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@@ -1388,324 +1388,311 @@ Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our
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design withstands them.
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\subsubsection*{Passive attacks}
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-\begin{tightlist}
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-\item \emph{Observing user traffic patterns.} Observations of connection
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- between a user and her first onion router will not reveal to whom
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- the user is connecting or what information is being sent. It will
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- reveal patterns of user traffic (both sent and received). Simple
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- profiling of user connection patterns is not generally possible,
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- however, because multiple application streams may be operating
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- simultaneously or in series over a single circuit. Thus, further
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- processing is necessary to discern even these usage patterns.
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+
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+\emph{Observing user traffic patterns.} Observations of connection
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+between a user and her first onion router will not reveal to whom
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+the user is connecting or what information is being sent. It will
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+reveal patterns of user traffic (both sent and received). Simple
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+profiling of user connection patterns is not generally possible,
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+however, because multiple application streams may be operating
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+simultaneously or in series over a single circuit. Thus, further
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+processing is necessary to discern even these usage patterns.
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-\item \emph{Observing user content.} At the user end, content is
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- encrypted; however, connections from the network to arbitrary
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- websites may not be. Further, a responding website may itself be
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- hostile. Filtering content is not a primary goal of
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- Onion Routing; nonetheless, Tor can directly make use of Privoxy and
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- related filtering services to anonymize application data streams.
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-
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-\item \emph{Option distinguishability.} Configuration options can be a
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- source of distinguishable patterns. In general there is economic
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- incentive to allow preferential services \cite{econymics}, and some
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- degree of configuration choice can attract users, which
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- provide anonymity. So far, however, we have
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- not found a compelling use case in Tor for any client-configurable
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- options. Thus, clients are currently distinguishable only by their
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- behavior.
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+\emph{Observing user content.} At the user end, content is
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+encrypted; however, connections from the network to arbitrary
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+websites may not be. Further, a responding website may itself be
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+hostile. Filtering content is not a primary goal of
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+Onion Routing; nonetheless, Tor can directly make use of Privoxy and
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+related filtering services to anonymize application data streams.
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+
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+\emph{Option distinguishability.} Configuration options can be a
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+source of distinguishable patterns. In general there is economic
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+incentive to allow preferential services \cite{econymics}, and some
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+degree of configuration choice can attract users, which
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+provide anonymity. So far, however, we have
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+not found a compelling use case in Tor for any client-configurable
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+options. Thus, clients are currently distinguishable only by their
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+behavior.
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%XXX Actually, circuitrebuildperiod is such an option. -RD
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-\item \emph{End-to-end Timing correlation.} Tor only minimally hides
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- end-to-end timing correlations. An attacker watching patterns of
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- traffic at the initiator and the responder will be
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- able to confirm the correspondence with high probability. The
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- greatest protection currently available against such confirmation is to hide
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- the connection between the onion proxy and the first Tor node,
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- by running the onion proxy locally or
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- behind a firewall. This approach
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- requires an observer to separate traffic originating at the onion
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- router from traffic passing through it; but because we do not mix
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- or pad, this does not provide much defense.
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+\emph{End-to-end Timing correlation.} Tor only minimally hides
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+end-to-end timing correlations. An attacker watching patterns of
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+traffic at the initiator and the responder will be
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+able to confirm the correspondence with high probability. The
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+greatest protection currently available against such confirmation is to hide
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+the connection between the onion proxy and the first Tor node,
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+by running the onion proxy locally or
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+behind a firewall. This approach
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+requires an observer to separate traffic originating at the onion
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+router from traffic passing through it; but because we do not mix
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+or pad, this does not provide much defense.
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-\item \emph{End-to-end Size correlation.} Simple packet counting
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- without timing correlation will also be effective in confirming
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- endpoints of a stream. However, even without padding, we have some
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- limited protection: the leaky pipe topology means different numbers
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- of packets may enter one end of a circuit than exit at the other.
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+\emph{End-to-end Size correlation.} Simple packet counting
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+without timing correlation will also be effective in confirming
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+endpoints of a stream. However, even without padding, we have some
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+limited protection: the leaky pipe topology means different numbers
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+of packets may enter one end of a circuit than exit at the other.
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-\item \emph{Website fingerprinting.} All the above passive
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- attacks that are at all effective are traffic confirmation attacks.
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- This puts them outside our general design goals. There is also
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- a passive traffic analysis attack that is potentially effective.
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- Rather than searching exit connections for timing and volume
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- correlations, the adversary may build up a database of
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- ``fingerprints'' containing file sizes and access patterns for many
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- interesting websites. He can confirm a user's connection to a given
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- site simply by consulting the database. This attack has
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- been shown to be effective against SafeWeb \cite{hintz-pet02}. But
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- Tor is not as vulnerable as SafeWeb to this attack: there is the
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- possibility that multiple streams are exiting the circuit at
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- different places concurrently. Also, fingerprinting will be limited to
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- the granularity of cells, currently 256 bytes. Other defenses include
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- larger cell sizes and/or minimal padding schemes that group websites
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- into large sets. But this remains an open problem. Link
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- padding or long-range dummies may also make fingerprints harder to
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- detect.\footnote{Note that
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- such fingerprinting should not be confused with the latency attacks
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- of \cite{back01}. Those require a fingerprint of the latencies of
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- all circuits through the network, combined with those from the
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- network edges to the targeted user and the responder website. While
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- these are in principal feasible and surprises are always possible,
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- these constitute a much more complicated attack, and there is no
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- current evidence of their practicality.}
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-
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-%\item \emph{Content analysis.} Tor explicitly provides no content
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-% rewriting for any protocol at a higher level than TCP. When
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-% protocol cleaners are available, however (as Privoxy is for HTTP),
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-% Tor can integrate them to address these attacks.
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-
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-\end{tightlist}
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+\emph{Website fingerprinting.} All the above passive
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+attacks that are at all effective are traffic confirmation attacks.
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+This puts them outside our general design goals. There is also
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+a passive traffic analysis attack that is potentially effective.
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+Rather than searching exit connections for timing and volume
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+correlations, the adversary may build up a database of
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+``fingerprints'' containing file sizes and access patterns for many
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+interesting websites. He can confirm a user's connection to a given
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+site simply by consulting the database. This attack has
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+been shown to be effective against SafeWeb \cite{hintz-pet02}. But
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+Tor is not as vulnerable as SafeWeb to this attack: there is the
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+possibility that multiple streams are exiting the circuit at
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+different places concurrently. Also, fingerprinting will be limited to
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+the granularity of cells, currently 256 bytes. Other defenses include
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+larger cell sizes and/or minimal padding schemes that group websites
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+into large sets. But this remains an open problem. Link
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+padding or long-range dummies may also make fingerprints harder to
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+detect.\footnote{Note that
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+such fingerprinting should not be confused with the latency attacks
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+of \cite{back01}. Those require a fingerprint of the latencies of
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+all circuits through the network, combined with those from the
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+network edges to the targeted user and the responder website. While
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+these are in principal feasible and surprises are always possible,
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+these constitute a much more complicated attack, and there is no
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+current evidence of their practicality.}
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\subsubsection*{Active attacks}
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-\begin{tightlist}
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-\item \emph{Compromise keys.}
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- If a TLS session key is compromised, an attacker
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- can view all the cells on TLS connection until the key is
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- renegotiated. (These cells are themselves encrypted.) If a TLS
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- private key is compromised, the attacker can fool others into
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- thinking that he is the affected OR, but still cannot accept any
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- connections. \\
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- If a circuit session key is compromised, the
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- attacker can unwrap a single layer of encryption from the relay
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- cells traveling along that circuit. (Only nodes on the circuit can
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- see these cells.) If an onion private key is compromised, the attacker
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- can impersonate the OR in circuits, but only if the attacker has
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- also compromised the OR's TLS private key, or is running the
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- previous OR in the circuit. (This compromise affects newly created
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- circuits, but because of perfect forward secrecy, the attacker
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- cannot hijack old circuits without compromising their session keys.)
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- In any case, periodic key rotation limits the window of opportunity
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- for compromising these keys. \\
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- Only by
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- compromising a node's identity key can an attacker replace that
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- node indefinitely, by sending new forged descriptors to the
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- directory servers. Finally, an attacker who can compromise a
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- directory server's identity key can influence every client's view
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- of the network---but only to the degree made possible by gaining a
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- vote with the rest of the the directory servers.
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-
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-\item \emph{Iterated compromise.} A roving adversary who can
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- compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coersion, or extralegal
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- coersion) could march down the circuit compromising the
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- nodes until he reaches the end. Unless the adversary can complete
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- this attack within the lifetime of the circuit, however, the ORs
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- will have discarded the necessary information before the attack can
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- be completed. (Thanks to the perfect forward secrecy of session
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- keys, the attacker cannot force nodes to decrypt recorded
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- traffic once the circuits have been closed.) Additionally, building
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- circuits that cross jurisdictions can make legal coercion
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- harder---this phenomenon is commonly called ``jurisdictional
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- arbitrage.'' The Java Anon Proxy project recently experienced the
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- need for this approach, when
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- the German government successfully ordered them to add a backdoor to
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- all of their nodes \cite{jap-backdoor}.
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-
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-\item \emph{Run a recipient.} By running a Web server, an adversary
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- trivially learns the timing patterns of users connecting to it, and
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- can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses. This can greatly
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- facilitate end-to-end attacks: If the adversary can induce certain
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- users to connect to his webserver (perhaps by advertising
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- content targeted at those users), she now holds one end of their
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- connection. Additionally, there is a danger that the application
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- protocols and associated programs can be induced to reveal
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- information about the initiator. Tor does not aim to solve this problem;
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- we depend on Privoxy and similar protocol cleaners.
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-
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-\item \emph{Run an onion proxy.} It is expected that end users will
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- nearly always run their own local onion proxy. However, in some
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- settings, it may be necessary for the proxy to run
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- remotely---typically, in an institutional setting which wants
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- to monitor the activity of those connecting to the proxy.
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- Compromising an onion proxy means compromising all future connections
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- through it.
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-
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-\item \emph{DoS non-observed nodes.} An observer who can observe some
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- of the Tor network can increase the value of this traffic analysis
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- by attacking non-observed nodes to shut them down, reduce
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- their reliability, or persuade users that they are not trustworthy.
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- The best defense here is robustness.
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+
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+\emph{Compromise keys.}
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+If a TLS session key is compromised, an attacker
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+can view all the cells on TLS connection until the key is
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+renegotiated. (These cells are themselves encrypted.) If a TLS
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+private key is compromised, the attacker can fool others into
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+thinking that he is the affected OR, but still cannot accept any
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+connections. \\
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+If a circuit session key is compromised, the
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+attacker can unwrap a single layer of encryption from the relay
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+cells traveling along that circuit. (Only nodes on the circuit can
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+see these cells.) If an onion private key is compromised, the attacker
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+can impersonate the OR in circuits, but only if the attacker has
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+also compromised the OR's TLS private key, or is running the
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+previous OR in the circuit. (This compromise affects newly created
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+circuits, but because of perfect forward secrecy, the attacker
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+cannot hijack old circuits without compromising their session keys.)
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+In any case, periodic key rotation limits the window of opportunity
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+for compromising these keys. \\
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+Only by
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+compromising a node's identity key can an attacker replace that
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+node indefinitely, by sending new forged descriptors to the
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+directory servers. Finally, an attacker who can compromise a
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+directory server's identity key can influence every client's view
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+of the network---but only to the degree made possible by gaining a
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+vote with the rest of the the directory servers.
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+
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+\emph{Iterated compromise.} A roving adversary who can
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+compromise ORs (by system intrusion, legal coersion, or extralegal
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+coersion) could march down the circuit compromising the
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+nodes until he reaches the end. Unless the adversary can complete
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+this attack within the lifetime of the circuit, however, the ORs
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+will have discarded the necessary information before the attack can
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+be completed. (Thanks to the perfect forward secrecy of session
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+keys, the attacker cannot force nodes to decrypt recorded
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+traffic once the circuits have been closed.) Additionally, building
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+circuits that cross jurisdictions can make legal coercion
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+harder---this phenomenon is commonly called ``jurisdictional
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+arbitrage.'' The Java Anon Proxy project recently experienced the
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+need for this approach, when
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+the German government successfully ordered them to add a backdoor to
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+all of their nodes \cite{jap-backdoor}.
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+
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+\emph{Run a recipient.} By running a Web server, an adversary
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+trivially learns the timing patterns of users connecting to it, and
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+can introduce arbitrary patterns in its responses. This can greatly
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+facilitate end-to-end attacks: If the adversary can induce certain
|
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+users to connect to his webserver (perhaps by advertising
|
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+content targeted at those users), she now holds one end of their
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+connection. Additionally, there is a danger that the application
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+protocols and associated programs can be induced to reveal
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+information about the initiator. Tor does not aim to solve this problem;
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+we depend on Privoxy and similar protocol cleaners.
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-\item \emph{Run a hostile node.} In addition to the abilities of a
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- local observer, an isolated hostile node can create circuits through
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- itself, or alter traffic patterns, to affect traffic at
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- other nodes. Its ability to directly DoS a neighbor is now limited
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- by bandwidth throttling. Nonetheless, in order to compromise the
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- anonymity of the endpoints of a circuit by its observations, a
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- hostile node must be immediately adjacent to that endpoint.
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+\emph{Run an onion proxy.} It is expected that end users will
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+nearly always run their own local onion proxy. However, in some
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+settings, it may be necessary for the proxy to run
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+remotely---typically, in an institutional setting which wants
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+to monitor the activity of those connecting to the proxy.
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+Compromising an onion proxy means compromising all future connections
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+through it.
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+
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+\emph{DoS non-observed nodes.} An observer who can observe some
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+of the Tor network can increase the value of this traffic analysis
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+by attacking non-observed nodes to shut them down, reduce
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+their reliability, or persuade users that they are not trustworthy.
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+The best defense here is robustness.
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-\item \emph{Run multiple hostile nodes.} If an adversary is able to
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- run multiple ORs, and is able to persuade the directory servers
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- that those ORs are trustworthy and independant, then occasionally
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- some user will choose one of those ORs for the start and another
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- as the end of a circuit. When this happens, the user's
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- anonymity is compromised for those streams. If an adversary can
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- control $m$ out of $N$ nodes, he should be able to correlate at most
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- $\left(\frac{m}{N}\right)^2$ of the traffic in this way---although an
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- adversary
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- could possibly attract a disproportionately large amount of traffic
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- by running an exit node with an unusually permissive exit policy.
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-
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-\item \emph{Compromise entire path.} Anyone compromising both
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- endpoints of a circuit can confirm this with high probability. If
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- the entire path is compromised, this becomes a certainty; however,
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- the added benefit to the adversary of such an attack is small in
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- relation to the difficulty.
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+\emph{Run a hostile node.} In addition to the abilities of a
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+local observer, an isolated hostile node can create circuits through
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+itself, or alter traffic patterns, to affect traffic at
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+other nodes. Its ability to directly DoS a neighbor is now limited
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+by bandwidth throttling. Nonetheless, in order to compromise the
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+anonymity of the endpoints of a circuit by its observations, a
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+hostile node must be immediately adjacent to that endpoint.
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-\item \emph{Run a hostile directory server.} Directory servers control
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- admission to the network. However, because the network directory
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- must be signed by a majority of servers, the threat of a single
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- hostile server is minimized.
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+\emph{Run multiple hostile nodes.} If an adversary is able to
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+run multiple ORs, and is able to persuade the directory servers
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+that those ORs are trustworthy and independant, then occasionally
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+some user will choose one of those ORs for the start and another
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+as the end of a circuit. When this happens, the user's
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+anonymity is compromised for those streams. If an adversary can
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+control $m$ out of $N$ nodes, he should be able to correlate at most
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+$\left(\frac{m}{N}\right)^2$ of the traffic in this way---although an
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+adversary
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+could possibly attract a disproportionately large amount of traffic
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+by running an exit node with an unusually permissive exit policy.
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+
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+\emph{Compromise entire path.} Anyone compromising both
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+endpoints of a circuit can confirm this with high probability. If
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+the entire path is compromised, this becomes a certainty; however,
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+the added benefit to the adversary of such an attack is small in
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+relation to the difficulty.
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+
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+\emph{Run a hostile directory server.} Directory servers control
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+admission to the network. However, because the network directory
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+must be signed by a majority of servers, the threat of a single
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+hostile server is minimized.
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-\item \emph{Selectively DoS a Tor node.} As noted, neighbors are
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- bandwidth limited; however, it is possible to open up sufficient
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- circuits that converge at a single onion router to
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- overwhelm its network connection, its ability to process new
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- circuits, or both.
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+\emph{Selectively DoS a Tor node.} As noted, neighbors are
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+bandwidth limited; however, it is possible to open up sufficient
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+circuits that converge at a single onion router to
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+overwhelm its network connection, its ability to process new
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+circuits, or both.
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% We aim to address something like this attack with our congestion
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% control algorithm.
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-\item \emph{Introduce timing into messages.} This is simply a stronger
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- version of passive timing attacks already discussed above.
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+\emph{Introduce timing into messages.} This is simply a stronger
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+version of passive timing attacks already discussed above.
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-\item \emph{Tagging attacks.} A hostile node could ``tag'' a
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- cell by altering it. This would render it unreadable, but if the
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- stream is, for example, an unencrypted request to a Web site,
|
|
|
- the garbled content coming out at the appropriate time could confirm
|
|
|
- the association. However, integrity checks on cells prevent
|
|
|
- this attack.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Replace contents of unauthenticated protocols.} When
|
|
|
- relaying an unauthenticated protocol like HTTP, a hostile exit node
|
|
|
- can impersonate the target server. Thus, whenever possible, clients
|
|
|
- should prefer protocols with end-to-end authentication.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Replay attacks.} Some anonymity protocols are vulnerable
|
|
|
- to replay attacks. Tor is not; replaying one side of a handshake
|
|
|
- will result in a different negotiated session key, and so the rest
|
|
|
- of the recorded session can't be used.
|
|
|
- % ``NonSSL Anonymizer''?
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Smear attacks.} An attacker could use the Tor network to
|
|
|
- engage in socially dissapproved acts, so as to try to bring the
|
|
|
- entire network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down.
|
|
|
- Exit policies can help reduce the possibilities for abuse, but
|
|
|
- ultimately, the network will require volunteers who can tolerate
|
|
|
- some political heat.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Distribute hostile code.} An attacker could trick users
|
|
|
- into running subverted Tor software that did not, in fact, anonymize
|
|
|
- their connections---or worse, trick ORs into running weakened
|
|
|
- software that provided users with less anonymity. We address this
|
|
|
- problem (but do not solve it completely) by signing all Tor releases
|
|
|
- with an official public key, and including an entry in the directory
|
|
|
- describing which versions are currently believed to be secure. To
|
|
|
- prevent an attacker from subverting the official release itself
|
|
|
- (through threats, bribery, or insider attacks), we provide all
|
|
|
- releases in source code form, encourage source audits, and
|
|
|
- frequently warn our users never to trust any software (even from
|
|
|
- us!) that comes without source.
|
|
|
-\end{tightlist}
|
|
|
+\emph{Tagging attacks.} A hostile node could ``tag'' a
|
|
|
+cell by altering it. This would render it unreadable, but if the
|
|
|
+stream is, for example, an unencrypted request to a Web site,
|
|
|
+the garbled content coming out at the appropriate time could confirm
|
|
|
+the association. However, integrity checks on cells prevent
|
|
|
+this attack.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Replace contents of unauthenticated protocols.} When
|
|
|
+relaying an unauthenticated protocol like HTTP, a hostile exit node
|
|
|
+can impersonate the target server. Thus, whenever possible, clients
|
|
|
+should prefer protocols with end-to-end authentication.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Replay attacks.} Some anonymity protocols are vulnerable
|
|
|
+to replay attacks. Tor is not; replaying one side of a handshake
|
|
|
+will result in a different negotiated session key, and so the rest
|
|
|
+of the recorded session can't be used.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Smear attacks.} An attacker could use the Tor network to
|
|
|
+engage in socially dissapproved acts, so as to try to bring the
|
|
|
+entire network into disrepute and get its operators to shut it down.
|
|
|
+Exit policies can help reduce the possibilities for abuse, but
|
|
|
+ultimately, the network will require volunteers who can tolerate
|
|
|
+some political heat.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Distribute hostile code.} An attacker could trick users
|
|
|
+into running subverted Tor software that did not, in fact, anonymize
|
|
|
+their connections---or worse, trick ORs into running weakened
|
|
|
+software that provided users with less anonymity. We address this
|
|
|
+problem (but do not solve it completely) by signing all Tor releases
|
|
|
+with an official public key, and including an entry in the directory
|
|
|
+describing which versions are currently believed to be secure. To
|
|
|
+prevent an attacker from subverting the official release itself
|
|
|
+(through threats, bribery, or insider attacks), we provide all
|
|
|
+releases in source code form, encourage source audits, and
|
|
|
+frequently warn our users never to trust any software (even from
|
|
|
+us!) that comes without source.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\subsubsection*{Directory attacks}
|
|
|
-\begin{tightlist}
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Destroy directory servers.} If a few directory
|
|
|
- servers drop out of operation, the others still arrive at a final
|
|
|
- directory. So long as any directory servers remain in operation,
|
|
|
- they will still broadcast their views of the network and generate a
|
|
|
- consensus directory. (If more than half are destroyed, this
|
|
|
- directory will not, however, have enough signatures for clients to
|
|
|
- use it automatically; human intervention will be necessary for
|
|
|
- clients to decide whether to trust the resulting directory, or continue
|
|
|
- to use the old valid one.)
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Subvert a directory server.} By taking over a directory
|
|
|
- server, an attacker can influence (but not control) the final
|
|
|
- directory. Since ORs are included or excluded by majority vote,
|
|
|
- the corrupt directory can at worst cast a tie-breaking vote to
|
|
|
- decide whether to include marginal ORs. How often such marginal
|
|
|
- cases will occur in practice, however, remains to be seen.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Subvert a majority of directory servers.} If the
|
|
|
- adversary controls more than half of the directory servers, he can
|
|
|
- decide on a final directory, and thus can include as many
|
|
|
- compromised ORs in the final directory as he wishes. Other than
|
|
|
- trying to ensure that directory server operators are truly
|
|
|
- independent and resistant to attack, Tor does not address this
|
|
|
- possibility.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Encourage directory server dissent.} The directory
|
|
|
- agreement protocol requires that directory server operators agree on
|
|
|
- the list of directory servers. An adversary who can persuade some
|
|
|
- of the directory server operators to distrust one another could
|
|
|
- split the quorum into mutually hostile camps, thus partitioning
|
|
|
- users based on which directory they used. Tor does not address
|
|
|
- this attack.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Trick the directory servers into listing a hostile OR.}
|
|
|
- Our threat model explicitly assumes directory server operators will
|
|
|
- be able to filter out most hostile ORs. If this is not true, an
|
|
|
- attacker can flood the directory with compromised servers.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Convince the directories that a malfunctioning OR is
|
|
|
- working.} In the current Tor implementation, directory servers
|
|
|
- assume that if they can start a TLS connection to an an OR, that OR
|
|
|
- must be running correctly. It would be easy for a hostile OR to
|
|
|
- subvert this test by only accepting TLS connections from ORs, and
|
|
|
- ignoring all cells. Thus, directory servers must actively test ORs
|
|
|
- by building circuits and streams as appropriate. The benefits and
|
|
|
- hazards of a similar approach are discussed in \cite{mix-acc}.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\end{tightlist}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-\subsubsection*{Attacks against rendezvous points}
|
|
|
-\begin{tightlist}
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Make many introduction requests.} An attacker could
|
|
|
- attempt to deny Bob service by flooding his Introduction Point with
|
|
|
- requests. Because the introduction point can block requests that
|
|
|
- lack authentication tokens, however, Bob can restrict the volume of
|
|
|
- requests he receives, or require a certain amount of computation for
|
|
|
- every request he receives.
|
|
|
+\emph{Destroy directory servers.} If a few directory
|
|
|
+servers drop out of operation, the others still arrive at a final
|
|
|
+directory. So long as any directory servers remain in operation,
|
|
|
+they will still broadcast their views of the network and generate a
|
|
|
+consensus directory. (If more than half are destroyed, this
|
|
|
+directory will not, however, have enough signatures for clients to
|
|
|
+use it automatically; human intervention will be necessary for
|
|
|
+clients to decide whether to trust the resulting directory, or continue
|
|
|
+to use the old valid one.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Subvert a directory server.} By taking over a directory
|
|
|
+server, an attacker can influence (but not control) the final
|
|
|
+directory. Since ORs are included or excluded by majority vote,
|
|
|
+the corrupt directory can at worst cast a tie-breaking vote to
|
|
|
+decide whether to include marginal ORs. How often such marginal
|
|
|
+cases will occur in practice, however, remains to be seen.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Subvert a majority of directory servers.} If the
|
|
|
+adversary controls more than half of the directory servers, he can
|
|
|
+decide on a final directory, and thus can include as many
|
|
|
+compromised ORs in the final directory as he wishes. Other than
|
|
|
+trying to ensure that directory server operators are truly
|
|
|
+independent and resistant to attack, Tor does not address this
|
|
|
+possibility.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Encourage directory server dissent.} The directory
|
|
|
+agreement protocol requires that directory server operators agree on
|
|
|
+the list of directory servers. An adversary who can persuade some
|
|
|
+of the directory server operators to distrust one another could
|
|
|
+split the quorum into mutually hostile camps, thus partitioning
|
|
|
+users based on which directory they used. Tor does not address
|
|
|
+this attack.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Trick the directory servers into listing a hostile OR.}
|
|
|
+Our threat model explicitly assumes directory server operators will
|
|
|
+be able to filter out most hostile ORs. If this is not true, an
|
|
|
+attacker can flood the directory with compromised servers.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Convince the directories that a malfunctioning OR is
|
|
|
+working.} In the current Tor implementation, directory servers
|
|
|
+assume that if they can start a TLS connection to an an OR, that OR
|
|
|
+must be running correctly. It would be easy for a hostile OR to
|
|
|
+subvert this test by only accepting TLS connections from ORs, and
|
|
|
+ignoring all cells. Thus, directory servers must actively test ORs
|
|
|
+by building circuits and streams as appropriate. The benefits and
|
|
|
+hazards of a similar approach are discussed in \cite{mix-acc}.
|
|
|
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Attack an introduction point.} An attacker could try to
|
|
|
- disrupt a location-hidden service by disabling its introduction
|
|
|
- point. But because a service's identity is attached to its public
|
|
|
- key, not its introduction point, the service can simply re-advertise
|
|
|
- itself at a different introduction point.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Attack multiple introduction points.} If an attacker is
|
|
|
- able to disable all of the introduction points for a given service,
|
|
|
- he can block access to the service. However, re-advertisement of
|
|
|
- introduction points can still be done secretly so that only
|
|
|
- high-priority clients know the address of the service's introduction
|
|
|
- points. These selective secret authorizations can also be issued
|
|
|
- during normal operation. Thus an attacker must disable
|
|
|
- all possible introduction points.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Compromise an introduction point.} If an attacker controls
|
|
|
- an introduction point for a service, it can flood the service with
|
|
|
- introduction requests, or prevent valid introduction requests from
|
|
|
- reaching the hidden server. The server will notice a flooding
|
|
|
- attempt if it receives many introduction requests. To notice
|
|
|
- blocking of valid requests, however, the hidden server should
|
|
|
- periodically test the introduction point by sending its introduction
|
|
|
- requests, and making sure it receives them.
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Compromise a rendezvous point.} Controlling a rendezvous
|
|
|
- point gains an attacker no more than controlling any other OR along
|
|
|
- a circuit, since all data passing along the rendezvous is protected
|
|
|
- by the session key shared by the client and server.
|
|
|
+\subsubsection*{Attacks against rendezvous points}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-\end{tightlist}
|
|
|
+\emph{Make many introduction requests.} An attacker could
|
|
|
+attempt to deny Bob service by flooding his Introduction Point with
|
|
|
+requests. Because the introduction point can block requests that
|
|
|
+lack authentication tokens, however, Bob can restrict the volume of
|
|
|
+requests he receives, or require a certain amount of computation for
|
|
|
+every request he receives.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Attack an introduction point.} An attacker could try to
|
|
|
+disrupt a location-hidden service by disabling its introduction
|
|
|
+point. But because a service's identity is attached to its public
|
|
|
+key, not its introduction point, the service can simply re-advertise
|
|
|
+itself at a different introduction point.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Attack multiple introduction points.} If an attacker is
|
|
|
+able to disable all of the introduction points for a given service,
|
|
|
+he can block access to the service. However, re-advertisement of
|
|
|
+introduction points can still be done secretly so that only
|
|
|
+high-priority clients know the address of the service's introduction
|
|
|
+points. These selective secret authorizations can also be issued
|
|
|
+during normal operation. Thus an attacker must disable
|
|
|
+all possible introduction points.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Compromise an introduction point.} If an attacker controls
|
|
|
+an introduction point for a service, it can flood the service with
|
|
|
+introduction requests, or prevent valid introduction requests from
|
|
|
+reaching the hidden server. The server will notice a flooding
|
|
|
+attempt if it receives many introduction requests. To notice
|
|
|
+blocking of valid requests, however, the hidden server should
|
|
|
+periodically test the introduction point by sending its introduction
|
|
|
+requests, and making sure it receives them.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Compromise a rendezvous point.} Controlling a rendezvous
|
|
|
+point gains an attacker no more than controlling any other OR along
|
|
|
+a circuit, since all data passing along the rendezvous is protected
|
|
|
+by the session key shared by the client and server.
|
|
|
|
|
|
\Section{Open Questions in Low-latency Anonymity}
|
|
|
\label{sec:maintaining-anonymity}
|
|
@@ -1901,57 +1888,61 @@ issues remaining to be ironed out. In particular:
|
|
|
% Many of these (Scalability, cover traffic, morphmix)
|
|
|
% are duplicates from open problems.
|
|
|
%
|
|
|
-\begin{tightlist}
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Scalability:} Tor's emphasis on design simplicity and
|
|
|
- deployability has led us to adopt a clique topology, a
|
|
|
- semi-centralized model for directories and trusts, and a
|
|
|
- full-network-visibility model for client knowledge. None of these
|
|
|
- properties will scale to more than a few hundred servers, at most.
|
|
|
- Promising approaches to better scalability exist (see
|
|
|
- Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}), but more deployment
|
|
|
- experience would be helpful in learning the relative importance of
|
|
|
- these bottlenecks.
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Cover traffic:} Currently we avoid cover traffic because
|
|
|
- of its clear costs in performance and bandwidth, and because its
|
|
|
- security benefits are not well understood. With more research
|
|
|
- \cite{SS03,defensive-dropping}, the price/value ratio may change,
|
|
|
- both for link-level cover traffic and also long-range cover traffic.
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Better directory distribution:} Even with the threshold
|
|
|
- directory agreement algorithm described in Section~\ref{subsec:dirservers},
|
|
|
- the directory servers are still trust bottlenecks. We must find more
|
|
|
- decentralized yet practical ways to distribute up-to-date snapshots of
|
|
|
- network status without introducing new attacks. Also, directory
|
|
|
- retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently
|
|
|
- download a description of the entire network state every 15
|
|
|
- minutes. As the state grows larger and clients more numerous, we
|
|
|
- may need to move to a solution in which clients only receive
|
|
|
- incremental updates to directory state, or where directories are
|
|
|
- cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Scalability:} Tor's emphasis on design simplicity and
|
|
|
+deployability has led us to adopt a clique topology, a
|
|
|
+semi-centralized model for directories and trusts, and a
|
|
|
+full-network-visibility model for client knowledge. None of these
|
|
|
+properties will scale to more than a few hundred servers, at most.
|
|
|
+Promising approaches to better scalability exist (see
|
|
|
+Section~\ref{sec:maintaining-anonymity}), but more deployment
|
|
|
+experience would be helpful in learning the relative importance of
|
|
|
+these bottlenecks.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Cover traffic:} Currently we avoid cover traffic because
|
|
|
+of its clear costs in performance and bandwidth, and because its
|
|
|
+security benefits are not well understood. With more research
|
|
|
+\cite{SS03,defensive-dropping}, the price/value ratio may change,
|
|
|
+both for link-level cover traffic and also long-range cover traffic.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Better directory distribution:} Even with the threshold
|
|
|
+directory agreement algorithm described in Section~\ref{subsec:dirservers},
|
|
|
+the directory servers are still trust bottlenecks. We must find more
|
|
|
+decentralized yet practical ways to distribute up-to-date snapshots of
|
|
|
+network status without introducing new attacks. Also, directory
|
|
|
+retrieval presents a scaling problem, since clients currently
|
|
|
+download a description of the entire network state every 15
|
|
|
+minutes. As the state grows larger and clients more numerous, we
|
|
|
+may need to move to a solution in which clients only receive
|
|
|
+incremental updates to directory state, or where directories are
|
|
|
+cached at the ORs to avoid high loads on the directory servers.
|
|
|
% XXX this is a design paper, not an implementation paper. the design
|
|
|
% says that they're already cached at the ORs. Agree/disagree?
|
|
|
% XXX Agree. -NM
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While
|
|
|
- Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous
|
|
|
- points and location-hidden servers, these features have not yet been
|
|
|
- implemented. While doing so we are likely to encounter additional
|
|
|
- issues that must be resolved, both in terms of usability and anonymity.
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Further specification review:} Although we have a public,
|
|
|
- byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, this protocol has
|
|
|
- not received extensive external review. We hope that as Tor
|
|
|
- becomes more widely deployed, more people will become interested in
|
|
|
- examining our specification.
|
|
|
-\item \emph{Wider-scale deployment:} The original goal of Tor was to
|
|
|
- gain experience in deploying an anonymizing overlay network, and
|
|
|
- learn from having actual users. We are now at the point in design
|
|
|
- and development where we can start deploying a wider network. Once
|
|
|
- we have many actual users, we will doubtlessly be better
|
|
|
- able to evaluate some of our design decisions, including our
|
|
|
- robustness/latency trade-offs, our performance trade-offs (including
|
|
|
- cell size), our abuse-prevention mechanisms, and
|
|
|
- our overall usability.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Implementing location-hidden servers:} While
|
|
|
+Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous} describes a design for rendezvous
|
|
|
+points and location-hidden servers, these features have not yet been
|
|
|
+implemented. While doing so we are likely to encounter additional
|
|
|
+issues that must be resolved, both in terms of usability and anonymity.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Further specification review:} Although we have a public,
|
|
|
+byte-level specification for the Tor protocols, this protocol has
|
|
|
+not received extensive external review. We hope that as Tor
|
|
|
+becomes more widely deployed, more people will become interested in
|
|
|
+examining our specification.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+\emph{Wider-scale deployment:} The original goal of Tor was to
|
|
|
+gain experience in deploying an anonymizing overlay network, and
|
|
|
+learn from having actual users. We are now at the point in design
|
|
|
+and development where we can start deploying a wider network. Once
|
|
|
+we have many actual users, we will doubtlessly be better
|
|
|
+able to evaluate some of our design decisions, including our
|
|
|
+robustness/latency trade-offs, our performance trade-offs (including
|
|
|
+cell size), our abuse-prevention mechanisms, and
|
|
|
+our overall usability.
|
|
|
% XXX large and small cells on same network.
|
|
|
% XXX work with morphmix spec
|
|
|
-\end{tightlist}
|
|
|
|
|
|
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|
|
|
|