123456789101112131415161718192021222324252627282930313233343536373839404142434445464748495051525354555657585960616263646566676869707172737475767778798081828384858687888990919293949596979899100101102103104105106107108109110111112113114115116117118119120121122123124125126127128129130131132133134135136137138139140141142143144145146147148149150151152153154155156157158159160161162163164165166167168169170171172173174175176177178179180181182183184185186187188189190191192193194195196197198199200201202203204205206207208209210211212213214215216217218219220221222223224225226227228229230231232233234235236237238239240241242243244245246247248249250251252253254255256257258259260261262263264265266267268269270271272273274275276277278279280281282283284285286287288289290291292293294295296297298299300301302303304 |
- /*
- * Copyright (C) 2011-2018 Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- *
- * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
- * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
- * distribution.
- * * Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its
- * contributors may be used to endorse or promote products derived
- * from this software without specific prior written permission.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
- * "AS IS" AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR
- * A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
- * OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
- * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
- * LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
- * OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
- */
- #include "sgx_trts.h"
- #include "sgx_edger8r.h"
- #include "trts_inst.h"
- #include <stdlib.h>
- #include <string.h>
- #include "util.h"
- #include "thread_data.h"
- #include "global_data.h"
- #include "trts_internal.h"
- #include "internal/rts.h"
- #ifdef SE_SIM
- #include "t_instructions.h" /* for `g_global_data_sim' */
- #include "sgx_spinlock.h"
- #endif
- #ifndef SE_SIM
- #include "se_cdefs.h"
- // add a version to trts
- SGX_ACCESS_VERSION(trts, 1);
- #endif
- // sgx_is_within_enclave()
- // Parameters:
- // addr - the start address of the buffer
- // size - the size of the buffer
- // Return Value:
- // 1 - the buffer is strictly within the enclave
- // 0 - the whole buffer or part of the buffer is not within the enclave,
- // or the buffer is wrap around
- //
- int sgx_is_within_enclave(const void *addr, size_t size)
- {
- size_t start = reinterpret_cast<size_t>(addr);
- size_t end = 0;
- size_t enclave_start = (size_t)&__ImageBase;
- size_t enclave_end = enclave_start + g_global_data.enclave_size - 1;
- // g_global_data.enclave_end = enclave_base + enclave_size - 1;
- // so the enclave range is [enclave_start, enclave_end] inclusively
- if(size > 0)
- {
- end = start + size - 1;
- }
- else
- {
- end = start;
- }
- if( (start <= end) && (start >= enclave_start) && (end <= enclave_end) )
- {
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- // sgx_is_outside_enclave()
- // Parameters:
- // addr - the start address of the buffer
- // size - the size of the buffer
- // Return Value:
- // 1 - the buffer is strictly outside the enclave
- // 0 - the whole buffer or part of the buffer is not outside the enclave,
- // or the buffer is wrap around
- //
- int sgx_is_outside_enclave(const void *addr, size_t size)
- {
- size_t start = reinterpret_cast<size_t>(addr);
- size_t end = 0;
- size_t enclave_start = (size_t)&__ImageBase;
- size_t enclave_end = enclave_start + g_global_data.enclave_size - 1;
- // g_global_data.enclave_end = enclave_base + enclave_size - 1;
- // so the enclave range is [enclave_start, enclave_end] inclusively
- if(size > 0)
- {
- end = start + size - 1;
- }
- else
- {
- end = start;
- }
- if( (start <= end) && ((end < enclave_start) || (start > enclave_end)) )
- {
- return 1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
- // sgx_ocalloc()
- // Parameters:
- // size - bytes to allocate on the outside stack
- // Return Value:
- // the pointer to the allocated space on the outside stack
- // NULL - fail to allocate
- //
- // sgx_ocalloc allocates memory on the outside stack. It is only used for OCALL, and will be auto freed when ECALL returns.
- // To achieve this, the outside stack pointer in SSA is updated when the stack memory is allocated,
- // but the outside stack pointer saved in the ECALL stack frame is not changed accordingly.
- // When doing an OCALL, the stack pointer is set as the value in SSA and EEXIT.
- // When ECALL or exception handling returns, the stack pointer is set as the value in the ECALL stack frame and then EEXIT,
- // so the outside stack is automatically unwind.
- // In addition, sgx_ocalloc needs perform outside stack probe to make sure it is not allocating beyond the end of the stack.
- #define OC_ROUND 16
- void * sgx_ocalloc(size_t size)
- {
- // read the outside stack address from current SSA
- thread_data_t *thread_data = get_thread_data();
- ssa_gpr_t *ssa_gpr = reinterpret_cast<ssa_gpr_t *>(thread_data->first_ssa_gpr);
- size_t addr = ssa_gpr->REG(sp_u);
- // check u_rsp points to the untrusted address.
- // if the check fails, it should be hacked. call abort directly
- if(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(reinterpret_cast<void *>(addr), sizeof(size_t)))
- {
- abort();
- }
- // size is too large to allocate. call abort() directly.
- if(addr < size)
- {
- abort();
- }
- // calculate the start address for the allocated memory
- addr -= size;
- addr &= ~(static_cast<size_t>(OC_ROUND - 1)); // for stack alignment
- // the allocated memory has overlap with enclave, abort the enclave
- if(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(reinterpret_cast<void *>(addr), size))
- {
- abort();
- }
- // probe the outside stack to ensure that we do not skip over the stack3 guard page
- // we need to probe all the pages including the first page and the last page
- // the first page need to be probed in case uRTS didnot touch that page before EENTER enclave
- // the last page need to be probed in case the enclave didnot touch that page before another OCALLOC
- size_t first_page = TRIM_TO_PAGE(ssa_gpr->REG(sp_u) - 1);
- size_t last_page = TRIM_TO_PAGE(addr);
- // To avoid the dead-loop in the following for(...) loop.
- // Attacker might fake a stack address that is within address 0x4095.
- if (last_page == 0)
- {
- abort();
- }
- // the compiler may optimize the following code to probe the pages in any order
- // while we only expect the probe order should be from higher addr to lower addr
- // so use volatile to avoid optimization by the compiler
- for(volatile size_t page = first_page; page >= last_page; page -= SE_PAGE_SIZE)
- {
- // OS may refuse to commit a physical page if the page fault address is smaller than RSP
- // So update the outside stack address before probe the page
- ssa_gpr->REG(sp_u) = page;
- *reinterpret_cast<uint8_t *>(page) = 0;
- }
- // update the outside stack address in the SSA to the allocated address
- ssa_gpr->REG(sp_u) = addr;
- return reinterpret_cast<void *>(addr);
- }
- // sgx_ocfree()
- // Parameters:
- // N/A
- // Return Value:
- // N/A
- // sgx_ocfree restores the original outside stack pointer in the SSA.
- // Do not call this function if you still need the buffer allocated by sgx_ocalloc within the ECALL.
- void sgx_ocfree()
- {
- // ECALL stack frame
- // last_sp -> | |
- // -------------
- // | ret_addr |
- // | xbp_u |
- // | xsp_u |
- thread_data_t *thread_data = get_thread_data();
- ssa_gpr_t *ssa_gpr = reinterpret_cast<ssa_gpr_t *>(thread_data->first_ssa_gpr);
- uintptr_t *addr = reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t *>(thread_data->last_sp);
- uintptr_t usp = *(addr - 3);
- if(!sgx_is_outside_enclave(reinterpret_cast<void *>(usp), sizeof(uintptr_t)))
- {
- abort();
- }
- ssa_gpr->REG(sp_u) = usp;
- }
- #ifdef SE_SIM
- static sgx_spinlock_t g_seed_lock = SGX_SPINLOCK_INITIALIZER;
- static uint32_t get_rand_lcg()
- {
- sgx_spin_lock(&g_seed_lock);
- uint64_t& seed = g_global_data_sim.seed;
- seed = (uint64_t)(6364136223846793005ULL * seed + 1);
- uint32_t n = (uint32_t)(seed >> 32);
- sgx_spin_unlock(&g_seed_lock);
- return n;
- }
- #endif
- static sgx_status_t __do_get_rand32(uint32_t* rand_num)
- {
- #ifndef SE_SIM
- /* We expect the CPU has RDRAND support for HW mode. Otherwise, an exception will be thrown
- * do_rdrand() will try to call RDRAND for 10 times
- */
- if(0 == do_rdrand(rand_num))
- return SGX_ERROR_UNEXPECTED;
- #else
- /* use LCG in simulation mode */
- *rand_num = get_rand_lcg();
- #endif
- return SGX_SUCCESS;
- }
- sgx_status_t sgx_read_rand(unsigned char *rand, size_t length_in_bytes)
- {
- // check parameters
- //
- // rand can be within or outside the enclave
- if(!rand || !length_in_bytes)
- {
- return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- if(!sgx_is_within_enclave(rand, length_in_bytes) && !sgx_is_outside_enclave(rand, length_in_bytes))
- {
- return SGX_ERROR_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- }
- // loop to rdrand
- uint32_t rand_num = 0;
- while(length_in_bytes > 0)
- {
- sgx_status_t status = __do_get_rand32(&rand_num);
- if(status != SGX_SUCCESS)
- {
- return status;
- }
- size_t size = (length_in_bytes < sizeof(rand_num)) ? length_in_bytes : sizeof(rand_num);
- memcpy(rand, &rand_num, size);
- rand += size;
- length_in_bytes -= size;
- }
- memset_s(&rand_num, sizeof(rand_num), 0, sizeof(rand_num));
- return SGX_SUCCESS;
- }
- extern uintptr_t __stack_chk_guard;
- int check_static_stack_canary(void *tcs)
- {
- size_t *canary = TCS2CANARY(tcs);
- if ( *canary != (size_t)__stack_chk_guard)
- {
- return -1;
- }
- return 0;
- }
|