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@@ -138,8 +138,8 @@ when do we rotate which keys (tls, link, etc)?
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additional fields to existing structures; implementations are constrained
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to ignore fields they do not expect.
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- Parties negotiate OR connection versions as described below in section
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-
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+ Parties negotiate OR connection versions as described below in sections
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+ 4.1 and 4.2.
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2. Connections
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@@ -305,13 +305,22 @@ when do we rotate which keys (tls, link, etc)?
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0 when the other side is recognized as a router running version
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0.1.2.??-alpha or earlier.
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- If a server finds that it wants to send a cell (for example because a
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+ [If a server finds that it wants to send a cell (for example because a
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circuit wants to extend to that client, and the TLS connection
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is already established) yet no cell has arrived yet, we can't
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distinguish between a version 0 client and a slow network. We can't
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assume that the other side approves of version 0, so we can't just
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start using version 0. Perhaps the right answer is to then launch a
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- new TLS connection because you don't have a usable one after all?
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+ new TLS connection because you don't have a usable one after all? -RD]
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+
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+ [That would seem to be thrashy. Let's see if we can do better. Remember,
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+ normal v0 clients always send something after connecting, so if we have
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+ had a connection for a while and gotten nothing over it, we could get away
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+ with assuming it's bad. Alternatively, we could identify V0 clients by
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+ the OU=Tor field in the certificates: we don't check for it, and we never
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+ documented it. We might break other people's clients by sending them
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+ hello cells, but only if those clients are nonconformant. Am I right?
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+ In any case, this seems way more reliable. -NM]
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5. Circuit management
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Nick Mathewson