tor.1.in 34 KB

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  1. .TH TOR 1 "January 2006" "TOR"
  2. .SH NAME
  3. tor \- The second-generation onion router
  4. .SH SYNOPSIS
  5. .B tor
  6. [\fIOPTION value\fR]...
  7. .SH DESCRIPTION
  8. .I tor
  9. is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
  10. service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
  11. negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
  12. knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
  13. the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
  14. the downstream node.
  15. .PP
  16. Basically \fItor\fR provides a distributed network of servers ("onion
  17. routers"). Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc --
  18. around the routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers
  19. themselves have difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
  20. .SH OPTIONS
  21. \fB-h, -help\fP
  22. Display a short help message and exit.
  23. .LP
  24. .TP
  25. \fB-f \fR\fIFILE\fP
  26. FILE contains further "option value" pairs. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
  27. .LP
  28. .TP
  29. Other options can be specified either on the command-line (\fI--option
  30. value\fR), or in the configuration file (\fIoption value\fR).
  31. Options are case-insensitive.
  32. .LP
  33. .TP
  34. \fBBandwidthRate \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  35. A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth on this node to
  36. the specified number of bytes per second. (Default: 3 MB)
  37. .LP
  38. .TP
  39. \fBBandwidthBurst \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  40. Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the
  41. given number of bytes. (Default: 6 MB)
  42. .LP
  43. .TP
  44. \fBMaxAdvertisedBandwidth \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  45. If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
  46. BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
  47. who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
  48. advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their
  49. server without impacting network performance.
  50. .LP
  51. .TP
  52. \fBConnLimit \fR\fINUM\fP
  53. The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to
  54. the Tor process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as
  55. many file descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this
  56. by "ulimit -H -n"). If this number is less than ConnLimit, then
  57. Tor will refuse to start.
  58. You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on
  59. Windows since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
  60. .LP
  61. .TP
  62. \fBControlPort \fR\fIPort\fP
  63. If set, Tor will accept connections on
  64. this port, and allow those connections to control the Tor process using the
  65. Tor Control Protocol (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also
  66. specify one of \fBHashedControlPassword\fP or \fBCookieAuthentication\fP,
  67. setting this option will cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to
  68. control it.
  69. .LP
  70. .TP
  71. \fBControlListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  72. Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port,
  73. bind to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We
  74. strongly recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're
  75. doing, since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
  76. dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1)
  77. .LP
  78. .TP
  79. \fBHashedControlPassword \fR\fIhashed_password\fP
  80. Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other process
  81. knows the password whose one-way hash is \fIhashed_password\fP. You can
  82. compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
  83. \fIpassword\fP".
  84. .LP
  85. .TP
  86. \fBCookieAuthentication \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  87. If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
  88. except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
  89. "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
  90. authentication methods should only be used on systems with good filesystem
  91. security. (Default: 0)
  92. .LP
  93. .TP
  94. \fBDataDirectory \fR\fIDIR\fP
  95. Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
  96. .LP
  97. .TP
  98. \fBDirServer \fR[\fInickname\fR] [\fBv1\fR] \fIaddress\fR\fB:\fIport fingerprint\fP
  99. Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided
  100. address and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can
  101. be repeated many times, for multiple authoritative directory
  102. servers. If the "v1" option is provided, Tor will use this server as an
  103. authority for old-style (v1) directories as well. (Only directory mirrors
  104. care about this.) If no \fBdirserver\fP line is given, Tor will use the default
  105. directory servers: moria1, moria2, and tor26. NOTE: this option is intended
  106. for setting up a private Tor network with its own directory authorities. If
  107. you use it, you will be distinguishable from other users, because you won't
  108. believe the same authorities they do.
  109. .LP
  110. .TP
  111. \fBFetchHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  112. If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from
  113. the rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using
  114. a Tor controller that handles hidserv fetches for you.
  115. (Default: 1)
  116. .LP
  117. .TP
  118. \fBFetchServerDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  119. If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
  120. descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
  121. you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
  122. (Default: 1)
  123. .LP
  124. .TP
  125. \fBFetchUselessDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  126. If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
  127. authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching
  128. useless descriptors, for example for routers that are not running.
  129. This option is useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist"
  130. script to enumerate Tor nodes that exit to certain addresses.
  131. (Default: 0)
  132. .LP
  133. .TP
  134. \fBGroup \fR\fIGID\fP
  135. On startup, setgid to this user.
  136. .LP
  137. .TP
  138. \fBHttpProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
  139. Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port
  140. (or host:80 if port is not specified),
  141. rather than connecting directly to any directory servers.
  142. .LP
  143. .TP
  144. \fBHttpProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
  145. If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Http proxy
  146. authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
  147. Http proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
  148. patch if you want it to support others.
  149. .LP
  150. .TP
  151. \fBHttpsProxy\fR \fIhost\fR[:\fIport\fR]\fP
  152. Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port
  153. (or host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than
  154. connecting directly to servers. You may want to set \fBFascistFirewall\fR
  155. to restrict the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your Https
  156. proxy only allows connecting to certain ports.
  157. .LP
  158. .TP
  159. \fBHttpsProxyAuthenticator\fR \fIusername:password\fP
  160. If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic Https proxy
  161. authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of
  162. Https proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a
  163. patch if you want it to support others.
  164. .LP
  165. .TP
  166. \fBKeepalivePeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
  167. To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive
  168. cell every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the
  169. connection has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM
  170. seconds of idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
  171. .LP
  172. .TP
  173. \fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBstderr\fR|\fBstdout\fR|\fBsyslog\fR\fP
  174. Send all messages between \fIminSeverity\fR and \fImaxSeverity\fR to
  175. the standard output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system
  176. log. (The "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized
  177. severity levels are debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using
  178. "notice" in most cases, since anything more verbose may provide sensitive
  179. information to an attacker who obtains the logs. If only one
  180. severity level is given, all messages of that level or higher will be
  181. sent to the listed destination.
  182. .LP
  183. .TP
  184. \fBLog \fR\fIminSeverity\fR[-\fImaxSeverity\fR] \fBfile\fR \fIFILENAME\fP
  185. As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The "Log"
  186. option may appear more than once in a configuration file. Messages
  187. are sent to all the logs that match their severity level.
  188. .LP
  189. .TP
  190. \fBOutboundBindAddress \fR\fIIP\fP
  191. Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
  192. is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
  193. of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
  194. .LP
  195. .TP
  196. \fBPidFile \fR\fIFILE\fP
  197. On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove FILE.
  198. .LP
  199. .TP
  200. \fBProtocolWarnings \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  201. If 1, Tor will log with severity 'warn' various cases of other parties
  202. not following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with
  203. severity 'info'. (Default: 0)
  204. .LP
  205. .TP
  206. \fBRunAsDaemon \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  207. If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has
  208. no effect on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line
  209. option. (Default: 0)
  210. .LP
  211. .TP
  212. \fBSafeLogging \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  213. If 1, Tor replaces potentially sensitive strings in the logs
  214. (e.g. addresses) with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can still be
  215. useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying information
  216. about what sites a user might have visited. (Default: 1)
  217. .LP
  218. .TP
  219. \fBUser \fR\fIUID\fP
  220. On startup, setuid to this user.
  221. .LP
  222. .TP
  223. \fBHardwareAccel \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fP
  224. If non-zero, try to use crypto hardware acceleration when
  225. available. This is untested and probably buggy. (Default: 0)
  226. .SH CLIENT OPTIONS
  227. .PP
  228. The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if \fBSocksPort\fP is non-zero):
  229. .LP
  230. .TP
  231. \fBAllowInvalidNodes\fR \fBentry\fR|\fBexit\fR|\fBmiddle\fR|\fBintroduction\fR|\fBrendezvous\fR|...\fP
  232. If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
  233. authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
  234. recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
  235. can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
  236. "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
  237. .LP
  238. .TP
  239. \fBCircuitBuildTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
  240. Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit
  241. isn't open in that time, give up on it.
  242. (Default: 1 minute.)
  243. .LP
  244. .TP
  245. \fBCircuitIdleTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
  246. If we have keept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds,
  247. then close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can
  248. expire all of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also,
  249. if we end up making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of
  250. the requests we're receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the
  251. circuit list.
  252. (Default: 1 hour.)
  253. .LP
  254. .TP
  255. \fBClientOnly \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  256. If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server. The default
  257. is to run as a client unless ORPort is configured. (Usually,
  258. you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at figuring out whether
  259. you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a useful server.)
  260. (Default: 0)
  261. .LP
  262. .TP
  263. \fBExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  264. A list of nodes to never use when building a circuit.
  265. .LP
  266. .TP
  267. \fBEntryNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  268. A list of preferred nodes to use for the first hop in the circuit.
  269. These are treated only as preferences unless StrictEntryNodes (see
  270. below) is also set.
  271. .LP
  272. .TP
  273. \fBExitNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  274. A list of preferred nodes to use for the last hop in the circuit.
  275. These are treated only as preferences unless StrictExitNodes (see
  276. below) is also set.
  277. .LP
  278. .TP
  279. \fBStrictEntryNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  280. If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "EntryNodes" for
  281. the first hop of a circuit.
  282. .LP
  283. .TP
  284. \fBStrictExitNodes \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  285. If 1, Tor will never use any nodes besides those listed in "ExitNodes" for
  286. the last hop of a circuit.
  287. .LP
  288. .TP
  289. \fBFascistFirewall \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  290. If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports that
  291. your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see \fBFirewallPorts\fR). This will
  292. allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with restrictive policies,
  293. but will not allow you to run as a server behind such a firewall.
  294. This option is deprecated; use
  295. ReachableAddresses instead.
  296. .LP
  297. .TP
  298. \fBFirewallPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
  299. A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only
  300. used when \fBFascistFirewall\fR is set. This option is deprecated; use
  301. ReachableAddresses instead. (Default: 80, 443)
  302. .LP
  303. .TP
  304. \fBReachableAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
  305. A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows you
  306. to connect to. The format is as
  307. for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except that "accept" is understood
  308. unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For example, 'ReachableAddresses
  309. 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept *:80' means that your
  310. firewall allows connections to everything inside net 99, rejects port
  311. 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port 80 otherwise.
  312. (Default: 'accept *:*'.)
  313. .LP
  314. .TP
  315. \fBReachableDirAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
  316. Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
  317. these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
  318. GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP
  319. is used. If \fBHttpProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that
  320. proxy.
  321. .LP
  322. .TP
  323. \fBReachableORAddresses \fR\fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP][:\fIPORT\fP]...\fP
  324. Like \fBReachableAddresses\fP, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
  325. these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not set
  326. explicitly then the value of \fBReachableAddresses\fP is used. If
  327. \fBHttpsProxy\fR is set then these connections will go through that proxy.
  328. The separation between \fBReachableORAddresses\fP and
  329. \fBReachableDirAddresses\fP is only interesting when you are connecting through
  330. proxies (see \fBHttpProxy\fR and \fBHttpsProxy\fR). Most proxies limit TLS
  331. connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443, and some
  332. limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory information) to
  333. port 80.
  334. .LP
  335. .TP
  336. \fBLongLivedPorts \fR\fIPORTS\fP
  337. A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
  338. (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
  339. ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a
  340. node will go down before the stream is finished.
  341. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863, 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 8300, 8888)
  342. .LP
  343. .TP
  344. \fBMapAddress\fR \fIaddress\fR \fInewaddress\fR
  345. When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to
  346. newaddress before processing it. For example, if you always want
  347. connections to www.indymedia.org to exit via \fItorserver\fR (where
  348. \fItorserver\fR is the nickname of the server),
  349. use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
  350. .LP
  351. .TP
  352. \fBNewCircuitPeriod \fR\fINUM\fP
  353. Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30 seconds)
  354. .LP
  355. .TP
  356. \fBMaxCircuitDirtiness \fR\fINUM\fP
  357. Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
  358. but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old.
  359. (Default: 10 minutes)
  360. .LP
  361. .TP
  362. \fBNodeFamily \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  363. The named Tor servers constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered
  364. servers, so never use any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a
  365. NodeFamily is only needed when a server doesn't list the family itself
  366. (with MyFamily). This option can be used multiple times.
  367. .LP
  368. .TP
  369. .\" \fBPathlenCoinWeight \fR\fI0.0-1.0\fP
  370. .\" Paths are 3 hops plus a geometric distribution centered around this coinweight.
  371. .\" Must be >=0.0 and <1.0. (Default: 0.3) NOT USED CURRENTLY
  372. .\" .TP
  373. \fBRendNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  374. A list of preferred nodes to use for the rendezvous point, if possible.
  375. .LP
  376. .TP
  377. \fBRendExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  378. A list of nodes to never use when choosing a rendezvous point.
  379. .LP
  380. .TP
  381. \fBSocksPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  382. Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
  383. applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
  384. connections. (Default: 9050)
  385. .LP
  386. .TP
  387. \fBSocksListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  388. Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
  389. applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port
  390. (e.g. 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times
  391. to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
  392. .LP
  393. .TP
  394. \fBSocksPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
  395. Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
  396. Socks ports.
  397. The policies have the same form as exit policies below.
  398. .LP
  399. .TP
  400. \fBSocksTimeout \fR\fINUM\fP
  401. Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds unattached before we fail it.
  402. (Default: 2 minutes.)
  403. .LP
  404. .TP
  405. \fBTestVia \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  406. A list of nodes to prefer for your middle hop when building testing
  407. circuits. This option is mainly for debugging reachability problems.
  408. .LP
  409. .TP
  410. \fBTrackHostExits \fR\fIhost\fR,\fI.domain\fR,\fI...\fR\fP
  411. For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent connections
  412. to hosts that match this value and attempt to
  413. reuse the same exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a '.', it is
  414. treated as matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a '.', it
  415. means match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to
  416. sites that will expire all your authentication cookies (ie log you out) if
  417. your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage of
  418. making it more clear that a given history is
  419. associated with a single user. However, most people who would wish to observe
  420. this will observe it through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
  421. .LP
  422. .TP
  423. \fBTrackHostExitsExpire \fR\fINUM\fP
  424. Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the association
  425. between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default
  426. is 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
  427. .LP
  428. .TP
  429. \fBUseEntryGuards \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  430. If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and
  431. try to stick with them. This is desirable because
  432. constantly changing servers increases the odds that an adversary who owns
  433. some servers will observe a fraction of your paths.
  434. (Defaults to 1.)
  435. .LP
  436. .TP
  437. \fBNumEntryGuards \fR\fINUM\fP
  438. If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
  439. as long-term entries for our circuits.
  440. (Defaults to 3.)
  441. .LP
  442. .TP
  443. \fBSafeSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  444. When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
  445. use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an
  446. IP address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
  447. Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
  448. (Defaults to 0.)
  449. .LP
  450. .TP
  451. \fBTestSocks \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  452. When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
  453. each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used
  454. a safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks).
  455. This helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly
  456. leaking DNS requests.
  457. (Default: 0)
  458. .LP
  459. .TP
  460. \fBVirtualAddrNetwork \fR\fIAddress\fB/\fIbits\fP
  461. When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the
  462. 'MAPADDRESS' command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range.
  463. (Default: 127.192.0.0/10)
  464. .SH SERVER OPTIONS
  465. .PP
  466. The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if \fBORPort\fP is non-zero):
  467. .LP
  468. .TP
  469. \fBAddress \fR\fIaddress\fP
  470. The IP or fqdn of this server (e.g. moria.mit.edu). You can leave this
  471. unset, and Tor will guess your IP.
  472. .LP
  473. .TP
  474. \fBAssumeReachable \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  475. This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
  476. don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
  477. immediately. If \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP is also set, this option
  478. instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and
  479. list all connected servers as running.
  480. .LP
  481. .TP
  482. \fBContactInfo \fR\fIemail_address\fP
  483. Administrative contact information for server. This line might get
  484. picked up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact
  485. that it's an email address.
  486. .LP
  487. .TP
  488. \fBExitPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
  489. Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
  490. "\fBaccept\fP|\fBreject\fP \fIADDR\fP[\fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP]\fB[:\fP\fIPORT\fP]".
  491. If \fB/\fP\fIMASK\fP is omitted then this policy just applies to the host
  492. given. Instead of giving a host or network you can also use "\fB*\fP" to
  493. denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0). \fIPORT\fP can be a single port number,
  494. an interval of ports "\fIFROM_PORT\fP\fB-\fP\fITO_PORT\fP", or "\fB*\fP".
  495. If \fIPORT\fP is omitted, that means "\fB*\fP".
  496. For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:*,accept *:*" would
  497. reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and
  498. accept anything else.
  499. To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
  500. 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
  501. 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
  502. These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your
  503. exit policy) unless you set the ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option
  504. to 0. For example, once you've done that, you could allow HTTP to
  505. 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to internal networks with
  506. "accept
  507. 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:*". See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more
  508. details about internal and reserved IP address space.
  509. This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put
  510. it all on one line.
  511. Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If
  512. you want to _replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
  513. either a reject *:* or an accept *:*. Otherwise, you're _augmenting_
  514. (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is:
  515. .PD 0
  516. .RS 12
  517. .IP "reject *:25"
  518. .IP "reject *:119"
  519. .IP "reject *:135-139"
  520. .IP "reject *:445"
  521. .IP "reject *:465"
  522. .IP "reject *:587"
  523. .IP "reject *:1214"
  524. .IP "reject *:4661-4666"
  525. .IP "reject *:6346-6429"
  526. .IP "reject *:6699"
  527. .IP "reject *:6881-6999"
  528. .IP "accept *:*"
  529. .RE
  530. .PD
  531. .LP
  532. .TP
  533. \fBExitPolicyRejectPrivate \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  534. Reject all private (local) networks at the beginning of your exit
  535. policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy. (Default: 1)
  536. .LP
  537. .TP
  538. \fBMaxOnionsPending \fR\fINUM\fP
  539. If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject new ones. (Default: 100)
  540. .LP
  541. .TP
  542. \fBMyFamily \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  543. Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group
  544. or organization identical or similar to that of the other named servers.
  545. When two servers both declare that they are in the same 'family', Tor clients
  546. will not use them in the same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the
  547. other servers in its family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
  548. .LP
  549. .TP
  550. \fBNickname \fR\fIname\fP
  551. Set the server's nickname to 'name'. Nicknames must be between 1
  552. and 19 characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters
  553. [a-zA-Z0-9].
  554. .LP
  555. .TP
  556. \fBNumCPUs \fR\fInum\fP
  557. How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
  558. .LP
  559. .TP
  560. \fBORPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  561. Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
  562. .LP
  563. .TP
  564. \fBORListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  565. Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
  566. servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
  567. specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
  568. .LP
  569. .TP
  570. \fBPublishServerDescriptor \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  571. If set to 0, Tor will act as a server if you have an ORPort
  572. defined, but it will not publish its descriptor to the dirservers. This
  573. option is useful if you're testing out your server, or if you're using
  574. a Tor controller that handles directory publishing for you.
  575. (Default: 1)
  576. .LP
  577. .TP
  578. \fBRedirectExit \fR\fIpattern target\fP
  579. Whenever an outgoing connection tries to connect to one of a given set
  580. of addresses, connect to \fItarget\fP (an \fIaddress:port\fP pair) instead.
  581. The address
  582. pattern is given in the same format as for an exit policy. The
  583. address translation applies after exit policies are applied. Multiple
  584. \fBRedirectExit\fP options can be used: once any one has matched
  585. successfully, no subsequent rules are considered. You can specify that no
  586. redirection is to be performed on a given set of addresses by using the
  587. special target string "pass", which prevents subsequent rules from being
  588. considered.
  589. .LP
  590. .TP
  591. \fBShutdownWaitLength\fR \fINUM\fP
  592. When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down: we close
  593. listeners and start refusing new circuits. After \fBNUM\fP seconds,
  594. we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immediately. (Default:
  595. 30 seconds)
  596. .LP
  597. .TP
  598. \fBAccountingMax \fR\fIN\fR \fBbytes\fR|\fBKB\fR|\fBMB\fR|\fBGB\fR|\fBTB\fP
  599. Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given
  600. accounting period, or receive more than that number in the period.
  601. For example, with AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB
  602. and receive 800 MB and continue running. It will only hibernate once one
  603. of the two reaches 1 GB.
  604. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
  605. time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from
  606. waking at the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in
  607. each period before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues,
  608. enabling hibernation is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it
  609. provides users with a collection of fast servers that are up some of
  610. the time, which is more useful than a set of slow servers that are
  611. always "available".
  612. .LP
  613. .TP
  614. \fBAccountingStart \fR\fBday\fR|\fBweek\fR|\fBmonth\fR [\fIday\fR] \fIHH:MM\fR\fP
  615. Specify how long accounting periods last. If \fBmonth\fP is given,
  616. each accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR on the
  617. \fIday\fRth day of one month to the same day and time of the next.
  618. (The day must be between 1 and 28.) If \fBweek\fP is given, each
  619. accounting period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR of the \fIday\fRth
  620. day of one week to the same day and time of the next week, with Monday
  621. as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If \fBday\fR is given, each accounting
  622. period runs from the time \fIHH:MM\fR each day to the same time on the
  623. next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
  624. "month 1 0:00".)
  625. .SH DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
  626. .PP
  627. The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is, if \fBDirPort\fP is non-zero):
  628. .LP
  629. .TP
  630. \fBAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  631. When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative
  632. directory server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its
  633. own list of good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients.
  634. Unless the clients already have you listed as a trusted directory, you
  635. probably do not want to set this option. Please coordinate with the other
  636. admins at tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
  637. .LP
  638. .TP
  639. \fBV1AuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  640. When this option is set in addition to \fBAuthoritativeDirectory\fP, Tor also
  641. generates a version 1 directory (for Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
  642. (As of Tor 0.1.1.12 every (v2) authoritative directory still provides most of
  643. the v1 directory functionality, even without this option set to 1.
  644. This however is expected to change in the future.)
  645. .LP
  646. .TP
  647. \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  648. When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on
  649. which versions of Tor are still believed safe for use to
  650. the published directory. Each version 1 authority is
  651. automatically a versioning authority; version 2 authorities
  652. provide this service optionally. See \fBRecommendedVersions\fP,
  653. \fBRecommendedClientVersions\fP, and \fBRecommendedServerVersions\fP.
  654. .LP
  655. .TP
  656. \fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  657. When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
  658. opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
  659. opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
  660. the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and
  661. fingerprint has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers
  662. will refuse to accept or publish descriptors that contradict a
  663. registered binding. See \fBapproved-routers\fP in the \fBFILES\fP
  664. section below.
  665. .LP
  666. .TP
  667. \fBDirPort \fR\fIPORT\fP
  668. Advertise the directory service on this port.
  669. .LP
  670. .TP
  671. \fBDirListenAddress \fR\fIIP\fR[:\fIPORT\fR]\fP
  672. Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind
  673. to this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
  674. .LP
  675. .TP
  676. \fBDirPolicy \fR\fIpolicy\fR,\fIpolicy\fR,\fI...\fP
  677. Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
  678. directory ports.
  679. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
  680. .LP
  681. .TP
  682. \fBRecommendedVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
  683. STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
  684. to be safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which
  685. pull down the directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This
  686. option can appear multiple times: the values from multiple lines are
  687. spliced together.
  688. When this is set then
  689. \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
  690. .LP
  691. .TP
  692. \fBRecommendedClientVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
  693. STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
  694. to be safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
  695. directories. If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
  696. is used.
  697. When this is set then
  698. \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
  699. .LP
  700. .TP
  701. \fBRecommendedServerVersions \fR\fISTRING\fP
  702. STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed
  703. to be safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
  704. directories. If this is not set then the value of \fBRecommendedVersions\fR
  705. is used.
  706. When this is set then
  707. \fBVersioningAuthoritativeDirectory\fP should be set too.
  708. .LP
  709. .TP
  710. \fBDirAllowPrivateAddresses \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  711. If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
  712. elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP or is a private IP,
  713. it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
  714. .LP
  715. .TP
  716. \fBRunTesting \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  717. If set to 1, Tor tries to build circuits through all of the servers it
  718. knows about, so it can tell which are up and which are down. This
  719. option is only useful for authoritative directories, so you probably
  720. don't want to use it.
  721. .LP
  722. .TP
  723. \fBAuthDirInvalid \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
  724. Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
  725. will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
  726. authority publishes.
  727. .LP
  728. .TP
  729. \fBAuthDirReject \fR\fIAddressPattern\fR...\fP
  730. Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
  731. will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
  732. authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor submitted
  733. for publication by this authority.
  734. .LP
  735. .TP
  736. \fBAuthDirRejectUnlisted \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  737. Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server
  738. rejects all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed
  739. in the fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get
  740. Sybiled. (Default: 0)
  741. .SH HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
  742. .PP
  743. The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
  744. .LP
  745. .TP
  746. \fBHiddenServiceDir \fR\fIDIRECTORY\fP
  747. Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden
  748. service must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple
  749. times to specify multiple services.
  750. .LP
  751. .TP
  752. \fBHiddenServicePort \fR\fIVIRTPORT \fR[\fITARGET\fR]\fP
  753. Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
  754. option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most recent
  755. hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to the
  756. same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or both
  757. by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port.
  758. .LP
  759. .TP
  760. \fBHiddenServiceNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  761. If possible, use the specified nodes as introduction points for the hidden
  762. service. If this is left unset, Tor will be smart and pick some reasonable
  763. ones; most people can leave this unset.
  764. .LP
  765. .TP
  766. \fBHiddenServiceExcludeNodes \fR\fInickname\fR,\fInickname\fR,\fI...\fP
  767. Do not use the specified nodes as introduction points for the hidden
  768. service. In normal use there is no reason to set this.
  769. .LP
  770. .TP
  771. \fBPublishHidServDescriptors \fR\fB0\fR|\fB1\fR\fP
  772. If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
  773. advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful
  774. if you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
  775. (Default: 1)
  776. .LP
  777. .TP
  778. \fBRendPostPeriod \fR\fIN\fR \fBseconds\fR|\fBminutes\fR|\fBhours\fR|\fBdays\fR|\fBweeks\fP
  779. Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
  780. service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
  781. uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes)
  782. .\" UNDOCUMENTED
  783. .\" ignoreversion
  784. .SH SIGNALS
  785. Tor catches the following signals:
  786. .LP
  787. .TP
  788. \fBSIGTERM\fR
  789. Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
  790. .LP
  791. .TP
  792. \fBSIGINT\fR
  793. Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
  794. slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
  795. (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
  796. .LP
  797. .TP
  798. \fBSIGHUP\fR
  799. The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing
  800. and reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and restart its
  801. helper processes if applicable.
  802. .LP
  803. .TP
  804. \fBSIGUSR1\fR
  805. Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and
  806. throughput.
  807. .LP
  808. .TP
  809. \fBSIGUSR2\fR
  810. Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels
  811. by sending a SIGHUP.
  812. .LP
  813. .TP
  814. \fBSIGCHLD\fR
  815. Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited,
  816. so it can clean up.
  817. .LP
  818. .TP
  819. \fBSIGPIPE\fR
  820. Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
  821. .LP
  822. .TP
  823. \fBSIGXFSZ\fR
  824. If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
  825. .SH FILES
  826. .LP
  827. .TP
  828. .B @CONFDIR@/torrc
  829. The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
  830. .LP
  831. .TP
  832. .B @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/
  833. The tor process stores keys and other data here.
  834. .LP
  835. .TP
  836. .B \fIDataDirectory\fP/approved-routers
  837. Only for naming authoritative directory servers
  838. (see \fBNamingAuthoritativeDirectory\fP).
  839. This file lists nickname to identity bindings. Each line lists a
  840. nickname and a fingerprint seperated by whitespace. See your
  841. \fBfingerprint\fP file in the \fIDataDirectory\fP for an example line.
  842. If the nickname is \fB!reject\fP then descriptors from the given
  843. identity (fingerprint) are rejected by the authoritative directory
  844. server. If it is \fB!invalid\fP then descriptors are accepted but marked
  845. in the directory as not valid, that is, not recommended.
  846. .SH SEE ALSO
  847. .BR privoxy (1),
  848. .BR tsocks (1),
  849. .BR torify (1)
  850. .BR http://tor.eff.org/
  851. .SH BUGS
  852. Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
  853. .SH AUTHORS
  854. Roger Dingledine <arma@mit.edu>, Nick Mathewson <nickm@alum.mit.edu>.