user.rs 12 KB

123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229230231232233234235236237238239240241242243244245246247248249250251252253254255256257258259260261262263264265266267268269270271272273274275276277278279280281282283284285286287288289290291292293294295296297298299300301302303304305306307308309310311312313314315316317318319320321322323324325326327328329330331332333334335336337338339340341342343344345346347348349
  1. // User behavior in simulation
  2. use crate::{
  3. get_date, negative_report::NegativeReport, positive_report::PositiveReport,
  4. simulation::state::State, BridgeDistributor,
  5. };
  6. use lox_cli::{networking::*, *};
  7. use lox_library::{
  8. bridge_table::{BridgeLine, MAX_BRIDGES_PER_BUCKET},
  9. cred::{Invitation, Lox},
  10. proto::check_blockage::MIN_TRUST_LEVEL,
  11. scalar_u32, IssuerPubKey,
  12. };
  13. use rand::Rng;
  14. pub struct User {
  15. // Does this user cooperate with a censor?
  16. censor: bool,
  17. // 2-character country code
  18. country: String,
  19. // The user always has a primary credential. If this credential's bucket is
  20. // blocked, the user may replace it or temporarily hold two credentials
  21. // while waiting to migrate from the primary credential.
  22. primary_cred: Lox,
  23. secondary_cred: Option<Lox>,
  24. // Does the user submit reports to Troll Patrol?
  25. submits_reports: bool,
  26. }
  27. impl User {
  28. pub async fn new(state: &State) -> Self {
  29. let (cred, bl) = get_lox_credential(
  30. &state.net,
  31. &get_open_invitation(&state.net).await,
  32. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  33. )
  34. .await;
  35. // Probabilistically decide whether this user cooperates with a censor
  36. let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
  37. let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
  38. let censor = num < state.prob_user_is_censor;
  39. // Probabilistically decide whether this user submits reports
  40. let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
  41. let submits_reports = num < state.prob_user_submits_reports;
  42. // Probabilistically decide user's country
  43. let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
  44. let cc = {
  45. let mut cc = String::default();
  46. for (country, prob) in &state.probs_user_in_country {
  47. let mut prob = *prob;
  48. if prob < num {
  49. cc = country.to_string();
  50. break;
  51. } else {
  52. prob -= num;
  53. }
  54. }
  55. cc
  56. };
  57. Self {
  58. censor: censor,
  59. country: cc,
  60. primary_cred: cred,
  61. secondary_cred: None,
  62. submits_reports: submits_reports,
  63. }
  64. }
  65. // TODO: This should probably return an actual error type
  66. pub async fn invite(&mut self, state: &State) -> Result<Self, String> {
  67. let etable = get_reachability_credential(&state.net).await;
  68. let (new_cred, invite) = issue_invite(
  69. &state.net,
  70. &self.primary_cred,
  71. &etable,
  72. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  73. get_reachability_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  74. get_invitation_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  75. )
  76. .await;
  77. self.primary_cred = new_cred;
  78. let (friend_cred, bucket) = redeem_invite(
  79. &state.net,
  80. &invite,
  81. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  82. get_invitation_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  83. )
  84. .await;
  85. // Probabilistically decide whether this user cooperates with a censor
  86. // We do not influence this by the inviting friend's status. Anyone
  87. // might have friends who are untrustworthy, and censors may invite
  88. // non-censors to maintain an illusion of trustworthiness. Also, a
  89. // "censor" user may not be knowingly helping a censor.
  90. let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
  91. let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
  92. let censor = num < state.prob_user_is_censor;
  93. // Probabilistically decide whether this user submits reports
  94. let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
  95. let submits_reports = num < state.prob_user_submits_reports;
  96. // Determine user's country
  97. let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
  98. let cc = if num < state.prob_friend_in_same_country {
  99. self.country.to_string()
  100. } else {
  101. // Probabilistically decide user's country
  102. let mut num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
  103. let mut cc = String::default();
  104. for (country, prob) in &state.probs_user_in_country {
  105. let prob = *prob;
  106. if prob < num {
  107. cc = country.to_string();
  108. break;
  109. } else {
  110. num -= prob;
  111. }
  112. }
  113. cc
  114. };
  115. Ok(Self {
  116. censor: censor,
  117. country: cc,
  118. primary_cred: friend_cred,
  119. secondary_cred: None,
  120. submits_reports: submits_reports,
  121. })
  122. }
  123. // Attempt to "connect" to the bridge, returns true if successful
  124. pub fn connect(&self, bridge: &BridgeLine) -> bool {
  125. true
  126. }
  127. pub async fn send_negative_reports(state: &State, reports: Vec<NegativeReport>) {
  128. let date = get_date();
  129. let pubkey = state.tp_pubkeys.get(&date).unwrap();
  130. for report in reports {
  131. state
  132. .net_tp
  133. .request(
  134. "/negativereport".to_string(),
  135. bincode::serialize(&report.encrypt(&pubkey)).unwrap(),
  136. )
  137. .await;
  138. }
  139. }
  140. pub async fn send_positive_reports(state: &State, reports: Vec<PositiveReport>) {
  141. for report in reports {
  142. state
  143. .net_tp
  144. .request("/positivereport".to_string(), report.to_json().into_bytes())
  145. .await;
  146. }
  147. }
  148. // User performs daily connection attempts, etc. and returns a vector of
  149. // newly invited friends and a vector of fingerprints of successfully
  150. // contacted bridges.
  151. pub async fn daily_tasks(&mut self, state: &State) -> (Vec<User>, Vec<[u8; 20]>) {
  152. // Download bucket to see if bridge is still reachable
  153. // (We assume that this step can be done even if the user can't actually
  154. // talk to the LA.)
  155. let (bucket, reachcred) = get_bucket(&state.net, &self.primary_cred).await;
  156. let level = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.trust_level).unwrap();
  157. // Can we level up the main credential?
  158. let can_level_up = reachcred.is_some()
  159. && (level == 0 && eligible_for_trust_promotion(&state.net, &self.primary_cred).await
  160. || level > 0 && eligible_for_level_up(&state.net, &self.primary_cred).await);
  161. // Can we migrate the main credential?
  162. let can_migrate = reachcred.is_none() && level >= MIN_TRUST_LEVEL;
  163. // Can we level up the secondary credential?
  164. let mut second_level_up = false;
  165. let mut failed = Vec::<BridgeLine>::new();
  166. let mut succeeded = Vec::<BridgeLine>::new();
  167. for i in 0..bucket.len() {
  168. // At level 0, we only have 1 bridge
  169. if (level > 0 || i == 0) && self.connect(&bucket[i]) {
  170. if self.submits_reports && level >= 3 {
  171. succeeded.push(bucket[i]);
  172. }
  173. break;
  174. } else {
  175. if self.submits_reports {
  176. failed.push(bucket[i]);
  177. }
  178. }
  179. }
  180. let second_cred = if succeeded.len() < 1 {
  181. if self.secondary_cred.is_some() {
  182. std::mem::replace(&mut self.secondary_cred, None)
  183. } else {
  184. // Get new credential
  185. let (cred, bl) = get_lox_credential(
  186. &state.net,
  187. &get_open_invitation(&state.net).await,
  188. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  189. )
  190. .await;
  191. Some(cred)
  192. }
  193. } else {
  194. // If we're able to connect with the primary credential, don't
  195. // keep a secondary one.
  196. None
  197. };
  198. if second_cred.is_some() {
  199. let second_cred = second_cred.as_ref().unwrap();
  200. let (second_bucket, second_reachcred) = get_bucket(&state.net, &second_cred).await;
  201. if self.connect(&second_bucket[0]) {
  202. succeeded.push(second_bucket[0]);
  203. if second_reachcred.is_some()
  204. && eligible_for_trust_promotion(&state.net, &second_cred).await
  205. {
  206. second_level_up = true;
  207. }
  208. } else {
  209. failed.push(second_bucket[0]);
  210. }
  211. }
  212. let mut negative_reports = Vec::<NegativeReport>::new();
  213. let mut positive_reports = Vec::<PositiveReport>::new();
  214. if self.submits_reports {
  215. for bridge in &failed {
  216. negative_reports.push(NegativeReport::from_bridgeline(
  217. *bridge,
  218. self.country.to_string(),
  219. BridgeDistributor::Lox,
  220. ));
  221. }
  222. if level >= 3 {
  223. for bridge in &succeeded {
  224. positive_reports.push(
  225. PositiveReport::from_lox_credential(
  226. bridge.fingerprint,
  227. None,
  228. &self.primary_cred,
  229. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  230. self.country.to_string(),
  231. )
  232. .unwrap(),
  233. );
  234. }
  235. }
  236. }
  237. // We might restrict these steps to succeeded.len() > 0, but we do
  238. // assume the user can contact the LA somehow, so let's just allow it.
  239. if can_level_up {
  240. let cred = level_up(
  241. &state.net,
  242. &self.primary_cred,
  243. &reachcred.unwrap(),
  244. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  245. get_reachability_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  246. )
  247. .await;
  248. self.primary_cred = cred;
  249. self.secondary_cred = None;
  250. }
  251. // We favor starting over at level 1 to migrating
  252. else if second_level_up {
  253. let second_cred = second_cred.as_ref().unwrap();
  254. let cred = trust_migration(
  255. &state.net,
  256. &second_cred,
  257. &trust_promotion(&state.net, &second_cred, get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys)).await,
  258. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  259. get_migration_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  260. )
  261. .await;
  262. self.primary_cred = cred;
  263. self.secondary_cred = None;
  264. } else if can_migrate {
  265. let cred = blockage_migration(
  266. &state.net,
  267. &self.primary_cred,
  268. &check_blockage(
  269. &state.net,
  270. &self.primary_cred,
  271. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  272. )
  273. .await,
  274. get_lox_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  275. get_migration_pub(&state.la_pubkeys),
  276. )
  277. .await;
  278. self.primary_cred = cred;
  279. self.secondary_cred = None;
  280. } else if second_cred.is_some() {
  281. // Couldn't connect with primary credential
  282. if succeeded.len() > 0 {
  283. // Keep the second credential only if it's useful
  284. self.secondary_cred = second_cred;
  285. }
  286. }
  287. if negative_reports.len() > 0 {
  288. Self::send_negative_reports(&state, negative_reports).await;
  289. }
  290. if positive_reports.len() > 0 {
  291. Self::send_positive_reports(&state, positive_reports).await;
  292. }
  293. // Invite friends if applicable
  294. let invitations = scalar_u32(&self.primary_cred.invites_remaining).unwrap();
  295. let mut new_friends = Vec::<User>::new();
  296. for i in 0..invitations {
  297. let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
  298. let num: f64 = rng.gen_range(0.0..1.0);
  299. if num < state.prob_user_invites_friend {
  300. match self.invite(&state).await {
  301. Ok(friend) => {
  302. // You really shouldn't push your friends, especially
  303. // new ones whose boundaries you might not know well.
  304. new_friends.push(friend);
  305. }
  306. Err(e) => {
  307. println!("{}", e);
  308. }
  309. }
  310. }
  311. }
  312. // List of fingerprints we contacted. This should not actually be more
  313. // than one.
  314. let mut connections = Vec::<[u8; 20]>::new();
  315. for bridge in succeeded {
  316. connections.push(bridge.get_hashed_fingerprint());
  317. }
  318. (new_friends, connections)
  319. }
  320. }