connection_t kept the identity_pkey but all it did was store it and

free it. perhaps we don't need it after all?


svn:r6518

src/or/connection.c

@@ -224,8 +224,6 @@ _connection_free(connection_t *conn)
     }
   }
 
-  if (conn->identity_pkey)
-    crypto_free_pk_env(conn->identity_pkey);
   tor_free(conn->nickname);
   tor_free(conn->socks_request);
   tor_free(conn->incoming_cmd);

src/or/connection_or.c

@@ -319,7 +319,6 @@ connection_or_init_conn_from_router(connection_t *conn, routerinfo_t *router)
   conn->addr = router->addr;
   conn->port = router->or_port;
   conn->receiver_bucket = conn->bandwidth = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
-  conn->identity_pkey = crypto_pk_dup_key(router->identity_pkey);
   connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, router->cache_info.identity_digest);
   conn->nickname = tor_strdup(router->nickname);
   tor_free(conn->address);

src/or/or.h

@@ -652,9 +652,8 @@ struct connection_t {
   char *address; /**< FQDN (or IP) of the guy on the other end.
                   * strdup into this, because free_connection frees it.
                   */
-  crypto_pk_env_t *identity_pkey; /**< Public RSA key for the other side's
-                                   * signing key. */
-  char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Hash of identity_pkey */
+  char identity_digest[DIGEST_LEN]; /**< Hash of the public RSA key for
+                                     * the other side's signing key. */
   char *nickname; /**< Nickname of OR on other side (if any). */
 
   /** Nickname of planned exit node -- used with .exit support. */