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@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "crypto_curve25519.h"
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#include "crypto_digest.h"
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+#include "crypto_dh.h"
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#include "crypto_ed25519.h"
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#include "crypto_format.h"
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#include "crypto_rand.h"
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@@ -72,41 +73,12 @@ ENABLE_GCC_WARNING(redundant-decls)
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#include "keccak-tiny/keccak-tiny.h"
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-/** A structure to hold the first half (x, g^x) of a Diffie-Hellman handshake
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- * while we're waiting for the second.*/
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-struct crypto_dh_t {
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- DH *dh; /**< The openssl DH object */
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-};
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-
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-static int tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn);
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-
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/** Boolean: has OpenSSL's crypto been initialized? */
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static int crypto_early_initialized_ = 0;
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/** Boolean: has OpenSSL's crypto been initialized? */
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static int crypto_global_initialized_ = 0;
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-/** Log all pending crypto errors at level <b>severity</b>. Use
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- * <b>doing</b> to describe our current activities.
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- */
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-static void
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-crypto_log_errors(int severity, const char *doing)
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-{
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- unsigned long err;
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- const char *msg, *lib, *func;
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- while ((err = ERR_get_error()) != 0) {
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- msg = (const char*)ERR_reason_error_string(err);
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- lib = (const char*)ERR_lib_error_string(err);
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- func = (const char*)ERR_func_error_string(err);
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- if (!msg) msg = "(null)";
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- if (!lib) lib = "(null)";
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- if (!func) func = "(null)";
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- if (BUG(!doing)) doing = "(null)";
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- tor_log(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "crypto error while %s: %s (in %s:%s)",
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- doing, msg, lib, func);
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- }
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-}
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-
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#ifndef DISABLE_ENGINES
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/** Log any OpenSSL engines we're using at NOTICE. */
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static void
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@@ -306,14 +278,6 @@ crypto_thread_cleanup(void)
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#endif
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}
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-/** Used by tortls.c: Get the DH* from a crypto_dh_t.
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- */
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-DH *
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-crypto_dh_get_dh_(crypto_dh_t *dh)
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-{
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- return dh->dh;
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-}
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-
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/** Allocate and return a new symmetric cipher using the provided key and iv.
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* The key is <b>bits</b> bits long; the IV is CIPHER_IV_LEN bytes. Both
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* must be provided. Key length must be 128, 192, or 256 */
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@@ -501,560 +465,6 @@ crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(const char *key,
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return (int)(fromlen - CIPHER_IV_LEN);
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}
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-/* DH */
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-
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-/** Our DH 'g' parameter */
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-#define DH_GENERATOR 2
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-
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-/** Shared P parameter for our circuit-crypto DH key exchanges. */
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-static BIGNUM *dh_param_p = NULL;
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-/** Shared P parameter for our TLS DH key exchanges. */
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-static BIGNUM *dh_param_p_tls = NULL;
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-/** Shared G parameter for our DH key exchanges. */
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-static BIGNUM *dh_param_g = NULL;
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-
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-/** Validate a given set of Diffie-Hellman parameters. This is moderately
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- * computationally expensive (milliseconds), so should only be called when
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- * the DH parameters change. Returns 0 on success, * -1 on failure.
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- */
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-static int
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-crypto_validate_dh_params(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *g)
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-{
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- DH *dh = NULL;
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- int ret = -1;
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-
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- /* Copy into a temporary DH object, just so that DH_check() can be called. */
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- if (!(dh = DH_new()))
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- goto out;
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-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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- BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
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- if (!(dh_p = BN_dup(p)))
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- goto out;
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- if (!(dh_g = BN_dup(g)))
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- goto out;
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- if (!DH_set0_pqg(dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g))
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- goto out;
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-#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */
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- if (!(dh->p = BN_dup(p)))
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- goto out;
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- if (!(dh->g = BN_dup(g)))
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- goto out;
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-#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
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-
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- /* Perform the validation. */
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- int codes = 0;
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- if (!DH_check(dh, &codes))
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- goto out;
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- if (BN_is_word(g, DH_GENERATOR_2)) {
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- /* Per https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Diffie-Hellman_parameters
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- *
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- * OpenSSL checks the prime is congruent to 11 when g = 2; while the
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- * IETF's primes are congruent to 23 when g = 2.
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- */
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- BN_ULONG residue = BN_mod_word(p, 24);
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- if (residue == 11 || residue == 23)
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- codes &= ~DH_NOT_SUITABLE_GENERATOR;
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- }
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- if (codes != 0) /* Specifics on why the params suck is irrelevant. */
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- goto out;
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-
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- /* Things are probably not evil. */
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- ret = 0;
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-
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- out:
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- if (dh)
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- DH_free(dh);
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- return ret;
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-}
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-
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-/** Set the global Diffie-Hellman generator, used for both TLS and internal
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- * DH stuff.
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- */
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-static void
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-crypto_set_dh_generator(void)
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-{
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- BIGNUM *generator;
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- int r;
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-
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- if (dh_param_g)
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- return;
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-
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- generator = BN_new();
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- tor_assert(generator);
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-
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- r = BN_set_word(generator, DH_GENERATOR);
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- tor_assert(r);
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-
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- dh_param_g = generator;
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-}
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-
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-/** Set the global TLS Diffie-Hellman modulus. Use the Apache mod_ssl DH
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- * modulus. */
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-void
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-crypto_set_tls_dh_prime(void)
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-{
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- BIGNUM *tls_prime = NULL;
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- int r;
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-
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- /* If the space is occupied, free the previous TLS DH prime */
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- if (BUG(dh_param_p_tls)) {
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- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
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- *
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- * We shouldn't be calling this twice.
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- */
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- BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls);
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- dh_param_p_tls = NULL;
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- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
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- }
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-
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- tls_prime = BN_new();
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- tor_assert(tls_prime);
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-
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- /* This is the 1024-bit safe prime that Apache uses for its DH stuff; see
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- * modules/ssl/ssl_engine_dh.c; Apache also uses a generator of 2 with this
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- * prime.
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- */
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- r = BN_hex2bn(&tls_prime,
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- "D67DE440CBBBDC1936D693D34AFD0AD50C84D239A45F520BB88174CB98"
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- "BCE951849F912E639C72FB13B4B4D7177E16D55AC179BA420B2A29FE324A"
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- "467A635E81FF5901377BEDDCFD33168A461AAD3B72DAE8860078045B07A7"
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- "DBCA7874087D1510EA9FCC9DDD330507DD62DB88AEAA747DE0F4D6E2BD68"
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- "B0E7393E0F24218EB3");
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- tor_assert(r);
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-
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- tor_assert(tls_prime);
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-
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- dh_param_p_tls = tls_prime;
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- crypto_set_dh_generator();
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- tor_assert(0 == crypto_validate_dh_params(dh_param_p_tls, dh_param_g));
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-}
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-
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-/** Initialize dh_param_p and dh_param_g if they are not already
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- * set. */
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-static void
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-init_dh_param(void)
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-{
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- BIGNUM *circuit_dh_prime;
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- int r;
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- if (BUG(dh_param_p && dh_param_g))
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- return; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE This function isn't supposed to be called twice.
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-
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- circuit_dh_prime = BN_new();
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- tor_assert(circuit_dh_prime);
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-
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- /* This is from rfc2409, section 6.2. It's a safe prime, and
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- supposedly it equals:
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- 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
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- */
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- r = BN_hex2bn(&circuit_dh_prime,
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- "FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC90FDAA22168C234C4C6628B80DC1CD129024E08"
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- "8A67CC74020BBEA63B139B22514A08798E3404DDEF9519B3CD3A431B"
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- "302B0A6DF25F14374FE1356D6D51C245E485B576625E7EC6F44C42E9"
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- "A637ED6B0BFF5CB6F406B7EDEE386BFB5A899FA5AE9F24117C4B1FE6"
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- "49286651ECE65381FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF");
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- tor_assert(r);
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-
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- /* Set the new values as the global DH parameters. */
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- dh_param_p = circuit_dh_prime;
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- crypto_set_dh_generator();
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- tor_assert(0 == crypto_validate_dh_params(dh_param_p, dh_param_g));
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-
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- if (!dh_param_p_tls) {
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- crypto_set_tls_dh_prime();
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- }
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-}
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-
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-/** Number of bits to use when choosing the x or y value in a Diffie-Hellman
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- * handshake. Since we exponentiate by this value, choosing a smaller one
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- * lets our handhake go faster.
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- */
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-#define DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS 320
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-
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-/** Allocate and return a new DH object for a key exchange. Returns NULL on
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- * failure.
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- */
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-crypto_dh_t *
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-crypto_dh_new(int dh_type)
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-{
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- crypto_dh_t *res = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypto_dh_t));
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-
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- tor_assert(dh_type == DH_TYPE_CIRCUIT || dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS ||
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- dh_type == DH_TYPE_REND);
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-
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- if (!dh_param_p)
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- init_dh_param();
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-
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- if (!(res->dh = DH_new()))
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- goto err;
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-
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-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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- BIGNUM *dh_p = NULL, *dh_g = NULL;
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-
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- if (dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS) {
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- dh_p = BN_dup(dh_param_p_tls);
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- } else {
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- dh_p = BN_dup(dh_param_p);
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- }
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- if (!dh_p)
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- goto err;
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-
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- dh_g = BN_dup(dh_param_g);
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- if (!dh_g) {
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- BN_free(dh_p);
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- goto err;
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- }
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-
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- if (!DH_set0_pqg(res->dh, dh_p, NULL, dh_g)) {
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- goto err;
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- }
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-
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- if (!DH_set_length(res->dh, DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS))
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- goto err;
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-#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */
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- if (dh_type == DH_TYPE_TLS) {
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- if (!(res->dh->p = BN_dup(dh_param_p_tls)))
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- goto err;
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- } else {
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- if (!(res->dh->p = BN_dup(dh_param_p)))
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- goto err;
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- }
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-
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- if (!(res->dh->g = BN_dup(dh_param_g)))
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- goto err;
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-
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- res->dh->length = DH_PRIVATE_KEY_BITS;
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-#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
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-
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- return res;
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-
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- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
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- * This error condition is only reached when an allocation fails */
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- err:
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- crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "creating DH object");
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- if (res->dh) DH_free(res->dh); /* frees p and g too */
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- tor_free(res);
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- return NULL;
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- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
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-}
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-
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-/** Return a copy of <b>dh</b>, sharing its internal state. */
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-crypto_dh_t *
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-crypto_dh_dup(const crypto_dh_t *dh)
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-{
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- crypto_dh_t *dh_new = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypto_dh_t));
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- tor_assert(dh);
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- tor_assert(dh->dh);
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- dh_new->dh = dh->dh;
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- DH_up_ref(dh->dh);
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- return dh_new;
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-}
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-
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-/** Return the length of the DH key in <b>dh</b>, in bytes.
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- */
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-int
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-crypto_dh_get_bytes(crypto_dh_t *dh)
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-{
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- tor_assert(dh);
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- return DH_size(dh->dh);
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-}
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-
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-/** Generate \<x,g^x\> for our part of the key exchange. Return 0 on
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- * success, -1 on failure.
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- */
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-int
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-crypto_dh_generate_public(crypto_dh_t *dh)
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-{
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-#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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- again:
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-#endif
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- if (!DH_generate_key(dh->dh)) {
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- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
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- * To test this we would need some way to tell openssl to break DH. */
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- crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "generating DH key");
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- return -1;
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- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
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- }
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-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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- /* OpenSSL 1.1.x doesn't appear to let you regenerate a DH key, without
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- * recreating the DH object. I have no idea what sort of aliasing madness
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- * can occur here, so do the check, and just bail on failure.
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- */
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- const BIGNUM *pub_key, *priv_key;
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- DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &pub_key, &priv_key);
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- if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, pub_key)<0) {
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- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-"
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- "the-universe chances really do happen. Treating as a failure.");
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- return -1;
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- }
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-#else /* !(defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API)) */
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- if (tor_check_dh_key(LOG_WARN, dh->dh->pub_key)<0) {
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- /* LCOV_EXCL_START
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- * If this happens, then openssl's DH implementation is busted. */
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- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO, "Weird! Our own DH key was invalid. I guess once-in-"
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- "the-universe chances really do happen. Trying again.");
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- /* Free and clear the keys, so OpenSSL will actually try again. */
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- BN_clear_free(dh->dh->pub_key);
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- BN_clear_free(dh->dh->priv_key);
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- dh->dh->pub_key = dh->dh->priv_key = NULL;
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- goto again;
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- /* LCOV_EXCL_STOP */
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- }
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-#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
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- return 0;
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-}
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-
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-/** Generate g^x as necessary, and write the g^x for the key exchange
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- * as a <b>pubkey_len</b>-byte value into <b>pubkey</b>. Return 0 on
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- * success, -1 on failure. <b>pubkey_len</b> must be \>= DH_BYTES.
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- */
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-int
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-crypto_dh_get_public(crypto_dh_t *dh, char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len)
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-{
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- int bytes;
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- tor_assert(dh);
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-
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- const BIGNUM *dh_pub;
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-
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-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
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- const BIGNUM *dh_priv;
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- DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv);
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-#else
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- dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key;
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-#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_1_1_API) */
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-
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- if (!dh_pub) {
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- if (crypto_dh_generate_public(dh)<0)
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- return -1;
|
|
|
- else {
|
|
|
-#ifdef OPENSSL_1_1_API
|
|
|
- DH_get0_key(dh->dh, &dh_pub, &dh_priv);
|
|
|
-#else
|
|
|
- dh_pub = dh->dh->pub_key;
|
|
|
-#endif
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(dh_pub);
|
|
|
- bytes = BN_num_bytes(dh_pub);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(bytes >= 0);
|
|
|
- if (pubkey_len < (size_t)bytes) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,
|
|
|
- "Weird! pubkey_len (%d) was smaller than DH_BYTES (%d)",
|
|
|
- (int) pubkey_len, bytes);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- memset(pubkey, 0, pubkey_len);
|
|
|
- BN_bn2bin(dh_pub, (unsigned char*)(pubkey+(pubkey_len-bytes)));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Check for bad Diffie-Hellman public keys (g^x). Return 0 if the key is
|
|
|
- * okay (in the subgroup [2,p-2]), or -1 if it's bad.
|
|
|
- * See http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/psandqs.ps.gz for some tips.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-tor_check_dh_key(int severity, const BIGNUM *bn)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- BIGNUM *x;
|
|
|
- char *s;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(bn);
|
|
|
- x = BN_new();
|
|
|
- tor_assert(x);
|
|
|
- if (BUG(!dh_param_p))
|
|
|
- init_dh_param(); //LCOV_EXCL_LINE we already checked whether we did this.
|
|
|
- BN_set_word(x, 1);
|
|
|
- if (BN_cmp(bn,x)<=0) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at least 2.");
|
|
|
- goto err;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- BN_copy(x,dh_param_p);
|
|
|
- BN_sub_word(x, 1);
|
|
|
- if (BN_cmp(bn,x)>=0) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "DH key must be at most p-2.");
|
|
|
- goto err;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- BN_clear_free(x);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- err:
|
|
|
- BN_clear_free(x);
|
|
|
- s = BN_bn2hex(bn);
|
|
|
- log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO, "Rejecting insecure DH key [%s]", s);
|
|
|
- OPENSSL_free(s);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Given a DH key exchange object, and our peer's value of g^y (as a
|
|
|
- * <b>pubkey_len</b>-byte value in <b>pubkey</b>) generate
|
|
|
- * <b>secret_bytes_out</b> bytes of shared key material and write them
|
|
|
- * to <b>secret_out</b>. Return the number of bytes generated on success,
|
|
|
- * or -1 on failure.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * (We generate key material by computing
|
|
|
- * SHA1( g^xy || "\x00" ) || SHA1( g^xy || "\x01" ) || ...
|
|
|
- * where || is concatenation.)
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-ssize_t
|
|
|
-crypto_dh_compute_secret(int severity, crypto_dh_t *dh,
|
|
|
- const char *pubkey, size_t pubkey_len,
|
|
|
- char *secret_out, size_t secret_bytes_out)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- char *secret_tmp = NULL;
|
|
|
- BIGNUM *pubkey_bn = NULL;
|
|
|
- size_t secret_len=0, secret_tmp_len=0;
|
|
|
- int result=0;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(dh);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(secret_bytes_out/DIGEST_LEN <= 255);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(pubkey_len < INT_MAX);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!(pubkey_bn = BN_bin2bn((const unsigned char*)pubkey,
|
|
|
- (int)pubkey_len, NULL)))
|
|
|
- goto error;
|
|
|
- if (tor_check_dh_key(severity, pubkey_bn)<0) {
|
|
|
- /* Check for invalid public keys. */
|
|
|
- log_fn(severity, LD_CRYPTO,"Rejected invalid g^x");
|
|
|
- goto error;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- secret_tmp_len = crypto_dh_get_bytes(dh);
|
|
|
- secret_tmp = tor_malloc(secret_tmp_len);
|
|
|
- result = DH_compute_key((unsigned char*)secret_tmp, pubkey_bn, dh->dh);
|
|
|
- if (result < 0) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CRYPTO,"DH_compute_key() failed.");
|
|
|
- goto error;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- secret_len = result;
|
|
|
- if (crypto_expand_key_material_TAP((uint8_t*)secret_tmp, secret_len,
|
|
|
- (uint8_t*)secret_out, secret_bytes_out)<0)
|
|
|
- goto error;
|
|
|
- secret_len = secret_bytes_out;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
|
- error:
|
|
|
- result = -1;
|
|
|
- done:
|
|
|
- crypto_log_errors(LOG_WARN, "completing DH handshake");
|
|
|
- if (pubkey_bn)
|
|
|
- BN_clear_free(pubkey_bn);
|
|
|
- if (secret_tmp) {
|
|
|
- memwipe(secret_tmp, 0, secret_tmp_len);
|
|
|
- tor_free(secret_tmp);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (result < 0)
|
|
|
- return result;
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return secret_len;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Given <b>key_in_len</b> bytes of negotiated randomness in <b>key_in</b>
|
|
|
- * ("K"), expand it into <b>key_out_len</b> bytes of negotiated key material in
|
|
|
- * <b>key_out</b> by taking the first <b>key_out_len</b> bytes of
|
|
|
- * H(K | [00]) | H(K | [01]) | ....
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * This is the key expansion algorithm used in the "TAP" circuit extension
|
|
|
- * mechanism; it shouldn't be used for new protocols.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Return 0 on success, -1 on failure.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-crypto_expand_key_material_TAP(const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len,
|
|
|
- uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int i, r = -1;
|
|
|
- uint8_t *cp, *tmp = tor_malloc(key_in_len+1);
|
|
|
- uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/
|
|
|
- tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST_LEN*256);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- memcpy(tmp, key_in, key_in_len);
|
|
|
- for (cp = key_out, i=0; cp < key_out+key_out_len;
|
|
|
- ++i, cp += DIGEST_LEN) {
|
|
|
- tmp[key_in_len] = i;
|
|
|
- if (crypto_digest((char*)digest, (const char *)tmp, key_in_len+1) < 0)
|
|
|
- goto exit;
|
|
|
- memcpy(cp, digest, MIN(DIGEST_LEN, key_out_len-(cp-key_out)));
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- r = 0;
|
|
|
- exit:
|
|
|
- memwipe(tmp, 0, key_in_len+1);
|
|
|
- tor_free(tmp);
|
|
|
- memwipe(digest, 0, sizeof(digest));
|
|
|
- return r;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Expand some secret key material according to RFC5869, using SHA256 as the
|
|
|
- * underlying hash. The <b>key_in_len</b> bytes at <b>key_in</b> are the
|
|
|
- * secret key material; the <b>salt_in_len</b> bytes at <b>salt_in</b> and the
|
|
|
- * <b>info_in_len</b> bytes in <b>info_in_len</b> are the algorithm's "salt"
|
|
|
- * and "info" parameters respectively. On success, write <b>key_out_len</b>
|
|
|
- * bytes to <b>key_out</b> and return 0. Assert on failure.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-crypto_expand_key_material_rfc5869_sha256(
|
|
|
- const uint8_t *key_in, size_t key_in_len,
|
|
|
- const uint8_t *salt_in, size_t salt_in_len,
|
|
|
- const uint8_t *info_in, size_t info_in_len,
|
|
|
- uint8_t *key_out, size_t key_out_len)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- uint8_t prk[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
|
|
- uint8_t tmp[DIGEST256_LEN + 128 + 1];
|
|
|
- uint8_t mac[DIGEST256_LEN];
|
|
|
- int i;
|
|
|
- uint8_t *outp;
|
|
|
- size_t tmp_len;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)prk,
|
|
|
- (const char*)salt_in, salt_in_len,
|
|
|
- (const char*)key_in, key_in_len);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* If we try to get more than this amount of key data, we'll repeat blocks.*/
|
|
|
- tor_assert(key_out_len <= DIGEST256_LEN * 256);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(info_in_len <= 128);
|
|
|
- memset(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
|
|
|
- outp = key_out;
|
|
|
- i = 1;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- while (key_out_len) {
|
|
|
- size_t n;
|
|
|
- if (i > 1) {
|
|
|
- memcpy(tmp, mac, DIGEST256_LEN);
|
|
|
- memcpy(tmp+DIGEST256_LEN, info_in, info_in_len);
|
|
|
- tmp[DIGEST256_LEN+info_in_len] = i;
|
|
|
- tmp_len = DIGEST256_LEN + info_in_len + 1;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- memcpy(tmp, info_in, info_in_len);
|
|
|
- tmp[info_in_len] = i;
|
|
|
- tmp_len = info_in_len + 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- crypto_hmac_sha256((char*)mac,
|
|
|
- (const char*)prk, DIGEST256_LEN,
|
|
|
- (const char*)tmp, tmp_len);
|
|
|
- n = key_out_len < DIGEST256_LEN ? key_out_len : DIGEST256_LEN;
|
|
|
- memcpy(outp, mac, n);
|
|
|
- key_out_len -= n;
|
|
|
- outp += n;
|
|
|
- ++i;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- memwipe(tmp, 0, sizeof(tmp));
|
|
|
- memwipe(mac, 0, sizeof(mac));
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Free a DH key exchange object.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-crypto_dh_free_(crypto_dh_t *dh)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (!dh)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(dh->dh);
|
|
|
- DH_free(dh->dh);
|
|
|
- tor_free(dh);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
/** @{ */
|
|
|
/** Uninitialize the crypto library. Return 0 on success. Does not detect
|
|
|
* failure.
|
|
@@ -1072,14 +482,7 @@ crypto_global_cleanup(void)
|
|
|
ERR_free_strings();
|
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (dh_param_p)
|
|
|
- BN_clear_free(dh_param_p);
|
|
|
- if (dh_param_p_tls)
|
|
|
- BN_clear_free(dh_param_p_tls);
|
|
|
- if (dh_param_g)
|
|
|
- BN_clear_free(dh_param_g);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- dh_param_p = dh_param_p_tls = dh_param_g = NULL;
|
|
|
+ crypto_dh_free_all();
|
|
|
|
|
|
#ifndef DISABLE_ENGINES
|
|
|
#ifndef OPENSSL_1_1_API
|