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- /*
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2017 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- * * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
- * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
- * from this software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
- * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
- * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
- * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
- * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- */
- #include "sgx_trts.h"
- #include "sgx_utils.h"
- #include "EnclaveMessageExchange.h"
- #include "sgx_eid.h"
- #include "error_codes.h"
- #include "sgx_ecp_types.h"
- #include "sgx_thread.h"
- #include <map>
- #include "dh_session_protocol.h"
- #include "sgx_dh.h"
- #include "sgx_tcrypto.h"
- #include "LocalAttestationCode_t.h"
- #include "sgx_tseal.h"
- #ifdef __cplusplus
- extern "C" {
- #endif
- uint32_t verify_peer_enclave_trust(sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t* peer_enclave_identity);
- #ifdef __cplusplus
- }
- #endif
- //uint32_t create_ecdsa_key_pair(sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, sgx_ec256_private_t* priv_key);
- //void serialize_key_pair_to_string( sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, sgx_ec256_private_t* signing_priv_key, uint8_t* private_public_key_string);
- //void deserialize_string_to_key_pair(uint8_t* private_public_key_string, sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, sgx_ec256_private_t* priv_key);
-
- #define MAX_SESSION_COUNT 16
- //number of open sessions
- // uint32_t g_session_count = 0;
- ATTESTATION_STATUS generate_session_id(uint32_t *session_id);
- ATTESTATION_STATUS end_session();
- //sgx_ec256_private_t signing_priv_key;
- uint32_t one_successful_la_done;
- sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_state;
- uint32_t session_ids[MAX_SESSION_COUNT];
- // Our enclave will not be doing LA with more than 1 decryptor enclave at a time.
- // We should not need this.
- //std::map<int, dh_session_t>g_dest_session_info_map;
- dh_session_t global_session_info;
- // TODO: May be we need to store all previously assigned session IDs instead of just the counter; to prevent replay attacks -
- uint32_t global_session_id=0;
- //Handle the request from Source Enclave for a session
- ATTESTATION_STATUS session_request(sgx_dh_msg1_t *dh_msg1,
- uint32_t *session_id )
- {
- // dh_session_t session_info;
- sgx_dh_session_t sgx_dh_session;
- sgx_status_t status = SGX_SUCCESS;
- if(!session_id || !dh_msg1)
- {
- return INVALID_PARAMETER_ERROR;
- }
- //Intialize the session as a session responder
- status = sgx_dh_init_session(SGX_DH_SESSION_RESPONDER, &sgx_dh_session);
- if(SGX_SUCCESS != status)
- {
- return status;
- }
- *session_id=1;
- global_session_info.status = IN_PROGRESS;
- //Generate Message1 that will be returned to Source Enclave
- status = sgx_dh_responder_gen_msg1((sgx_dh_msg1_t*)dh_msg1, &sgx_dh_session);
- if(SGX_SUCCESS != status)
- {
- global_session_id--;
- // SAFE_FREE(g_session_id_tracker[*session_id]);
- return status;
- }
- memcpy(&global_session_info.in_progress.dh_session, &sgx_dh_session, sizeof(sgx_dh_session_t));
- //return sgx_seal_data(0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL);
- //Store the session information under the correspoding source enlave id key
- // g_dest_session_info_map.insert(std::pair<sgx_enclave_id_t, dh_session_t>(src_enclave_id, session_info));
- return status;
- }
- //Verify Message 2, generate Message3 and exchange Message 3 with Source Enclave
- ATTESTATION_STATUS exchange_report(
- sgx_dh_msg2_t *dh_msg2,
- sgx_dh_msg3_t *dh_msg3,
- uint32_t* session_id, uint8_t* read_or_write)
- {
- sgx_key_128bit_t dh_aek; // Session key
- // dh_session_t session_info;
- ATTESTATION_STATUS status = SUCCESS;
- sgx_dh_session_t sgx_dh_session;
- sgx_dh_session_enclave_identity_t initiator_identity;
- if(!dh_msg2 || !dh_msg3)
- {
- return INVALID_PARAMETER_ERROR;
- }
- memset(&dh_aek,0, sizeof(sgx_key_128bit_t));
- // Why is there a do-while loop anyway? It seems like there is no successful exit ...
- // do
- // {
- // TODO: Make sure that this works - pointers
- // session_info = global_session_info;
- if(global_session_info.status != IN_PROGRESS)
- {
- status = INVALID_SESSION;
- end_session();
- }
- memcpy(&sgx_dh_session, &global_session_info.in_progress.dh_session, sizeof(sgx_dh_session_t));
- dh_msg3->msg3_body.additional_prop_length = 0;
- //Process message 2 from source enclave and obtain message 3
- sgx_status_t se_ret = sgx_dh_responder_proc_msg2(dh_msg2,
- dh_msg3,
- &sgx_dh_session,
- &dh_aek,
- &initiator_identity);
- if(SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
- {
- status = se_ret;
- end_session();
- }
- uint32_t hash_count;
- // THIS IS WHERE THE DECRYPTOR VERIFIES THE APACHE'S MRSIGNER IS THE PUBLIC KEY GIVEN AFTER THE LOCAL ATTESTATION WITH THE VERIFIER.
- //Verify source enclave's trust
- uint32_t verify_return=verify_peer_enclave_trust(&initiator_identity);
- if(verify_return!=0)
- return verify_return;
- if(one_successful_la_done == 0)
- {
- one_successful_la_done = 1; *read_or_write=1;
- }
- else
- {
- one_successful_la_done=2; *read_or_write=0;
- }
- // TODO: Verify that these changes will be lost on update.
- //save the session ID, status and initialize the session nonce
- global_session_info.session_id = *session_id;
- global_session_info.status = ACTIVE;
- global_session_info.active.counter = 0;
- memcpy(&global_session_info.active.AEK, &dh_aek, sizeof(sgx_key_128bit_t));
- memset(&dh_aek,0, sizeof(sgx_key_128bit_t));
- //g_session_count++;*/
- // }while(0);
- return status;
- }
- /*
- ATTESTATION_STATUS encrypt(__attribute__((unused)) uint8_t *plaintext, __attribute__((unused)) size_t plaintext_length, __attribute__((unused)) uint8_t* payload_tag, __attribute__((unused)) uint8_t* ciphertext, __attribute__((unused)) uint32_t* active_counter)
- {
- // return 0;
- sgx_status_t status;
- if(plaintext == NULL)
- {
- return INVALID_PARAMETER_ERROR;
- }
- //Check if the nonce for the session has not exceeded 2^32-2 if so end session and start a new session
- if(global_session_info.active.counter == ((uint32_t) - 2))
- { return 0xFF; // TODO: DO something here.
- // close_session(src_enclave_id);
- // create_session(src_enclave_id, session_info);
- }
- //return plaintext_length ;
- uint32_t count;
- uint8_t* temp_plaintext = (uint8_t*) malloc(plaintext_length);
- for(count=0; count<plaintext_length; count++)
- *(temp_plaintext+count)=*(plaintext+count);
- secure_message_t* temp_req_message = (secure_message_t*)malloc(sizeof(secure_message_t)+ plaintext_length); // WTF is this even - what happens to padding?
- memset(temp_req_message,0,sizeof(secure_message_t)+ plaintext_length);
- //Use the session nonce as the payload IV
- // memcpy(req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.reserved,&global_session_info.active.counter,sizeof(global_session_info.active.counter));
- // *active_counter=global_session_info.active.counter;
- memcpy(temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.reserved,&global_session_info.active.counter,sizeof(global_session_info.active.counter));
- //Set the session ID of the message to the current session id
- // req_message->session_id = global_session_info.session_id;
- uint32_t temp_plaintext_length = plaintext_length;
- uint8_t* shared_key = (uint8_t*)malloc(16); // 128 bit aes key
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- *(shared_key+count)=global_session_info.active.AEK[count];
- // return 0;
- //Prepare the request message with the encrypted payload
- status =
- sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt((sgx_key_128bit_t*)shared_key, temp_plaintext, temp_plaintext_length,
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&(temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload)),
- reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&(temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.reserved)),
- 0xc, NULL, 0,
- &(temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload_tag));
- for(count=0;count<48;count++)
- *(ciphertext+count) = temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload[count];
- // tag length is 16 as per sgx_tseal.h
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- *(payload_tag+count) = temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload_tag[count];
- // TODO: Should this depend on whether the call has been successful or not?
- //Update the value of the session nonce in the source enclave
- // global_session_info.active.counter +=1; // TODO: Activate this again.
- free(shared_key); free(temp_plaintext); free(temp_req_message);
- return status;
- //return global_session_info.active.counter-1;
- }
- uint32_t decrypt(__attribute__((unused)) uint8_t* ciphertext, __attribute__((unused)) size_t ciphertext_length, __attribute__((unused)) uint8_t* payload_tag, __attribute__((unused)) uint8_t* plaintext, __attribute__((unused)) size_t plaintext_length)
- {
- uint32_t count; sgx_status_t status;
- uint8_t* shared_key = (uint8_t*)malloc(16); // 128 bit aes key
- secure_message_t* temp_req_message = (secure_message_t*)malloc(sizeof(secure_message_t)+ plaintext_length); // WTF is this even - what happens to padding?
- memset(temp_req_message,0,sizeof(secure_message_t)+ plaintext_length);
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- *(shared_key+count)=global_session_info.active.AEK[count];
- uint8_t* temp_ciphertext = (uint8_t*) malloc(ciphertext_length);
- for(count=0; count<ciphertext_length; count++)
- *(temp_ciphertext+count)=*(ciphertext+count);
- uint8_t* temp_plaintext = (uint8_t*) malloc(plaintext_length);
- memset(temp_plaintext, 0, plaintext_length);
- // uint8_t temp_payload_tag[16];// = (uint8_t*) malloc(16);
- // for(count=0; count<16; count++)
- // *(temp_payload_tag+count)=*(payload_tag+count);
- // const uint8_t expected_payload_tag[16]; // = (uint8_t*) malloc(16);
- uint8_t* iv = (uint8_t*) malloc(12);
- memset(iv, 0, 12);
- memcpy(iv, &global_session_info.active.counter, sizeof(uint32_t));
- //Decrypt the response message payload
- // status = sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt(&global_session_info.active.AEK, resp_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload, resp_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload_size, pl$reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(&(resp_message->message_aes_gcm_data.reserved)), sizeof(resp_message->message_aes_gcm_data.reserved), NULL, 0, &resp_message$
- status = sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt((sgx_key_128bit_t*) shared_key, temp_ciphertext, ciphertext_length,
- temp_plaintext, iv, 0xc, NULL, 0, &(temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload_tag));
- for(count=0;count<16; count++)
- {
- // if(temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload_tag[count] != *(payload_tag+count))
- // return 0x2;
- *(payload_tag+count)=temp_req_message->message_aes_gcm_data.payload_tag[count];
- }
-
- // for(count=0; count<plaintext_length; count++)
- // *(plaintext+count)=*(temp_plaintext+count);
- //
- free(shared_key); free(temp_ciphertext); free(temp_plaintext); // free(temp_payload_tag);
- return status;
- return 0;
- }
- */
- /*
- uint32_t create_ecdsa_key_pair(sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, sgx_ec256_private_t* priv_key)
- {
- sgx_status_t se_ret; sgx_status_t se_ret2;
- //create ECC context
- ecc_state = NULL;
- se_ret = sgx_ecc256_open_context(&ecc_state);
- if(SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret)
- return se_ret;
- // generate private key and public key
- se_ret = sgx_ecc256_create_key_pair(priv_key, pub_key, ecc_state);
- se_ret2 = sgx_ecc256_close_context(ecc_state);
- if(SGX_SUCCESS != se_ret || se_ret2!= SGX_SUCCESS) // something weird has happened - couldn't shut it down.
- return 0xFFFFFFFF;
- return SGX_SUCCESS;
- }
- // todo: set to private
- // todo: assumes that the length of the keystring is at least 3*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE
- void serialize_key_pair_to_string(sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, sgx_ec256_private_t* signing_priv_key, uint8_t* private_public_key_string)
- {
- if(private_public_key_string != NULL) // nowhere to serialize to
- {
- uint32_t counter;
- if(pub_key != NULL) // public key to serialize
- {
- for(counter=0;counter<SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- *(private_public_key_string+counter)=pub_key->gx[counter];
- for(counter=SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE;counter<2*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- *(private_public_key_string+counter)=pub_key->gy[counter-SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE];
- }
- if(signing_priv_key != NULL) // private key to serialize
- {
- for(counter=2*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE;counter<3*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- *(private_public_key_string+counter)=signing_priv_key->r[counter - 2*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE];
- }
- }
- }
- // todo: set to private
- void deserialize_string_to_key_pair(uint8_t* private_public_key_string, sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, sgx_ec256_private_t* signing_priv_key)
- {
- if(private_public_key_string != NULL) // nowhere to deserialize from
- {
- uint32_t counter;
- if(signing_priv_key != NULL)
- {
- for(counter=2*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE;counter<3*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- signing_priv_key->r[counter-2*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE]=*(private_public_key_string+counter);
- }
- if(pub_key != NULL)
- {
- for(counter=0;counter<SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- pub_key->gx[counter]=*(private_public_key_string+counter);
- for(counter=SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE;counter<2*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- pub_key->gy[counter-SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE]=*(private_public_key_string+counter);
- }
- }
- }
- uint32_t create_and_seal_ecdsa_signing_key_pair(__attribute__((unused)) sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, __attribute__((unused)) uint32_t* sealed_data_length, __attribute__((unused)) uint8_t* sealed_data)
- {
- uint32_t ret_status; sgx_ec256_private_t private_key; uint32_t counter;
- ret_status=create_ecdsa_key_pair(pub_key, &private_key);
- if(ret_status!=SGX_SUCCESS)
- return ret_status;
- for(counter=0;counter<SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- signing_priv_key.r[counter]=private_key.r[counter];
- // generating the entire string as there is no SGX function to generate the public key from the private one.
- uint8_t* private_public_key_string = (uint8_t*) malloc(3*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE);
- uint8_t* sealed_data2 = (uint8_t*) malloc(*sealed_data_length);
- // serializing keypair to string
- serialize_key_pair_to_string(pub_key, &private_key, private_public_key_string);
- uint8_t* private_key_string = (uint8_t*) malloc(SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE);
- for(counter=0;counter<SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE;counter++)
- *(private_key_string+counter)=private_key.r[counter];
- // return *sealed_data_length;
- ret_status = sgx_seal_data(0, NULL, 3*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE, private_public_key_string, *sealed_data_length, (sgx_sealed_data_t*) sealed_data2);
- for(counter=0;counter<*sealed_data_length;counter++)
- *(sealed_data+counter)=*(sealed_data2+counter);
- free(sealed_data2);
- free(private_key_string); //free(private_key);
- free(private_public_key_string);
- return ret_status; // SGX_SUCCESS;
- }
- uint32_t unseal_and_restore_sealed_signing_key_pair(__attribute__((unused)) sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, __attribute__((unused)) uint8_t* sealed_data, __attribute__((unused)) uint32_t* sgx_sealed_data_length)
- {
- return SGX_SUCCESS;
- }
- uint32_t unseal_and_restore_sealed_signing_key_pair(__attribute__((unused)) sgx_ec256_public_t* pub_key, uint8_t* sealed_data, size_t* sgx_sealed_data_length)
- {
- uint32_t expected_plaintext_msg_length; uint8_t* temp_plaintext; uint32_t counter; uint32_t ret_status;
- expected_plaintext_msg_length = sgx_get_encrypt_txt_len((sgx_sealed_data_t*)sealed_data);
- if(expected_plaintext_msg_length == 0xffffffff)
- return 0xFFFFFFFF;
- // uint32_t return_status;
- uint8_t* sealed_data2 = (uint8_t*) malloc(*sgx_sealed_data_length);
- for(counter=0;counter<*sgx_sealed_data_length;counter++)
- {
- *(sealed_data2+counter)=*(sealed_data+counter);
- }
- temp_plaintext = (uint8_t*)malloc( expected_plaintext_msg_length );
- ret_status = sgx_unseal_data((sgx_sealed_data_t*)sealed_data2, NULL, 0, temp_plaintext, &expected_plaintext_msg_length);
- if(ret_status != SGX_SUCCESS)
- {
- free(temp_plaintext);free(sealed_data2);
- switch(ret_status)
- {
- case SGX_ERROR_MAC_MISMATCH:
- // MAC of the sealed data is incorrect. The sealed data has been tampered.
- break;
- case SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ATTRIBUTE:
- // Indicates attribute field of the sealed data is incorrect.
- break;
- case SGX_ERROR_INVALID_ISVSVN:
- // Indicates isv_svn field of the sealed data is greater than the enclave�s ISVSVN. This is a downgraded enclave.
- break;
- case SGX_ERROR_INVALID_CPUSVN:
- // Indicates cpu_svn field of the sealed data is greater than the platform�s cpu_svn. enclave is on a downgraded platform.
- break;
- case SGX_ERROR_INVALID_KEYNAME:
- // Indicates key_name field of the sealed data is incorrect.
- break;
- default:
- // other errors
- break;
- }
- return ret_status;
- }
-
- deserialize_string_to_key_pair(temp_plaintext, pub_key, &signing_priv_key);
- free(temp_plaintext); free(sealed_data2);
- return SGX_SUCCESS;
- }
- uint32_t create_and_sign_client_side_pub_key(sgx_measurement_t* mr_enclave, sgx_ec256_public_t* generated_pub_key, sgx_ec256_signature_t* generated_signature)
- {
- // create key pair
- uint32_t ret_status = create_ecdsa_key_pair(&short_term_pub_key, &short_term_priv_key); uint32_t counter;
- uint32_t ret_status2;
- if(ret_status!=SGX_SUCCESS)
- return ret_status;
- // serialize public key, append mr_enclave
- uint8_t* public_key_string = (uint8_t*) malloc(3*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE); // for .edl file - size parameter for serialize is 96 and this fits coz we need to append the mr_enclave to the pub key
- serialize_key_pair_to_string(&short_term_pub_key, NULL, public_key_string);
- for(counter=32*2; counter<32*3; counter++) // appending mr_enclave
- *(public_key_string+counter)=mr_enclave->m[counter];
- // retrieve long-term private key from global variable - apparently, need to create a local copy or it crashes
- sgx_ec256_private_t long_term_priv_key;
- for(counter=0; counter<SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- long_term_priv_key.r[counter] = signing_priv_key.r[counter];
- // sign public key with long-term private key
- sgx_ec256_signature_t local_signature; sgx_ecc_state_handle_t ecc_handle;
- //// opening context for signature
- ret_status = sgx_ecc256_open_context(&ecc_handle);
- if(ret_status != SGX_SUCCESS)
- return ret_status;
- ret_status = sgx_ecdsa_sign(public_key_string,2*SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE, &long_term_priv_key, &local_signature, ecc_handle);
- ret_status2 = sgx_ecc256_close_context(ecc_handle);
- free(public_key_string);
- if(ret_status == SGX_SUCCESS)
- {
- for(counter=0; counter<SGX_ECP256_KEY_SIZE; counter++)
- generated_pub_key->gx[counter] = short_term_pub_key.gx[counter];
- for(counter=0;counter<SGX_NISTP_ECP256_KEY_SIZE ; counter++)
- {
- generated_signature->x[counter] = local_signature.x[counter];
- generated_signature->y[counter] = local_signature.y[counter];
- }
- }
- if(ret_status != SGX_SUCCESS || ret_status2 != SGX_SUCCESS)
- return 0xFFFFFFFF;
- return 0;
- }
- */
- uint32_t calculate_sealed_data_size( uint32_t input_size)
- {
- // *op_size=sgx_calc_sealed_data_size(0, input_size);
- return sgx_calc_sealed_data_size(0, input_size);
- }
- // TODO: Fix this.
- //Respond to the request from the Source Enclave to close the session
- ATTESTATION_STATUS end_session(/**/)
- {
- return SUCCESS;
- }
- /*
- // Session_id is set to the first index of the pointer array that is non-null.(Not sure how it is ensured that all of them point to NULL at the start)
- // Why can't it just keep a counter that is incremented? What are the values of g_session_id_tracker array?
- //Returns a new sessionID for the source destination session
- ATTESTATION_STATUS generate_session_id(uint32_t *session_id)
- {
- ATTESTATION_STATUS status = SUCCESS;
- if(!session_id)
- {
- return INVALID_PARAMETER_ERROR;
- }
- //if the session structure is untintialized, set that as the next session ID
- for (int i = 0; i < MAX_SESSION_COUNT; i++)
- {
- if (g_session_id_tracker[i] == NULL)
- {
- *session_id = i;
- return status;
- }
- }
- status = NO_AVAILABLE_SESSION_ERROR;
- return status;
- */
- // *session_id=++global_session_id;
- //}
- uint32_t decrypt(uint8_t* ip_ciphertext, uint32_t ciphertext_len, uint8_t* ip_tag, uint8_t* op_plaintext)
- {
- // if(one_successful_la_done < 2) // doesn't matter as confidentiality of the signer is not a problem - changing it in memory so that the decryptor accepts another mrsigner is a problem.
- // return 0xfe; // will not return plaintext to the caller as this is the apache's mrsigner, sent to the verifier (value 1) or no LA done yet (value 0)
- uint32_t return_status2; uint32_t count;
- unsigned char key[16];
- // copying key to within the enclave as apparently it can't operate on it // TODO: Check if it works now.
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- key[count]=global_session_info.active.AEK[count];
- // copying ciphertext to within the enclave (otherwise it crashes with NOT enclave signal)
- uint8_t* ciphertext = (uint8_t*) malloc(ciphertext_len);
- for(count=0;count<ciphertext_len;count++)
- *(ciphertext+count)=*(ip_ciphertext+count);
- uint8_t* tag = (uint8_t*) malloc(16);
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- *(tag+count)=*(ip_tag+count);
- uint8_t* plaintext = (uint8_t*) malloc(ciphertext_len);
- uint8_t iv[12];
-
- memset(iv, 0, 12); //memcpy(iv, &global_session_info.active.counter, 4);
- return_status2=sgx_rijndael128GCM_decrypt((sgx_key_128bit_t*) key, ciphertext, ciphertext_len, plaintext, iv, 0xc, NULL, 0, (sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t*)tag);
- for(count=0;count<ciphertext_len;count++)
- *(op_plaintext+count)=plaintext[count];
- free(plaintext); free (ciphertext); free(tag);
- return return_status2;
- }
- uint32_t encrypt(uint8_t* ip_ciphertext, uint32_t ciphertext_len, uint8_t* ip_tag, uint8_t* op_plaintext)
- {
- uint32_t return_status2; uint32_t count;
- unsigned char key[16];
- // copying key to within the enclave as apparently it can't operate on it // TODO: Check if it works now.
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- key[count]=global_session_info.active.AEK[count];
- // copying ciphertext to within the enclave (otherwise it crashes with NOT enclave signal)
- uint8_t* ciphertext = (uint8_t*) malloc(ciphertext_len);
- for(count=0;count<ciphertext_len;count++)
- *(ciphertext+count)=*(ip_ciphertext+count);
- uint8_t* tag = (uint8_t*) malloc(16);
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- *(tag+count)=*(ip_tag+count);
- uint8_t* plaintext = (uint8_t*) malloc(ciphertext_len);
- uint8_t iv[12];
- memset(iv, 0, 12); //memcpy(iv, &global_session_info.active.counter, 4);
- return_status2=sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt((sgx_key_128bit_t*) key, ciphertext, ciphertext_len, plaintext, iv, 0xc, NULL, 0, (sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t*)tag);
- for(count=0;count<ciphertext_len;count++)
- *(op_plaintext+count)=plaintext[count];
- free(plaintext); free (ciphertext); free(tag);
- return return_status2;
- }
- uint32_t encrypt_internal(uint8_t* ip_ciphertext, uint32_t ciphertext_len, uint8_t* op_tag, uint8_t* op_plaintext)
- {
- //return encrypt(ip_ciphertext, ciphertext_len, ip_tag, op_plaintext);
- uint32_t return_status2; uint32_t count;
- unsigned char key[16];
- // copying key to within the enclave as apparently it can't operate on it // TODO: Check if it works now.
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- key[count]=global_session_info.active.AEK[count];
- // copying ciphertext to within the enclave (otherwise it crashes with NOT enclave signal)
- uint8_t* ciphertext = (uint8_t*) malloc(ciphertext_len);
- for(count=0;count<ciphertext_len;count++)
- *(ciphertext+count)=*(ip_ciphertext+count);
- uint8_t tag[16];
- uint8_t* plaintext = (uint8_t*) malloc(ciphertext_len);
- uint8_t iv[12];
- memset(iv, 0, 12); //memcpy(iv, &global_session_info.active.counter, 4);
- return_status2=sgx_rijndael128GCM_encrypt((sgx_key_128bit_t*) key, ciphertext, ciphertext_len, plaintext, iv, 0xc, NULL, 0, (sgx_aes_gcm_128bit_tag_t*)tag);
- for(count=0;count<ciphertext_len;count++)
- *(op_plaintext+count)=plaintext[count];
- for(count=0;count<16;count++)
- op_tag[count]=tag[count];
- free(plaintext); free (ciphertext);
- return return_status2;
- }
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