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compress sec1-3, we're at 15pg with standard latex8.sty now

svn:r765
Roger Dingledine 22 years ago
parent
commit
6c68317577
1 changed files with 8 additions and 8 deletions
  1. 8 8
      doc/tor-design.tex

+ 8 - 8
doc/tor-design.tex

@@ -160,11 +160,11 @@ or flooding and send less data until the congestion subsides.
 
 
 \textbf{Directory servers:} The earlier Onion Routing design
 \textbf{Directory servers:} The earlier Onion Routing design
 planned to flood link-state information through the network---an approach
 planned to flood link-state information through the network---an approach
-that can be unreliable and open to partitioning attacks or
-deception. Tor takes a simplified view toward distributing link-state
+that can be unreliable and open to partitioning attacks.
+Tor takes a simplified view toward distributing such
 information. Certain more trusted nodes act as \emph{directory
 information. Certain more trusted nodes act as \emph{directory
 servers}: they provide signed directories that describe known
 servers}: they provide signed directories that describe known
-routers and their availability.  Users periodically download these
+routers and their availability. Users periodically download the
 directories via HTTP.
 directories via HTTP.
 
 
 \textbf{Variable exit policies:} Tor provides a consistent mechanism
 \textbf{Variable exit policies:} Tor provides a consistent mechanism
@@ -388,8 +388,8 @@ multiple communications to or from a single user.  Within this
 main goal, however, several considerations have directed
 main goal, however, several considerations have directed
 Tor's evolution.
 Tor's evolution.
 
 
-\textbf{Deployability:} The design must be implemented,
-deployed, and used in the real world.  Thus it
+\textbf{Deployability:} The design must be deployed and used in the
+real world.  Thus it
 must not be expensive to run (for example, by requiring more bandwidth
 must not be expensive to run (for example, by requiring more bandwidth
 than volunteers are willing to provide); must not place a heavy
 than volunteers are willing to provide); must not place a heavy
 liability burden on operators (for example, by allowing attackers to
 liability burden on operators (for example, by allowing attackers to
@@ -491,9 +491,9 @@ which points in the network he should attack.
 Our adversary might try to link an initiator Alice with her
 Our adversary might try to link an initiator Alice with her
 communication partners, or try to build a profile of Alice's
 communication partners, or try to build a profile of Alice's
 behavior. He might mount passive attacks by observing the network edges
 behavior. He might mount passive attacks by observing the network edges
-and correlating traffic entering and leaving the network---either
-by relationships in packet timing; relationships in volume;
-or relationships in externally visible user-selected
+and correlating traffic entering and leaving the network---by
+relationships in packet timing, volume, or externally visible
+user-selected
 options. The adversary can also mount active attacks by compromising
 options. The adversary can also mount active attacks by compromising
 routers or keys; by replaying traffic; by selectively denying service
 routers or keys; by replaying traffic; by selectively denying service
 to trustworthy routers to move users to
 to trustworthy routers to move users to