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@@ -89,6 +89,9 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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authority's nickname, which MUST be unique among authorities, and
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MUST match the nickname in the "directory-signature" entry.
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+ "directory-signature" -- [XXXX this should be tagged with the nickname
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+ or identity somehow.]
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+
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Authorities SHOULD cache their most recently generated votes so they
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can persist them across restarts. Authorities SHOULD NOT generate
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another document until valid-until has passed.
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@@ -102,7 +105,6 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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XXXX some way to request older networkstatus docs?
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-
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2.2. Consensus directory specifications
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Consensuses are like v2.1 votes, except for the following fields:
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@@ -142,22 +144,75 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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directory-signature, sorted in ascending order by nickname,
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case-insensitively.
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- A router entry should be included in the result if it is included by
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- more than half of the authorities (total authorities, not just those
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- whose votes we have). A router entry has a flag set if it is included
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- by more than half of the authorities who care about that flag. [XXXX
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- this creates a DOS incentive. Can we remember what flags people set the
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- last time we saw them?]
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+ A router entry should be included in the result if it is included by more
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+ than half of the authorities (total authorities, not just those whose votes
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+ we have). A router entry has a flag set if it is included by more than
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+ half of the authorities who care about that flag. [XXXX this creates an
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+ incentive for attackers to DOS authorities whose votes they don't like.
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+ Can we remember what flags people set the last time we saw them?]
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+
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+ The signature hash covers from the "network-status-version" line through
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+ the characters "directory-signature" in the first "directory-signature"
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+ line.
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+
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+ Consensus directories SHOULD be rejected if they are not signed by more
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+ than half of the known authorities.
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+
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+2.2.1. Detached signatures
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+
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+ Assuming full connectivity, every authority should compute and sign the
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+ same consensus directory in each period. Therefore, it isn't necessary to
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+ download the consensus computed by each authority; instead, the authorities
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+ only push/fetch each others' signatures. A "detached signature" document
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+ contains a single "consensus-digest" entry and one or more
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+ directory-signature entries. [XXXX specify more.]
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+
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+2.3. URLs and timelines
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+
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+2.3.1. URLs and timeline used for agreement
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+
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+ A router SHOULD publish its vote immediately at the start of each voting
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+ period. It does this by making it available at
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+ http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/authority.z
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+ and posting it to each other authority at the URL
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+ http://<hostname>/tor/post/vote
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+
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+ If, N minutes after the voting period has begun, an authority does not have
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+ a current statement from another authority, the first authority retrieves
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+ the other's statement.
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- [What does the signature hash cover ? XXX]
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+ Once an authority has a vote from another authority, it makes it available
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+ at
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+ http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/<fp>.z
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+ where <fp> is the fingerprint of the other authority's identity key.
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+
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+ The consensus network status, along with as many signatures as the server
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+ currently knows, should be available at
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+ http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/consensus.z
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+ All of the detached signatures it knows for consensus status should be
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+ available at:
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+ http://<hostname>/tor/status-vote/current/consensus-signatures.z
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+
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+ Once an authority has computed and signed a consensus network status, it
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+ should send its detached signature to each other authority at the URL
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+ http://<hostname>/tor/post/consensus-signature
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-2.3. Agreement and timeline
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- [XXXX publish signed vote summaries.]
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- [XXXX URL list: vote, other people's votes, directory.]
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- [XXXX in-progress URL vs done URL]
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[XXXX Store votes to disk.]
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+2.3.2. Serving a consensus directory
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+
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+ Once the authority is done getting signatures on the consensus directory,
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+ it should serve it from:
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+ http://<hostname>/tor/status/consensus.z
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+
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+ Caches SHOULD download consensus directories from an authority and serve
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+ them from the same URL.
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+
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+2.3.3. Timeline and synchronization
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+
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+ [XXXX]
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+
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2.4. Distributing routerdescs between authorities
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Consensus will be more meaningful if authorities take steps to make sure
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@@ -273,6 +328,16 @@ $Id: /tor/branches/eventdns/doc/dir-spec.txt 9469 2006-11-01T23:56:30.179423Z ni
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4. Migration
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- For directory voting, ...
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+ For directory voting:
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+ * It would be cool if caches could get ready to download these, verify
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+ enough signatures, and serve them now. That way once stuff works all
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+ we need to do is upgrade the authorities. Caches don't need to verify
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+ the correctness of the format so long as it's signed.
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+
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+ For dropping the "opt" requirement:
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+ * stop requiring it as of 0.1.2.x. Stop generating it once earlier
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+ formats are obsolete.
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+
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+ For multilevel keys:
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+ * no idea
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-caches need to start caching consensuses and accepting multisigned documents.
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