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@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ Tor uses the standard and near-ubiquitous SOCKS
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\cite{socks4,socks5} proxy interface, allowing us to support most TCP-based
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programs without modification. This design change allows Tor to
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use the filtering features of privacy-enhancing
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-application-level proxies such as Privoxy without having to
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+application-level proxies such as Privoxy \cite{privoxy} without having to
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incorporate those features itself.
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\item \textbf{Many TCP streams can share one circuit:} The original
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@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ internet chat, or SSH connections.
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Tor belongs to the second category: \emph{low-latency} designs that attempt
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to anonymize interactive network traffic. Because these protocols typically
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-involve a large number of packets that much be delivered quickly, it is
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+involve a large number of packets that must be delivered quickly, it is
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difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the
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interactive communication from points from correlating the timing and volume
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of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These
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@@ -379,7 +379,7 @@ Some systems, such as Crowds \cite{crowds-tissec}, do not rely changing the
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appearance of packets to hide the path; rather they try to prevent an
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intermediary from knowing when whether it is talking to an ultimate
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initiator, or just another intermediary. Crowds uses no public-key
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-encryption encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all
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+encryption, but the responder and all data are visible to all
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nodes on the path so that anonymity of connection initiator depends on
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filtering all identifying information from the data stream. Crowds only
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supports HTTP traffic.
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@@ -485,7 +485,7 @@ research lacking a generally accepted solution.
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% the enclave-firewall model? -RD
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% I don't think we should. -NM
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\item[No protocol normalization:] Tor does not provide \emph{protocol
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- normalization} Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients
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+ normalization} like Privoxy or the Anonymizer. In order to make clients
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indistinguishable when they complex and variable protocols such as HTTP,
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Tor must be layered with a filtering proxy such as Privoxy to hide
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differences between clients, expunge protocol features that leak identity,
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Peter Palfrader