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+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
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+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
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+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
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+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2017, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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+
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+#ifndef ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_ST_H
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+#define ORIGIN_CIRCUIT_ST_H
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+
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+#include "or.h"
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+
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+#include "circuit_st.h"
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+
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+struct onion_queue_t;
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+
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+/** An origin_circuit_t holds data necessary to build and use a circuit.
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+ */
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+struct origin_circuit_t {
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+ circuit_t base_;
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+
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+ /** Linked list of AP streams (or EXIT streams if hidden service)
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+ * associated with this circuit. */
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+ edge_connection_t *p_streams;
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+
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+ /** Bytes read on this circuit since last call to
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+ * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
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+ * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
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+ uint32_t n_read_circ_bw;
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+
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+ /** Bytes written to on this circuit since last call to
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+ * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
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+ * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
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+ uint32_t n_written_circ_bw;
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+
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+ /** Total known-valid relay cell bytes since last call to
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+ * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
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+ * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
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+ uint32_t n_delivered_read_circ_bw;
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+
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+ /** Total written relay cell bytes since last call to
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+ * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
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+ * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
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+ uint32_t n_delivered_written_circ_bw;
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+
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+ /** Total overhead data in all known-valid relay data cells since last
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+ * call to control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're
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+ * configured to emit CIRC_BW events. */
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+ uint32_t n_overhead_read_circ_bw;
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+
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+ /** Total written overhead data in all relay data cells since last call to
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+ * control_event_circ_bandwidth_used(). Only used if we're configured
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+ * to emit CIRC_BW events. */
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+ uint32_t n_overhead_written_circ_bw;
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+
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+ /** Build state for this circuit. It includes the intended path
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+ * length, the chosen exit router, rendezvous information, etc.
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+ */
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+ cpath_build_state_t *build_state;
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+ /** The doubly-linked list of crypt_path_t entries, one per hop,
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+ * for this circuit. This includes ciphers for each hop,
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+ * integrity-checking digests for each hop, and package/delivery
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+ * windows for each hop.
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+ */
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+ crypt_path_t *cpath;
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+
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+ /** Holds all rendezvous data on either client or service side. */
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+ rend_data_t *rend_data;
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+
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+ /** Holds hidden service identifier on either client or service side. This
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+ * is for both introduction and rendezvous circuit. */
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+ struct hs_ident_circuit_t *hs_ident;
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+
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+ /** Holds the data that the entry guard system uses to track the
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+ * status of the guard this circuit is using, and thereby to determine
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+ * whether this circuit can be used. */
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+ struct circuit_guard_state_t *guard_state;
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+
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+ /** Index into global_origin_circuit_list for this circuit. -1 if not
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+ * present. */
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+ int global_origin_circuit_list_idx;
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+
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+ /** How many more relay_early cells can we send on this circuit, according
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+ * to the specification? */
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+ unsigned int remaining_relay_early_cells : 4;
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+
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+ /** Set if this circuit is insanely old and we already informed the user */
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+ unsigned int is_ancient : 1;
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+
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+ /** Set if this circuit has already been opened. Used to detect
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+ * cannibalized circuits. */
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+ unsigned int has_opened : 1;
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Path bias state machine. Used to ensure integrity of our
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+ * circuit building and usage accounting. See path_state_t
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+ * for more details.
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+ */
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+ path_state_bitfield_t path_state : 3;
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+
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+ /* If this flag is set, we should not consider attaching any more
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+ * connections to this circuit. */
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+ unsigned int unusable_for_new_conns : 1;
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+
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+ /**
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+ * Tristate variable to guard against pathbias miscounting
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+ * due to circuit purpose transitions changing the decision
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+ * of pathbias_should_count(). This variable is informational
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+ * only. The current results of pathbias_should_count() are
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+ * the official decision for pathbias accounting.
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+ */
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+ uint8_t pathbias_shouldcount;
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+#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_UNDECIDED 0
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+#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_IGNORED 1
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+#define PATHBIAS_SHOULDCOUNT_COUNTED 2
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+
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+ /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe stream ID
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+ * for response comparison */
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+ streamid_t pathbias_probe_id;
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+
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+ /** For path probing. Store the temporary probe address nonce
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+ * (in host byte order) for response comparison. */
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+ uint32_t pathbias_probe_nonce;
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+
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+ /** Set iff this is a hidden-service circuit which has timed out
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+ * according to our current circuit-build timeout, but which has
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+ * been kept around because it might still succeed in connecting to
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+ * its destination, and which is not a fully-connected rendezvous
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+ * circuit.
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+ *
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+ * (We clear this flag for client-side rendezvous circuits when they
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+ * are 'joined' to the other side's rendezvous circuit, so that
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+ * connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit can put client streams on
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+ * the circuit. We also clear this flag for service-side rendezvous
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+ * circuits when they are 'joined' to a client's rend circ, but only
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+ * for symmetry with the client case. Client-side introduction
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+ * circuits are closed when we get a joined rend circ, and
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+ * service-side introduction circuits never have this flag set.) */
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+ unsigned int hs_circ_has_timed_out : 1;
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+
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+ /** Set iff this circuit has been given a relaxed timeout because
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+ * no circuits have opened. Used to prevent spamming logs. */
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+ unsigned int relaxed_timeout : 1;
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+
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+ /** Set iff this is a service-side rendezvous circuit for which a
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+ * new connection attempt has been launched. We consider launching
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+ * a new service-side rend circ to a client when the previous one
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+ * fails; now that we don't necessarily close a service-side rend
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+ * circ when we launch a new one to the same client, this flag keeps
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+ * us from launching two retries for the same failed rend circ. */
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+ unsigned int hs_service_side_rend_circ_has_been_relaunched : 1;
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+
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+ /** What commands were sent over this circuit that decremented the
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+ * RELAY_EARLY counter? This is for debugging task 878. */
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+ uint8_t relay_early_commands[MAX_RELAY_EARLY_CELLS_PER_CIRCUIT];
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+
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+ /** How many RELAY_EARLY cells have been sent over this circuit? This is
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+ * for debugging task 878, too. */
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+ int relay_early_cells_sent;
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+
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+ /** The next stream_id that will be tried when we're attempting to
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+ * construct a new AP stream originating at this circuit. */
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+ streamid_t next_stream_id;
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+
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+ /* The intro key replaces the hidden service's public key if purpose is
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+ * S_ESTABLISH_INTRO or S_INTRO, provided that no unversioned rendezvous
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+ * descriptor is used. */
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+ crypto_pk_t *intro_key;
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+
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+ /** Quasi-global identifier for this circuit; used for control.c */
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+ /* XXXX NM This can get re-used after 2**32 circuits. */
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+ uint32_t global_identifier;
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+
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+ /** True if we have associated one stream to this circuit, thereby setting
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+ * the isolation parameters for this circuit. Note that this doesn't
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+ * necessarily mean that we've <em>attached</em> any streams to the circuit:
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+ * we may only have marked up this circuit during the launch process.
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+ */
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+ unsigned int isolation_values_set : 1;
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+ /** True iff any stream has <em>ever</em> been attached to this circuit.
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+ *
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+ * In a better world we could use timestamp_dirty for this, but
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+ * timestamp_dirty is far too overloaded at the moment.
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+ */
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+ unsigned int isolation_any_streams_attached : 1;
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+
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+ /** A bitfield of ISO_* flags for every isolation field such that this
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+ * circuit has had streams with more than one value for that field
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+ * attached to it. */
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+ uint8_t isolation_flags_mixed;
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+
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+ /** @name Isolation parameters
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+ *
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+ * If any streams have been associated with this circ (isolation_values_set
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+ * == 1), and all streams associated with the circuit have had the same
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+ * value for some field ((isolation_flags_mixed & ISO_FOO) == 0), then these
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+ * elements hold the value for that field.
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+ *
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+ * Note again that "associated" is not the same as "attached": we
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+ * preliminarily associate streams with a circuit while the circuit is being
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+ * launched, so that we can tell whether we need to launch more circuits.
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+ *
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+ * @{
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+ */
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+ uint8_t client_proto_type;
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+ uint8_t client_proto_socksver;
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+ uint16_t dest_port;
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+ tor_addr_t client_addr;
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+ char *dest_address;
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+ int session_group;
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+ unsigned nym_epoch;
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+ size_t socks_username_len;
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+ uint8_t socks_password_len;
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+ /* Note that the next two values are NOT NUL-terminated; see
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+ socks_username_len and socks_password_len for their lengths. */
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+ char *socks_username;
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+ char *socks_password;
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+ /** Global identifier for the first stream attached here; used by
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+ * ISO_STREAM. */
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+ uint64_t associated_isolated_stream_global_id;
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+ /**@}*/
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+ /** A list of addr_policy_t for this circuit in particular. Used by
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+ * adjust_exit_policy_from_exitpolicy_failure.
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+ */
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+ smartlist_t *prepend_policy;
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+
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+ /** How long do we wait before closing this circuit if it remains
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+ * completely idle after it was built, in seconds? This value
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+ * is randomized on a per-circuit basis from CircuitsAvailableTimoeut
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+ * to 2*CircuitsAvailableTimoeut. */
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+ int circuit_idle_timeout;
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+
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+};
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+
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+#endif
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+
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