive attacks separately.'' ? -NM
  541. Third, we constrain the impact of hostile users. Users are assumed to vary
  542. widely in both the duration and number of times they are connected to the Tor
  543. network. They can also be assumed to vary widely in the volume and shape of
  544. the traffic they send and receive. Hostile users are, by definition, limited
  545. to creating and varying their own connections into or through a Tor
  546. network. They may attack their own connections to try to gain identity
  547. information of the responder in a rendezvous connection. They can also try to
  548. attack sites through the Onion Routing network; however we will consider this
  549. abuse rather than an attack per se (see
  550. Section~\ref{subsec:exitpolicies}). Other than abuse, a hostile user's
  551. motivation to attack his own connections is limited to the network effects of
  552. such actions, such as denial of service (DoS) attacks. Thus, in this case,
  553. we can view user as simply an extreme case of the ordinary user; although
  554. ordinary users are not likely to engage in, e.g., IP spoofing, to gain their
  555. objectives.
  556. In general, we are more focused on traffic analysis attacks than
  557. traffic confirmation attacks.
  558. %A user who runs a Tor proxy on his own
  559. %machine, connects to some remote Tor-node and makes a connection to an
  560. %open Internet site, such as a public web server, is vulnerable to
  561. %traffic confirmation.
  562. That is, an active attacker who suspects that
  563. a particular client is communicating with a particular server can
  564. confirm this if she can modify and observe both the
  565. connection between the Tor network and the client and that between the
  566. Tor network and the server. Even a purely passive attacker can
  567. confirm traffic if the timing and volume properties of the traffic on
  568. the connection are unique enough. (This is not to say that Tor offers
  569. no resistance to traffic confirmation; it does. We defer discussion
  570. of this point and of particular attacks until Section~\ref{sec:attacks},
  571. after we have described Tor in more detail.)
  572. % XXX We need to say what traffic analysis is: How about...
  573. On the other hand, we {\it do} try to prevent an attacker from
  574. performing traffic analysis: that is, attempting to learn the communication
  575. partners of an arbitrary user.
  576. % XXX If that's not right, what is? It would be silly to have a
  577. % threat model section without saying what we want to prevent the
  578. % attacker from doing. -NM
  579. % XXX Also, do we want to mention linkability or building profiles? -NM
  580. Our assumptions about our adversary's capabilities imply a number of
  581. possible attacks against users' anonymity. Our adversary might try to
  582. mount passive attacks by observing the edges of the network and
  583. correlating traffic entering and leaving the network: either because
  584. of relationships in packet timing; relationships in the volume of data
  585. sent; [XXX simple observation??]; or relationships in any externally
  586. visible user-selected options. The adversary can also mount active
  587. attacks by trying to compromise all the servers' keys in a
  588. path---either through illegitimate means or through legal coercion in
  589. unfriendly jurisdiction; by selectively DoSing trustworthy servers; by
  590. introducing patterns into entering traffic that can later be detected;
  591. or by modifying data entering the network and hoping that trashed data
  592. comes out the other end. The attacker can additionally try to
  593. decrease the network's reliability by performing antisocial activities
  594. from reliable servers and trying to get them taken down.
  595. % XXX Should there be more or less? Should we turn this into a
  596. % bulleted list? Should we cut it entirely?
  597. We consider these attacks and more, and describe our defenses against them
  598. in Section~\ref{sec:attacks}.
  599. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  600. \Section{The Tor Design}
  601. \label{sec:design}
  602. The Tor network is an overlay network; each node is called an onion router
  603. (OR). Onion routers run as normal user-level processes without needing
  604. any special
  605. privileges. Currently, each OR maintains a long-term TLS \cite{TLS}
  606. connection to every other
  607. OR. (We examine some ways to relax this clique-topology assumption in
  608. Section~\ref{subsec:restricted-routes}.) A subset of the ORs also act as
  609. directory servers, tracking which routers are currently in the network;
  610. see Section~\ref{subsec:dirservers} for directory server details. Users
  611. run local software called an onion proxy (OP) to fetch directories,
  612. establish paths (called \emph{virtual circuits}) across the network,
  613. and handle connections from user applications. Onion proxies accept
  614. TCP streams and multiplex them across the virtual circuit. The onion
  615. router on the other side
  616. % I don't mean other side, I mean wherever it is on the circuit. But
  617. % don't want to introduce complexity this early? Hm. -RD
  618. of the circuit connects to the destinations of
  619. the TCP streams and relays data.
  620. Each onion router uses three public keys: a long-term identity key, a
  621. short-term onion key, and a short-term link key. The identity
  622. (signing) key is used to sign TLS certificates, to sign its router
  623. descriptor (a summary of its keys, address, bandwidth, exit policy,
  624. etc), and to sign directories if it is a directory server. Changing
  625. the identity key of a router is considered equivalent to creating a
  626. new router. The onion (decryption) key is used for decrypting requests
  627. from users to set up a circuit and negotiate ephemeral keys. Finally,
  628. link keys are used by the TLS protocol when communicating between
  629. onion routers. We discuss rotating these keys in
  630. Section~\ref{subsec:rotating-keys}.
  631. Section~\ref{subsec:cells} discusses the structure of the fixed-size
  632. \emph{cells} that are the unit of communication in Tor. We describe
  633. in Section~\ref{subsec:circuits} how virtual circuits are
  634. built, extended, truncated, and destroyed. Section~\ref{subsec:tcp}
  635. describes how TCP streams are routed through the network, and finally
  636. Section~\ref{subsec:congestion} talks about congestion control and
  637. fairness issues.
  638. \SubSection{Cells}
  639. \label{subsec:cells}
  640. % I think we should describe connections before cells. -NM
  641. Traffic passes from one OR to another, or between a user's OP and an OR,
  642. in fixed-size cells. Each cell is 256
  643. bytes, and consists of a header and a payload. The header includes an
  644. anonymous circuit identifier (ACI) that specifies which circuit the
  645. % Should we replace ACI with circID ? What is this 'anonymous circuit'
  646. % thing anyway? -RD
  647. cell refers to
  648. (many circuits can be multiplexed over the single TCP connection between
  649. ORs or between an OP and an OR), and a command to describe what to do
  650. with the cell's payload. Cells are either \emph{control} cells, which are
  651. interpreted by the node that receives them, or \emph{relay} cells,
  652. which carry end-to-end stream data. Controls cells can be one of:
  653. \emph{padding} (currently used for keepalive, but also usable for link
  654. padding); \emph{create} or \emph{created} (used to set up a new circuit);
  655. or \emph{destroy} (to tear down a circuit).
  656. % We need to say that ACIs are connection-specific: each circuit has
  657. % a different ACI along each connection. -NM
  658. % agreed -RD
  659. Relay cells have an additional header (the relay header) after the
  660. cell header, containing the stream identifier (many streams can
  661. be multiplexed over a circuit); an end-to-end checksum for integrity
  662. checking; the length of the relay payload; and a relay command. Relay
  663. commands can be one of: \emph{relay
  664. data} (for data flowing down the stream), \emph{relay begin} (to open a
  665. stream), \emph{relay end} (to close a stream), \emph{relay connected}
  666. (to notify the OP that a relay begin has succeeded), \emph{relay
  667. extend} and \emph{relay extended} (to extend the circuit by a hop,
  668. and to acknowledge), \emph{relay truncate} and \emph{relay truncated}
  669. (to tear down only part of the circuit, and to acknowledge), \emph{relay
  670. sendme} (used for congestion control), and \emph{relay drop} (used to
  671. implement long-range dummies).
  672. We describe each of these cell types in more detail below.
  673. % Nick: should there have been a table here? -RD
  674. % Maybe. -NM
  675. \SubSection{Circuits and streams}
  676. \label{subsec:circuits}
  677. % I think when we say ``the user,'' maybe we should say ``the user's OP.''
  678. The original Onion Routing design built one circuit for each
  679. TCP stream. Because building a circuit can take several tenths of a
  680. second (due to public-key cryptography delays and network latency),
  681. this design imposed high costs on applications like web browsing that
  682. open many TCP streams.
  683. In Tor, each circuit can be shared by many TCP streams. To avoid
  684. delays, users construct circuits preemptively. To limit linkability
  685. among the streams, users rotate connections by building a new circuit
  686. periodically (currently every minute) if the previous one has been
  687. used, and expire old used circuits that are no longer in use. Thus
  688. even heavy users spend a negligible amount of time and CPU in
  689. building circuits, but only a limited number of requests can be linked
  690. to each other by a given exit node. Also, because circuits are built
  691. in the background, failed routers do not affects user experience.
  692. \subsubsection{Constructing a circuit}
  693. Users construct each incrementally, negotiating a symmetric key with
  694. each hop one at a time. To begin creating a new circuit, the user
  695. (call her Alice) sends a \emph{create} cell to the first node in her
  696. chosen path. The cell's payload is the first half of the
  697. Diffie-Hellman handshake, encrypted to the onion key of the OR (call
  698. him Bob). Bob responds with a \emph{created} cell containg the second
  699. half of the DH handshake, along with a hash of the negotiated key
  700. $K=g^{xy}$. This protocol tries to achieve unilateral entity
  701. authentication (Alice knows she's handshaking with Bob, Bob doesn't
  702. care who is opening the circuit---Alice has no key and is trying to
  703. remain anonymous); unilateral key authentication (Alice and Bob
  704. agree on a key, and Alice knows Bob is the only other person who could
  705. know it). We also want perfect forward
  706. secrecy, key freshness, etc.
  707. \begin{equation}
  708. \begin{aligned}
  709. \mathrm{Alice} \rightarrow \mathrm{Bob}&: E_{PK_{Bob}}(g^x) \\
  710. \mathrm{Bob} \rightarrow \mathrm{Alice}&: g^y, H(K | \mathrm{``handshake"}) \\
  711. \end{aligned}
  712. \end{equation}
  713. The second step shows both that it was Bob
  714. who received $g^x$, and that it was Bob who came up with $y$. We use
  715. PK encryption in the first step (rather than, e.g., using the first two
  716. steps of STS, which has a signature in the second step) because we
  717. don't have enough room in a single cell for a public key and also a
  718. signature. Preliminary analysis with the NRL protocol analyzer \cite{meadows96}
  719. shows the above protocol to be secure (including providing PFS) under the
  720. traditional Dolev-Yao model.
  721. % cite Cathy? -RD
  722. % did I use the buzzwords correctly? -RD
  723. % Hm. I think that this paragraph could go earlier in expository
  724. % order: we describe how to build whole circuit, then explain the
  725. % protocol in more detail. -NM
  726. To extend a circuit past the first hop, Alice sends a \emph{relay extend}
  727. cell to the last node in the circuit, specifying the address of the new
  728. OR and an encrypted $g^x$ for it. That node copies the half-handshake
  729. into a \emph{create} cell, and passes it to the new OR to extend the
  730. circuit. When it responds with a \emph{created} cell, the penultimate OR
  731. copies the payload into a \emph{relay extended} cell and passes it back.
  732. % Nick: please fix my "that OR" pronouns -RD
  733. \subsubsection{Relay cells}
  734. Once Alice has established the circuit (so she shares a key with each
  735. OR on the circuit), she can send relay cells.
  736. The stream ID in the relay header indicates to which stream the cell belongs.
  737. A relay cell can be addressed to any of the ORs on the circuit. To
  738. construct a relay cell addressed to a given OR, Alice iteratively
  739. encrypts the cell payload (that is, the relay header and payload)
  740. with the symmetric key of each hop up to that OR. Then, at each hop
  741. down the circuit, the OR decrypts the cell payload and checks whether
  742. it recognizes the stream ID. A stream ID is recognized either if it
  743. is an already open stream at that OR, or if it is equal to zero. The
  744. zero stream ID is treated specially, and is used for control messages,
  745. e.g. starting a new stream. If the stream ID is unrecognized, the OR
  746. passes the relay cell downstream. This \emph{leaky pipe} circuit topology
  747. allows Alice's streams to exit at different ORs on a single circuit.
  748. Alice may choose different exit points because of their exit policies,
  749. or to keep the ORs from knowing that two streams
  750. originate at the same person.
  751. To tear down a circuit, Alice sends a destroy control cell. Each OR
  752. in the circuit receives the destroy cell, closes all open streams on
  753. that circuit, and passes a new destroy cell forward. But since circuits
  754. can be built incrementally, they can also be torn down incrementally:
  755. Alice can instead send a relay truncate cell to a node along the circuit. That
  756. node will send a destroy cell forward, and reply with an acknowledgment
  757. (relay truncated). Alice might truncate her circuit so she can extend it
  758. to different nodes without signaling to the first few nodes (or somebody
  759. observing them) that she is changing her circuit. That is, nodes in the
  760. middle are not even aware that the circuit was truncated, because the
  761. relay cells are encrypted. Similarly, if a node on the circuit goes down,
  762. the adjacent node can send a relay truncated back to Alice. Thus the
  763. ``break a node and see which circuits go down'' attack is weakened.
  764. \SubSection{Opening and closing streams}
  765. \label{subsec:tcp}
  766. When Alice's application wants to open a TCP connection to a given
  767. address and port, it asks the OP (via SOCKS) to make the connection. The
  768. OP chooses the newest open circuit (or creates one if none is available),
  769. chooses a suitable OR on that circuit to be the exit node (usually the
  770. last node, but maybe others due to exit policy conflicts; see
  771. Section~\ref{sec:exit-policies}), chooses a new random stream ID for
  772. this stream,
  773. and delivers a relay begin cell to that exit node. It uses a stream ID
  774. of zero for the begin cell (so the OR will recognize it), and the relay
  775. payload lists the new stream ID and the destination address and port.
  776. Once the exit node completes the connection to the remote host, it
  777. responds with a relay connected cell through the circuit. Upon receipt,
  778. the OP notifies the application that it can begin talking.
  779. There's a catch to using SOCKS, though -- some applications hand the
  780. alphanumeric address to the proxy, while others resolve it into an IP
  781. address first and then hand the IP to the proxy. When the application
  782. does the DNS resolution first, Alice broadcasts her destination. Common
  783. applications like Mozilla and ssh have this flaw.
  784. In the case of Mozilla, we're fine: the filtering web proxy called Privoxy
  785. does the SOCKS call safely, and Mozilla talks to Privoxy safely. But a
  786. portable general solution, such as for ssh, is an open problem. We could
  787. modify the local nameserver, but this approach is invasive, brittle, and
  788. not portable. We could encourage the resolver library to do resolution
  789. via TCP rather than UDP, but this approach is hard to do right, and also
  790. has portability problems. Our current answer is to encourage the use of
  791. privacy-aware proxies like Privoxy wherever possible, and also provide
  792. a tool similar to \emph{dig} that can do a private lookup through the
  793. Tor network.
  794. Ending a Tor stream is analogous to ending a TCP stream: it uses a
  795. two-step handshake for normal operation, or a one-step handshake for
  796. errors. If one side of the stream closes abnormally, that node simply
  797. sends a relay teardown cell, and tears down the stream. If one side
  798. % Nick: mention relay teardown in 'cell' subsec? good enough name? -RD
  799. of the stream closes the connection normally, that node sends a relay
  800. end cell down the circuit. When the other side has sent back its own
  801. relay end, the stream can be torn down. This two-step handshake allows
  802. for TCP-based applications that, for example, close a socket for writing
  803. but are still willing to read.
  804. \SubSection{Integrity checking on streams}
  805. In the old Onion Routing design, traffic was vulnerable to a
  806. malleability attack: an attacker could make changes to an encrypted
  807. cell to create corresponding changes to the data leaving the network.
  808. (Even an external adversary could do this, despite link encryption!)
  809. This weakness allowed an adversary to change a create cell to a destroy
  810. cell; change the destination address in a relay begin cell to the
  811. adversary's webserver; or change a user on an ftp connection from
  812. typing ``dir'' to typing ``delete *''. Any node or observer along the
  813. path could introduce such corruption in a stream.
  814. Tor prevents external adversaries by mounting this attack simply by
  815. using TLS. Addressing the insider malleability attack, however, is
  816. more complex.
  817. Rather than doing integrity checking of the relay cells at each hop,
  818. which would increase packet size
  819. by a function of path length\footnote{This is also the argument against
  820. using recent cipher modes like EAX \cite{eax} --- we don't want the added
  821. message-expansion overhead at each hop, and we don't want to leak the path
  822. length (or pad to some max path length).}, we choose to
  823. % accept passive timing attacks,
  824. % (How? I don't get it. Do we mean end-to-end traffic
  825. % confirmation attacks? -NM)
  826. and perform integrity
  827. checking only at the edges of the circuit. When Alice negotiates a key
  828. with the exit hop, they both start a SHA-1 with some derivative of that key,
  829. thus starting out with randomness that only the two of them know. From
  830. then on they each incrementally add all the data bytes flowing across
  831. the stream to the SHA-1, and each relay cell includes the first 4 bytes
  832. of the current value of the hash.
  833. The attacker must be able to guess all previous bytes between Alice
  834. and Bob on that circuit (including the pseudorandomness from the key
  835. negotiation), plus the bytes in the current cell, to remove or modify the
  836. cell. Attacks on SHA-1 where the adversary can incrementally add to a
  837. hash to produce a new valid hash don't work,
  838. because all hashes are end-to-end encrypted across the circuit.
  839. The computational overhead isn't so bad, compared to doing an AES
  840. % XXX We never say we use AES. Say it somewhere above? -RD
  841. crypt at each hop in the circuit. We use only four bytes per cell to
  842. minimize overhead; the chance that an adversary will correctly guess a
  843. valid hash, plus the payload the current cell, is acceptly low, given
  844. that Alice or Bob tear down the circuit if they receive a bad hash.
  845. \SubSection{Rate limiting and fairness}
  846. Volunteers are generally more willing to run services that can limit
  847. their bandwidth usage. To accomodate them, Tor servers use a token
  848. bucket approach to limit the number of bytes they
  849. receive. Tokens are added to the bucket each second (when the bucket is
  850. full, new tokens are discarded.) Each token represents permission to
  851. receive one byte from the network---to receive a byte, the connection
  852. must remove a token from the bucket. Thus if the bucket is empty, that
  853. connection must wait until more tokens arrive. The number of tokens we
  854. add enforces a long-term average rate of incoming bytes, while still
  855. permitting short-term bursts above the allowed bandwidth. Current bucket
  856. sizes are set to ten seconds worth of traffic.
  857. Further, we want to avoid starving any Tor streams. Entire circuits
  858. could starve if we read greedily from connections and one connection
  859. uses all the remaining bandwidth. We solve this by dividing the number
  860. of tokens in the bucket by the number of connections that want to read,
  861. and reading at most that number of bytes from each connection. We iterate
  862. this procedure until the number of tokens in the bucket is under some
  863. threshold (eg 10KB), at which point we greedily read from connections.
  864. Because the Tor protocol generates roughly the same number of outgoing
  865. bytes as incoming bytes, it is sufficient in practice to rate-limit
  866. incoming bytes.
  867. % Is it? Fun attack: I send you lots of 1-byte-at-a-time TCP frames.
  868. % In response, you send lots of 256 byte cells. Can I use this to
  869. % make you exceed your outgoing bandwidth limit by a factor of 256? -NM
  870. % Can we resolve this by, when reading from edge connections, rounding up
  871. % the bytes read (wrt buckets) to the nearest multiple of 256? -RD
  872. Further, inspired by Rennhard et al's design in \cite{anonnet}, a
  873. circuit's edges heuristically distinguish interactive streams from bulk
  874. streams by comparing the frequency with which they supply cells. We can
  875. provide good latency for interactive streams by giving them preferential
  876. service, while still getting good overall throughput to the bulk
  877. streams. Such preferential treatment presents a possible end-to-end
  878. attack, but an adversary who can observe both
  879. ends of the stream can already learn this information through timing
  880. attacks.
  881. \SubSection{Congestion control}
  882. \label{subsec:congestion}
  883. Even with bandwidth rate limiting, we still need to worry about
  884. congestion, either accidental or intentional. If enough users choose the
  885. same OR-to-OR connection for their circuits, that connection can become
  886. saturated. For example, an adversary could make a large HTTP PUT request
  887. through the onion routing network to a webserver he runs, and then
  888. refuse to read any of the bytes at the webserver end of the
  889. circuit. Without some congestion control mechanism, these bottlenecks
  890. can propagate back through the entire network. We describe our
  891. responses below.
  892. \subsubsection{Circuit-level}
  893. To control a circuit's bandwidth usage, each OR keeps track of two
  894. windows. The \emph{package window} tracks how many relay data cells the OR is
  895. allowed to package (from outside streams) for transmission back to the OP,
  896. and the \emph{deliver window} tracks how many relay data cells it is willing
  897. to deliver to streams outside the network. Each window is initialized
  898. (say, to 1000 data cells). When a data cell is packaged or delivered,
  899. the appropriate window is decremented. When an OR has received enough
  900. data cells (currently 100), it sends a relay sendme cell towards the OP,
  901. with stream ID zero. When an OR receives a relay sendme cell with stream
  902. ID zero, it increments its packaging window. Either of these cells
  903. increments the corresponding window by 100. If the packaging window
  904. reaches 0, the OR stops reading from TCP connections for all streams
  905. on the corresponding circuit, and sends no more relay data cells until
  906. receiving a relay sendme cell.
  907. The OP behaves identically, except that it must track a packaging window
  908. and a delivery window for every OR in the circuit. If a packaging window
  909. reaches 0, it stops reading from streams destined for that OR.
  910. \subsubsection{Stream-level}
  911. The stream-level congestion control mechanism is similar to the
  912. circuit-level mechanism above. ORs and OPs use relay sendme cells
  913. to implement end-to-end flow control for individual streams across
  914. circuits. Each stream begins with a package window (e.g. 500 cells),
  915. and increments the window by a fixed value (50) upon receiving a relay
  916. sendme cell. Rather than always returning a relay sendme cell as soon
  917. as enough cells have arrived, the stream-level congestion control also
  918. has to check whether data has been successfully flushed onto the TCP
  919. stream; it sends a relay sendme only when the number of bytes pending
  920. to be flushed is under some threshold (currently 10 cells worth).
  921. Currently, non-data relay cells do not affect the windows. Thus we
  922. avoid potential deadlock issues, e.g. because a stream can't send a
  923. relay sendme cell because its packaging window is empty.
  924. \subsubsection{Needs more research}
  925. We don't need to reimplement full TCP windows (with sequence numbers,
  926. the ability to drop cells when we're full and retransmit later, etc),
  927. because the TCP streams already guarantee in-order delivery of each
  928. cell. But we need to investigate further the effects of the current
  929. parameters on throughput and latency, while also keeping privacy in mind;
  930. see Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity} for more discussion.
  931. \Section{Other design decisions}
  932. \SubSection{Resource management and DoS prevention}
  933. \label{subsec:dos}
  934. Providing Tor as a public service provides many opportunities for an
  935. attacker to mount denial-of-service attacks against the network. While
  936. flow control and rate limiting (discussed in
  937. section~\ref{subsec:congestion}) prevents users from consuming more
  938. bandwidth than nodes are willing to provide, opportunities remain for
  939. consume more network resources than their fair share, or to render the
  940. network unusable for other users.
  941. First of all, there are a number of CPU-consuming denial-of-service
  942. attacks wherein an attacker can force an OR to perform expensive
  943. cryptographic operations. For example, an attacker who sends a
  944. \emph{create} cell full of junk bytes can force an OR to perform an RSA
  945. decrypt its half of the Diffie-Helman handshake. Similarly, an attacker
  946. fake the start of a TLS handshake, forcing the OR to carry out its
  947. (comparatively expensive) half of the handshake at no real computational
  948. cost to the attacker.
  949. To address these attacks, several approaches exist. First, ORs may
  950. demand proof-of-computation tokens \cite{hashcash} before beginning new
  951. TLS handshakes or accepting \emph{create} cells. So long as these
  952. tokens are easy to verify and computationally expensive to produce, this
  953. approach limits the DoS attack multiplier. Additionally, ORs may limit
  954. the rate at which they accept create cells and TLS connections, so that
  955. the computational work of doing so does not drown out the (comparatively
  956. inexpensive) work of symmetric cryptography needed to keep users'
  957. packets flowing. This rate limiting could, however, allows an attacker
  958. to slow down other users as they build new circuits.
  959. % What about link-to-link rate limiting?
  960. % This paragraph needs more references.
  961. More worrisome are distributed denial of service attacks wherein an
  962. attacker uses a large number of compromised hosts throughout the network
  963. to consume the Tor network's resources. Although these attacks are not
  964. new to the networking literature, some proposed approaches are a poor
  965. fit to anonymous networks. For example, solutions based on backtracking
  966. harmful traffic present a significant risk that an anonymity-breaking
  967. adversary could exploit the backtracking mechanism to compromise users'
  968. anonymity. [XXX So, what should we say here? -NM]
  969. % Now would be a good point to talk about twins. What the do, what
  970. % they can't.
  971. Attackers also have an opportunity to attack the Tor network by mounting
  972. attacks on the hosts and network links running it. If an attacker can
  973. successfully disrupt a single circuit or link along a virtual circuit,
  974. all currently open streams passing along that part of the circuit
  975. become unrecoverable, and are closed. The current Tor design treats
  976. such attacks as intermittent network failures, and depends on users and
  977. applications to respond or recover as appropriate. A possible future
  978. design could use an end-to-end based TCP-like acknowledgment protocol,
  979. so that no streams are lost unless the entry or exit point themselves
  980. are disrupted. This solution would require more buffering at exits,
  981. however, and its network properties still need to be investigated. [XXX
  982. That sounds really evasive. We should say more.]
  983. %[XXX Mention that OR-to-OR connections should be highly reliable
  984. % (whatever that means). If they aren't, everything can stall.]
  985. %=====================
  986. % This stuff should go elsewhere. Probably section 2.
  987. Channel-based anonymity designs must choose which protocol layer to
  988. anonymize. They may choose to intercept IP packets directly, and relay
  989. them whole (stripping the source address) as the contents of the
  990. circuit \cite{tarzan:ccs02,freedom2-arch}. Alternatively,
  991. they may
  992. accept TCP streams and relay the data in those streams along the
  993. circuit, ignoring the breakdown of that data into TCP frames. (Tor
  994. takes this approach, as does Rennhard's anonymity network \cite{anonnet}
  995. and MorphMix \cite{morphmix:fc04}.) Finally, they may accept
  996. application-level protocols (such as HTTP) and relay the application
  997. requests themselves along the circuit.
  998. This protocol-layer decision represents a compromise between flexibility
  999. and anonymity. For example, a system that understands HTTP can strip
  1000. identifying information from those requests; can take advantage of
  1001. caching to limit the number of requests that leave the network; and can
  1002. batch or encode those requests in order to minimize the number of
  1003. connections. On the other hand, an IP-level anonymizer can handle
  1004. nearly any protocol, even ones unforeseen by their designers. TCP-level
  1005. anonymity networks like Tor present a middle approach: they are fairly
  1006. application neutral (so long as the application supports, or can be
  1007. tunneled across, TCP), but by treating application connections as data
  1008. streams rather than raw TCP packets, they avoid the well-known
  1009. inefficiencies of tunneling TCP over TCP \cite{tcp-over-tcp-is-bad}.
  1010. % Is there a better tcp-over-tcp-is-bad reference?
  1011. %Also mention that weirdo IP trickery requires kernel patches to most
  1012. %operating systems? -NM
  1013. \SubSection{Exit policies and abuse}
  1014. \label{subsec:exitpolicies}
  1015. Exit abuse is a serious barrier to wide-scale Tor deployment. Not
  1016. only does anonymity present would-be vandals and abusers with an
  1017. opportunity to hide the origins of their activities---but also,
  1018. existing sanctions against abuse present an easy way for attackers to
  1019. harm the Tor network by implicating exit servers for their abuse.
  1020. Thus, must block or limit attacks and other abuse that travel through
  1021. the Tor network.
  1022. Also, applications that commonly use IP-based authentication (such
  1023. institutional mail or web servers) can be fooled by the fact that
  1024. anonymous connections appear to originate at the exit OR. Rather than
  1025. expose a private service, an administrator may prefer to prevent Tor
  1026. users from connecting to those services from a local OR.
  1027. To mitigate abuse issues, in Tor, each onion router's \emph{exit
  1028. policy} describes to which external addresses and ports the router
  1029. will permit stream connections. On one end of the spectrum are
  1030. \emph{open exit} nodes that will connect anywhere. As a compromise,
  1031. most onion routers will function as \emph{restricted exits} that
  1032. permit connections to the world at large, but prevent access to
  1033. certain abuse-prone addresses and services. on the other end are
  1034. \emph{middleman} nodes that only relay traffic to other Tor nodes, and
  1035. \emph{private exit} nodes that only connect to a local host or
  1036. network. (Using a private exit (if one exists) is a more secure way
  1037. for a client to connect to a given host or network---an external
  1038. adversary cannot eavesdrop traffic between the private exit and the
  1039. final destination, and so is less sure of Alice's destination and
  1040. activities.) is less sure of Alice's destination. More generally,
  1041. nodes can require a variety of forms of traffic authentication
  1042. \cite{or-discex00}.
  1043. %Tor offers more reliability than the high-latency fire-and-forget
  1044. %anonymous email networks, because the sender opens a TCP stream
  1045. %with the remote mail server and receives an explicit confirmation of
  1046. %acceptance. But ironically, the private exit node model works poorly for
  1047. %email, when Tor nodes are run on volunteer machines that also do other
  1048. %things, because it's quite hard to configure mail transport agents so
  1049. %normal users can send mail normally, but the Tor process can only deliver
  1050. %mail locally. Further, most organizations have specific hosts that will
  1051. %deliver mail on behalf of certain IP ranges; Tor operators must be aware
  1052. %of these hosts and consider putting them in the Tor exit policy.
  1053. %The abuse issues on closed (e.g. military) networks are different
  1054. %from the abuse on open networks like the Internet. While these IP-based
  1055. %access controls are still commonplace on the Internet, on closed networks,
  1056. %nearly all participants will be honest, and end-to-end authentication
  1057. %can be assumed for important traffic.
  1058. Many administrators will use port restrictions to support only a
  1059. limited set of well-known services, such as HTTP, SSH, or AIM.
  1060. This is not a complete solution, since abuse opportunities for these
  1061. protocols are still well known. Nonetheless, the benefits are real,
  1062. since administrators seem used to the concept of port 80 abuse not
  1063. coming from the machine's owner.
  1064. A further solution may be to use proxies to clean traffic for certain
  1065. protocols as it leaves the network. For example, much abusive HTTP
  1066. behavior (such as exploiting buffer overflows or well-known script
  1067. vulnerabilities) can be detected in a straightforward manner.
  1068. Similarly, one could run automatic spam filtering software (such as
  1069. SpamAssassin) on email exiting the OR network. A generic
  1070. intrusion detection system (IDS) could be adapted to these purposes.
  1071. [XXX Mention possibility of filtering spam-like habits--e.g., many
  1072. recipients. -NM]
  1073. ORs may also choose to rewrite exiting traffic in order to append
  1074. headers or other information to indicate that the traffic has passed
  1075. through an anonymity service. This approach is commonly used, to some
  1076. success, by email-only anonymity systems. When possible, ORs can also
  1077. run on servers with hostnames such as {\it anonymous}, to further
  1078. alert abuse targets to the nature of the anonymous traffic.
  1079. %we should run a squid at each exit node, to provide comparable anonymity
  1080. %to private exit nodes for cache hits, to speed everything up, and to
  1081. %have a buffer for funny stuff coming out of port 80. we could similarly
  1082. %have other exit proxies for other protocols, like mail, to check
  1083. %delivered mail for being spam.
  1084. %[XXX Um, I'm uncomfortable with this for several reasons.
  1085. %It's not good for keeping honest nodes honest about discarding
  1086. %state after it's no longer needed. Granted it keeps an external
  1087. %observer from noticing how often sites are visited, but it also
  1088. %allows fishing expeditions. ``We noticed you went to this prohibited
  1089. %site an hour ago. Kindly turn over your caches to the authorities.''
  1090. %I previously elsewhere suggested bulk transfer proxies to carve
  1091. %up big things so that they could be downloaded in less noticeable
  1092. %pieces over several normal looking connections. We could suggest
  1093. %similarly one or a handful of squid nodes that might serve up
  1094. %some of the more sensitive but common material, especially if
  1095. %the relevant sites didn't want to or couldn't run their own OR.
  1096. %This would be better than having everyone run a squid which would
  1097. %just help identify after the fact the different history of that
  1098. %node's activity. All this kind of speculation needs to move to
  1099. %future work section I guess. -PS]
  1100. A mixture of open and restricted exit nodes will allow the most
  1101. flexibility for volunteers running servers. But while a large number
  1102. of middleman nodes is useful to provide a large and robust network,
  1103. having only a small number of exit nodes reduces the number of nodes
  1104. an adversary needs to monitor for traffic analysis, and places a
  1105. greater burden on the exit nodes. This tension can be seen in the JAP
  1106. cascade model, wherein only one node in each cascade needs to handle
  1107. abuse complaints---but an adversary only needs to observe the entry
  1108. and exit of a cascade to perform traffic analysis on all that
  1109. cascade's users. The Hydra model (many entries, few exits) presents a
  1110. different compromise: only a few exit nodes are needed, but an
  1111. adversary needs to work harder to watch all the clients.
  1112. Finally, we note that exit abuse must not be dismissed as a peripheral
  1113. issue: when a system's public image suffers, it can reduce the number
  1114. and diversity of that system's users, and thereby reduce the anonymity
  1115. of the system itself. Like usability, public perception is also a
  1116. security parameter. Sadly, preventing abuse of open exit nodes is an
  1117. unsolved problem, and will probably remain an arms race for the
  1118. forseeable future. The abuse problems faced by Princeton's CoDeeN
  1119. project \cite{darkside} give us a glimpse of likely issues.
  1120. \SubSection{Directory Servers}
  1121. \label{subsec:dirservers}
  1122. First-generation Onion Routing designs \cite{or-jsac98,freedom2-arch} did
  1123. % is or-jsac98 the right cite here? what's our stock OR cite? -RD
  1124. in-band network status updates: each router flooded a signed statement
  1125. to its neighbors, which propagated it onward. But anonymizing networks
  1126. have different security goals than typical link-state routing protocols.
  1127. For example, delays (accidental or intentional)
  1128. that can cause different parts of the network to have different pictures
  1129. of link-state and topology are not only inconvenient---they give
  1130. attackers an opportunity to exploit differences in client knowledge.
  1131. We also worry about attacks to deceive a
  1132. client about the router membership list, topology, or current network
  1133. state. Such \emph{partitioning attacks} on client knowledge help an
  1134. adversary with limited resources to efficiently deploy those resources
  1135. when attacking a target.
  1136. Instead of flooding, Tor uses a small group of redundant, well-known
  1137. directory servers to track changes in network topology and node state,
  1138. including keys and exit policies. Directory servers are a small group
  1139. of well-known, mostly-trusted onion routers. They listen on a
  1140. separate port as an HTTP server, so that participants can fetch
  1141. current network state and router lists (a \emph{directory}), and so
  1142. that other onion routers can upload their router descriptors. Onion
  1143. routers now periodically publish signed statements of their state to
  1144. the directories only. The directories themselves combine this state
  1145. information with their own views of network liveness, and generate a
  1146. signed description of the entire network state whenever its contents
  1147. have changed. Client software is pre-loaded with a list of the
  1148. directory servers and their keys, and uses this information to
  1149. bootstrap each client's view of the network.
  1150. When a directory receives a signed statement from and onion router, it
  1151. recognizes the onion router by its identity (signing) key.
  1152. Directories do not automatically advertise ORs that they do not
  1153. recognize. (If they did, an adversary could take over the network by
  1154. creating many servers \cite{sybil}.) Instead, new nodes must be
  1155. approved by the directory administrator before they are included.
  1156. Mechanisms for automated node approval are an area of active research,
  1157. and are discussed more in section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}.
  1158. Of course, a variety of attacks remain. An adversary who controls a
  1159. directory server can track certain clients by providing different
  1160. information---perhaps by listing only nodes under its control
  1161. as working, or by informing only certain clients about a given
  1162. node. Moreover, an adversary without control of a directory server can
  1163. still exploit differences among client knowledge. If Eve knows that
  1164. node $M$ is listed on server $D_1$ but not on $D_2$, she can use this
  1165. knowledge to link traffic through $M$ to clients who have queried $D_1$.
  1166. Thus these directory servers must be synchronized and redundant. The
  1167. software is distributed with the signature public key of each directory
  1168. server, and directories must be signed by a threshold of these keys.
  1169. The directory servers in Tor are modeled after those in Mixminion
  1170. \cite{minion-design}, but our situation is easier. First, we make the
  1171. simplifying assumption that all participants agree on who the
  1172. directory servers are. Second, Mixminion needs to predict node
  1173. behavior, whereas Tor only needs a threshold consensus of the current
  1174. state of the network.
  1175. % Cite dir-spec or dir-agreement?
  1176. Tor directory servers build a consensus directory through a simple
  1177. four-round broadcast protocol. In round one, each server dates and
  1178. signs its current opinion, and broadcasts it to the other directory
  1179. servers; then in round two, each server rebroadcasts all the signed
  1180. opinions it has received. At this point all directory servers check
  1181. to see whether any server has signed multiple opinions in the same
  1182. period. If so, the server is either broken or cheating, so protocol
  1183. stops and notifies the administrators, who either remove the cheater
  1184. or wait for the broken server to be fixed. If there are no
  1185. discrepancies, each directory server then locally computes algorithm
  1186. on the set of opinions, resulting in a uniform shared directory. In
  1187. round three servers sign this directory and broadcast it; and finally
  1188. in round four the servers rebroadcast the directory and all the
  1189. signatures. If any directory server drops out of the network, its
  1190. signature is not included on the file directory.
  1191. The rebroadcast steps ensure that a directory server is heard by
  1192. either all of the other servers or none of them, assuming that any two
  1193. directories can talk directly, or via a third directory (some of the
  1194. links between directory servers may be down). Broadcasts are feasible
  1195. because there are relatively few directory servers (currently 3, but we expect
  1196. to use as many as 9 as the network scales). The actual local algorithm
  1197. for computing the shared directory is a straightforward threshold
  1198. voting process: we include an OR if a majority of directory servers
  1199. believe it to be good.
  1200. When a client Alice retrieves a consensus directory, she uses it if it
  1201. is signed by a majority of the directory servers she knows.
  1202. Using directory servers rather than flooding provides simplicity and
  1203. flexibility. For example, they don't complicate the analysis when we
  1204. start experimenting with non-clique network topologies. And because
  1205. the directories are signed, they can be cached by other onion routers,
  1206. or indeed by any server. Thus directory servers are not a performance
  1207. bottleneck when we have many users, and do not aid traffic analysis by
  1208. forcing clients to periodically announce their existence to any
  1209. central point.
  1210. % Mention Hydra as an example of non-clique topologies. -NM, from RD
  1211. % also find some place to integrate that dirservers have to actually
  1212. % lay test circuits and use them, otherwise routers could connect to
  1213. % the dirservers but discard all other traffic.
  1214. % in some sense they're like reputation servers in \cite{mix-acc} -RD
  1215. \Section{Rendezvous points: location privacy}
  1216. \label{sec:rendezvous}
  1217. Rendezvous points are a building block for \emph{location-hidden
  1218. services} (also known as ``responder anonymity'') in the Tor
  1219. network. Location-hidden services allow a server Bob to a TCP
  1220. service, such as a webserver, without revealing the IP of his service.
  1221. Besides allowing Bob to provided services anonymously, location
  1222. privacy also seeks to provide some protection against DDoS attacks:
  1223. attackers are forced to attack the onion routing network as a whole
  1224. rather than just Bob's IP.
  1225. \subsection{Goals for rendezvous points}
  1226. \label{subsec:rendezvous-goals}
  1227. In addition to our other goals, have tried to provide the following
  1228. properties in our design for location-hidden servers:
  1229. \begin{tightlist}
  1230. \item[Flood-proof:] An attacker should not be able to flood Bob with traffic
  1231. simply by sending may requests to Bob's public location. Thus, Bob needs a
  1232. way to filter incoming requests.
  1233. \item[Robust:] Bob should be able to maintain a long-term pseudonymous
  1234. identity even in the presence of OR failure. Thus, Bob's identity must not
  1235. be tied to a single OR.
  1236. \item[Smear-resistant:] An attacker should not be able to use rendezvous
  1237. points to smear an OR. That is, if a social attacker tries to host a
  1238. location-hidden service that is illegal or disreputable, it should not
  1239. appear---even to a casual observer---that the OR is hosting that service.
  1240. \item[Application-transparent:] Although we are willing to require users to
  1241. run special software to access location-hidden servers, we are not willing
  1242. to require them to modify their applications.
  1243. \end{tightlist}
  1244. \subsection{Rendezvous design}
  1245. We provide location-hiding for Bob by allowing him to advertise
  1246. several onion routers (his \emph{Introduction Points}) as his public
  1247. location. (He may do this on any robust efficient distributed
  1248. key-value lookup system with authenticated updates, such as CFS
  1249. \cite{cfs:sosp01}\footnote{
  1250. Each onion router could run a node in this lookup
  1251. system; also note that as a stopgap measure, we can start by running a
  1252. simple lookup system on the directory servers.})
  1253. Alice, the client, chooses a node for her
  1254. \emph{Meeting Point}. She connects to one of Bob's introduction
  1255. points, informs him about her rendezvous point, and then waits for him
  1256. to connect to the rendezvous point. This extra level of indirection
  1257. helps Bob's introduction points avoid problems associated with serving
  1258. unpopular files directly, as could occur, for example, if Bob chooses
  1259. an introduction point in Texas to serve anti-ranching propaganda,
  1260. or if Bob's service tends to get DDoS'ed by network vandals.
  1261. The extra level of indirection also allows Bob to respond to some requests
  1262. and ignore others.
  1263. The steps of a rendezvous as follows. These steps are performed on
  1264. behalf of Alice and Bob by their local onion proxies, which they both
  1265. must run; application integration is described more fully below.
  1266. \begin{tightlist}
  1267. \item Bob chooses some introduction ppoints, and advertises them via
  1268. CFS (or some other distributed key-value publication system).
  1269. \item Bob establishes a Tor virtual circuit to each of his
  1270. Introduction Points, and waits.
  1271. \item Alice learns about Bob's service out of band (perhaps Bob told her,
  1272. or she found it on a website). She looks up the details of Bob's
  1273. service from CFS.
  1274. \item Alice chooses an OR to serve as a Rendezvous Point (RP) for this
  1275. transaction. She establishes a virtual circuit to her RP, and
  1276. tells it to wait for connections. [XXX how?]
  1277. \item Alice opens an anonymous stream to one of Bob's Introduction
  1278. Points, and gives it message (encrypted for Bob) which tells him
  1279. about herself, her chosen RP, and the first half of an ephemeral
  1280. key handshake. The Introduction Point sends the message to Bob.
  1281. \item Bob may decide to ignore Alice's request. [XXX Based on what?]
  1282. Otherwise, he creates a new virtual circuit to Alice's RP, and
  1283. authenticates himself. [XXX how?]
  1284. \item If the authentication is successful, the RP connects Alice's
  1285. virtual circuit to Bob's. Note that RP can't recognize Alice,
  1286. Bob, or the data they transmit (they share a session key).
  1287. \item Alice now sends a Begin cell along the circuit. It arrives at Bob's
  1288. onion proxy. Bob's onion proxy connects to Bob's webserver.
  1289. \item An anonymous stream has been established, and Alice and Bob
  1290. communicate as normal.
  1291. \end{tightlist}
  1292. [XXX We need to modify the above to refer people down to these next
  1293. paragraphs. -NM]
  1294. When establishing an introduction point, Bob provides the onion router
  1295. with a public ``introduction'' key. The hash of this public key
  1296. identifies a unique service, and (since Bob is required to sign his
  1297. messages) prevents anybody else from usurping Bob's introduction point
  1298. in the future. Bob uses the same public key when establishing the other
  1299. introduction points for that service.
  1300. The message that Alice gives the introduction point includes a hash of Bob's
  1301. public key to identify the service, an optional initial authentication
  1302. token (the introduction point can do prescreening, eg to block replays),
  1303. and (encrypted to Bob's public key) the location of the rendezvous point,
  1304. a rendezvous cookie Bob should tell RP so he gets connected to
  1305. Alice, an optional authentication token so Bob can choose whether to respond,
  1306. and the first half of a DH key exchange. When Bob connects to RP
  1307. and gets connected to Alice's pipe, his first cell contains the
  1308. other half of the DH key exchange.
  1309. The authentication tokens can be used to provide selective access to users
  1310. proportional to how important it is that they main uninterrupted access
  1311. to the service. During normal situations, Bob's service might simply be
  1312. offered directly from mirrors; Bob can also give out authentication cookies
  1313. to high-priority users. If those mirrors are knocked down by DDoS attacks,
  1314. those users can switch to accessing Bob's service via the Tor
  1315. rendezvous system.
  1316. \SubSection{Integration with user applications}
  1317. For each service Bob offers, he configures his local onion proxy to know
  1318. the local IP and port of the server, a strategy for authorizing Alices,
  1319. and a public key. Bob publishes
  1320. the public key, an expiration
  1321. time (``not valid after''), and the current introduction points for
  1322. his
  1323. service into CFS, all indexed by the hash of the public key
  1324. Note that Bob's webserver is unmodified, and doesn't even know
  1325. that it's hidden behind the Tor network.
  1326. Because Alice's applications must work unchanged, her client interface
  1327. remains a SOCKS proxy. Thus we must encode all of the necessary
  1328. information into the fully qualified domain name Alice uses when
  1329. establishing her connections. Location-hidden services use a virtual
  1330. top level domain called `.onion': thus hostnames take the form
  1331. x.y.onion where x encodes the hash of PK, and y is the authentication
  1332. cookie. Alice's onion proxy examines hostnames and recognizes when
  1333. they're destined for a hidden server. If so, it decodes the PK and
  1334. starts the rendezvous as described in the table above.
  1335. \subsection{Previous rendezvous work}
  1336. Ian Goldberg developed a similar notion of rendezvous points for
  1337. low-latency anonymity systems \cite{ian-thesis}. His ``service tags''
  1338. play the same role in his design as the hashes of services' public
  1339. keys play in ours. We use public key hashes so that they can be
  1340. self-authenticating, and so the client can recognize the same service
  1341. with confidence later on. His design also differs from ours in the
  1342. following ways: First, Goldberg suggests that the client should
  1343. manually hunt down a current location of the service via Gnutella;
  1344. whereas our use of the DHT makes lookup faster, more robust, and
  1345. transparent to the user. Second, in Tor the client and server
  1346. negotiate ephemeral keys via Diffie-Hellman, so at no point in the
  1347. path is the plaintext exposed. Third, our design tries to minimize the
  1348. exposure associated with running the service, so as to make volunteers
  1349. more willing to offer introduction and rendezvous point services.
  1350. Tor's introduction points do not output any bytes to the clients, and
  1351. the rendezvous points don't know the client, the server, or the data
  1352. being transmitted. The indirection scheme is also designed to include
  1353. authentication/authorization---if the client doesn't include the right
  1354. cookie with its request for service, the server need not even
  1355. acknowledge its existence.
  1356. \Section{Analysis}
  1357. \label{sec:analysis}
  1358. In this section, we discuss how well Tor meets our stated design goals
  1359. and its resistance to attacks.
  1360. \SubSection{Meeting Basic Goals}
  1361. % None of these seem to say very much. Should this subsection be removed?
  1362. \begin{tightlist}
  1363. \item [Basic Anonymity:] Because traffic is encrypted, changing in
  1364. appearance, and can flow from anywhere to anywhere within the
  1365. network, a simple observer that cannot see both the initiator
  1366. activity and the corresponding activity where the responder talks to
  1367. the network will not be able to link the initiator and responder.
  1368. Nor is it possible to directly correlate any two communication
  1369. sessions as coming from a single source without additional
  1370. information. Resistance to more sophisticated anonymity threats is
  1371. discussed below.
  1372. \item[Deployability:] Tor requires no specialized hardware. Tor
  1373. requires no kernel modifications; it runs in user space (currently
  1374. on Linux, various BSDs, and Windows). All of these imply a low
  1375. technical barrier to running a Tor node. There is an assumption that
  1376. Tor nodes have good relatively persistent net connectivity
  1377. (currently T1 or better);
  1378. % Is that reasonable to say? We haven't really discussed it -P.S.
  1379. % Roger thinks otherwise; he will fix this. -NM
  1380. however, there is no padding overhead, and operators can limit
  1381. bandwidth on any link. Tor is freely available under the modified
  1382. BSD license, and operators are able to choose their own exit
  1383. policies, thus reducing legal and social barriers to
  1384. running a node.
  1385. \item[Usability:] As noted, Tor runs in user space. So does the onion
  1386. proxy, which is comparatively easy to install and run. SOCKS-aware
  1387. applications require nothing more than to be pointed at the onion
  1388. proxy; other applications can be redirected to use SOCKS for their
  1389. outgoing TCP connections by drop-in libraries such as tsocks.
  1390. \item[Flexibility:] Tor's design and implementation is fairly modular,
  1391. so that,
  1392. for example, a scalable P2P replacement for the directory servers
  1393. would not substantially impact other aspects of the system. Tor
  1394. runs on top of TCP, so design options that could not easily do so
  1395. would be difficult to test on the current network. However, most
  1396. low-latency protocols are designed to run over TCP. We are currently
  1397. discussing with the designers of MorphMix interoperability of the
  1398. two systems, which seems to be relatively straightforward. This will
  1399. allow testing and direct comparison of the two rather different
  1400. designs.
  1401. % Do we want to say this? I don't think we should talk about this
  1402. % kind of discussion till we have more positive results.
  1403. \item[Conservative design:] Tor opts for practicality when there is no
  1404. clear resolution of anonymity tradeoffs or practical means to
  1405. achieve resolution. Thus, we do not currently pad or mix; although
  1406. it would be easy to add either of these. Indeed, our system allows
  1407. long-range and variable padding if this should ever be shown to have
  1408. a clear advantage. Similarly, we do not currently attempt to
  1409. resolve such issues as Sybil attacks to dominate the network except
  1410. by such direct means as personal familiarity of director operators
  1411. with all node operators.
  1412. \end{tightlist}
  1413. \SubSection{Attacks and Defenses}
  1414. \label{sec:attacks}
  1415. Below we summarize a variety of attacks and how well our design withstands
  1416. them.
  1417. [XXX Note that some of these attacks are outside our threat model! -NM]
  1418. \subsubsection*{Passive attacks}
  1419. \begin{tightlist}
  1420. \item \emph{Observing user traffic patterns.} Observations of connection
  1421. between an end user and a first onion router will not reveal to whom
  1422. the user is connecting or what information is being sent. It will
  1423. reveal patterns of user traffic (both sent and received). Simple
  1424. profiling of user connection patterns is not generally possible,
  1425. however, because multiple application connections (streams) may be
  1426. operating simultaneously or in series over a single circuit. Thus,
  1427. further processing is necessary to try to discern even these usage
  1428. patterns.
  1429. \item \emph{Observing user content.} At the user end, content is
  1430. encrypted; however, connections from the network to arbitrary
  1431. websites may not be. Further, a responding website may itself be
  1432. considered an adversary. Filtering content is not a primary goal of
  1433. Onion Routing; nonetheless, Tor can directly make use of Privoxy and
  1434. related filtering services via SOCKS and thus anonymize their
  1435. application data streams.
  1436. \item \emph{Option distinguishability.} Configuration options can be a
  1437. source of distinguishable patterns. In general there is economic
  1438. incentive to allow preferential services \cite{econymics}, and some
  1439. degree of configuration choice is a factor in attracting large
  1440. numbers of users to provide anonymity. So far, however, we have
  1441. not found a compelling use case in Tor for any client-configurable
  1442. options. Thus, clients are currently distinguishable only by their
  1443. behavior.
  1444. \item \emph{End-to-end Timing correlation.} Tor only minimally hides
  1445. end-to-end timing correlations. If an attacker can watch patterns of
  1446. traffic at the initiator end and the responder end, then he will be
  1447. able to confirm the correspondence with high probability. The
  1448. greatest protection currently against such confirmation is if the
  1449. connection between the onion proxy and the first Tor node is hidden,
  1450. possibly because it is local or behind a firewall. This approach
  1451. requires an observer to separate traffic originating the onion
  1452. router from traffic passes through it. We still do not, however,
  1453. predict this approach to be a large problem for an attacker who can
  1454. observe traffic at both ends of an application connection.
  1455. \item \emph{End-to-end Size correlation.} Simple packet counting
  1456. without timing consideration will also be effective in confirming
  1457. endpoints of a connection through Onion Routing; although slightly
  1458. less so. This is because, even without padding, the leaky pipe
  1459. topology means different numbers of packets may enter one end of a
  1460. circuit than exit at the other.
  1461. \item \emph{Website fingerprinting.} All the above passive
  1462. attacks that are at all effective are traffic confirmation attacks.
  1463. This puts them outside our general design goals. There is also
  1464. a passive traffic analysis attack that is potentially effective.
  1465. Instead of searching exit connections for timing and volume
  1466. correlations it is possible to build up a database of
  1467. ``fingerprints'' containing file sizes and access patterns for a
  1468. large numbers of interesting websites. If one now wants to
  1469. monitor the activity of a user, it may be possible to confirm a
  1470. connection to a site simply by consulting the database. This attack has
  1471. been shown to be effective against SafeWeb \cite{hintz-pet02}. Onion
  1472. Routing is not as vulnerable as SafeWeb to this attack: There is the
  1473. possibility that multiple streams are exiting the circuit at
  1474. different places concurrently. Also, fingerprinting will be limited to
  1475. the granularity of cells, currently 256 bytes. Larger cell sizes
  1476. and/or minimal padding schemes that group websites into large sets
  1477. are possible responses. But this remains an open problem. Link
  1478. padding or long-range dummies may also make fingerprints harder to
  1479. detect. (Note that
  1480. such fingerprinting should not be confused with the latency attacks
  1481. of \cite{back01}. Those require a fingerprint of the latencies of
  1482. all circuits through the network, combined with those from the
  1483. network edges to the targeted user and the responder website. While
  1484. these are in principal feasible and surprises are always possible,
  1485. these constitute a much more complicated attack, and there is no
  1486. current evidence of their practicality.)
  1487. \item \emph{Content analysis.} Tor explicitly provides no content
  1488. rewriting for any protocol at a higher level than TCP. When
  1489. protocol cleaners are available, however (as Privoxy is for HTTP),
  1490. Tor can integrate them in order to address these attacks.
  1491. \end{tightlist}
  1492. \subsubsection*{Active attacks}
  1493. \begin{tightlist}
  1494. \item \emph{Key compromise.} We consider the impact of a compromise
  1495. for each type of key in turn, from the shortest- to the
  1496. longest-lived. If a circuit session key is compromised, the
  1497. attacker can unwrap a single layer of encryption from the relay
  1498. cells traveling along that circuit. (Only nodes on the circuit can
  1499. see these cells.) If a TLS session key is compromised, an attacker
  1500. can view all the cells on TLS connection until the key is
  1501. renegotiated. (These cells are themselves encrypted.) If a TLS
  1502. private key is compromised, the attacker can fool others into
  1503. thinking that he is the affected OR, but still cannot accept any
  1504. connections. If an onion private key is compromised, the attacker
  1505. can impersonate the OR in circuits, but only if the attacker has
  1506. also compromised the OR's TLS private key, or is running the
  1507. previous OR in the circuit. (This compromise affects newly created
  1508. circuits, but because of perfect forward secrecy, the attacker
  1509. cannot hijack old circuits without compromising their session keys.)
  1510. In any case, an attacker can only take advantage of a compromise in
  1511. these mid-term private keys until they expire. Only by
  1512. compromising a node's identity key can an attacker replace that
  1513. node indefinitely, by sending new forged mid-term keys to the
  1514. directories. Finally, an attacker who can compromise a
  1515. \emph{directory's} identity key can influence every client's view
  1516. of the network---but only to the degree made possible by gaining a
  1517. vote with the rest of the the directory servers.
  1518. \item \emph{Iterated compromise.} A roving adversary who can
  1519. compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coersion, or extralegal
  1520. coersion) could march down length of a circuit compromising the
  1521. nodes until he reaches the end. Unless the adversary can complete
  1522. this attack within the lifetime of the circuit, however, the ORs
  1523. will have discarded the necessary information before the attack can
  1524. be completed. (Thanks to the perfect forward secrecy of session
  1525. keys, the attacker cannot cannot force nodes to decrypt recorded
  1526. traffic once the circuits have been closed.) Additionally, building
  1527. circuits that cross jurisdictions can make legal coercion
  1528. harder---this phenomenon is commonly called ``jurisdictional
  1529. arbitrage.''
  1530. \item \emph{Run a recipient.} By running a Web server, an adversary
  1531. trivially learns the timing patterns of those connecting to it, and
  1532. can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses. This can greatly
  1533. facilitate end-to-end attacks: If the adversary can induce certain
  1534. users to connect to connect to his webserver (perhaps by providing
  1535. content targeted at those users), she now holds one end of their
  1536. connection. Additonally, here is a danger that the application
  1537. protocols and associated programs can be induced to reveal
  1538. information about the initiator. This is not directly in Onion
  1539. Routing's protection area, so we are dependent on Privoxy and
  1540. similar protocol cleaners to solve the problem.
  1541. \item \emph{Run an onion proxy.} It is expected that end users will
  1542. nearly always run their own local onion proxy. However, in some
  1543. settings, it may be necessary for the proxy to run
  1544. remotely---typically, in an institutional setting where it was
  1545. necessary to monitor the activity of those connecting to the proxy.
  1546. The drawback, of course, is that if the onion proxy is compromised,
  1547. then all future connections through it are completely compromised.
  1548. \item \emph{DoS non-observed nodes.} An observer who can observe some
  1549. of the Tor network can increase the value of this traffic analysis
  1550. if it can attack non-observed nodes to shut them down, reduce
  1551. their reliability, or persuade users that they are not trustworthy.
  1552. The best defense here is robustness.
  1553. \item \emph{Run a hostile node.} In addition to the abilties of a
  1554. local observer, an isolated hostile node can create circuits through
  1555. itself, or alter traffic patterns, in order to affect traffic at
  1556. other nodes. Its ability to directly DoS a neighbor is now limited
  1557. by bandwidth throttling. Nonetheless, in order to compromise the
  1558. anonymity of the endpoints of a circuit by its observations, a
  1559. hostile node is only significant if it is immediately adjacent to
  1560. that endpoint.
  1561. \item \emph{Run multiple hostile nodes.} If an adversary is able to
  1562. run multiple ORs, and is able to persuade the directory servers
  1563. that those ORs are trustworthy and independant, then occasionally
  1564. some user will choose one of those ORs for the start and another of
  1565. those ORs as the end of a circuit. When this happens, the user's
  1566. anonymity is compromised for those circuits. If an adversary can
  1567. control $m$ out of $N$ nodes, he should be able to correlate at most
  1568. $\frac{m}{N}$ of the traffic in this way---although an adersary
  1569. could possibly attract a disproportionately large amount of traffic
  1570. by running an exit node with an unusually permisssive exit policy.
  1571. \item \emph{Compromise entire path.} Anyone compromising both
  1572. endpoints of a circuit can confirm this with high probability. If
  1573. the entire path is compromised, this becomes a certainty; however,
  1574. the added benefit to the adversary of such an attack is small in
  1575. relation to the difficulty.
  1576. \item \emph{Run a hostile directory server.} Directory servers control
  1577. admission to the network. However, because the network directory
  1578. must be signed by a majority of servers, the threat of a single
  1579. hostile server is minimized.
  1580. \item \emph{Selectively DoS a Tor node.} As noted, neighbors are
  1581. bandwidth limited; however, it is possible to open up sufficient
  1582. numbers of circuits that converge at a single onion router to
  1583. overwhelm its network connection, its ability to process new
  1584. circuits or both.
  1585. %OK so I noticed that twins are completely removed from the paper above,
  1586. % but it's after 5 so I'll leave that problem to you guys. -PS
  1587. \item \emph{Introduce timing into messages.} This is simply a stronger
  1588. version of passive timing attacks already discussed above.
  1589. \item \emph{Tagging attacks.} A hostile node could try to ``tag'' a
  1590. cell by altering it. This would render it unreadable, but if the
  1591. connection is, for example, an unencrypted request to a Web site,
  1592. the garbled content coming out at the appropriate time could confirm
  1593. the association. However, integrity checks on cells prevent
  1594. this attack from succeeding.
  1595. \item \emph{Replace contents of unauthenticated protocols.} When a
  1596. relaying an unauthenticated protocol like HTTP, a hostile exit node
  1597. can impersonate the target server. Thus, whenever possible, clients
  1598. should prefer protocols with end-to-end authentication.
  1599. \item \emph{Replay attacks.} Some anonymity protocols are vulnerable
  1600. to replay attacks. Tor is not; replaying one side of a handshake
  1601. will result in a different negotiated session key, and so the rest
  1602. of the recorded session can't be used.
  1603. % ``NonSSL Anonymizer''?
  1604. \item \emph{Smear attacks.} An attacker could use the Tor network to
  1605. engage in socially dissapproved acts, so as to try to bring the
  1606. entire network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down.
  1607. Exit policies can help reduce the possibilities for abuse, but
  1608. ultimately, the network will require volunteers who can tolerate
  1609. some political heat.
  1610. \end{tightlist}
  1611. \subsubsection*{Directory attacks}
  1612. \begin{tightlist}
  1613. \item knock out a dirserver
  1614. \item knock out half the dirservers
  1615. \item trick user into using different software (with different dirserver
  1616. keys)
  1617. \item OR connects to the dirservers but nowhere else
  1618. \item foo
  1619. \end{tightlist}
  1620. \subsubsection*{Attacks against rendezvous points}
  1621. \begin{tightlist}
  1622. \item foo
  1623. \end{tightlist}
  1624. \Section{Open Questions in Low-latency Anonymity}
  1625. \label{sec:maintaining-anonymity}
  1626. % There must be a better intro than this! -NM
  1627. In addition to the open problems discussed in
  1628. section~\ref{subsec:non-goals}, many other questions remain to be
  1629. solved by future research before we can be truly confident that we
  1630. have built a secure low-latency anonymity service.
  1631. Many of these open issues are questions of balance. For example,
  1632. how often should users rotate to fresh circuits? Too-frequent
  1633. rotation is inefficient and expensive, but too-infrequent rotation
  1634. makes the user's traffic linkable. Instead of opening a fresh
  1635. circuit; clients can also limit linkability exit from a middle point
  1636. of the circuit, or by truncating and re-extending the circuit, but
  1637. more analysis is needed to determine the proper trade-off.
  1638. [XXX mention predecessor attacks?]
  1639. A similar question surrounds timing of directory operations:
  1640. how often should directories be updated? With too-infrequent
  1641. updates clients receive an inaccurate picture of the network; with
  1642. too-frequent updates the directory servers are overloaded.
  1643. %do different exit policies at different exit nodes trash anonymity sets,
  1644. %or not mess with them much?
  1645. %
  1646. %% Why would they? By routing traffic to certain nodes preferentially?
  1647. [XXX Choosing paths and path lengths: I'm not writing this bit till
  1648. Arma's pathselection stuff is in. -NM]
  1649. %%%% Roger said that he'd put a path selection paragraph into section
  1650. %%%% 4 that would replace this.
  1651. %
  1652. %I probably should have noted that this means loops will be on at least
  1653. %five hop routes, which should be rare given the distribution. I'm
  1654. %realizing that this is reproducing some of the thought that led to a
  1655. %default of five hops in the original onion routing design. There were
  1656. %some different assumptions, which I won't spell out now. Note that
  1657. %enclave level protections really change these assumptions. If most
  1658. %circuits are just two hops, then just a single link observer will be
  1659. %able to tell that two enclaves are communicating with high probability.
  1660. %So, it would seem that enclaves should have a four node minimum circuit
  1661. %to prevent trivial circuit insider identification of the whole circuit,
  1662. %and three hop minimum for circuits from an enclave to some nonclave
  1663. %responder. But then... we would have to make everyone obey these rules
  1664. %or a node that through timing inferred it was on a four hop circuit
  1665. %would know that it was probably carrying enclave to enclave traffic.
  1666. %Which... if there were even a moderate number of bad nodes in the
  1667. %network would make it advantageous to break the connection to conduct
  1668. %a reformation intersection attack. Ahhh! I gotta stop thinking
  1669. %about this and work on the paper some before the family wakes up.
  1670. %On Sat, Oct 25, 2003 at 06:57:12AM -0400, Paul Syverson wrote:
  1671. %> Which... if there were even a moderate number of bad nodes in the
  1672. %> network would make it advantageous to break the connection to conduct
  1673. %> a reformation intersection attack. Ahhh! I gotta stop thinking
  1674. %> about this and work on the paper some before the family wakes up.
  1675. %This is the sort of issue that should go in the 'maintaining anonymity
  1676. %with tor' section towards the end. :)
  1677. %Email from between roger and me to beginning of section above. Fix and move.
  1678. Throughout this paper, we have assumed that end-to-end traffic
  1679. analysis cannot yet be defeated. But even high-latency anonymity
  1680. systems can be vulnerable to end-to-end traffic analysis, if the
  1681. traffic volumes are high enough, and if users' habits are sufficiently
  1682. distinct \cite{limits-open,statistical-disclosure}. \emph{What can be
  1683. done to limit the effectiveness of these attacks against low-latency
  1684. systems?} Tor already makes some effort to conceal the starts and
  1685. ends of streams by wrapping all long-range control commands in
  1686. identical-looking relay cells, but more analysis is needed. Link
  1687. padding could frustrate passive observer who count packets; long-range
  1688. padding could work against observers who own the first hop in a
  1689. circuit. But more research needs to be done in order to find an
  1690. efficient and practical approach. Volunteers prefer not to run
  1691. constant-bandwidth padding; but more sophisticated traffic shaping
  1692. approaches remain somewhat unanalyzed. [XXX is this so?] Recent work
  1693. on long-range padding \cite{defensive-dropping} shows promise. One
  1694. could also try to reduce correlation in packet timing by batching and
  1695. re-ordering packets, but it is unclear whether this could improve
  1696. anonymity without introducing so much latency as to render the
  1697. network unusable.
  1698. Even if passive timing attacks were wholly solved, active timing
  1699. attacks would remain. \emph{What can
  1700. be done to address attackers who can introduce timing patterns into
  1701. a user's traffic?} [XXX mention likely approaches]
  1702. %%% I think we cover this by framing the problem as ``Can we make
  1703. %%% end-to-end characteristics of low-latency systems as good as
  1704. %%% those of high-latency systems?'' Eliminating long-term
  1705. %%% intersection is a hard problem.
  1706. %
  1707. %Even regardless of link padding from Alice to the cloud, there will be
  1708. %times when Alice is simply not online. Link padding, at the edges or
  1709. %inside the cloud, does not help for this.
  1710. In order to scale to large numbers of users, and to prevent an
  1711. attacker from observing the whole network at once, it may be necessary
  1712. for low-latency anonymity systems to support far more servers than Tor
  1713. currently anticipates. This introduces several issues. First, if
  1714. approval by a centralized set of directory servers is no longer
  1715. feasible, what mechanism should be used to prevent adversaries from
  1716. signing up many spurious servers?
  1717. Second, if clients can no longer have a complete
  1718. picture of the network at all times, how can should they perform
  1719. discovery while preventing attackers from manipulating or exploiting
  1720. gaps in client knowledge? Third, if there are to many servers
  1721. for every server to constantly communicate with every other, what kind
  1722. of non-clique topology should the network use? Restricted-route
  1723. topologies promise comparable anonymity with better scalability
  1724. \cite{danezis-pets03}, but whatever topology we choose, we need some
  1725. way to keep attackers from manipulating their position within it.
  1726. Fourth, since no centralized authority is tracking server reliability,
  1727. How do we prevent unreliable servers from rendering the network
  1728. unusable? Fifth, do clients receive so much anonymity benefit from
  1729. running their own servers that we should expect them all to do so, or
  1730. do we need to find another incentive structure to motivate them?
  1731. (Tarzan and MorphMix present possible solutions.)
  1732. [[ XXX how to approve new nodes (advogato, sybil, captcha (RTT));]
  1733. Alternatively, it may be the case that one of these problems proves
  1734. intractable, or that the drawbacks to many-server systems prove
  1735. greater than the benefits. Nevertheless, we may still do well to
  1736. consider non-clique topologies. A cascade topology may provide more
  1737. defense against traffic confirmation confirmation.
  1738. % Why would it? Cite. -NM
  1739. Does the hydra (many inputs, few outputs) topology work
  1740. better? Are we going to get a hydra anyway because most nodes will be
  1741. middleman nodes?
  1742. %%% Do more with this paragraph once The TCP-over-TCP paragraph is
  1743. %%% more integrated into Related works.
  1744. %
  1745. As mentioned in section\ref{where-is-it-now}, Tor could improve its
  1746. robustness against node failure by buffering stream data at the
  1747. network's edges, and performing end-to-end acknowledgments. The
  1748. efficacy of this approach remains to be tested, however, and there
  1749. may be more effective means for ensuring reliable connections in the
  1750. presence of unreliable nodes.
  1751. %%% Keeping this original paragraph for a little while, since it
  1752. %%% is not the same as what's written there now.
  1753. %
  1754. %Because Tor depends on TLS and TCP to provide a reliable transport,
  1755. %when one of the servers goes down, all the circuits (and thus streams)
  1756. %traveling over that server must break. This reduces anonymity because
  1757. %everybody needs to reconnect right then (does it? how much?) and
  1758. %because exit connections all break at the same time, and it also harms
  1759. %usability. It seems the problem is even worse in a peer-to-peer
  1760. %environment, because so far such systems don't really provide an
  1761. %incentive for nodes to stay connected when they're done browsing, so
  1762. %we would expect a much higher churn rate than for onion routing.
  1763. %there ways of allowing streams to survive the loss of a node in the
  1764. %path?
  1765. % Roger or Paul suggested that we say something about incentives,
  1766. % too, but I think that's a better candidate for our future work
  1767. % section. After all, we will doubtlessly learn very much about why
  1768. % people do or don't run and use Tor in the near future. -NM
  1769. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  1770. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  1771. \Section{Future Directions}
  1772. \label{sec:conclusion}
  1773. % Mention that we need to do TCP over tor for reliability.
  1774. Tor brings together many innovations into
  1775. a unified deployable system. But there are still several attacks that
  1776. work quite well, as well as a number of sustainability and run-time
  1777. issues remaining to be ironed out. In particular:
  1778. % Many of these (Scalability, cover traffic) are duplicates from open problems.
  1779. %
  1780. \begin{itemize}
  1781. \item \emph{Scalability:} Tor's emphasis on design simplicity and
  1782. deployability has led us to adopt a clique topology, a
  1783. semi-centralized model for directories and trusts, and a
  1784. full-network-visibility model for client knowledge. None of these
  1785. properties will scale to more than a few hundred servers, at most.
  1786. Promising approaches to better scalability exist (see
  1787. section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}), but more deployment
  1788. experience would be helpful in learning the relative importance of
  1789. these bottlenecks.
  1790. \item \emph{Cover traffic:} Currently we avoid cover traffic because
  1791. of its clear costs in performance and bandwidth, and because its
  1792. security benefits have not well understood. With more research
  1793. \cite{SS03,defensive-dropping}, the price/value ratio may change,
  1794. both for link-level cover traffic and also long-range cover traffic.
  1795. \item \emph{Better directory distribution:} Even with the threshold
  1796. directory agreement algorithm described in \ref{subsec:dirservers},
  1797. the directory servers are still trust bottlenecks. We must find more
  1798. decentralized yet practical ways to distribute up-to-date snapshots of
  1799. network status without introducing new attacks. Also, directory
  1800. retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently
  1801. download a description of the entire network state every 15
  1802. minutes. As the state grows larger and clients more numerous, we
  1803. may need to move to a solution in which clients only receive
  1804. incremental updates to directory state, or where directories are
  1805. cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers.
  1806. \item \emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While
  1807. Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous
  1808. points and location-hidden servers, these feature has not yet been
  1809. implemented. While doing so, will likely encounter additional
  1810. issues, both in terms of usability and anonymity, that must be
  1811. resolved.
  1812. \item \emph{Further specification review:} Although we have a public,
  1813. byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, this protocol has
  1814. not received extensive external review. We hope that as Tor
  1815. becomes more widely deployed, more people will become interested in
  1816. examining our specification.
  1817. \item \emph{Wider-scale deployment:} The original goal of Tor was to
  1818. gain experience in deploying an anonymizing overlay network, and
  1819. learn from having actual users. We are now at the point in design
  1820. and development where we can start deploying a wider network. Once
  1821. we have are ready for actual users, we will doubtlessly be better
  1822. able to evaluate some of our design decisions, including our
  1823. robustness/latency tradeoffs, our abuse-prevention mechanisms, and
  1824. our overall usability.
  1825. \end{itemize}
  1826. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  1827. %% commented out for anonymous submission
  1828. %\Section{Acknowledgments}
  1829. % Peter Palfrader for editing
  1830. % Bram Cohen for congestion control discussions
  1831. %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
  1832. \bibliographystyle{latex8}
  1833. \bibliography{tor-design}
  1834. \end{document}
  1835. % Style guide:
  1836. % U.S. spelling
  1837. % avoid contractions (it's, can't, etc.)
  1838. % prefer ``for example'' or ``such as'' to e.g.
  1839. % prefer ``that is'' to i.e.
  1840. % 'mix', 'mixes' (as noun)
  1841. % 'mix-net'
  1842. % 'mix', 'mixing' (as verb)
  1843. % 'middleman' [Not with a hyphen; the hyphen has been optional
  1844. % since Middle English.]
  1845. % 'nymserver'
  1846. % 'Cypherpunk', 'Cypherpunks', 'Cypherpunk remailer'
  1847. % 'Onion Routing design', 'onion router' [note capitalization]
  1848. % 'SOCKS'
  1849. % Try not to use \cite as a noun.
  1850. % 'Authorizating' sounds great, but it isn't a word.
  1851. % 'First, second, third', not 'Firstly, secondly, thirdly'.
  1852. % 'circuit', not 'channel'
  1853. % Typography: no space on either side of an em dash---ever.
  1854. % Hyphens are for multi-part words; en dashs imply movement or
  1855. % opposition (The Alice--Bob connection); and em dashes are
  1856. % for punctuation---like that.
  1857. %
  1858. % 'Substitute ``Damn'' every time you're inclined to write ``very;'' your
  1859. % editor will delete it and the writing will be just as it should be.'
  1860. % -- Mark Twain