tor-parallel-relay-conn/doc/spec/control-spec.txt

                   TC: A Tor control protocol (Version 1)

0. Scope

  This document describes an implementation-specific protocol that is used
  for other programs (such as frontend user-interfaces) to communicate with a
  locally running Tor process.  It is not part of the Tor onion routing
  protocol.

  This protocol replaces version 0 of TC, which is now deprecated.  For
  reference, TC is described in "control-spec-v0.txt".  Implementors are
  recommended to avoid using TC directly, but instead to use a library that
  can easily be updated to use the newer protocol.  (Version 0 is used by Tor
  versions 0.1.0.x; the protocol in this document only works with Tor
  versions in the 0.1.1.x series and later.)

1. Protocol outline

  TC is a bidirectional message-based protocol.  It assumes an underlying
  stream for communication between a controlling process (the "client"
  or "controller") and a Tor process (or "server").  The stream may be
  implemented via TCP, TLS-over-TCP, a Unix-domain socket, or so on,
  but it must provide reliable in-order delivery.  For security, the
  stream should not be accessible by untrusted parties.

  In TC, the client and server send typed messages to each other over the
  underlying stream.  The client sends "commands" and the server sends
  "replies".

  By default, all messages from the server are in response to messages from
  the client.  Some client requests, however, will cause the server to send
  messages to the client indefinitely far into the future.  Such
  "asynchronous" replies are marked as such.

  Servers respond to messages in the order messages are received.

2. Message format

2.1. Description format

  The message formats listed below use ABNF as described in RFC 2234.
  The protocol itself is loosely based on SMTP (see RFC 2821).

  We use the following nonterminals from RFC 2822: atom, qcontent

  We define the following general-use nonterminals:

     String = DQUOTE *qcontent DQUOTE

  There are explicitly no limits on line length.  All 8-bit characters are
  permitted unless explicitly disallowed.

  Wherever CRLF is specified to be accepted from the controller, Tor MAY also
  accept LF.  Tor, however, MUST NOT generate LF instead of CRLF.
  Controllers SHOULD always send CRLF.

2.2. Commands from controller to Tor

    Command = Keyword Arguments CRLF / "+" Keyword Arguments CRLF Data
    Keyword = 1*ALPHA
    Arguments = *(SP / VCHAR)

  Specific commands and their arguments are described below in section 3.

2.3. Replies from Tor to the controller

    Reply = SyncReply / AsyncReply
    SyncReply = *(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine) EndReplyLine
    AsyncReply = *(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine) EndReplyLine

    MidReplyLine = StatusCode "-" ReplyLine
    DataReplyLine = StatusCode "+" ReplyLine Data
    EndReplyLine = StatusCode SP ReplyLine
    ReplyLine = [ReplyText] CRLF
    ReplyText = XXXX
    StatusCode = 3DIGIT

  Specific replies are mentioned below in section 3, and described more fully
  in section 4.

  [Compatibility note:  versions of Tor before 0.2.0.3-alpha sometimes
  generate AsyncReplies of the form "*(MidReplyLine / DataReplyLine)".
  This is incorrect, but controllers that need to work with these
  versions of Tor should be prepared to get multi-line AsyncReplies with
  the final line (usually "650 OK") omitted.]

2.4. General-use tokens

  ; Identifiers for servers.
  ServerID = Nickname / Fingerprint

  Nickname = 1*19 NicknameChar
  NicknameChar = "a"-"z" / "A"-"Z" / "0" - "9"
  Fingerprint = "$" 40*HEXDIG

  ; A "=" indicates that the given nickname is canonical; a "~" indicates
  ; that the given nickname is not canonical.  If no nickname is given at
  ; all, Tor does not even have a guess for what this router calls itself.
  LongName = Fingerprint [ ( "=" / "~" ) Nickname ]

  ; How a controller tells Tor about a particular OR.  There are four
  ; possible formats:
  ;    $Digest -- The router whose identity key hashes to the given digest.
  ;        This is the preferred way to refer to an OR.
  ;    $Digest~Name -- The router whose identity key hashes to the given
  ;        digest, but only if the router has the given nickname.
  ;    $Digest=Name -- The router whose identity key hashes to the given
  ;        digest, but only if the router is Named and has the given
  ;        nickname.
  ;    Name -- The Named router with the given nickname, or, if no such
  ;        router exists, any router whose nickname matches the one given.
  ;        This is not a safe way to refer to routers, since Named status
  ;        could under some circumstances change over time.
  ServerSpec = LongName / Nickname

  ; Unique identifiers for streams or circuits.  Currently, Tor only
  ; uses digits, but this may change
  StreamID = 1*16 IDChar
  CircuitID = 1*16 IDChar
  IDChar = ALPHA / DIGIT

  Address = ip4-address / ip6-address / hostname   (XXXX Define these)

  ; A "Data" section is a sequence of octets concluded by the terminating
  ; sequence CRLF "." CRLF.  The terminating sequence may not appear in the
  ; body of the data.  Leading periods on lines in the data are escaped with
  ; an additional leading period as in RFC 2821 section 4.5.2.
  Data = *DataLine "." CRLF
  DataLine = CRLF / "." 1*LineItem CRLF / NonDotItem *LineItem CRLF
  LineItem = NonCR / 1*CR NonCRLF
  NonDotItem = NonDotCR / 1*CR NonCRLF

3. Commands

  All commands are case-insensitive, but most keywords are case-sensitive.

3.1. SETCONF

  Change the value of one or more configuration variables.  The syntax is:

    "SETCONF" 1*(SP keyword ["=" value]) CRLF
    value = String / QuotedString

  Tor behaves as though it had just read each of the key-value pairs
  from its configuration file.  Keywords with no corresponding values have
  their configuration values reset to 0 or NULL (use RESETCONF if you want
  to set it back to its default).  SETCONF is all-or-nothing: if there
  is an error in any of the configuration settings, Tor sets none of them.

  Tor responds with a "250 configuration values set" reply on success.
  If some of the listed keywords can't be found, Tor replies with a
  "552 Unrecognized option" message. Otherwise, Tor responds with a
  "513 syntax error in configuration values" reply on syntax error, or a
  "553 impossible configuration setting" reply on a semantic error.

  When a configuration option takes multiple values, or when multiple
  configuration keys form a context-sensitive group (see GETCONF below), then
  setting _any_ of the options in a SETCONF command is taken to reset all of
  the others.  For example, if two ORBindAddress values are configured, and a
  SETCONF command arrives containing a single ORBindAddress value, the new
  command's value replaces the two old values.

  Sometimes it is not possible to change configuration options solely by
  issuing a series of SETCONF commands, because the value of one of the
  configuration options depends on the value of another which has not yet
  been set. Such situations can be overcome by setting multiple configuration
  options with a single SETCONF command (e.g. SETCONF ORPort=443
  ORListenAddress=9001).

3.2. RESETCONF

  Remove all settings for a given configuration option entirely, assign
  its default value (if any), and then assign the String provided.
  Typically the String is left empty, to simply set an option back to
  its default. The syntax is:

    "RESETCONF" 1*(SP keyword ["=" String]) CRLF

  Otherwise it behaves like SETCONF above.

3.3. GETCONF

  Request the value of a configuration variable.  The syntax is:

    "GETCONF" 1*(SP keyword) CRLF

  If all of the listed keywords exist in the Tor configuration, Tor replies
  with a series of reply lines of the form:
      250 keyword=value
  If any option is set to a 'default' value semantically different from an
  empty string, Tor may reply with a reply line of the form:
      250 keyword

  Value may be a raw value or a quoted string.  Tor will try to use
  unquoted values except when the value could be misinterpreted through
  not being quoted.

  If some of the listed keywords can't be found, Tor replies with a
  "552 unknown configuration keyword" message.

  If an option appears multiple times in the configuration, all of its
  key-value pairs are returned in order.

  Some options are context-sensitive, and depend on other options with
  different keywords.  These cannot be fetched directly.  Currently there
  is only one such option: clients should use the "HiddenServiceOptions"
  virtual keyword to get all HiddenServiceDir, HiddenServicePort,
  HiddenServiceNodes, and HiddenServiceExcludeNodes option settings.

3.4. SETEVENTS

  Request the server to inform the client about interesting events.  The
  syntax is:

     "SETEVENTS" [SP "EXTENDED"] *(SP EventCode) CRLF

     EventCode = "CIRC" / "STREAM" / "ORCONN" / "BW" / "DEBUG" /
         "INFO" / "NOTICE" / "WARN" / "ERR" / "NEWDESC" / "ADDRMAP" /
         "AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS" / "DESCCHANGED" / "STATUS_GENERAL" /
         "STATUS_CLIENT" / "STATUS_SERVER" / "GUARD" / "NS" / "STREAM_BW" /
         "CLIENTS_SEEN" / "NEWCONSENSUS"

  Any events *not* listed in the SETEVENTS line are turned off; thus, sending
  SETEVENTS with an empty body turns off all event reporting.

  The server responds with a "250 OK" reply on success, and a "552
  Unrecognized event" reply if one of the event codes isn't recognized.  (On
  error, the list of active event codes isn't changed.)

  If the flag string "EXTENDED" is provided, Tor may provide extra
  information with events for this connection; see 4.1 for more information.
  NOTE: All events on a given connection will be provided in extended format,
  or none.
  NOTE: "EXTENDED" is only supported in Tor 0.1.1.9-alpha or later.

  Each event is described in more detail in Section 4.1.

3.5. AUTHENTICATE

  Sent from the client to the server.  The syntax is:
     "AUTHENTICATE" [ SP 1*HEXDIG / QuotedString ] CRLF

  The server responds with "250 OK" on success or "515 Bad authentication" if
  the authentication cookie is incorrect.  Tor closes the connection on an
  authentication failure.

  The format of the 'cookie' is implementation-dependent; see 5.1 below for
  information on how the standard Tor implementation handles it.

  Before the client has authenticated, no command other than PROTOCOLINFO,
  AUTHENTICATE, or QUIT is valid.  If the controller sends any other command,
  or sends a malformed command, or sends an unsuccessful AUTHENTICATE
  command, or sends PROTOCOLINFO more than once, Tor sends an error reply and
  closes the connection.

  To prevent some cross-protocol attacks, the AUTHENTICATE command is still
  required even if all authentication methods in Tor are disabled.  In this
  case, the controller should just send "AUTHENTICATE" CRLF.

  (Versions of Tor before 0.1.2.16 and 0.2.0.4-alpha did not close the
  connection after an authentication failure.)

3.6. SAVECONF

  Sent from the client to the server.  The syntax is:
     "SAVECONF" CRLF

  Instructs the server to write out its config options into its torrc. Server
  returns "250 OK" if successful, or "551 Unable to write configuration
  to disk" if it can't write the file or some other error occurs.

  See also the "getinfo config-text" command, if the controller wants
  to write the torrc file itself.

3.7. SIGNAL

  Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:

     "SIGNAL" SP Signal CRLF

     Signal = "RELOAD" / "SHUTDOWN" / "DUMP" / "DEBUG" / "HALT" /
              "HUP" / "INT" / "USR1" / "USR2" / "TERM" / "NEWNYM" /
              "CLEARDNSCACHE"

  The meaning of the signals are:

      RELOAD    -- Reload: reload config items, refetch directory. (like HUP)
      SHUTDOWN  -- Controlled shutdown: if server is an OP, exit immediately.
                   If it's an OR, close listeners and exit after 30 seconds.
                   (like INT)
      DUMP      -- Dump stats: log information about open connections and
                   circuits. (like USR1)
      DEBUG     -- Debug: switch all open logs to loglevel debug. (like USR2)
      HALT      -- Immediate shutdown: clean up and exit now. (like TERM)
      CLEARDNSCACHE -- Forget the client-side cached IPs for all hostnames.
      NEWNYM    -- Switch to clean circuits, so new application requests
                   don't share any circuits with old ones.  Also clears
                   the client-side DNS cache.  (Tor MAY rate-limit its
                   response to this signal.)

  The server responds with "250 OK" if the signal is recognized (or simply
  closes the socket if it was asked to close immediately), or "552
  Unrecognized signal" if the signal is unrecognized.

3.8. MAPADDRESS

  Sent from the client to the server.  The syntax is:

    "MAPADDRESS" 1*(Address "=" Address SP) CRLF

  The first address in each pair is an "original" address; the second is a
  "replacement" address.  The client sends this message to the server in
  order to tell it that future SOCKS requests for connections to the original
  address should be replaced with connections to the specified replacement
  address.  If the addresses are well-formed, and the server is able to
  fulfill the request, the server replies with a 250 message:
    250-OldAddress1=NewAddress1
    250 OldAddress2=NewAddress2

  containing the source and destination addresses.  If request is
  malformed, the server replies with "512 syntax error in command
  argument".  If the server can't fulfill the request, it replies with
  "451 resource exhausted".

  The client may decline to provide a body for the original address, and
  instead send a special null address ("0.0.0.0" for IPv4, "::0" for IPv6, or
  "." for hostname), signifying that the server should choose the original
  address itself, and return that address in the reply.  The server
  should ensure that it returns an element of address space that is unlikely
  to be in actual use.  If there is already an address mapped to the
  destination address, the server may reuse that mapping.

  If the original address is already mapped to a different address, the old
  mapping is removed.  If the original address and the destination address
  are the same, the server removes any mapping in place for the original
  address.

  Example:
    C: MAPADDRESS 0.0.0.0=torproject.org 1.2.3.4=tor.freehaven.net
    S: 250-127.192.10.10=torproject.org
    S: 250 1.2.3.4=tor.freehaven.net

  {Note: This feature is designed to be used to help Tor-ify applications
  that need to use SOCKS4 or hostname-less SOCKS5.  There are three
  approaches to doing this:
     1. Somehow make them use SOCKS4a or SOCKS5-with-hostnames instead.
     2. Use tor-resolve (or another interface to Tor's resolve-over-SOCKS
        feature) to resolve the hostname remotely.  This doesn't work
        with special addresses like x.onion or x.y.exit.
     3. Use MAPADDRESS to map an IP address to the desired hostname, and then
        arrange to fool the application into thinking that the hostname
        has resolved to that IP.
  This functionality is designed to help implement the 3rd approach.}

  Mappings set by the controller last until the Tor process exits:
  they never expire. If the controller wants the mapping to last only
  a certain time, then it must explicitly un-map the address when that
  time has elapsed.

3.9. GETINFO

  Sent from the client to the server.  The syntax is as for GETCONF:
    "GETINFO" 1*(SP keyword) CRLF
  one or more NL-terminated strings.  The server replies with an INFOVALUE
  message, or a 551 or 552 error.

  Unlike GETCONF, this message is used for data that are not stored in the Tor
  configuration file, and that may be longer than a single line.  On success,
  one ReplyLine is sent for each requested value, followed by a final 250 OK
  ReplyLine.  If a value fits on a single line, the format is:
      250-keyword=value
  If a value must be split over multiple lines, the format is:
      250+keyword=
      value
      .
  Recognized keys and their values include:

    "version" -- The version of the server's software, including the name
      of the software. (example: "Tor 0.0.9.4")

    "config-file" -- The location of Tor's configuration file ("torrc").

    "config-text" -- The contents that Tor would write if you send it
      a SAVECONF command, so the controller can write the file to
      disk itself. [First implemented in 0.2.2.7-alpha.]

    ["exit-policy/prepend" -- The default exit policy lines that Tor will
      *prepend* to the ExitPolicy config option.
     -- Never implemented. Useful?]

    "exit-policy/default" -- The default exit policy lines that Tor will
      *append* to the ExitPolicy config option.

    "desc/id/<OR identity>" or "desc/name/<OR nickname>" -- the latest
      server descriptor for a given OR, NUL-terminated.

    "desc-annotations/id/<OR identity>" -- outputs the annotations string
      (source, timestamp of arrival, purpose, etc) for the corresponding
      descriptor. [First implemented in 0.2.0.13-alpha.]

    "extra-info/digest/<digest>"  -- the extrainfo document whose digest (in
      hex) is <digest>.  Only available if we're downloading extra-info
      documents.

    "ns/id/<OR identity>" or "ns/name/<OR nickname>" -- the latest router
      status info (v2 directory style) for a given OR.  Router status
      info is as given in
      dir-spec.txt, and reflects the current beliefs of this Tor about the
      router in question. Like directory clients, controllers MUST
      tolerate unrecognized flags and lines.  The published date and
      descriptor digest are those believed to be best by this Tor,
      not necessarily those for a descriptor that Tor currently has.
      [First implemented in 0.1.2.3-alpha.]

    "ns/all" -- Router status info (v2 directory style) for all ORs we
      have an opinion about, joined by newlines. [First implemented
      in 0.1.2.3-alpha.]

    "ns/purpose/<purpose>" -- Router status info (v2 directory style)
      for all ORs of this purpose. Mostly designed for /ns/purpose/bridge
      queries. [First implemented in 0.2.0.13-alpha.]

    "desc/all-recent" -- the latest server descriptor for every router that
      Tor knows about.

    "network-status" -- a space-separated list (v1 directory style)
      of all known OR identities. This is in the same format as the
      router-status line in v1 directories; see dir-spec-v1.txt section
      3 for details.  (If VERBOSE_NAMES is enabled, the output will
      not conform to dir-spec-v1.txt; instead, the result will be a
      space-separated list of LongName, each preceded by a "!" if it is
      believed to be not running.) This option is deprecated; use
      "ns/all" instead.

    "address-mappings/all"
    "address-mappings/config"
    "address-mappings/cache"
    "address-mappings/control" -- a \r\n-separated list of address
      mappings, each in the form of "from-address to-address expiry".
      The 'config' key returns those address mappings set in the
      configuration; the 'cache' key returns the mappings in the
      client-side DNS cache; the 'control' key returns the mappings set
      via the control interface; the 'all' target returns the mappings
      set through any mechanism.
      Expiry is formatted as with ADDRMAP events, except that "expiry" is
      always a time in GMT or the string "NEVER"; see section 4.1.7.
      First introduced in 0.2.0.3-alpha.

    "addr-mappings/*" -- as for address-mappings/*, but without the
      expiry portion of the value.  Use of this value is deprecated
      since 0.2.0.3-alpha; use address-mappings instead.

    "address" -- the best guess at our external IP address. If we
      have no guess, return a 551 error. (Added in 0.1.2.2-alpha)

    "fingerprint" -- the contents of the fingerprint file that Tor
      writes as a server, or a 551 if we're not a server currently.
      (Added in 0.1.2.3-alpha)

    "circuit-status"
      A series of lines as for a circuit status event. Each line is of
      the form:
         CircuitID SP CircStatus [SP Path] CRLF

    "stream-status"
      A series of lines as for a stream status event.  Each is of the form:
         StreamID SP StreamStatus SP CircID SP Target CRLF

    "orconn-status"
      A series of lines as for an OR connection status event.  Each is of the
      form:
         ServerID SP ORStatus CRLF

    "entry-guards"
      A series of lines listing the currently chosen entry guards, if any.
      Each is of the form:
         ServerID2 SP Status [SP ISOTime] CRLF

         Status-with-time = ("unlisted") SP ISOTime
         Status = ("up" / "never-connected" / "down" /
                      "unusable" / "unlisted" )

         ServerID2 = Nickname / 40*HEXDIG

      [From 0.1.1.4-alpha to 0.1.1.10-alpha, this was called "helper-nodes".
       Tor still supports calling it that for now, but support will be
       removed in 0.1.3.x.]

      [Older versions of Tor (before 0.1.2.x-final) generated 'down' instead
       of unlisted/unusable.  Current Tors never generate 'down'.]

      [XXXX ServerID2 differs from ServerID in not prefixing fingerprints
       with a $.  This is an implementation error.  It would be nice to add
       the $ back in if we can do so without breaking compatibility.]

    "accounting/enabled"
    "accounting/hibernating"
    "accounting/bytes"
    "accounting/bytes-left"
    "accounting/interval-start"
    "accounting/interval-wake"
    "accounting/interval-end"
      Information about accounting status.  If accounting is enabled,
      "enabled" is 1; otherwise it is 0.  The "hibernating" field is "hard"
      if we are accepting no data; "soft" if we're accepting no new
      connections, and "awake" if we're not hibernating at all.  The "bytes"
      and "bytes-left" fields contain (read-bytes SP write-bytes), for the
      start and the rest of the interval respectively.  The 'interval-start'
      and 'interval-end' fields are the borders of the current interval; the
      'interval-wake' field is the time within the current interval (if any)
      where we plan[ned] to start being active. The times are GMT.

    "config/names"
      A series of lines listing the available configuration options. Each is
      of the form:
         OptionName SP OptionType [ SP Documentation ] CRLF
         OptionName = Keyword
         OptionType = "Integer" / "TimeInterval" / "DataSize" / "Float" /
           "Boolean" / "Time" / "CommaList" / "Dependant" / "Virtual" /
           "String" / "LineList"
         Documentation = Text

    "info/names"
      A series of lines listing the available GETINFO options.  Each is of
      one of these forms:
         OptionName SP Documentation CRLF
         OptionPrefix SP Documentation CRLF
         OptionPrefix = OptionName "/*"

    "events/names"
      A space-separated list of all the events supported by this version of
      Tor's SETEVENTS.

    "features/names"
      A space-separated list of all the events supported by this version of
      Tor's USEFEATURE.

    "ip-to-country/*"
      Maps IP addresses to 2-letter country codes.  For example,
      "GETINFO ip-to-country/18.0.0.1" should give "US".

    "next-circuit/IP:port"
      XXX todo.

    "dir/status-vote/current/consensus" [added in Tor 0.2.1.6-alpha]
    "dir/status/authority"
    "dir/status/fp/<F>"
    "dir/status/fp/<F1>+<F2>+<F3>"
    "dir/status/all"
    "dir/server/fp/<F>"
    "dir/server/fp/<F1>+<F2>+<F3>"
    "dir/server/d/<D>"
    "dir/server/d/<D1>+<D2>+<D3>"
    "dir/server/authority"
    "dir/server/all"
      A series of lines listing directory contents, provided according to the
      specification for the URLs listed in Section 4.4 of dir-spec.txt.  Note
      that Tor MUST NOT provide private information, such as descriptors for
      routers not marked as general-purpose.  When asked for 'authority'
      information for which this Tor is not authoritative, Tor replies with
      an empty string.

    "status/circuit-established"
    "status/enough-dir-info"
    "status/good-server-descriptor"
    "status/accepted-server-descriptor"
    "status/..."
      These provide the current internal Tor values for various Tor
      states. See Section 4.1.10 for explanations. (Only a few of the
      status events are available as getinfo's currently. Let us know if
      you want more exposed.)
    "status/reachability-succeeded/or"
      0 or 1, depending on whether we've found our ORPort reachable.
    "status/reachability-succeeded/dir"
      0 or 1, depending on whether we've found our DirPort reachable.
    "status/reachability-succeeded"
      "OR=" ("0"/"1") SP "DIR=" ("0"/"1")
      Combines status/reachability-succeeded/*; controllers MUST ignore
      unrecognized elements in this entry.
    "status/bootstrap-phase"
      Returns the most recent bootstrap phase status event
      sent. Specifically, it returns a string starting with either
      "NOTICE BOOTSTRAP ..." or "WARN BOOTSTRAP ...". Controllers should
      use this getinfo when they connect or attach to Tor to learn its
      current bootstrap state.
    "status/version/recommended"
      List of currently recommended versions.
    "status/version/current"
      Status of the current version. One of: new, old, unrecommended,
      recommended, new in series, obsolete.
    "status/clients-seen"
      A summary of which countries we've seen clients from recently,
      formatted the same as the CLIENTS_SEEN status event described in
      Section 4.1.14. This GETINFO option is currently available only
      for bridge relays.

  Examples:
     C: GETINFO version desc/name/moria1
     S: 250+desc/name/moria=
     S: [Descriptor for moria]
     S: .
     S: 250-version=Tor 0.1.1.0-alpha-cvs
     S: 250 OK

3.10. EXTENDCIRCUIT

  Sent from the client to the server.  The format is:
      "EXTENDCIRCUIT" SP CircuitID SP
                      ServerSpec *("," ServerSpec)
                      [SP "purpose=" Purpose] CRLF

  This request takes one of two forms: either the CircuitID is zero, in
  which case it is a request for the server to build a new circuit according
  to the specified path, or the CircuitID is nonzero, in which case it is a
  request for the server to extend an existing circuit with that ID according
  to the specified path.

  If CircuitID is 0 and "purpose=" is specified, then the circuit's
  purpose is set. Two choices are recognized: "general" and
  "controller". If not specified, circuits are created as "general".

  If the request is successful, the server sends a reply containing a
  message body consisting of the CircuitID of the (maybe newly created)
  circuit. The syntax is "250" SP "EXTENDED" SP CircuitID CRLF.

3.11. SETCIRCUITPURPOSE

  Sent from the client to the server.  The format is:
      "SETCIRCUITPURPOSE" SP CircuitID SP Purpose CRLF

  This changes the circuit's purpose. See EXTENDCIRCUIT above for details.

3.12. SETROUTERPURPOSE

  Sent from the client to the server.  The format is:
      "SETROUTERPURPOSE" SP NicknameOrKey SP Purpose CRLF

  This changes the descriptor's purpose. See +POSTDESCRIPTOR below
  for details.

  NOTE: This command was disabled and made obsolete as of Tor
  0.2.0.8-alpha. It doesn't exist anymore, and is listed here only for
  historical interest.

3.13. ATTACHSTREAM

  Sent from the client to the server.  The syntax is:
     "ATTACHSTREAM" SP StreamID SP CircuitID [SP "HOP=" HopNum] CRLF

  This message informs the server that the specified stream should be
  associated with the specified circuit.  Each stream may be associated with
  at most one circuit, and multiple streams may share the same circuit.
  Streams can only be attached to completed circuits (that is, circuits that
  have sent a circuit status 'BUILT' event or are listed as built in a
  GETINFO circuit-status request).

  If the circuit ID is 0, responsibility for attaching the given stream is
  returned to Tor.

  If HOP=HopNum is specified, Tor will choose the HopNumth hop in the
  circuit as the exit node, rather than the last node in the circuit.
  Hops are 1-indexed; generally, it is not permitted to attach to hop 1.

  Tor responds with "250 OK" if it can attach the stream, 552 if the circuit
  or stream didn't exist, or 551 if the stream couldn't be attached for
  another reason.

  {Implementation note: Tor will close unattached streams by itself,
  roughly two minutes after they are born. Let the developers know if
  that turns out to be a problem.}

  {Implementation note: By default, Tor automatically attaches streams to
  circuits itself, unless the configuration variable
  "__LeaveStreamsUnattached" is set to "1".  Attempting to attach streams
  via TC when "__LeaveStreamsUnattached" is false may cause a race between
  Tor and the controller, as both attempt to attach streams to circuits.}

  {Implementation note: You can try to attachstream to a stream that
  has already sent a connect or resolve request but hasn't succeeded
  yet, in which case Tor will detach the stream from its current circuit
  before proceeding with the new attach request.}

3.14. POSTDESCRIPTOR

  Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
    "+POSTDESCRIPTOR" [SP "purpose=" Purpose] [SP "cache=" Cache]
                      CRLF Descriptor CRLF "." CRLF

  This message informs the server about a new descriptor. If Purpose is
  specified, it must be either "general", "controller", or "bridge",
  else we return a 552 error. The default is "general".

  If Cache is specified, it must be either "no" or "yes", else we
  return a 552 error. If Cache is not specified, Tor will decide for
  itself whether it wants to cache the descriptor, and controllers
  must not rely on its choice.

  The descriptor, when parsed, must contain a number of well-specified
  fields, including fields for its nickname and identity.

  If there is an error in parsing the descriptor, the server must send a
  "554 Invalid descriptor" reply. If the descriptor is well-formed but
  the server chooses not to add it, it must reply with a 251 message
  whose body explains why the server was not added. If the descriptor
  is added, Tor replies with "250 OK".

3.15. REDIRECTSTREAM

  Sent from the client to the server. The syntax is:
    "REDIRECTSTREAM" SP StreamID SP Address [SP Port] CRLF

  Tells the server to change the exit address on the specified stream.  If
  Port is specified, changes the destination port as well.  No remapping
  is performed on the new provided address.

  To be sure that the modified address will be used, this event must be sent
  after a new stream event is received, and before attaching this stream to
  a circuit.

  Tor replies with "250 OK" on success.

3.16. CLOSESTREAM

  Sent from the client to the server.  The syntax is:

    "CLOSESTREAM" SP StreamID SP Reason *(SP Flag) CRLF

  Tells the server to close the specified stream.  The reason should be one
  of the Tor RELAY_END reasons given in tor-spec.txt, as a decimal.  Flags is
  not used currently; Tor servers SHOULD ignore unrecognized flags.  Tor may
  hold the stream open for a while to flush any data that is pending.

  Tor replies with "250 OK" on success, or a 512 if there aren't enough
  arguments, or a 552 if it doesn't recognize the StreamID or reason.

3.17. CLOSECIRCUIT

   The syntax is:
     CLOSECIRCUIT SP CircuitID *(SP Flag) CRLF
     Flag = "IfUnused"

  Tells the server to close the specified circuit.   If "IfUnused" is
  provided, do not close the circuit unless it is unused.

  Other flags may be defined in the future; Tor SHOULD ignore unrecognized
  flags.

  Tor replies with "250 OK" on success, or a 512 if there aren't enough
  arguments, or a 552 if it doesn't recognize the CircuitID.

3.18. QUIT

  Tells the server to hang up on this controller connection. This command
  can be used before authenticating.

3.19. USEFEATURE

  The syntax is:

    "USEFEATURE" *(SP FeatureName) CRLF
    FeatureName = 1*(ALPHA / DIGIT / "_" / "-")

  Sometimes extensions to the controller protocol break compatibility with
  older controllers.  In this case, whenever possible, the extensions are
  first included in Tor disabled by default, and only enabled on a given
  controller connection when the "USEFEATURE" command is given.  Once a
  "USEFEATURE" command is given, it applies to all subsequent interactions on
  the same connection; to disable an enabled feature, a new controller
  connection must be opened.

  This is a forward-compatibility mechanism; each feature will eventually
  become a regular part of the control protocol in some future version of Tor.
  Tor will ignore a request to use any feature that is already on by default.
  Tor will give a "552" error if any requested feature is not recognized.

  Feature names are case-insensitive.

  EXTENDED_EVENTS

     Same as passing 'EXTENDED' to SETEVENTS; this is the preferred way to
     request the extended event syntax.

    This feature was first used in 0.1.2.3-alpha.  It is always-on in
    Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha and later.

  VERBOSE_NAMES

     Instead of ServerID as specified above, the controller should
     identify ORs by LongName in events and GETINFO results.  This format is
     strictly more informative: rather than including Nickname for
     known Named routers and Fingerprint for unknown or unNamed routers, the
     LongName format includes a Fingerprint, an indication of Named status,
     and a Nickname (if one is known).

     This will not be always-enabled until at least two stable
     releases after 0.1.2.2-alpha, the release where it was first
     available.  It is always-on in Tor 0.2.2.1-alpha and later.

3.20. RESOLVE

  The syntax is
    "RESOLVE" *Option *Address CRLF
    Option = "mode=reverse"
    Address = a hostname or IPv4 address

  This command launches a remote hostname lookup request for every specified
  request (or reverse lookup if "mode=reverse" is specified).  Note that the
  request is done in the background: to see the answers, your controller will
  need to listen for ADDRMAP events; see 4.1.7 below.

  [Added in Tor 0.2.0.3-alpha]

3.21. PROTOCOLINFO

  The syntax is:
    "PROTOCOLINFO" *(SP PIVERSION) CRLF

  The server reply format is:
    "250-PROTOCOLINFO" SP PIVERSION CRLF *InfoLine "250 OK" CRLF

    InfoLine = AuthLine / VersionLine / OtherLine

     AuthLine = "250-AUTH" SP "METHODS=" AuthMethod *(",")AuthMethod
                       *(SP "COOKIEFILE=" AuthCookieFile) CRLF
     VersionLine = "250-VERSION" SP "Tor=" TorVersion [SP Arguments] CRLF

     AuthMethod =
      "NULL"           / ; No authentication is required
      "HASHEDPASSWORD" / ; A controller must supply the original password
      "COOKIE"         / ; A controller must supply the contents of a cookie

     AuthCookieFile = QuotedString
     TorVersion = QuotedString

     OtherLine = "250-" Keyword [SP Arguments] CRLF

    PIVERSION: 1*DIGIT

  Tor MAY give its InfoLines in any order; controllers MUST ignore InfoLines
  with keywords they do not recognize.  Controllers MUST ignore extraneous
  data on any InfoLine.

  PIVERSION is there in case we drastically change the syntax one day. For
  now it should always be "1".  Controllers MAY provide a list of the
  protocolinfo versions they support; Tor MAY select a version that the
  controller does not support.

  AuthMethod is used to specify one or more control authentication
  methods that Tor currently accepts.

  AuthCookieFile specifies the absolute path and filename of the
  authentication cookie that Tor is expecting and is provided iff
  the METHODS field contains the method "COOKIE".  Controllers MUST handle
  escape sequences inside this string.

  The VERSION line contains the Tor version.

  [Unlike other commands besides AUTHENTICATE, PROTOCOLINFO may be used (but
  only once!) before AUTHENTICATE.]

  [PROTOCOLINFO was not supported before Tor 0.2.0.5-alpha.]

4. Replies

  Reply codes follow the same 3-character format as used by SMTP, with the
  first character defining a status, the second character defining a
  subsystem, and the third designating fine-grained information.

  The TC protocol currently uses the following first characters:

    2yz   Positive Completion Reply
       The command was successful; a new request can be started.

    4yz   Temporary Negative Completion reply
       The command was unsuccessful but might be reattempted later.

    5yz   Permanent Negative Completion Reply
       The command was unsuccessful; the client should not try exactly
       that sequence of commands again.

    6yz   Asynchronous Reply
       Sent out-of-order in response to an earlier SETEVENTS command.

  The following second characters are used:

    x0z   Syntax
       Sent in response to ill-formed or nonsensical commands.

    x1z   Protocol
       Refers to operations of the Tor Control protocol.

    x5z   Tor
       Refers to actual operations of Tor system.

  The following codes are defined:

     250 OK
     251 Operation was unnecessary
         [Tor has declined to perform the operation, but no harm was done.]

     451 Resource exhausted

     500 Syntax error: protocol

     510 Unrecognized command
     511 Unimplemented command
     512 Syntax error in command argument
     513 Unrecognized command argument
     514 Authentication required
     515 Bad authentication

     550 Unspecified Tor error

     551 Internal error
               [Something went wrong inside Tor, so that the client's
                request couldn't be fulfilled.]

     552 Unrecognized entity
               [A configuration key, a stream ID, circuit ID, event,
                mentioned in the command did not actually exist.]

     553 Invalid configuration value
         [The client tried to set a configuration option to an
           incorrect, ill-formed, or impossible value.]

     554 Invalid descriptor

     555 Unmanaged entity

     650 Asynchronous event notification

  Unless specified to have specific contents, the human-readable messages
  in error replies should not be relied upon to match those in this document.

4.1. Asynchronous events

  These replies can be sent after a corresponding SETEVENTS command has been
  received.  They will not be interleaved with other Reply elements, but they
  can appear between a command and its corresponding reply.  For example,
  this sequence is possible:

     C: SETEVENTS CIRC
     S: 250 OK
     C: GETCONF SOCKSPORT ORPORT
     S: 650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2
     S: 250-SOCKSPORT=9050
     S: 250 ORPORT=0

  But this sequence is disallowed:
     C: SETEVENTS CIRC
     S: 250 OK
     C: GETCONF SOCKSPORT ORPORT
     S: 250-SOCKSPORT=9050
     S: 650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2
     S: 250 ORPORT=0

  Clients MUST tolerate more arguments in an asynchonous reply than
  expected, and MUST tolerate more lines in an asynchronous reply than
  expected.  For instance, a client that expects a CIRC message like:
      650 CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2
  must tolerate:
      650-CIRC 1000 EXTENDED moria1,moria2 0xBEEF
      650-EXTRAMAGIC=99
      650 ANONYMITY=high

  If clients ask for extended events, then each event line as specified below
  will be followed by additional extensions. Additional lines will be of the
  form
      "650" ("-"/" ") KEYWORD ["=" ARGUMENTS] CRLF
  Additional arguments will be of the form
      SP KEYWORD ["=" ( QuotedString / * NonSpDquote ) ]
  Such clients MUST tolerate lines with keywords they do not recognize.

4.1.1. Circuit status changed

   The syntax is:

     "650" SP "CIRC" SP CircuitID SP CircStatus [SP Path]
          [SP "REASON=" Reason [SP "REMOTE_REASON=" Reason]] CRLF

      CircStatus =
               "LAUNCHED" / ; circuit ID assigned to new circuit
               "BUILT"    / ; all hops finished, can now accept streams
               "EXTENDED" / ; one more hop has been completed
               "FAILED"   / ; circuit closed (was not built)
               "CLOSED"     ; circuit closed (was built)

      Path = ServerID *("," ServerID)

      Reason = "NONE" / "TORPROTOCOL" / "INTERNAL" / "REQUESTED" /
               "HIBERNATING" / "RESOURCELIMIT" / "CONNECTFAILED" /
               "OR_IDENTITY" / "OR_CONN_CLOSED" / "TIMEOUT" /
               "FINISHED" / "DESTROYED" / "NOPATH" / "NOSUCHSERVICE"

   The path is provided only when the circuit has been extended at least one
   hop.

   The "REASON" field is provided only for FAILED and CLOSED events, and only
   if extended events are enabled (see 3.19).  Clients MUST accept reasons
   not listed above.  Reasons are as given in tor-spec.txt, except for:

      NOPATH          (Not enough nodes to make circuit)

   The "REMOTE_REASON" field is provided only when we receive a DESTROY or
   TRUNCATE cell, and only if extended events are enabled.  It contains the
   actual reason given by the remote OR for closing the circuit. Clients MUST
   accept reasons not listed above.  Reasons are as listed in tor-spec.txt.

4.1.2. Stream status changed

    The syntax is:

      "650" SP "STREAM" SP StreamID SP StreamStatus SP CircID SP Target
          [SP "REASON=" Reason [ SP "REMOTE_REASON=" Reason ]]
          [SP "SOURCE=" Source] [ SP "SOURCE_ADDR=" Address ":" Port ]
          [SP "PURPOSE=" Purpose]
          CRLF

      StreamStatus =
               "NEW"          / ; New request to connect
               "NEWRESOLVE"   / ; New request to resolve an address
               "REMAP"        / ; Address re-mapped to another
               "SENTCONNECT"  / ; Sent a connect cell along a circuit
               "SENTRESOLVE"  / ; Sent a resolve cell along a circuit
               "SUCCEEDED"    / ; Received a reply; stream established
               "FAILED"       / ; Stream failed and not retriable
               "CLOSED"       / ; Stream closed
               "DETACHED"       ; Detached from circuit; still retriable

       Target = Address ":" Port

  The circuit ID designates which circuit this stream is attached to.  If
  the stream is unattached, the circuit ID "0" is given.

      Reason = "MISC" / "RESOLVEFAILED" / "CONNECTREFUSED" /
               "EXITPOLICY" / "DESTROY" / "DONE" / "TIMEOUT" /
               "HIBERNATING" / "INTERNAL"/ "RESOURCELIMIT" /
               "CONNRESET" / "TORPROTOCOL" / "NOTDIRECTORY" / "END"

   The "REASON" field is provided only for FAILED, CLOSED, and DETACHED
   events, and only if extended events are enabled (see 3.19).  Clients MUST
   accept reasons not listed above.  Reasons are as given in tor-spec.txt,
   except for:

      END          (We received a RELAY_END cell from the other side of this
                    stream.)
      [XXXX document more. -NM]

   The "REMOTE_REASON" field is provided only when we receive a RELAY_END
   cell, and only if extended events are enabled.  It contains the actual
   reason given by the remote OR for closing the stream. Clients MUST accept
   reasons not listed above.  Reasons are as listed in tor-spec.txt.

   "REMAP" events include a Source if extended events are enabled:
      Source = "CACHE" / "EXIT"
   Clients MUST accept sources not listed above.  "CACHE" is given if
   the Tor client decided to remap the address because of a cached
   answer, and "EXIT" is given if the remote node we queried gave us
   the new address as a response.

   The "SOURCE_ADDR" field is included with NEW and NEWRESOLVE events if
   extended events are enabled.  It indicates the address and port
   that requested the connection, and can be (e.g.) used to look up the
   requesting program.

      Purpose = "DIR_FETCH" / "UPLOAD_DESC" / "DNS_REQUEST" /
                 "USER" /  "DIRPORT_TEST"

   The "PURPOSE" field is provided only for NEW and NEWRESOLVE events, and
   only if extended events are enabled (see 3.19).  Clients MUST accept
   purposes not listed above.

4.1.3. OR Connection status changed

  The syntax is:
    "650" SP "ORCONN" SP (ServerID / Target) SP ORStatus [ SP "REASON="
             Reason ] [ SP "NCIRCS=" NumCircuits ] CRLF

    ORStatus = "NEW" / "LAUNCHED" / "CONNECTED" / "FAILED" / "CLOSED"

  NEW is for incoming connections, and LAUNCHED is for outgoing
  connections. CONNECTED means the TLS handshake has finished (in
  either direction). FAILED means a connection is being closed that
  hasn't finished its handshake, and CLOSED is for connections that
  have handshaked.

  A ServerID is specified unless it's a NEW connection, in which
  case we don't know what server it is yet, so we use Address:Port.

  If extended events are enabled (see 3.19), optional reason and
  circuit counting information is provided for CLOSED and FAILED
  events.

      Reason = "MISC" / "DONE" / "CONNECTREFUSED" /
               "IDENTITY" / "CONNECTRESET" / "TIMEOUT" / "NOROUTE" /
               "IOERROR" / "RESOURCELIMIT"

  NumCircuits counts both established and pending circuits.

4.1.4. Bandwidth used in the last second

  The syntax is:
     "650" SP "BW" SP BytesRead SP BytesWritten *(SP Type "=" Num) CRLF
     BytesRead = 1*DIGIT
     BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT
     Type = "DIR" / "OR" / "EXIT" / "APP" / ...
     Num = 1*DIGIT

  BytesRead and BytesWritten are the totals. [In a future Tor version,
  we may also include a breakdown of the connection types that used
  bandwidth this second (not implemented yet).]

4.1.5. Log messages

  The syntax is:
     "650" SP Severity SP ReplyText CRLF
  or
     "650+" Severity CRLF Data 650 SP "OK" CRLF

     Severity = "DEBUG" / "INFO" / "NOTICE" / "WARN"/ "ERR"

4.1.6. New descriptors available

  Syntax:
     "650" SP "NEWDESC" 1*(SP ServerID) CRLF

4.1.7. New Address mapping

  Syntax:
     "650" SP "ADDRMAP" SP Address SP NewAddress SP Expiry
       [SP Error] SP GMTExpiry CRLF

     NewAddress = Address / "<error>"
     Expiry = DQUOTE ISOTime DQUOTE / "NEVER"

     Error = "error=" ErrorCode
     ErrorCode = XXXX
     GMTExpiry = "EXPIRES=" DQUOTE IsoTime DQUOTE

  Error and GMTExpiry are only provided if extended events are enabled.

  Expiry is expressed as the local time (rather than GMT).  This is a bug,
  left in for backward compatibility; new code should look at GMTExpiry
  instead.

  These events are generated when a new address mapping is entered in the
  cache, or when the answer for a RESOLVE command is found.

4.1.8. Descriptors uploaded to us in our role as authoritative dirserver

  Syntax:
     "650" "+" "AUTHDIR_NEWDESCS" CRLF Action CRLF Message CRLF
       Descriptor CRLF "." CRLF "650" SP "OK" CRLF
     Action = "ACCEPTED" / "DROPPED" / "REJECTED"
     Message = Text

4.1.9. Our descriptor changed

  Syntax:
     "650" SP "DESCCHANGED" CRLF

  [First added in 0.1.2.2-alpha.]

4.1.10. Status events

  Status events (STATUS_GENERAL, STATUS_CLIENT, and STATUS_SERVER) are sent
  based on occurrences in the Tor process pertaining to the general state of
  the program.  Generally, they correspond to log messages of severity Notice
  or higher.  They differ from log messages in that their format is a
  specified interface.

  Syntax:
     "650" SP StatusType SP StatusSeverity SP StatusAction
                                         [SP StatusArguments] CRLF

     StatusType = "STATUS_GENERAL" / "STATUS_CLIENT" / "STATUS_SERVER"
     StatusSeverity = "NOTICE" / "WARN" / "ERR"
     StatusAction = 1*ALPHA
     StatusArguments = StatusArgument *(SP StatusArgument)
     StatusArgument = StatusKeyword '=' StatusValue
     StatusKeyword = 1*(ALNUM / "_")
     StatusValue = 1*(ALNUM / '_')  / QuotedString

     Action is a string, and Arguments is a series of keyword=value
     pairs on the same line.  Values may be space-terminated strings,
     or quoted strings.

     These events are always produced with EXTENDED_EVENTS and
     VERBOSE_NAMES; see the explanations in the USEFEATURE section
     for details.

     Controllers MUST tolerate unrecognized actions, MUST tolerate
     unrecognized arguments, MUST tolerate missing arguments, and MUST
     tolerate arguments that arrive in any order.

     Each event description below is accompanied by a recommendation for
     controllers.  These recommendations are suggestions only; no controller
     is required to implement them.

  Compatibility note: versions of Tor before 0.2.0.22-rc incorrectly
  generated "STATUS_SERVER" as "STATUS_SEVER".  To be compatible with those
  versions, tools should accept both.

  Actions for STATUS_GENERAL events can be as follows:

     CLOCK_JUMPED
     "TIME=NUM"
       Tor spent enough time without CPU cycles that it has closed all
       its circuits and will establish them anew. This typically
       happens when a laptop goes to sleep and then wakes up again. It
       also happens when the system is swapping so heavily that Tor is
       starving. The "time" argument specifies the number of seconds Tor
       thinks it was unconscious for (or alternatively, the number of
       seconds it went back in time).

       This status event is sent as NOTICE severity normally, but WARN
       severity if Tor is acting as a server currently.

       {Recommendation for controller: ignore it, since we don't really
       know what the user should do anyway. Hm.}

     DANGEROUS_VERSION
     "CURRENT=version"
     "REASON=NEW/OBSOLETE/UNRECOMMENDED"
     "RECOMMENDED=\"version, version, ...\""
       Tor has found that directory servers don't recommend its version of
       the Tor software.  RECOMMENDED is a comma-and-space-separated string
       of Tor versions that are recommended.  REASON is NEW if this version
       of Tor is newer than any recommended version, OBSOLETE if
       this version of Tor is older than any recommended version, and
       UNRECOMMENDED if some recommended versions of Tor are newer and
       some are older than this version. (The "OBSOLETE" reason was called
       "OLD" from Tor 0.1.2.3-alpha up to and including 0.2.0.12-alpha.)

       {Controllers may want to suggest that the user upgrade OLD or
       UNRECOMMENDED versions.  NEW versions may be known-insecure, or may
       simply be development versions.}

     TOO_MANY_CONNECTIONS
     "CURRENT=NUM"
       Tor has reached its ulimit -n or whatever the native limit is on file
       descriptors or sockets.  CURRENT is the number of sockets Tor
       currently has open.  The user should really do something about
       this. The "current" argument shows the number of connections currently
       open.

       {Controllers may recommend that the user increase the limit, or
       increase it for them.  Recommendations should be phrased in an
       OS-appropriate way and automated when possible.}

     BUG
     "REASON=STRING"
       Tor has encountered a situation that its developers never expected,
       and the developers would like to learn that it happened. Perhaps
       the controller can explain this to the user and encourage her to
       file a bug report?

       {Controllers should log bugs, but shouldn't annoy the user in case a
       bug appears frequently.}

     CLOCK_SKEW
       SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS
       MIN_SKEW="+" / "-" SECONDS.
       SOURCE="DIRSERV:" IP ":" Port /
              "NETWORKSTATUS:" IP ":" Port /
              "OR:" IP ":" Port /
              "CONSENSUS"
         If "SKEW" is present, it's an estimate of how far we are from the
         time declared in the source.  (In other words, if we're an hour in
         the past, the value is -3600.)  "MIN_SKEW" is present, it's a lower
         bound.  If the source is a DIRSERV, we got the current time from a
         connection to a dirserver.  If the source is a NETWORKSTATUS, we
         decided we're skewed because we got a v2 networkstatus from far in
         the future.  If the source is OR, the skew comes from a NETINFO
         cell from a connection to another relay.  If the source is
         CONSENSUS, we decided we're skewed because we got a networkstatus
         consensus from the future.

         {Tor should send this message to controllers when it thinks the
         skew is so high that it will interfere with proper Tor operation.
         Controllers shouldn't blindly adjust the clock, since the more
         accurate source of skew info (DIRSERV) is currently
         unauthenticated.}

     BAD_LIBEVENT
     "METHOD=" libevent method
     "VERSION=" libevent version
     "BADNESS=" "BROKEN" / "BUGGY" / "SLOW"
     "RECOVERED=" "NO" / "YES"
        Tor knows about bugs in using the configured event method in this
        version of libevent.  "BROKEN" libevents won't work at all;
        "BUGGY" libevents might work okay; "SLOW" libevents will work
        fine, but not quickly.  If "RECOVERED" is YES, Tor managed to
        switch to a more reliable (but probably slower!) libevent method.

        {Controllers may want to warn the user if this event occurs, though
        generally it's the fault of whoever built the Tor binary and there's
        not much the user can do besides upgrade libevent or upgrade the
        binary.}

     DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE
       Tor believes that none of the known directory servers are
       reachable -- this is most likely because the local network is
       down or otherwise not working, and might help to explain for the
       user why Tor appears to be broken.

       {Controllers may want to warn the user if this event occurs; further
       action is generally not possible.}

     CONSENSUS_ARRIVED
        Tor has received and validated a new consensus networkstatus.
        (This event can be delayed a little while after the consensus
        is received, if Tor needs to fetch certificates.)

  Actions for STATUS_CLIENT events can be as follows:

     BOOTSTRAP
     "PROGRESS=" num
     "TAG=" Keyword
     "SUMMARY=" String
     ["WARNING=" String
      "REASON=" Keyword
      "COUNT=" num
      "RECOMMENDATION=" Keyword
     ]

       Tor has made some progress at establishing a connection to the
       Tor network, fetching directory information, or making its first
       circuit; or it has encountered a problem while bootstrapping. This
       status event is especially useful for users with slow connections
       or with connectivity problems.

       "Progress" gives a number between 0 and 100 for how far through
       the bootstrapping process we are. "Summary" is a string that can
       be displayed to the user to describe the *next* task that Tor
       will tackle, i.e., the task it is working on after sending the
       status event. "Tag" is a string that controllers can use to
       recognize bootstrap phases, if they want to do something smarter
       than just blindly displaying the summary string; see Section 5
       for the current tags that Tor issues.

       The StatusSeverity describes whether this is a normal bootstrap
       phase (severity notice) or an indication of a bootstrapping
       problem (severity warn).

       For bootstrap problems, we include the same progress, tag, and
       summary values as we would for a normal bootstrap event, but we
       also include "warning", "reason", "count", and "recommendation"
       key/value combos. The "count" number tells how many bootstrap
       problems there have been so far at this phase. The "reason"
       string lists one of the reasons allowed in the ORCONN event. The
       "warning" argument string with any hints Tor has to offer about
       why it's having troubles bootstrapping.

       The "reason" values are long-term-stable controller-facing tags to
       identify particular issues in a bootstrapping step.  The warning
       strings, on the other hand, are human-readable. Controllers
       SHOULD NOT rely on the format of any warning string. Currently
       the possible values for "recommendation" are either "ignore" or
       "warn" -- if ignore, the controller can accumulate the string in
       a pile of problems to show the user if the user asks; if warn,
       the controller should alert the user that Tor is pretty sure
       there's a bootstrapping problem.

       Currently Tor uses recommendation=ignore for the first
       nine bootstrap problem reports for a given phase, and then
       uses recommendation=warn for subsequent problems at that
       phase. Hopefully this is a good balance between tolerating
       occasional errors and reporting serious problems quickly.

     ENOUGH_DIR_INFO
       Tor now knows enough network-status documents and enough server
       descriptors that it's going to start trying to build circuits now.

       {Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
       progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
       to tell them so.}

     NOT_ENOUGH_DIR_INFO
       We discarded expired statuses and router descriptors to fall
       below the desired threshold of directory information. We won't
       try to build any circuits until ENOUGH_DIR_INFO occurs again.

       {Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
       progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
       to tell them so.}

     CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED
       Tor is able to establish circuits for client use. This event will
       only be sent if we just built a circuit that changed our mind --
       that is, prior to this event we didn't know whether we could
       establish circuits.

       {Suggested use: controllers can notify their users that Tor is
       ready for use as a client once they see this status event. [Perhaps
       controllers should also have a timeout if too much time passes and
       this event hasn't arrived, to give tips on how to troubleshoot.
       On the other hand, hopefully Tor will send further status events
       if it can identify the problem.]}

     CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED
     "REASON=" "EXTERNAL_ADDRESS" / "DIR_ALL_UNREACHABLE" / "CLOCK_JUMPED"
       We are no longer confident that we can build circuits. The "reason"
       keyword provides an explanation: which other status event type caused
       our lack of confidence.

       {Controllers may want to use this event to decide when to indicate
       progress to their users, but should not interrupt the user's browsing
       to do so.}
       [Note: only REASON=CLOCK_JUMPED is implemented currently.]

     DANGEROUS_PORT
     "PORT=" port
     "RESULT=" "REJECT" / "WARN"
       A stream was initiated to a port that's commonly used for
       vulnerable-plaintext protocols. If the Result is "reject", we
       refused the connection; whereas if it's "warn", we allowed it.

       {Controllers should warn their users when this occurs, unless they
       happen to know that the application using Tor is in fact doing so
       correctly (e.g., because it is part of a distributed bundle). They
       might also want some sort of interface to let the user configure
       their RejectPlaintextPorts and WarnPlaintextPorts config options.}

     DANGEROUS_SOCKS
     "PROTOCOL=" "SOCKS4" / "SOCKS5"
     "ADDRESS=" IP:port
       A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port using one of the SOCKS
       approaches that doesn't support hostnames -- only raw IP addresses.
       If the client application got this address from gethostbyname(),
       it may be leaking target addresses via DNS.

       {Controllers should warn their users when this occurs, unless they
       happen to know that the application using Tor is in fact doing so
       correctly (e.g., because it is part of a distributed bundle).}

     SOCKS_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL
       "DATA=string"
       A connection was made to Tor's SOCKS port that tried to use it
       for something other than the SOCKS protocol. Perhaps the user is
       using Tor as an HTTP proxy?   The DATA is the first few characters
       sent to Tor on the SOCKS port.

       {Controllers may want to warn their users when this occurs: it
       indicates a misconfigured application.}

     SOCKS_BAD_HOSTNAME
      "HOSTNAME=QuotedString"
       Some application gave us a funny-looking hostname. Perhaps
       it is broken? In any case it won't work with Tor and the user
       should know.

       {Controllers may want to warn their users when this occurs: it
       usually indicates a misconfigured application.}

  Actions for STATUS_SERVER can be as follows:

     EXTERNAL_ADDRESS
     "ADDRESS=IP"
     "HOSTNAME=NAME"
     "METHOD=CONFIGURED/DIRSERV/RESOLVED/INTERFACE/GETHOSTNAME"
       Our best idea for our externally visible IP has changed to 'IP'.
       If 'HOSTNAME' is present, we got the new IP by resolving 'NAME'.  If the
       method is 'CONFIGURED', the IP was given verbatim as a configuration
       option.  If the method is 'RESOLVED', we resolved the Address
       configuration option to get the IP.  If the method is 'GETHOSTNAME',
       we resolved our hostname to get the IP.  If the method is 'INTERFACE',
       we got the address of one of our network interfaces to get the IP.  If
       the method is 'DIRSERV', a directory server told us a guess for what
       our IP might be.

       {Controllers may want to record this info and display it to the user.}

     CHECKING_REACHABILITY
     "ORADDRESS=IP:port"
     "DIRADDRESS=IP:port"
       We're going to start testing the reachability of our external OR port
       or directory port.

       {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status, but
       the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}

     REACHABILITY_SUCCEEDED
     "ORADDRESS=IP:port"
     "DIRADDRESS=IP:port"
       We successfully verified the reachability of our external OR port or
       directory port (depending on which of ORADDRESS or DIRADDRESS is
       given.)

       {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status, but
       the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}

     GOOD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
       We successfully uploaded our server descriptor to at least one
       of the directory authorities, with no complaints.

       {Originally, the goal of this event was to declare "every authority
       has accepted the descriptor, so there will be no complaints
       about it." But since some authorities might be offline, it's
       harder to get certainty than we had thought. As such, this event
       is equivalent to ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR below. Controllers
       should just look at ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR and should ignore
       this event for now.}

     SERVER_DESCRIPTOR_STATUS
     "STATUS=" "LISTED" / "UNLISTED"
       We just got a new networkstatus consensus, and whether we're in
       it or not in it has changed. Specifically, status is "listed"
       if we're listed in it but previous to this point we didn't know
       we were listed in a consensus; and status is "unlisted" if we
       thought we should have been listed in it (e.g. we were listed in
       the last one), but we're not.

       {Moving from listed to unlisted is not necessarily cause for
       alarm. The relay might have failed a few reachability tests,
       or the Internet might have had some routing problems. So this
       feature is mainly to let relay operators know when their relay
       has successfully been listed in the consensus.}

       [Not implemented yet. We should do this in 0.2.2.x. -RD]

     NAMESERVER_STATUS
     "NS=addr"
     "STATUS=" "UP" / "DOWN"
     "ERR=" message
        One of our nameservers has changed status.

        {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status, but
        the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}

     NAMESERVER_ALL_DOWN
        All of our nameservers have gone down.

        {This is a problem; if it happens often without the nameservers
        coming up again, the user needs to configure more or better
        nameservers.}

     DNS_HIJACKED
        Our DNS provider is providing an address when it should be saying
        "NOTFOUND"; Tor will treat the address as a synonym for "NOTFOUND".

        {This is an annoyance; controllers may want to tell admins that their
        DNS provider is not to be trusted.}

     DNS_USELESS
        Our DNS provider is giving a hijacked address instead of well-known
        websites; Tor will not try to be an exit node.

        {Controllers could warn the admin if the server is running as an
        exit server: the admin needs to configure a good DNS server.
        Alternatively, this happens a lot in some restrictive environments
        (hotels, universities, coffeeshops) when the user hasn't registered.}

     BAD_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
     "DIRAUTH=addr:port"
     "REASON=string"
        A directory authority rejected our descriptor.  Possible reasons
        include malformed descriptors, incorrect keys, highly skewed clocks,
        and so on.

        {Controllers should warn the admin, and try to cope if they can.}

     ACCEPTED_SERVER_DESCRIPTOR
     "DIRAUTH=addr:port"
        A single directory authority accepted our descriptor.
        // actually notice

       {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status, but
       the controller should not interrupt the user to tell them so.}

     REACHABILITY_FAILED
     "ORADDRESS=IP:port"
     "DIRADDRESS=IP:port"
       We failed to connect to our external OR port or directory port
       successfully.

       {This event could affect the controller's idea of server status.  The
       controller should warn the admin and suggest reasonable steps to take.}

4.1.11. Our set of guard nodes has changed

  Syntax:
     "650" SP "GUARD" SP Type SP Name SP Status ... CRLF
     Type = "ENTRY"
     Name = The (possibly verbose) nickname of the guard affected.
     Status = "NEW" | "UP" | "DOWN" | "BAD" | "GOOD" | "DROPPED"

  [explain states. XXX]

4.1.12. Network status has changed

  Syntax:
     "650" "+" "NS" CRLF 1*NetworkStatus "." CRLF "650" SP "OK" CRLF

  The event is used whenever our local view of a relay status changes.
  This happens when we get a new v3 consensus (in which case the entries
  we see are a duplicate of what we see in the NEWCONSENSUS event,
  below), but it also happens when we decide to mark a relay as up or
  down in our local status, for example based on connection attempts.

  [First added in 0.1.2.3-alpha]

4.1.13. Bandwidth used on an application stream

  The syntax is:
     "650" SP "STREAM_BW" SP StreamID SP BytesWritten SP BytesRead CRLF
     BytesWritten = 1*DIGIT
     BytesRead = 1*DIGIT

  BytesWritten and BytesRead are the number of bytes written and read
  by the application since the last STREAM_BW event on this stream.

  Note that from Tor's perspective, *reading* a byte on a stream means
  that the application *wrote* the byte. That's why the order of "written"
  vs "read" is opposite for stream_bw events compared to bw events.

  These events are generated about once per second per stream; no events
  are generated for streams that have not written or read. These events
  apply only to streams entering Tor (such as on a SOCKSPort, TransPort,
  or so on). They are not generated for exiting streams.

4.1.14. Per-country client stats

  The syntax is:
     "650" SP "CLIENTS_SEEN" SP TimeStarted SP CountrySummary CRLF

  We just generated a new summary of which countries we've seen clients
  from recently. The controller could display this for the user, e.g.
  in their "relay" configuration window, to give them a sense that they
  are actually being useful.

  Currently only bridge relays will receive this event, but once we figure
  out how to sufficiently aggregate and sanitize the client counts on
  main relays, we might start sending these events in other cases too.

  TimeStarted is a quoted string indicating when the reported summary
  counts from (in GMT).

  The CountrySummary keyword has as its argument a comma-separated,
  possibly empty set of "countrycode=count" pairs. For example (without
  linebreak),
  650-CLIENTS_SEEN TimeStarted="2008-12-25 23:50:43"
  CountrySummary=us=16,de=8,uk=8

4.1.15. New consensus networkstatus has arrived.

  The syntax is:
     "650" "+" "NEWCONSENSUS" CRLF 1*NetworkStatus "." CRLF "650" SP
     "OK" CRLF

  A new consensus networkstatus has arrived. We include NS-style lines for
  every relay in the consensus. NEWCONSENSUS is a separate event from the
  NS event, because the list here represents every usable relay: so any
  relay *not* mentioned in this list is implicitly no longer recommended.

  [First added in 0.2.1.13-alpha]

5. Implementation notes

5.1. Authentication

  If the control port is open and no authentication operation is enabled, Tor
  trusts any local user that connects to the control port.  This is generally
  a poor idea.

  If the 'CookieAuthentication' option is true, Tor writes a "magic cookie"
  file named "control_auth_cookie" into its data directory.  To authenticate,
  the controller must send the contents of this file, encoded in hexadecimal.

  If the 'HashedControlPassword' option is set, it must contain the salted
  hash of a secret password.  The salted hash is computed according to the
  S2K algorithm in RFC 2440 (OpenPGP), and prefixed with the s2k specifier.
  This is then encoded in hexadecimal, prefixed by the indicator sequence
  "16:".  Thus, for example, the password 'foo' could encode to:
     16:660537E3E1CD49996044A3BF558097A981F539FEA2F9DA662B4626C1C2
        ++++++++++++++++**^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
           salt                       hashed value
                       indicator
  You can generate the salt of a password by calling
           'tor --hash-password <password>'
  or by using the example code in the Python and Java controller libraries.
  To authenticate under this scheme, the controller sends Tor the original
  secret that was used to generate the password, either as a quoted string
  or encoded in hexadecimal.

5.2. Don't let the buffer get too big.

  If you ask for lots of events, and 16MB of them queue up on the buffer,
  the Tor process will close the socket.

5.3. Backward compatibility with v0 control protocol.

  The 'version 0' control protocol was replaced in Tor 0.1.1.x. Support
  was removed in Tor 0.2.0.x. Every non-obsolete version of Tor now
  supports the version 1 control protocol.

  For backward compatibility with the "version 0" control protocol,
  Tor used to check whether the third octet of the first command is zero.
  (If it was, Tor assumed that version 0 is in use.)

  This compatibility was removed in Tor 0.1.2.16 and 0.2.0.4-alpha.

5.4. Tor config options for use by controllers

  Tor provides a few special configuration options for use by controllers.
  These options can be set and examined by the SETCONF and GETCONF commands,
  but are not saved to disk by SAVECONF.

  Generally, these options make Tor unusable by disabling a portion of Tor's
  normal operations.  Unless a controller provides replacement functionality
  to fill this gap, Tor will not correctly handle user requests.

  __AllDirOptionsPrivate

    If true, Tor will try to launch all directory operations through
    anonymous connections.  (Ordinarily, Tor only tries to anonymize
    requests related to hidden services.)  This option will slow down
    directory access, and may stop Tor from working entirely if it does not
    yet have enough directory information to build circuits.

    (Boolean. Default: "0".)

  __DisablePredictedCircuits

    If true, Tor will not launch preemptive "general-purpose" circuits for
    streams to attach to.  (It will still launch circuits for testing and
    for hidden services.)

    (Boolean. Default: "0".)

  __LeaveStreamsUnattached

    If true, Tor will not automatically attach new streams to circuits;
    instead, the controller must attach them with ATTACHSTREAM.  If the
    controller does not attach the streams, their data will never be routed.

    (Boolean. Default: "0".)

  __HashedControlSessionPassword

    As HashedControlPassword, but is not saved to the torrc file by
    SAVECONF.  Added in Tor 0.2.0.20-rc.

  __ReloadTorrcOnSIGHUP

    If this option is true (the default), we reload the torrc from disk
    every time we get a SIGHUP (from the controller or via a signal).
    Otherwise, we don't.  This option exists so that controllers can keep
    their options from getting overwritten when a user sends Tor a HUP for
    some other reason (for example, to rotate the logs).

    (Boolean.  Default: "1")

5.5. Phases from the Bootstrap status event.

  This section describes the various bootstrap phases currently reported
  by Tor. Controllers should not assume that the percentages and tags
  listed here will continue to match up, or even that the tags will stay
  in the same order. Some phases might also be skipped (not reported)
  if the associated bootstrap step is already complete, or if the phase
  no longer is necessary. Only "starting" and "done" are guaranteed to
  exist in all future versions.

  Current Tor versions enter these phases in order, monotonically.
  Future Tors MAY revisit earlier stages.

  Phase 0:
  tag=starting summary="Starting"

  Tor starts out in this phase.

  Phase 5:
  tag=conn_dir summary="Connecting to directory mirror"

  Tor sends this event as soon as Tor has chosen a directory mirror --
  e.g. one of the authorities if bootstrapping for the first time or
  after a long downtime, or one of the relays listed in its cached
  directory information otherwise.

  Tor will stay at this phase until it has successfully established
  a TCP connection with some directory mirror. Problems in this phase
  generally happen because Tor doesn't have a network connection, or
  because the local firewall is dropping SYN packets.

  Phase 10:
  tag=handshake_dir summary="Finishing handshake with directory mirror"

  This event occurs when Tor establishes a TCP connection with a relay used
  as a directory mirror (or its https proxy if it's using one). Tor remains
  in this phase until the TLS handshake with the relay is finished.

  Problems in this phase generally happen because Tor's firewall is
  doing more sophisticated MITM attacks on it, or doing packet-level
  keyword recognition of Tor's handshake.

  Phase 15:
  tag=onehop_create summary="Establishing one-hop circuit for dir info"

  Once TLS is finished with a relay, Tor will send a CREATE_FAST cell
  to establish a one-hop circuit for retrieving directory information.
  It will remain in this phase until it receives the CREATED_FAST cell
  back, indicating that the circuit is ready.

  Phase 20:
  tag=requesting_status summary="Asking for networkstatus consensus"

  Once we've finished our one-hop circuit, we will start a new stream
  for fetching the networkstatus consensus. We'll stay in this phase
  until we get the 'connected' relay cell back, indicating that we've
  established a directory connection.

  Phase 25:
  tag=loading_status summary="Loading networkstatus consensus"

  Once we've established a directory connection, we will start fetching
  the networkstatus consensus document. This could take a while; this
  phase is a good opportunity for using the "progress" keyword to indicate
  partial progress.

  This phase could stall if the directory mirror we picked doesn't
  have a copy of the networkstatus consensus so we have to ask another,
  or it does give us a copy but we don't find it valid.

  Phase 40:
  tag=loading_keys summary="Loading authority key certs"

  Sometimes when we've finished loading the networkstatus consensus,
  we find that we don't have all the authority key certificates for the
  keys that signed the consensus. At that point we put the consensus we
  fetched on hold and fetch the keys so we can verify the signatures.

  Phase 45
  tag=requesting_descriptors summary="Asking for relay descriptors"

  Once we have a valid networkstatus consensus and we've checked all
  its signatures, we start asking for relay descriptors. We stay in this
  phase until we have received a 'connected' relay cell in response to
  a request for descriptors.

  Phase 50:
  tag=loading_descriptors summary="Loading relay descriptors"

  We will ask for relay descriptors from several different locations,
  so this step will probably make up the bulk of the bootstrapping,
  especially for users with slow connections. We stay in this phase until
  we have descriptors for at least 1/4 of the usable relays listed in
  the networkstatus consensus. This phase is also a good opportunity to
  use the "progress" keyword to indicate partial steps.

  Phase 80:
  tag=conn_or summary="Connecting to entry guard"

  Once we have a valid consensus and enough relay descriptors, we choose
  some entry guards and start trying to build some circuits. This step
  is similar to the "conn_dir" phase above; the only difference is
  the context.

  If a Tor starts with enough recent cached directory information,
  its first bootstrap status event will be for the conn_or phase.

  Phase 85:
  tag=handshake_or summary="Finishing handshake with entry guard"

  This phase is similar to the "handshake_dir" phase, but it gets reached
  if we finish a TCP connection to a Tor relay and we have already reached
  the "conn_or" phase. We'll stay in this phase until we complete a TLS
  handshake with a Tor relay.

  Phase 90:
  tag=circuit_create summary="Establishing circuits"

  Once we've finished our TLS handshake with an entry guard, we will
  set about trying to make some 3-hop circuits in case we need them soon.

  Phase 100:
  tag=done summary="Done"

  A full 3-hop exit circuit has been established. Tor is ready to handle
  application connections now.