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- #include <api.h>
- #include <list.h>
- #include <pal_crypto.h>
- #include <pal_debug.h>
- #include <pal_error.h>
- #include <pal_internal.h>
- #include <pal_linux.h>
- #include <pal_linux_error.h>
- #include <pal_security.h>
- #include <spinlock.h>
- #include <stdbool.h>
- #include "enclave_pages.h"
- __sgx_mem_aligned struct pal_enclave_state pal_enclave_state;
- void * enclave_base, * enclave_top;
- struct pal_enclave_config pal_enclave_config;
- static int register_trusted_file (const char * uri, const char * checksum_str);
- bool sgx_is_completely_within_enclave (const void * addr, uint64_t size)
- {
- if (((uint64_t) addr) > (UINT64_MAX - size)) {
- return false;
- }
- return enclave_base <= addr && addr + size <= enclave_top;
- }
- bool sgx_is_completely_outside_enclave(const void* addr, uint64_t size) {
- if (((uint64_t) addr) > (UINT64_MAX - size)) {
- return false;
- }
- return enclave_base >= addr + size || enclave_top <= addr;
- }
- void* sgx_alloc_on_ustack(uint64_t size) {
- void* ustack = GET_ENCLAVE_TLS(ustack) - size;
- if (!sgx_is_completely_outside_enclave(ustack, size)) {
- return NULL;
- }
- SET_ENCLAVE_TLS(ustack, ustack);
- return ustack;
- }
- void* sgx_copy_to_ustack(const void* ptr, uint64_t size) {
- if (!sgx_is_completely_within_enclave(ptr, size)) {
- return NULL;
- }
- void* uptr = sgx_alloc_on_ustack(size);
- if (uptr) {
- memcpy(uptr, ptr, size);
- }
- return uptr;
- }
- void sgx_reset_ustack(void) {
- SET_ENCLAVE_TLS(ustack, GET_ENCLAVE_TLS(ustack_top));
- }
- /* NOTE: Value from possibly untrusted uptr must be copied inside
- * CPU register or enclave stack (to prevent TOCTOU). Function call
- * achieves this. Attribute ensures no inline optimization. */
- __attribute__((noinline))
- bool sgx_copy_ptr_to_enclave(void** ptr, void* uptr, uint64_t size) {
- assert(ptr);
- if (!sgx_is_completely_outside_enclave(uptr, size)) {
- *ptr = NULL;
- return false;
- }
- *ptr = uptr;
- return true;
- }
- /* NOTE: Value from possibly untrusted uptr and usize must be copied
- * inside CPU registers or enclave stack (to prevent TOCTOU). Function
- * call achieves this. Attribute ensures no inline optimization. */
- __attribute__((noinline))
- uint64_t sgx_copy_to_enclave(const void* ptr, uint64_t maxsize, const void* uptr, uint64_t usize) {
- if (usize > maxsize ||
- !sgx_is_completely_outside_enclave(uptr, usize) ||
- !sgx_is_completely_within_enclave(ptr, usize)) {
- return 0;
- }
- memcpy((void*) ptr, uptr, usize);
- return usize;
- }
- static void print_report(sgx_report_t* r) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " cpu_svn: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(r->body.cpu_svn.svn));
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " mr_enclave: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(r->body.mr_enclave.m));
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " mr_signer: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(r->body.mr_signer.m));
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " attr.flags: %016lx\n", r->body.attributes.flags);
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " attr.xfrm: %016lx\n", r->body.attributes.xfrm);
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " isv_prod_id: %02x\n", r->body.isv_prod_id);
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " isv_svn: %02x\n", r->body.isv_svn);
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " report_data: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(r->body.report_data.d));
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " key_id: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(r->key_id.id));
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " mac: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(r->mac));
- }
- static sgx_key_128bit_t enclave_key;
- /*
- * sgx_get_report() obtains a CPU-signed report for local attestation
- * @target_info: the enclave target info
- * @data: the data to be included and signed in the report
- * @report: a buffer for storing the report
- */
- static int sgx_get_report(sgx_target_info_t* target_info, sgx_sign_data_t* data,
- sgx_report_t* report) {
- __sgx_mem_aligned struct pal_enclave_state state;
- memcpy(&state, &pal_enclave_state, sizeof(state));
- memcpy(&state.enclave_data, data, sizeof(*data));
- int ret = sgx_report(target_info, &state, report);
- if (ret) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "sgx_report failed: ret = %d)\n", ret);
- return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- }
- print_report(report);
- return 0;
- }
- int sgx_verify_report (sgx_report_t* report)
- {
- __sgx_mem_aligned sgx_key_request_t keyrequest;
- memset(&keyrequest, 0, sizeof(sgx_key_request_t));
- keyrequest.key_name = REPORT_KEY;
- memcpy(&keyrequest.key_id, &report->key_id, sizeof(keyrequest.key_id));
- sgx_key_128bit_t report_key __attribute__((aligned(sizeof(sgx_key_128bit_t))));
- memset(&report_key, 0, sizeof(report_key));
- int ret = sgx_getkey(&keyrequest, &report_key);
- if (ret) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Can't get report key\n");
- return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "Get report key for verification: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(report_key));
- sgx_mac_t check_mac;
- memset(&check_mac, 0, sizeof(check_mac));
- // Generating the MAC with AES-CMAC using the report key. Only hash the part of the report
- // BEFORE the keyid field (hence the offsetof(...) trick). ENCLU[EREPORT] does not include
- // the MAC and the keyid fields when generating the MAC.
- lib_AESCMAC((uint8_t*)&report_key, sizeof(report_key),
- (uint8_t*)report, offsetof(sgx_report_t, key_id),
- (uint8_t*)&check_mac, sizeof(check_mac));
- // Clear the report key for security
- memset(&report_key, 0, sizeof(report_key));
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "Verify report:\n");
- print_report(report);
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, " verify: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(check_mac));
- if (memcmp(&check_mac, &report->mac, sizeof(check_mac))) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Report verification failed\n");
- return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- int init_enclave_key (void)
- {
- __sgx_mem_aligned sgx_key_request_t keyrequest;
- memset(&keyrequest, 0, sizeof(sgx_key_request_t));
- keyrequest.key_name = SEAL_KEY;
- int ret = sgx_getkey(&keyrequest, &enclave_key);
- if (ret) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Can't get seal key\n");
- return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "Seal key: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(enclave_key));
- return 0;
- }
- /*
- * The file integrity check is designed as follow:
- *
- * For each file that requires authentication (specified in the manifest
- * as "sgx.trusted_files.xxx"), a SHA256 checksum is generated and stored
- * in the manifest, signed and verified as part of the enclave's crypto
- * measurement. When user requests for opening the file, Graphene loads
- * the whole file, generate the SHA256 checksum, and check with the known
- * checksums listed in the manifest. If the checksum does not match, and
- * neither does the file is allowed for unauthenticated access, the file
- * access will be rejected.
- *
- * During the generation of the SHA256 checksum, a 128-bit hash is also
- * generated for each chunk in the file. The per-chunk hashes are used
- * for partial verification in future reads, to avoid re-verifying the
- * whole file again or the need of caching file contents. The per-chunk
- * hashes are stored as "stubs" for each file. For a performance reason,
- * each per-chunk hash is a 128-bit AES-CMAC hash value, using a secret
- * key generated at the beginning of the enclave.
- */
- DEFINE_LIST(trusted_file);
- struct trusted_file {
- LIST_TYPE(trusted_file) list;
- int64_t index;
- uint64_t size;
- size_t uri_len;
- char uri[URI_MAX];
- sgx_checksum_t checksum;
- sgx_stub_t * stubs;
- };
- DEFINE_LISTP(trusted_file);
- static LISTP_TYPE(trusted_file) trusted_file_list = LISTP_INIT;
- static spinlock_t trusted_file_lock = INIT_SPINLOCK_UNLOCKED;
- static int trusted_file_indexes = 0;
- static bool allow_file_creation = 0;
- static int file_check_policy = FILE_CHECK_POLICY_STRICT;
- /* Assumes `path` is normalized */
- static bool path_is_equal_or_subpath(const struct trusted_file* tf,
- const char* path,
- size_t path_len) {
- if (tf->uri_len > path_len || memcmp(tf->uri, path, tf->uri_len)) {
- /* tf->uri is not prefix of `path` */
- return false;
- }
- if (tf->uri_len == path_len) {
- /* Both are equal */
- return true;
- }
- if (tf->uri[tf->uri_len - 1] == '/' || path[tf->uri_len] == '/') {
- /* tf->uri is a subpath of `path` */
- return true;
- }
- if (tf->uri_len == URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN && !memcmp(tf->uri, URI_PREFIX_FILE, URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN)) {
- /* Empty path is a prefix of everything */
- return true;
- }
- return false;
- }
- /*
- * 'load_trusted_file' checks if the file to be opened is trusted
- * or allowed for unauthenticated access, according to the manifest.
- *
- * file: file handle to be opened
- * stubptr: buffer for catching matched file stub.
- * sizeptr: size pointer
- * create: this file is newly created or not
- *
- * Returns 0 if succeeded, or an error code otherwise.
- */
- int load_trusted_file (PAL_HANDLE file, sgx_stub_t ** stubptr,
- uint64_t * sizeptr, int create, void** umem)
- {
- *stubptr = NULL;
- *sizeptr = 0;
- *umem = NULL;
- struct trusted_file * tf = NULL, * tmp;
- char uri[URI_MAX];
- char normpath[URI_MAX];
- int ret, fd = file->file.fd;
- if (!(HANDLE_HDR(file)->flags & RFD(0)))
- return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- ret = _DkStreamGetName(file, uri, URI_MAX);
- if (ret < 0) {
- return ret;
- }
- /* Allow to create the file when allow_file_creation is turned on;
- The created file is added to allowed_file list for later access */
- if (create && allow_file_creation) {
- register_trusted_file(uri, NULL);
- return 0;
- }
- /* Normalize the uri */
- if (!strstartswith_static(uri, URI_PREFIX_FILE)) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Invalid URI [%s]: Trusted files must start with 'file:'\n", uri);
- return -PAL_ERROR_INVAL;
- }
- assert(sizeof(normpath) > URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN);
- memcpy(normpath, URI_PREFIX_FILE, URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN);
- size_t len = sizeof(normpath) - URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN;
- ret = get_norm_path(uri + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN, normpath + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN, &len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E,
- "Path (%s) normalization failed: %s\n",
- uri + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN,
- pal_strerror(ret));
- return ret;
- }
- len += URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN;
- spinlock_lock(&trusted_file_lock);
- LISTP_FOR_EACH_ENTRY(tmp, &trusted_file_list, list) {
- if (tmp->stubs) {
- /* trusted files: must be exactly the same URI */
- if (tmp->uri_len == len && !memcmp(tmp->uri, normpath, len + 1)) {
- tf = tmp;
- break;
- }
- } else {
- /* allowed files: must be a subfolder or file */
- if (path_is_equal_or_subpath(tmp, normpath, len)) {
- tf = tmp;
- break;
- }
- }
- }
- spinlock_unlock(&trusted_file_lock);
- if (!tf || !tf->index) {
- if (!tf) {
- if (get_file_check_policy() != FILE_CHECK_POLICY_ALLOW_ALL_BUT_LOG)
- return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- pal_printf("Allowing access to an unknown file due to "
- "file_check_policy settings: %s\n", uri);
- }
- *stubptr = NULL;
- PAL_STREAM_ATTR attr;
- ret = _DkStreamAttributesQuery(normpath, &attr);
- if (!ret)
- *sizeptr = attr.pending_size;
- else
- *sizeptr = 0;
- return 0;
- }
- if (tf->index < 0)
- return tf->index;
- sgx_stub_t* stubs = NULL;
- /* mmap the whole trusted file in untrusted memory for future reads/writes; it is
- * caller's responsibility to unmap those areas after use */
- *sizeptr = tf->size;
- if (*sizeptr) {
- ret = ocall_mmap_untrusted(fd, 0, tf->size, PROT_READ, umem);
- if (IS_ERR(ret)) {
- *umem = NULL;
- ret = unix_to_pal_error(ERRNO(ret));
- goto failed;
- }
- }
- #if CACHE_FILE_STUBS == 1
- if (tf->stubs) {
- *stubptr = tf->stubs;
- *sizeptr = tf->size;
- return 0;
- }
- #endif
- int nstubs = tf->size / TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE +
- (tf->size % TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE ? 1 : 0);
- stubs = malloc(sizeof(sgx_stub_t) * nstubs);
- if (!stubs) {
- ret = -PAL_ERROR_NOMEM;
- goto failed;
- }
- sgx_stub_t * s = stubs; /* stubs is an array of 128bit values */
- uint64_t offset = 0;
- LIB_SHA256_CONTEXT sha;
- ret = lib_SHA256Init(&sha);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- for (; offset < tf->size ; offset += TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE, s++) {
- /* For each stub, generate a 128bit hash of a file chunk with
- * AES-CMAC, and then update the SHA256 digest. */
- uint64_t mapping_size = MIN(tf->size - offset, TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE);
- LIB_AESCMAC_CONTEXT aes_cmac;
- ret = lib_AESCMACInit(&aes_cmac, (uint8_t*)&enclave_key, sizeof(enclave_key));
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- /*
- * To prevent TOCTOU attack when generating the file checksum, we
- * need to copy the file content into the enclave before hashing.
- * For optimization, we use a relatively small buffer (1024 byte) to
- * store the data for checksum generation.
- */
- #define FILE_CHUNK_SIZE 1024UL
- uint8_t small_chunk[FILE_CHUNK_SIZE]; /* Buffer for hashing */
- size_t chunk_offset = 0;
- for (; chunk_offset < mapping_size; chunk_offset += FILE_CHUNK_SIZE) {
- uint64_t chunk_size = MIN(mapping_size - chunk_offset, FILE_CHUNK_SIZE);
- /* Any file content needs to be copied into the enclave before
- * checking and re-hashing */
- memcpy(small_chunk, *umem + offset + chunk_offset, chunk_size);
- /* Update the file checksum */
- ret = lib_SHA256Update(&sha, small_chunk, chunk_size);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- /* Update the checksum for the file chunk */
- ret = lib_AESCMACUpdate(&aes_cmac, small_chunk, chunk_size);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- }
- /* Store the checksum for one file chunk for checking */
- ret = lib_AESCMACFinish(&aes_cmac, (uint8_t *) s, sizeof *s);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- }
- sgx_checksum_t hash;
- /* Finalize and checking if the checksum of the whole file matches
- * with record given in the manifest. */
- ret = lib_SHA256Final(&sha, (uint8_t *) hash.bytes);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- if (memcmp(&hash, &tf->checksum, sizeof(sgx_checksum_t))) {
- ret = -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- goto failed;
- }
- spinlock_lock(&trusted_file_lock);
- if (tf->stubs || tf->index == -PAL_ERROR_DENIED)
- free(tf->stubs);
- *stubptr = tf->stubs = stubs;
- ret = tf->index;
- spinlock_unlock(&trusted_file_lock);
- return ret;
- failed:
- if (*umem) {
- assert(*sizeptr > 0);
- ocall_munmap_untrusted(*umem, *sizeptr);
- }
- free(stubs);
- spinlock_lock(&trusted_file_lock);
- if (!tf->stubs) {
- tf->index = -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- }
- spinlock_unlock(&trusted_file_lock);
- return ret;
- }
- int get_file_check_policy ()
- {
- return file_check_policy;
- }
- static void set_file_check_policy (int policy)
- {
- file_check_policy = policy;
- }
- /*
- * A common helper function for copying and checking the file contents
- * from a buffer mapped outside the enclaves into an in-enclave buffer.
- * If needed, regions at either the beginning or the end of the copied regions
- * are copied into a scratch buffer to avoid a TOCTTOU race.
- *
- * * Note that it must be done this way to avoid the following TOCTTOU race
- * * condition with the untrusted host as an adversary:
- * * Adversary: put good contents in buffer
- * * Enclave: buffer check passes
- * * Adversary: put bad contents in buffer
- * * Enclave: copies in bad buffer contents
- *
- * * For optimization, we verify the memory in place, as the application code
- * should not use the memory before return. There can be subtle interactions
- * at the edges of a region with ELF loading. Namely, the ELF loader will
- * want to map several file chunks that are not aligned to TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE
- * next to each other, sometimes overlapping. There is probably room to
- * improve load time with more smarts around ELF loading, but for now, just
- * make things work.
- *
- * 'umem' is the untrusted file memory mapped outside the enclave (should
- * already be mapped up by the caller). 'umem_start' and 'umem_end' are
- * the offset _within the file_ of 'umem'. 'umem_start' should be aligned
- * to the file checking chunk size (TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE). 'umem_end' can be
- * either aligned, or equal to 'total_size'. 'buffer' is the in-enclave
- * buffer for copying the file content. 'offset' is the offset within the file
- * for copying into the buffer. 'size' is the size of the in-enclave buffer.
- * 'stubs' contain the checksums of all the chunks in a file.
- */
- int copy_and_verify_trusted_file (const char * path, const void * umem,
- uint64_t umem_start, uint64_t umem_end,
- void * buffer, uint64_t offset, uint64_t size,
- sgx_stub_t * stubs, uint64_t total_size)
- {
- /* Check that the untrusted mapping is aligned to TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE
- * and includes the range for copying into the buffer */
- assert(IS_ALIGNED(umem_start, TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE));
- assert(offset >= umem_start && offset + size <= umem_end);
- /* Start copying and checking at umem_start. The checked content may or
- * may not be copied into the file content, depending on the offset of
- * the content within the file. */
- uint64_t checking = umem_start;
- /* The stubs is an array of 128-bit hash values of the file chunks.
- * from the beginning of the file. 's' points to the stub that needs to
- * be checked for the current offset. */
- sgx_stub_t * s = stubs + checking / TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE;
- int ret = 0;
- for (; checking < umem_end ; checking += TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE, s++) {
- /* Check one chunk at a time. */
- uint64_t checking_size = MIN(total_size - checking, TRUSTED_STUB_SIZE);
- uint64_t checking_end = checking + checking_size;
- sgx_checksum_t hash;
- if (checking >= offset && checking_end <= offset + size) {
- /* If the checking chunk completely overlaps with the region
- * needed for copying into the buffer, simplying use the buffer
- * for checking */
- memcpy(buffer + checking - offset, umem + checking - umem_start,
- checking_size);
- /* Storing the checksum (using AES-CMAC) inside hash. */
- ret = lib_AESCMAC((uint8_t*)&enclave_key, sizeof(enclave_key),
- buffer + checking - offset, checking_size,
- (uint8_t*)&hash, sizeof(hash));
- } else {
- /* If the checking chunk only partially overlaps with the region,
- * read the file content in smaller chunks and only copy the part
- * needed by the caller. */
- LIB_AESCMAC_CONTEXT aes_cmac;
- ret = lib_AESCMACInit(&aes_cmac, (uint8_t*)&enclave_key, sizeof(enclave_key));
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- uint8_t small_chunk[FILE_CHUNK_SIZE]; /* A small buffer */
- uint64_t chunk_offset = checking;
- for (; chunk_offset < checking_end
- ; chunk_offset += FILE_CHUNK_SIZE) {
- uint64_t chunk_size = MIN(checking_end - chunk_offset,
- FILE_CHUNK_SIZE);
- /* Copy into the small buffer before hashing the content */
- memcpy(small_chunk, umem + (chunk_offset - umem_start),
- chunk_size);
- /* Update the hash for the current chunk */
- ret = lib_AESCMACUpdate(&aes_cmac, small_chunk, chunk_size);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- /* Determine if the part just copied and checked is needed
- * by the caller. If so, copy it into the user buffer. */
- uint64_t copy_start = chunk_offset;
- uint64_t copy_end = copy_start + chunk_size;
- if (copy_start < offset)
- copy_start = offset;
- if (copy_end > offset + size)
- copy_end = offset + size;
- if (copy_end > copy_start)
- memcpy(buffer + (copy_start - offset),
- small_chunk + (copy_start - chunk_offset),
- copy_end - copy_start);
- }
- /* Storing the checksum (using AES-CMAC) inside hash. */
- ret = lib_AESCMACFinish(&aes_cmac, (uint8_t*)&hash, sizeof(hash));
- }
- if (ret < 0)
- goto failed;
- /*
- * Check if the hash matches with the checksum of current chunk.
- * If not, return with access denied. Note: some file content may
- * still be in the buffer (including the corrupted part).
- * We assume the user won't use the content if this function
- * returns with failures.
- *
- * XXX: Maybe we should zero the buffer after denying the access?
- */
- if (memcmp(s, &hash, sizeof(sgx_stub_t))) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Accesing file:%s is denied. Does not match with MAC"
- " at chunk starting at %lu-%lu.\n",
- path, checking, checking_end);
- return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- }
- }
- return 0;
- failed:
- return -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- }
- static int register_trusted_file (const char * uri, const char * checksum_str)
- {
- struct trusted_file * tf = NULL, * new;
- size_t uri_len = strlen(uri);
- int ret;
- spinlock_lock(&trusted_file_lock);
- LISTP_FOR_EACH_ENTRY(tf, &trusted_file_list, list) {
- if (tf->uri_len == uri_len && !memcmp(tf->uri, uri, uri_len)) {
- spinlock_unlock(&trusted_file_lock);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- spinlock_unlock(&trusted_file_lock);
- new = malloc(sizeof(struct trusted_file));
- if (!new)
- return -PAL_ERROR_NOMEM;
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(new, list);
- new->uri_len = uri_len;
- memcpy(new->uri, uri, uri_len + 1);
- new->size = 0;
- new->stubs = NULL;
- if (checksum_str) {
- PAL_STREAM_ATTR attr;
- ret = _DkStreamAttributesQuery(uri, &attr);
- if (!ret)
- new->size = attr.pending_size;
- char checksum_text[sizeof(sgx_checksum_t) * 2 + 1] = "\0";
- size_t nbytes = 0;
- for (; nbytes < sizeof(sgx_checksum_t) ; nbytes++) {
- char byte1 = checksum_str[nbytes * 2];
- char byte2 = checksum_str[nbytes * 2 + 1];
- unsigned char val = 0;
- if (byte1 == 0 || byte2 == 0) {
- break;
- }
- if (!(byte1 >= '0' && byte1 <= '9') &&
- !(byte1 >= 'a' && byte1 <= 'f')) {
- break;
- }
- if (!(byte2 >= '0' && byte2 <= '9') &&
- !(byte2 >= 'a' && byte2 <= 'f')) {
- break;
- }
- if (byte1 >= '0' && byte1 <= '9')
- val = byte1 - '0';
- if (byte1 >= 'a' && byte1 <= 'f')
- val = byte1 - 'a' + 10;
- val *= 16;
- if (byte2 >= '0' && byte2 <= '9')
- val += byte2 - '0';
- if (byte2 >= 'a' && byte2 <= 'f')
- val += byte2 - 'a' + 10;
- new->checksum.bytes[nbytes] = val;
- snprintf(checksum_text + nbytes * 2, 3, "%02x", val);
- }
- if (nbytes < sizeof(sgx_checksum_t)) {
- free(new);
- return -PAL_ERROR_INVAL;
- }
- new->index = (++trusted_file_indexes);
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "trusted: [%ld] %s %s\n", new->index,
- checksum_text, new->uri);
- } else {
- memset(&new->checksum, 0, sizeof(sgx_checksum_t));
- new->index = 0;
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "allowed: %s\n", new->uri);
- }
- spinlock_lock(&trusted_file_lock);
- LISTP_FOR_EACH_ENTRY(tf, &trusted_file_list, list) {
- if (tf->uri_len == uri_len && !memcmp(tf->uri, uri, uri_len)) {
- spinlock_unlock(&trusted_file_lock);
- free(new);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- LISTP_ADD_TAIL(new, &trusted_file_list, list);
- spinlock_unlock(&trusted_file_lock);
- return 0;
- }
- static int init_trusted_file (const char * key, const char * uri)
- {
- char cskey[URI_MAX], * tmp;
- char checksum[URI_MAX];
- char normpath[URI_MAX];
- tmp = strcpy_static(cskey, "sgx.trusted_checksum.", URI_MAX);
- memcpy(tmp, key, strlen(key) + 1);
- ssize_t ret = get_config(pal_state.root_config, cskey, checksum, sizeof(checksum));
- if (ret < 0)
- return 0;
- /* Normalize the uri */
- if (!strstartswith_static(uri, URI_PREFIX_FILE)) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Invalid URI [%s]: Trusted files must start with 'file:'\n", uri);
- return -PAL_ERROR_INVAL;
- }
- assert(sizeof(normpath) > URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN);
- memcpy(normpath, URI_PREFIX_FILE, URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN);
- size_t len = sizeof(normpath) - URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN;
- ret = get_norm_path(uri + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN, normpath + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN, &len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E,
- "Path (%s) normalization failed: %s\n",
- uri + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN,
- pal_strerror(ret));
- return ret;
- }
- return register_trusted_file(normpath, checksum);
- }
- int init_trusted_files (void) {
- struct config_store* store = pal_state.root_config;
- char* cfgbuf = NULL;
- ssize_t cfgsize;
- int nuris, ret;
- char key[CONFIG_MAX];
- char uri[CONFIG_MAX];
- char* k;
- char* tmp;
- if (pal_sec.exec_name[0] != '\0') {
- ret = init_trusted_file("exec", pal_sec.exec_name);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- }
- cfgbuf = malloc(CONFIG_MAX);
- if (!cfgbuf) {
- ret = -PAL_ERROR_NOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- ssize_t len = get_config(store, "loader.preload", cfgbuf, CONFIG_MAX);
- if (len > 0) {
- int npreload = 0;
- char key[10];
- const char * start, * end;
- for (start = cfgbuf ; start < cfgbuf + len ; start = end + 1) {
- for (end = start ; end < cfgbuf + len && *end && *end != ',' ; end++);
- if (end > start) {
- char uri[end - start + 1];
- memcpy(uri, start, end - start);
- uri[end - start] = 0;
- snprintf(key, 10, "preload%d", npreload++);
- ret = init_trusted_file(key, uri);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- }
- }
- }
- cfgsize = get_config_entries_size(store, "sgx.trusted_files");
- if (cfgsize <= 0)
- goto no_trusted;
- free(cfgbuf);
- cfgbuf = malloc(cfgsize);
- if (!cfgbuf) {
- ret = -PAL_ERROR_NOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- nuris = get_config_entries(store, "sgx.trusted_files", cfgbuf, cfgsize);
- if (nuris <= 0)
- goto no_trusted;
- tmp = strcpy_static(key, "sgx.trusted_files.", sizeof(key));
- k = cfgbuf;
- for (int i = 0 ; i < nuris ; i++) {
- len = strlen(k);
- memcpy(tmp, k, len + 1);
- k += len + 1;
- len = get_config(store, key, uri, sizeof(uri));
- if (len > 0) {
- ret = init_trusted_file(key + static_strlen("sgx.trusted_files."), uri);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out;
- }
- }
- no_trusted:
- cfgsize = get_config_entries_size(store, "sgx.allowed_files");
- if (cfgsize <= 0)
- goto no_allowed;
- free(cfgbuf);
- cfgbuf = malloc(cfgsize);
- if (!cfgbuf) {
- ret = -PAL_ERROR_NOMEM;
- goto out;
- }
- nuris = get_config_entries(store, "sgx.allowed_files", cfgbuf, cfgsize);
- if (nuris <= 0)
- goto no_allowed;
- tmp = strcpy_static(key, "sgx.allowed_files.", sizeof(key));
- k = cfgbuf;
- for (int i = 0 ; i < nuris ; i++) {
- len = strlen(k);
- memcpy(tmp, k, len + 1);
- k += len + 1;
- len = get_config(store, key, uri, sizeof(uri));
- if (len <= 0) {
- continue;
- }
- /* Normalize the uri */
- char norm_path[URI_MAX];
- if (!strstartswith_static(uri, URI_PREFIX_FILE)) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Invalid URI [%s]: Allowed files must start with 'file:'\n", uri);
- ret = -PAL_ERROR_INVAL;
- goto out;
- }
- assert(sizeof(norm_path) > URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN);
- memcpy(norm_path, URI_PREFIX_FILE, URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN);
- size_t norm_path_len = sizeof(norm_path) - URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN;
- ret = get_norm_path(uri + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN,
- norm_path + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN,
- &norm_path_len);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E,
- "Path (%s) normalization failed: %s\n",
- uri + URI_PREFIX_FILE_LEN,
- pal_strerror(ret));
- goto out;
- }
- register_trusted_file(norm_path, NULL);
- }
- no_allowed:
- ret = 0;
- if (get_config(store, "sgx.allow_file_creation", cfgbuf, cfgsize) > 0 && cfgbuf[0] == '1')
- allow_file_creation = true;
- else
- allow_file_creation = false;
- out:
- free(cfgbuf);
- return ret;
- }
- int init_trusted_children (void)
- {
- struct config_store * store = pal_state.root_config;
- char key[CONFIG_MAX], mrkey[CONFIG_MAX];
- char uri[CONFIG_MAX], mr_enclave[CONFIG_MAX];
- char * tmp1 = strcpy_static(key, "sgx.trusted_children.", sizeof(key));
- char * tmp2 = strcpy_static(mrkey, "sgx.trusted_mrenclave.", sizeof(mrkey));
- ssize_t cfgsize = get_config_entries_size(store, "sgx.trusted_mrenclave");
- if (cfgsize <= 0)
- return 0;
- char * cfgbuf = malloc(cfgsize);
- if (!cfgbuf)
- return -PAL_ERROR_NOMEM;
- int nuris = get_config_entries(store, "sgx.trusted_mrenclave",
- cfgbuf, cfgsize);
- if (nuris > 0) {
- char * k = cfgbuf;
- for (int i = 0 ; i < nuris ; i++) {
- int len = strlen(k);
- memcpy(tmp1, k, len + 1);
- memcpy(tmp2, k, len + 1);
- k += len + 1;
- ssize_t ret = get_config(store, key, uri, sizeof(uri));
- if (ret < 0)
- continue;
- ret = get_config(store, mrkey, mr_enclave, sizeof(mr_enclave));
- if (ret > 0)
- register_trusted_child(uri, mr_enclave);
- }
- }
- free(cfgbuf);
- return 0;
- }
- int init_file_check_policy (void)
- {
- char cfgbuf[CONFIG_MAX];
- ssize_t ret = get_config(pal_state.root_config, "sgx.file_check_policy",
- cfgbuf, sizeof(cfgbuf));
- if (ret > 0) {
- if (!strcmp_static(cfgbuf, "strict"))
- set_file_check_policy(FILE_CHECK_POLICY_STRICT);
- else if (!strcmp_static(cfgbuf, "allow_all_but_log"))
- set_file_check_policy(FILE_CHECK_POLICY_ALLOW_ALL_BUT_LOG);
- else
- INIT_FAIL(PAL_ERROR_INVAL, "unknown file check policy");
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "File check policy: %s\n", cfgbuf);
- }
- return 0;
- }
- int init_enclave (void)
- {
- // Get report to initialize info (MR_ENCLAVE, etc.) about this enclave from
- // a trusted source.
- // Since this report is only read by ourselves we can
- // leave targetinfo zeroed.
- __sgx_mem_aligned sgx_target_info_t targetinfo = {0};
- __sgx_mem_aligned struct pal_enclave_state reportdata = {0};
- __sgx_mem_aligned sgx_report_t report;
- assert(sizeof(reportdata) == sizeof(sgx_report_data_t));
- int ret = sgx_report(&targetinfo, (sgx_report_data_t*)&reportdata, &report);
- if (ret) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "failed to get self report: %d\n", ret);
- return -PAL_ERROR_INVAL;
- }
- memcpy(&pal_sec.mr_enclave, &report.body.mr_enclave, sizeof(pal_sec.mr_enclave));
- memcpy(&pal_sec.mr_signer, &report.body.mr_signer, sizeof(pal_sec.mr_signer));
- pal_sec.enclave_attributes = report.body.attributes;
- /*
- * The enclave id is uniquely created for each enclave as a token
- * for authenticating the enclave as the sender of attestation.
- * See 'host/Linux-SGX/db_process.c' for further explanation.
- */
- ret = _DkRandomBitsRead(&pal_enclave_state.enclave_id,
- sizeof(pal_enclave_state.enclave_id));
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to generate a random id: %d\n", ret);
- return ret;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- int _DkStreamKeyExchange(PAL_HANDLE stream, PAL_SESSION_KEY* key) {
- uint8_t pub[DH_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(DH_SIZE)));
- uint8_t agree[DH_SIZE] __attribute__((aligned(DH_SIZE)));
- PAL_NUM pubsz, agreesz;
- LIB_DH_CONTEXT context;
- int64_t bytes;
- int64_t ret;
- ret = lib_DhInit(&context);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Key Exchange: DH Init failed: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out_no_final;
- }
- pubsz = sizeof pub;
- ret = lib_DhCreatePublic(&context, pub, &pubsz);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Key Exchange: DH CreatePublic failed: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- assert(pubsz > 0 && pubsz <= DH_SIZE);
- if (pubsz < DH_SIZE) {
- /* Insert leading zero bytes if necessary. These values are big-
- * endian, so we either need to know the length of the bignum or
- * zero-pad at the beginning instead of the end. This code chooses
- * to do the latter. */
- memmove(pub + (DH_SIZE - pubsz), pub, pubsz);
- memset(pub, 0, DH_SIZE - pubsz);
- }
- for (bytes = 0, ret = 0; bytes < DH_SIZE; bytes += ret) {
- ret = _DkStreamWrite(stream, 0, DH_SIZE - bytes, pub + bytes, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -PAL_ERROR_INTERRUPTED || ret == -PAL_ERROR_TRYAGAIN) {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to exchange the secret key via RPC: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- for (bytes = 0, ret = 0 ; bytes < DH_SIZE ; bytes += ret) {
- ret = _DkStreamRead(stream, 0, DH_SIZE - bytes, pub + bytes, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -PAL_ERROR_INTERRUPTED || ret == -PAL_ERROR_TRYAGAIN) {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to exchange the secret key via RPC: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- agreesz = sizeof agree;
- ret = lib_DhCalcSecret(&context, pub, DH_SIZE, agree, &agreesz);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Key Exchange: DH CalcSecret failed: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- assert(agreesz > 0 && agreesz <= sizeof agree);
- /*
- * Using SHA256 as a KDF to convert the 128-byte DH secret to a 256-bit AES key.
- * According to the NIST recommendation:
- * https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-56Cr1.pdf,
- * a key derivation function (KDF) can be a secure hash function (e.g., SHA-256),
- * HMAC, or KMAC.
- */
- LIB_SHA256_CONTEXT sha;
- if ((ret = lib_SHA256Init(&sha)) < 0 ||
- (ret = lib_SHA256Update(&sha, agree, agreesz)) < 0 ||
- (ret = lib_SHA256Final(&sha, (uint8_t*)key)) < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to derive the session key: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "Key exchange succeeded: %s\n", ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(*key));
- ret = 0;
- out:
- lib_DhFinal(&context);
- out_no_final:
- return ret;
- }
- /*
- * Initalize the request of local report exchange.
- *
- * We refer to this enclave as A and to the other enclave as B, e.g., A is this
- * parent enclave and B is the child enclave in the fork case (for more info,
- * see comments in db_process.c).
- */
- int _DkStreamReportRequest(PAL_HANDLE stream, sgx_sign_data_t* data,
- check_mr_enclave_t check_mr_enclave) {
- __sgx_mem_aligned sgx_target_info_t target_info;
- __sgx_mem_aligned sgx_report_t report;
- uint64_t bytes;
- int64_t ret;
- /* A -> B: targetinfo[A] */
- memset(&target_info, 0, sizeof(target_info));
- memcpy(&target_info.mr_enclave, &pal_sec.mr_enclave, sizeof(sgx_measurement_t));
- memcpy(&target_info.attributes, &pal_sec.enclave_attributes, sizeof(sgx_attributes_t));
- for (bytes = 0, ret = 0; bytes < SGX_TARGETINFO_FILLED_SIZE; bytes += ret) {
- ret = _DkStreamWrite(stream, 0, SGX_TARGETINFO_FILLED_SIZE - bytes,
- ((void*)&target_info) + bytes, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -PAL_ERROR_INTERRUPTED || ret == -PAL_ERROR_TRYAGAIN) {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to send target info via RPC: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- /* B -> A: report[B -> A] */
- for (bytes = 0, ret = 0 ; bytes < sizeof(report) ; bytes += ret) {
- ret = _DkStreamRead(stream, 0, sizeof(report) - bytes,
- ((void*)&report) + bytes, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -PAL_ERROR_INTERRUPTED || ret == -PAL_ERROR_TRYAGAIN) {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to receive local report via RPC: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "Received local report (mr_enclave = %s)\n",
- ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(report.body.mr_enclave.m));
- /* Verify report[B -> A] */
- ret = sgx_verify_report(&report);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to verify local report: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- struct pal_enclave_state* remote_state = (void*)&report.body.report_data;
- ret = check_mr_enclave(stream, &report.body.mr_enclave, remote_state);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to check local report: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- if (ret == 1) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Not an allowed enclave (mr_enclave = %s). Maybe missing 'sgx.trusted_children' in the manifest file?\n",
- ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(report.body.mr_enclave.m));
- ret = -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- goto out;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "Local attestation succeeded!\n");
- /* A -> B: report[A -> B] */
- memcpy(&target_info.mr_enclave , &report.body.mr_enclave, sizeof(sgx_measurement_t));
- memcpy(&target_info.attributes, &report.body.attributes, sizeof(sgx_attributes_t));
- ret = sgx_get_report(&target_info, data, &report);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to get local report from CPU: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- for (bytes = 0, ret = 0 ; bytes < sizeof(report) ; bytes += ret) {
- ret = _DkStreamWrite(stream, 0, sizeof(report) - bytes,
- ((void*)&report) + bytes, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -PAL_ERROR_INTERRUPTED || ret == -PAL_ERROR_TRYAGAIN) {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to send local report via RPC: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- return 0;
- out:
- DkStreamDelete(stream, 0);
- return ret;
- }
- /*
- * Respond to the request of local report exchange.
- *
- * We refer to this enclave as B and to the other enclave as A, e.g., B is this
- * child enclave and A is the parent enclave in the fork case (for more info,
- * see comments in db_process.c).
- */
- int _DkStreamReportRespond(PAL_HANDLE stream, sgx_sign_data_t* data,
- check_mr_enclave_t check_mr_enclave) {
- __sgx_mem_aligned sgx_target_info_t target_info;
- __sgx_mem_aligned sgx_report_t report;
- uint64_t bytes;
- int64_t ret;
- memset(&target_info, 0, sizeof(target_info));
- /* A -> B: targetinfo[A] */
- for (bytes = 0, ret = 0 ; bytes < SGX_TARGETINFO_FILLED_SIZE ; bytes += ret) {
- ret = _DkStreamRead(stream, 0, SGX_TARGETINFO_FILLED_SIZE - bytes,
- ((void*)&target_info) + bytes, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -PAL_ERROR_INTERRUPTED || ret == -PAL_ERROR_TRYAGAIN) {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to receive target info via RPC: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- /* B -> A: report[B -> A] */
- ret = sgx_get_report(&target_info, data, &report);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to get local report from CPU: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- for (bytes = 0, ret = 0 ; bytes < sizeof(report) ; bytes += ret) {
- ret = _DkStreamWrite(stream, 0, sizeof(report) - bytes,
- ((void*)&report) + bytes, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -PAL_ERROR_INTERRUPTED || ret == -PAL_ERROR_TRYAGAIN) {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to send local report via PRC: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- /* A -> B: report[A -> B] */
- for (bytes = 0, ret = 0 ; bytes < sizeof(report) ; bytes += ret) {
- ret = _DkStreamRead(stream, 0, sizeof(report) - bytes,
- ((void*)&report) + bytes, NULL, 0);
- if (ret < 0) {
- if (ret == -PAL_ERROR_INTERRUPTED || ret == -PAL_ERROR_TRYAGAIN) {
- ret = 0;
- continue;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to receive local report via RPC: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "Received local report (mr_enclave = %s)\n",
- ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(report.body.mr_enclave.m));
- /* Verify report[A -> B] */
- ret = sgx_verify_report(&report);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to verify local report: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- struct pal_enclave_state* remote_state = (void*)&report.body.report_data;
- ret = check_mr_enclave(stream, &report.body.mr_enclave, remote_state);
- if (ret < 0) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Failed to check mr_enclave: %ld\n", ret);
- goto out;
- }
- if (ret == 1) {
- SGX_DBG(DBG_E, "Not an allowed enclave (mr_enclave = %s). Maybe missing 'sgx.trusted_children' in the manifest file?\n",
- ALLOCA_BYTES2HEXSTR(report.body.mr_enclave.m));
- ret = -PAL_ERROR_DENIED;
- goto out;
- }
- SGX_DBG(DBG_S, "Local attestation succeeded!\n");
- return 0;
- out:
- DkStreamDelete(stream, 0);
- return ret;
- }
- int _DkStreamSecureInit(PAL_HANDLE stream, bool is_server, PAL_SESSION_KEY* session_key,
- LIB_SSL_CONTEXT** out_ssl_ctx) {
- int stream_fd;
- if (IS_HANDLE_TYPE(stream, process))
- stream_fd = stream->process.stream;
- else
- return -PAL_ERROR_BADHANDLE;
- LIB_SSL_CONTEXT* ssl_ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ssl_ctx));
- if (!ssl_ctx)
- return -PAL_ERROR_NOMEM;
- int ret = lib_SSLInit(ssl_ctx, stream_fd, is_server,
- (const uint8_t*)session_key, sizeof(*session_key),
- ocall_read, ocall_write);
- if (ret != 0) {
- free(ssl_ctx);
- return ret;
- }
- *out_ssl_ctx = ssl_ctx;
- return 0;
- }
- int _DkStreamSecureFree(LIB_SSL_CONTEXT* ssl_ctx) {
- lib_SSLFree(ssl_ctx);
- free(ssl_ctx);
- return 0;
- }
- int _DkStreamSecureRead(LIB_SSL_CONTEXT* ssl_ctx, uint8_t* buf, size_t len) {
- return lib_SSLRead(ssl_ctx, buf, len);
- }
- int _DkStreamSecureWrite(LIB_SSL_CONTEXT* ssl_ctx, const uint8_t* buf, size_t len) {
- return lib_SSLWrite(ssl_ctx, buf, len);
- }
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