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@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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"most recent" networkstatus sources, and different versions of each
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"most recent" networkstatus sources, and different versions of each
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(since authorities change their statements often). Also, it is very
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(since authorities change their statements often). Also, it is very
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redundant: most of the downloaded networkstatus are probably quite
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redundant: most of the downloaded networkstatus are probably quite
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- similar.
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+ similar. Worse, the overhead grows as we add more authorities.
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So if we have clients only download a single multiply signed consensus
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So if we have clients only download a single multiply signed consensus
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network status statement, we can:
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network status statement, we can:
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@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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- Assuming that client-side or cache-side clocks are more correct
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- Assuming that client-side or cache-side clocks are more correct
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than we assume now.
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than we assume now.
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- Assuming that authority clocks are perfectly correct.
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- Assuming that authority clocks are perfectly correct.
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- - Degrading badly if an authority dies or is offline for a bit.
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+ - Degrading badly if a few authorities die or are offline for a bit.
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We do not have to perform well if:
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We do not have to perform well if:
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- No clique of more than half the authorities can agree about who
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- No clique of more than half the authorities can agree about who
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@@ -90,7 +90,10 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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MUST match the nickname in the "directory-signature" entry.
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MUST match the nickname in the "directory-signature" entry.
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"directory-signature" -- [XXXX this should be tagged with the nickname
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"directory-signature" -- [XXXX this should be tagged with the nickname
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- or identity somehow.]
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+ or identity somehow. -NM] [The bottom of
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+ http://belegost.mit.edu/tor/status/authority already puts the
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+ nickname next to it. So we can just fix the spec to require
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+ this? -RD]
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Authorities SHOULD cache their most recently generated votes so they
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Authorities SHOULD cache their most recently generated votes so they
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can persist them across restarts. Authorities SHOULD NOT generate
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can persist them across restarts. Authorities SHOULD NOT generate
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@@ -124,9 +127,13 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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re-English this sentence]
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re-English this sentence]
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"client-versions" and "server-versions" are sorted in ascending
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"client-versions" and "server-versions" are sorted in ascending
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- order.
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+ order based on version-spec.txt.
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"dir-options" and "known-flags" are not included.
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"dir-options" and "known-flags" are not included.
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+[XXX really? why not list the ones that are used in the consensus?
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+For example, right now BadExit is in use, but no servers would be
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+labelled BadExit, and it's still worth knowing that it was considered
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+by the authorities. -RD]
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The fields MUST occur in the following order:
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The fields MUST occur in the following order:
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"network-status-version"
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"network-status-version"
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@@ -141,7 +148,7 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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"server-versions"
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"server-versions"
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The signatures at the end of the document appear as multiple instances
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The signatures at the end of the document appear as multiple instances
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- directory-signature, sorted in ascending order by nickname,
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+ of directory-signature, sorted in ascending order by nickname,
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case-insensitively.
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case-insensitively.
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A router entry should be included in the result if it is included by more
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A router entry should be included in the result if it is included by more
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@@ -149,7 +156,12 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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we have). A router entry has a flag set if it is included by more than
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we have). A router entry has a flag set if it is included by more than
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half of the authorities who care about that flag. [XXXX this creates an
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half of the authorities who care about that flag. [XXXX this creates an
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incentive for attackers to DOS authorities whose votes they don't like.
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incentive for attackers to DOS authorities whose votes they don't like.
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- Can we remember what flags people set the last time we saw them?]
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+ Can we remember what flags people set the last time we saw them? -NM]
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+ [Which 'we' are we talking here? The end-users never learn which
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+ authority sets which flags. So you're thinking the authorities
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+ should record the last vote they saw from each authority and if it's
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+ within a week or so, count all the flags that it advertised as 'no'
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+ votes? Plausible. -RD]
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The signature hash covers from the "network-status-version" line through
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The signature hash covers from the "network-status-version" line through
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the characters "directory-signature" in the first "directory-signature"
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the characters "directory-signature" in the first "directory-signature"
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@@ -227,6 +239,11 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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another, we can rely on this existing mechanism to keep authorities up to
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another, we can rely on this existing mechanism to keep authorities up to
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date.
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date.
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+ [We should do a thorough read-through of dir-spec again to make sure
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+ that the authorities converge on which descriptor to "prefer" for
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+ each router. Right now the decision happens at the client, which is
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+ no longer the right place for it. -RD]
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+
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3. Questions and concerns
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3. Questions and concerns
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3.1. Push or pull?
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3.1. Push or pull?
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