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@@ -51,6 +51,71 @@ find /var/log/tor \( \( ! -user debian-tor \) -o \( ! -group adm \) \) -print0 |
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find /var/log/tor -type d -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty chmod 02750
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find /var/log/tor -type f -print0 | xargs -0 --no-run-if-empty chmod 00640
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+
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+move_away_keys=0
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+
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+if [ "$1" = "configure" ] &&
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+ [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys ] &&
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+ [ ! -z "$2" ]; then
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+ if dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.1.2.19-2; then
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+ move_away_keys=1
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+ elif dpkg --compare-versions "$2" gt 0.2.0 &&
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+ dpkg --compare-versions "$2" lt 0.2.0.26-rc; then
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+ move_away_keys=1
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+ fi
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+fi
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+if [ "$move_away_keys" = "1" ]; then
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+ echo "Retiring possibly compromised keys. See /usr/share/doc/tor/NEWS.Debian.gz"
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+ echo "and /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY for"
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+ echo "further information."
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+ if ! [ -d /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package ]; then
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+ mkdir /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package
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+ cat > /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/README.REALLY << EOF
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+It has been discovered that the random number generator in Debian's
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+openssl package is predictable. This is caused by an incorrect
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+Debian-specific change to the openssl package (CVE-2008-0166). As a
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+result, cryptographic key material may be guessable.
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+
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+See Debian Security Advisory number 1571 (DSA-1571) for more information:
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+http://lists.debian.org/debian-security-announce/2008/msg00152.html
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+
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+The Debian package for Tor has moved away the onion keys upon package
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+upgrade, and it will have moved away your identity key if it was created
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+in the affected timeframe. There is no sure way to automatically tell
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+if your key was created with an affected openssl library, so this move
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+is done unconditionally.
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+
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+If you have restarted Tor since this change (and the package probably
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+did that for you already unless you configured your system differently)
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+then the Tor daemon already created new keys for itself and in all
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+likelyhood is already working just fine with new keys.
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+
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+If you are absolutely certain that your identity key was created with
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+a non-affected version of openssl and for some reason you have to retain
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+the old identity, then you can move back the copy of secret_id_key to
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+/var/lib/tor/keys. Do not move back the onion keys, they were created
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+only recently since they are temporary keys with a lifetime of only a few
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+days anyway.
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+
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+Sincerely,
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+Peter Palfrader, Tue, 13 May 2008 13:32:23 +0200
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+EOF
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+ fi
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+ for f in secret_onion_key secret_onion_key.old; do
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+ if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" ]; then
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+ mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/"$f" /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/"$f"
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+ fi
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+ done
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+ if [ -e /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key ]; then
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+ id_mtime=`/usr/bin/stat -c %Y /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key`
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+ sept=`date -d '2006-09-10' +%s`
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+ if [ "$id_mtime" -gt "$sept" ] ; then
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+ mv -v /var/lib/tor/keys/secret_id_key /var/lib/tor/keys/moved-away-by-tor-package/secret_id_key
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+ fi
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+ fi
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+fi
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+
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+
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#DEBHELPER#
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exit 0
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Peter Palfrader