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@@ -9,12 +9,11 @@
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* \brief The actual details of building circuits.
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**/
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-#define CIRCUIT_PRIVATE
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-
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#include "or.h"
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#include "channel.h"
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#include "circuitbuild.h"
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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+#include "circuitstats.h"
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#include "circuituse.h"
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#include "command.h"
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#include "config.h"
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@@ -24,6 +23,7 @@
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#include "connection_or.h"
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#include "control.h"
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#include "directory.h"
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+#include "entrynodes.h"
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#include "main.h"
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#include "networkstatus.h"
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#include "nodelist.h"
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@@ -36,95 +36,17 @@
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#include "routerlist.h"
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#include "routerparse.h"
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#include "routerset.h"
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-#include "statefile.h"
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#include "crypto.h"
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-#undef log
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-#include <math.h>
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#ifndef MIN
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#define MIN(a,b) ((a)<(b)?(a):(b))
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#endif
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-#define CBT_BIN_TO_MS(bin) ((bin)*CBT_BIN_WIDTH + (CBT_BIN_WIDTH/2))
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-
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/********* START VARIABLES **********/
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-/** Global list of circuit build times */
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-// XXXX: Add this as a member for entry_guard_t instead of global?
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-// Then we could do per-guard statistics, as guards are likely to
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-// vary in their own latency. The downside of this is that guards
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-// can change frequently, so we'd be building a lot more circuits
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-// most likely.
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-/* XXXX024 Make this static; add accessor functions. */
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-circuit_build_times_t circ_times;
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/** A global list of all circuits at this hop. */
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extern circuit_t *global_circuitlist;
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-/** An entry_guard_t represents our information about a chosen long-term
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- * first hop, known as a "helper" node in the literature. We can't just
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- * use a node_t, since we want to remember these even when we
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- * don't have any directory info. */
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-typedef struct {
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- char nickname[MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
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- char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
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- time_t chosen_on_date; /**< Approximately when was this guard added?
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- * "0" if we don't know. */
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- char *chosen_by_version; /**< What tor version added this guard? NULL
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- * if we don't know. */
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- unsigned int made_contact : 1; /**< 0 if we have never connected to this
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- * router, 1 if we have. */
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- unsigned int can_retry : 1; /**< Should we retry connecting to this entry,
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- * in spite of having it marked as unreachable?*/
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- unsigned int path_bias_notice : 1; /**< Did we alert the user about path bias
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- * for this node already? */
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- unsigned int path_bias_disabled : 1; /**< Have we disabled this node because
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- * of path bias issues? */
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- time_t bad_since; /**< 0 if this guard is currently usable, or the time at
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- * which it was observed to become (according to the
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- * directory or the user configuration) unusable. */
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- time_t unreachable_since; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the
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- * time at which we first noticed we couldn't
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- * connect to it. */
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- time_t last_attempted; /**< 0 if we can connect to this guard, or the time
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- * at which we last failed to connect to it. */
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-
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- unsigned first_hops; /**< Number of first hops this guard has completed */
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- unsigned circuit_successes; /**< Number of successfully built circuits using
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- * this guard as first hop. */
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-} entry_guard_t;
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-
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-/** Information about a configured bridge. Currently this just matches the
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- * ones in the torrc file, but one day we may be able to learn about new
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- * bridges on our own, and remember them in the state file. */
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-typedef struct {
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- /** Address of the bridge. */
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- tor_addr_t addr;
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- /** TLS port for the bridge. */
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- uint16_t port;
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- /** Boolean: We are re-parsing our bridge list, and we are going to remove
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- * this one if we don't find it in the list of configured bridges. */
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- unsigned marked_for_removal : 1;
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- /** Expected identity digest, or all zero bytes if we don't know what the
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- * digest should be. */
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- char identity[DIGEST_LEN];
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-
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- /** Name of pluggable transport protocol taken from its config line. */
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- char *transport_name;
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-
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- /** When should we next try to fetch a descriptor for this bridge? */
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- download_status_t fetch_status;
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-} bridge_info_t;
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-
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-/** A list of our chosen entry guards. */
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-static smartlist_t *entry_guards = NULL;
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-/** A value of 1 means that the entry_guards list has changed
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- * and those changes need to be flushed to disk. */
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-static int entry_guards_dirty = 0;
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-
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-/** If set, we're running the unit tests: we should avoid clobbering
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- * our state file or accessing get_options() or get_or_state() */
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-static int unit_tests = 0;
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-
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/********* END VARIABLES ************/
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static channel_t * channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr,
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@@ -137,12 +59,6 @@ static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath);
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static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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static int count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *routers);
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static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice);
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-
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-static void entry_guards_changed(void);
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-static entry_guard_t *entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest);
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-
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-static void bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge);
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-
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static int entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
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static void pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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@@ -162,5741 +78,2331 @@ channel_connect_for_circuit(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
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return chan;
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}
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-/**
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- * This function decides if CBT learning should be disabled. It returns
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- * true if one or more of the following four conditions are met:
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+/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id,
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+ * and with the high bit specified by conn-\>circ_id_type, until we get
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+ * a circ_id that is not in use by any other circuit on that conn.
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*
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- * 1. If the cbtdisabled consensus parameter is set.
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- * 2. If the torrc option LearnCircuitBuildTimeout is false.
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- * 3. If we are a directory authority
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- * 4. If we fail to write circuit build time history to our state file.
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+ * Return it, or 0 if can't get a unique circ_id.
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*/
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-static int
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-circuit_build_times_disabled(void)
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+static circid_t
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+get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan)
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{
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- if (unit_tests) {
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+ circid_t test_circ_id;
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+ circid_t attempts=0;
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+ circid_t high_bit;
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+
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+ tor_assert(chan);
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+
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+ if (chan->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER) {
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+ log_warn(LD_BUG,
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+ "Trying to pick a circuit ID for a connection from "
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+ "a client with no identity.");
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return 0;
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- } else {
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- int consensus_disabled = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtdisabled",
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- 0, 0, 1);
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- int config_disabled = !get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout;
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- int dirauth_disabled = get_options()->AuthoritativeDir;
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- int state_disabled = did_last_state_file_write_fail() ? 1 : 0;
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-
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- if (consensus_disabled || config_disabled || dirauth_disabled ||
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- state_disabled) {
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- log_debug(LD_CIRC,
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- "CircuitBuildTime learning is disabled. "
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- "Consensus=%d, Config=%d, AuthDir=%d, StateFile=%d",
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- consensus_disabled, config_disabled, dirauth_disabled,
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- state_disabled);
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- return 1;
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- } else {
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- log_debug(LD_CIRC,
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- "CircuitBuildTime learning is not disabled. "
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- "Consensus=%d, Config=%d, AuthDir=%d, StateFile=%d",
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- consensus_disabled, config_disabled, dirauth_disabled,
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- state_disabled);
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+ }
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+ high_bit =
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+ (chan->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ? 1<<15 : 0;
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+ do {
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+ /* Sequentially iterate over test_circ_id=1...1<<15-1 until we find a
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+ * circID such that (high_bit|test_circ_id) is not already used. */
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+ test_circ_id = chan->next_circ_id++;
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+ if (test_circ_id == 0 || test_circ_id >= 1<<15) {
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+ test_circ_id = 1;
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+ chan->next_circ_id = 2;
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+ }
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+ if (++attempts > 1<<15) {
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+ /* Make sure we don't loop forever if all circ_id's are used. This
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+ * matters because it's an external DoS opportunity.
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+ */
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+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"No unused circ IDs. Failing.");
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return 0;
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}
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- }
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+ test_circ_id |= high_bit;
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+ } while (circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(test_circ_id, chan));
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+ return test_circ_id;
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}
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-/**
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- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmaxtimeouts consensus paramter.
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- *
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- * Effect: When this many timeouts happen in the last 'cbtrecentcount'
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- * circuit attempts, the client should discard all of its history and
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- * begin learning a fresh timeout value.
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+/** If <b>verbose</b> is false, allocate and return a comma-separated list of
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+ * the currently built elements of <b>circ</b>. If <b>verbose</b> is true, also
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+ * list information about link status in a more verbose format using spaces.
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+ * If <b>verbose_names</b> is false, give nicknames for Named routers and hex
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+ * digests for others; if <b>verbose_names</b> is true, use $DIGEST=Name style
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+ * names.
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*/
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-static int32_t
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-circuit_build_times_max_timeouts(void)
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+static char *
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+circuit_list_path_impl(origin_circuit_t *circ, int verbose, int verbose_names)
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{
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- int32_t cbt_maxtimeouts;
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-
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- cbt_maxtimeouts = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtmaxtimeouts",
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- CBT_DEFAULT_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT,
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- CBT_MIN_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT,
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- CBT_MAX_MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT);
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-
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- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
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- log_debug(LD_BUG,
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- "circuit_build_times_max_timeouts() called, cbtmaxtimeouts is"
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- " %d",
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- cbt_maxtimeouts);
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- }
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+ crypt_path_t *hop;
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+ smartlist_t *elements;
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+ const char *states[] = {"closed", "waiting for keys", "open"};
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+ char *s;
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- return cbt_maxtimeouts;
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-}
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+ elements = smartlist_new();
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-/**
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- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtnummodes consensus paramter.
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- *
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- * Effect: This value governs how many modes to use in the weighted
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- * average calculation of Pareto parameter Xm. A value of 3 introduces
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- * some bias (2-5% of CDF) under ideal conditions, but allows for better
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- * performance in the event that a client chooses guard nodes of radically
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- * different performance characteristics.
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- */
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-static int32_t
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-circuit_build_times_default_num_xm_modes(void)
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-{
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- int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtnummodes",
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- CBT_DEFAULT_NUM_XM_MODES,
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- CBT_MIN_NUM_XM_MODES,
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- CBT_MAX_NUM_XM_MODES);
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-
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- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
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- log_debug(LD_BUG,
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- "circuit_build_times_default_num_xm_modes() called, cbtnummodes"
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- " is %d",
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- num);
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+ if (verbose) {
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+ const char *nickname = build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state);
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+ smartlist_add_asprintf(elements, "%s%s circ (length %d%s%s):",
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+ circ->build_state->is_internal ? "internal" : "exit",
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+ circ->build_state->need_uptime ? " (high-uptime)" : "",
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+ circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
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+ circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : ", last hop ",
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+ circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" :
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+ (nickname?nickname:"*unnamed*"));
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}
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- return num;
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-}
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-
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-/**
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- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmincircs consensus paramter.
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- *
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- * Effect: This is the minimum number of circuits to build before
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- * computing a timeout.
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- */
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-static int32_t
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-circuit_build_times_min_circs_to_observe(void)
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-{
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- int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtmincircs",
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- CBT_DEFAULT_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE,
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- CBT_MIN_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE,
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- CBT_MAX_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE);
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-
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- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
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- log_debug(LD_BUG,
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- "circuit_build_times_min_circs_to_observe() called, cbtmincircs"
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- " is %d",
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- num);
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- }
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+ hop = circ->cpath;
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+ do {
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+ char *elt;
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+ const char *id;
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+ const node_t *node;
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+ if (!hop)
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+ break;
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+ if (!verbose && hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
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+ break;
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+ if (!hop->extend_info)
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+ break;
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+ id = hop->extend_info->identity_digest;
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+ if (verbose_names) {
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+ elt = tor_malloc(MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
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+ if ((node = node_get_by_id(id))) {
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+ node_get_verbose_nickname(node, elt);
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+ } else if (is_legal_nickname(hop->extend_info->nickname)) {
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+ elt[0] = '$';
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+ base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, id, DIGEST_LEN);
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+ elt[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]= '~';
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+ strlcpy(elt+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2,
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+ hop->extend_info->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
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+ } else {
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+ elt[0] = '$';
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+ base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, id, DIGEST_LEN);
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+ }
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+ } else { /* ! verbose_names */
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+ node = node_get_by_id(id);
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+ if (node && node_is_named(node)) {
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+ elt = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(node));
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+ } else {
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+ elt = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
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+ elt[0] = '$';
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+ base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, id, DIGEST_LEN);
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+ }
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+ }
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+ tor_assert(elt);
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+ if (verbose) {
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+ tor_assert(hop->state <= 2);
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+ smartlist_add_asprintf(elements,"%s(%s)",elt,states[hop->state]);
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+ tor_free(elt);
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+ } else {
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+ smartlist_add(elements, elt);
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+ }
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+ hop = hop->next;
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+ } while (hop != circ->cpath);
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- return num;
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+ s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, verbose?" ":",", 0, NULL);
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+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
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+ smartlist_free(elements);
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+ return s;
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}
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-/** Return true iff <b>cbt</b> has recorded enough build times that we
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- * want to start acting on the timeout it implies. */
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-int
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-circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
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+/** If <b>verbose</b> is false, allocate and return a comma-separated
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+ * list of the currently built elements of <b>circ</b>. If
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+ * <b>verbose</b> is true, also list information about link status in
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+ * a more verbose format using spaces.
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+ */
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+char *
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+circuit_list_path(origin_circuit_t *circ, int verbose)
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{
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- return cbt->total_build_times >= circuit_build_times_min_circs_to_observe();
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+ return circuit_list_path_impl(circ, verbose, 0);
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}
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|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtquantile consensus paramter.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Effect: This is the position on the quantile curve to use to set the
|
|
|
- * timeout value. It is a percent (10-99).
|
|
|
+/** Allocate and return a comma-separated list of the currently built elements
|
|
|
+ * of <b>circ</b>, giving each as a verbose nickname.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-double
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff(void)
|
|
|
+char *
|
|
|
+circuit_list_path_for_controller(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtquantile",
|
|
|
- CBT_DEFAULT_QUANTILE_CUTOFF,
|
|
|
- CBT_MIN_QUANTILE_CUTOFF,
|
|
|
- CBT_MAX_QUANTILE_CUTOFF);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff() called, cbtquantile"
|
|
|
- " is %d",
|
|
|
- num);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return num/100.0;
|
|
|
+ return circuit_list_path_impl(circ, 0, 1);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* DOCDOC circuit_build_times_get_bw_scale */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_get_bw_scale(networkstatus_t *ns)
|
|
|
+/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, the nicknames of each router in
|
|
|
+ * <b>circ</b>'s cpath. Also log the length of the cpath, and the intended
|
|
|
+ * exit point.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+void
|
|
|
+circuit_log_path(int severity, unsigned int domain, origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- return networkstatus_get_param(ns, "bwweightscale",
|
|
|
- BW_WEIGHT_SCALE,
|
|
|
- BW_MIN_WEIGHT_SCALE,
|
|
|
- BW_MAX_WEIGHT_SCALE);
|
|
|
+ char *s = circuit_list_path(circ,1);
|
|
|
+ tor_log(severity,domain,"%s",s);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(s);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtclosequantile consensus paramter.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Effect: This is the position on the quantile curve to use to set the
|
|
|
- * timeout value to use to actually close circuits. It is a percent
|
|
|
- * (0-99).
|
|
|
+/** Tell the rep(utation)hist(ory) module about the status of the links
|
|
|
+ * in <b>circ</b>. Hops that have become OPEN are marked as successfully
|
|
|
+ * extended; the _first_ hop that isn't open (if any) is marked as
|
|
|
+ * unable to extend.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-static double
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_close_quantile(void)
|
|
|
+/* XXXX Someday we should learn from OR circuits too. */
|
|
|
+void
|
|
|
+circuit_rep_hist_note_result(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int32_t param;
|
|
|
- /* Cast is safe - circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff() is capped */
|
|
|
- int32_t min = (int)tor_lround(100*circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff());
|
|
|
- param = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtclosequantile",
|
|
|
- CBT_DEFAULT_CLOSE_QUANTILE,
|
|
|
- CBT_MIN_CLOSE_QUANTILE,
|
|
|
- CBT_MAX_CLOSE_QUANTILE);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "circuit_build_times_close_quantile() called, cbtclosequantile"
|
|
|
- " is %d", param);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (param < min) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_DIR, "Consensus parameter cbtclosequantile is "
|
|
|
- "too small, raising to %d", min);
|
|
|
- param = min;
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
+ const char *prev_digest = NULL;
|
|
|
+ hop = circ->cpath;
|
|
|
+ if (!hop) /* circuit hasn't started building yet. */
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ if (server_mode(get_options())) {
|
|
|
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
|
+ if (!me)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ prev_digest = me->cache_info.identity_digest;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- return param / 100.0;
|
|
|
+ do {
|
|
|
+ const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(hop->extend_info->identity_digest);
|
|
|
+ if (node) { /* Why do we check this? We know the identity. -NM XXXX */
|
|
|
+ if (prev_digest) {
|
|
|
+ if (hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
|
+ rep_hist_note_extend_succeeded(prev_digest, node->identity);
|
|
|
+ else {
|
|
|
+ rep_hist_note_extend_failed(prev_digest, node->identity);
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ prev_digest = node->identity;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ prev_digest = NULL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ hop=hop->next;
|
|
|
+ } while (hop!=circ->cpath);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbttestfreq consensus paramter.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Effect: Describes how often in seconds to build a test circuit to
|
|
|
- * gather timeout values. Only applies if less than 'cbtmincircs'
|
|
|
- * have been recorded.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static int32_t
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_test_frequency(void)
|
|
|
+/** Pick all the entries in our cpath. Stop and return 0 when we're
|
|
|
+ * happy, or return -1 if an error occurs. */
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbttestfreq",
|
|
|
- CBT_DEFAULT_TEST_FREQUENCY,
|
|
|
- CBT_MIN_TEST_FREQUENCY,
|
|
|
- CBT_MAX_TEST_FREQUENCY);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "circuit_build_times_test_frequency() called, cbttestfreq is %d",
|
|
|
- num);
|
|
|
+ int r;
|
|
|
+ again:
|
|
|
+ r = onion_extend_cpath(circ);
|
|
|
+ if (r < 0) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Generating cpath hop failed.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return num;
|
|
|
+ if (r == 0)
|
|
|
+ goto again;
|
|
|
+ return 0; /* if r == 1 */
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtmintimeout consensus parameter.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Effect: This is the minimum allowed timeout value in milliseconds.
|
|
|
- * The minimum is to prevent rounding to 0 (we only check once
|
|
|
- * per second).
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static int32_t
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_min_timeout(void)
|
|
|
+/** Create and return a new origin circuit. Initialize its purpose and
|
|
|
+ * build-state based on our arguments. The <b>flags</b> argument is a
|
|
|
+ * bitfield of CIRCLAUNCH_* flags. */
|
|
|
+origin_circuit_t *
|
|
|
+origin_circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int flags)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int32_t num = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtmintimeout",
|
|
|
- CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE,
|
|
|
- CBT_MIN_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE,
|
|
|
- CBT_MAX_TIMEOUT_MIN_VALUE);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "circuit_build_times_min_timeout() called, cbtmintimeout is %d",
|
|
|
- num);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return num;
|
|
|
+ /* sets circ->p_circ_id and circ->p_chan */
|
|
|
+ origin_circuit_t *circ = origin_circuit_new();
|
|
|
+ circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT);
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel =
|
|
|
+ ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state->need_uptime =
|
|
|
+ ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state->need_capacity =
|
|
|
+ ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state->is_internal =
|
|
|
+ ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
+ circ->base_.purpose = purpose;
|
|
|
+ return circ;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtinitialtimeout consensus paramter.
|
|
|
+/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>exit</b>
|
|
|
+ * is defined, then use that as your exit router, else choose a suitable
|
|
|
+ * exit node.
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * Effect: This is the timeout value to use before computing a timeout,
|
|
|
- * in milliseconds.
|
|
|
+ * Also launch a connection to the first OR in the chosen path, if
|
|
|
+ * it's not open already.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-int32_t
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_initial_timeout(void)
|
|
|
+origin_circuit_t *
|
|
|
+circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, int flags)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int32_t min = circuit_build_times_min_timeout();
|
|
|
- int32_t param = networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "cbtinitialtimeout",
|
|
|
- CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE,
|
|
|
- CBT_MIN_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE,
|
|
|
- CBT_MAX_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "circuit_build_times_initial_timeout() called, "
|
|
|
- "cbtinitialtimeout is %d",
|
|
|
- param);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
+ int err_reason = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (param < min) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_DIR, "Consensus parameter cbtinitialtimeout is too small, "
|
|
|
- "raising to %d", min);
|
|
|
- param = min;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return param;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ circ = origin_circuit_init(purpose, flags);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Retrieve and bounds-check the cbtrecentcount consensus paramter.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Effect: This is the number of circuit build times to keep track of
|
|
|
- * for deciding if we hit cbtmaxtimeouts and need to reset our state
|
|
|
- * and learn a new timeout.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static int32_t
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_recent_circuit_count(networkstatus_t *ns)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int32_t num;
|
|
|
- num = networkstatus_get_param(ns, "cbtrecentcount",
|
|
|
- CBT_DEFAULT_RECENT_CIRCUITS,
|
|
|
- CBT_MIN_RECENT_CIRCUITS,
|
|
|
- CBT_MAX_RECENT_CIRCUITS);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!(get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout)) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "circuit_build_times_recent_circuit_count() called, "
|
|
|
- "cbtrecentcount is %d",
|
|
|
- num);
|
|
|
+ if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit) < 0 ||
|
|
|
+ onion_populate_cpath(circ) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH);
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return num;
|
|
|
+ control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if ((err_reason = circuit_handle_first_hop(circ)) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason);
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ return circ;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * This function is called when we get a consensus update.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * It checks to see if we have changed any consensus parameters
|
|
|
- * that require reallocation or discard of previous stats.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_new_consensus_params(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- networkstatus_t *ns)
|
|
|
+/** Start establishing the first hop of our circuit. Figure out what
|
|
|
+ * OR we should connect to, and if necessary start the connection to
|
|
|
+ * it. If we're already connected, then send the 'create' cell.
|
|
|
+ * Return 0 for ok, -reason if circ should be marked-for-close. */
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int32_t num;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * First check if we're doing adaptive timeouts at all; nothing to
|
|
|
- * update if we aren't.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
|
|
|
- num = circuit_build_times_recent_circuit_count(ns);
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *firsthop;
|
|
|
+ channel_t *n_chan;
|
|
|
+ int err_reason = 0;
|
|
|
+ const char *msg = NULL;
|
|
|
+ int should_launch = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (num > 0) {
|
|
|
- if (num != cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs) {
|
|
|
- int8_t *recent_circs;
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_CIRC, "The Tor Directory Consensus has changed how many "
|
|
|
- "circuits we must track to detect network failures from %d "
|
|
|
- "to %d.", cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs, num);
|
|
|
+ firsthop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(firsthop);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(firsthop->extend_info);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- tor_assert(cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop ||
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs == 0);
|
|
|
+ /* now see if we're already connected to the first OR in 'route' */
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Looking for firsthop '%s'",
|
|
|
+ fmt_addrport(&firsthop->extend_info->addr,
|
|
|
+ firsthop->extend_info->port));
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * Technically this is a circular array that we are reallocating
|
|
|
- * and memcopying. However, since it only consists of either 1s
|
|
|
- * or 0s, and is only used in a statistical test to determine when
|
|
|
- * we should discard our history after a sufficient number of 1's
|
|
|
- * have been reached, it is fine if order is not preserved or
|
|
|
- * elements are lost.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * cbtrecentcount should only be changing in cases of severe network
|
|
|
- * distress anyway, so memory correctness here is paramount over
|
|
|
- * doing acrobatics to preserve the array.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- recent_circs = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(int8_t)*num);
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop &&
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs > 0) {
|
|
|
- memcpy(recent_circs, cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop,
|
|
|
- sizeof(int8_t)*MIN(num, cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs));
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ n_chan = channel_get_for_extend(firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest,
|
|
|
+ &firsthop->extend_info->addr,
|
|
|
+ &msg,
|
|
|
+ &should_launch);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- // Adjust the index if it needs it.
|
|
|
- if (num < cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs) {
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx = MIN(num-1,
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ if (!n_chan) {
|
|
|
+ /* not currently connected in a useful way. */
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Next router is %s: %s",
|
|
|
+ safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(firsthop->extend_info)),
|
|
|
+ msg?msg:"???");
|
|
|
+ circ->base_.n_hop = extend_info_dup(firsthop->extend_info);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- tor_free(cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop);
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop = recent_circs;
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs = num;
|
|
|
+ if (should_launch) {
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
|
+ control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_DIR, 0);
|
|
|
+ n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(
|
|
|
+ &firsthop->extend_info->addr,
|
|
|
+ firsthop->extend_info->port,
|
|
|
+ firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest);
|
|
|
+ if (!n_chan) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing.");
|
|
|
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- /* else no change, nothing to do */
|
|
|
- } else { /* num == 0 */
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * Weird. This probably shouldn't happen, so log a warning, but try
|
|
|
- * to do something sensible anyway.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "The cbtrecentcircs consensus parameter came back zero! "
|
|
|
- "This disables adaptive timeouts since we can't keep track of "
|
|
|
- "any recent circuits.");
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(cbt);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * Adaptive timeouts are disabled; this might be because of the
|
|
|
- * LearnCircuitBuildTimes config parameter, and hence permanent, or
|
|
|
- * the cbtdisabled consensus parameter, so it may be a new condition.
|
|
|
- * Treat it like getting num == 0 above and free the circuit history
|
|
|
- * if we have any.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(cbt);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Make a note that we're running unit tests (rather than running Tor
|
|
|
- * itself), so we avoid clobbering our state file. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuitbuild_running_unit_tests(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- unit_tests = 1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Return the initial default or configured timeout in milliseconds
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static double
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- double timeout;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * Check if we have LearnCircuitBuildTimeout, and if we don't,
|
|
|
- * always use CircuitBuildTimeout, no questions asked.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- if (get_options()->LearnCircuitBuildTimeout) {
|
|
|
- if (!unit_tests && get_options()->CircuitBuildTimeout) {
|
|
|
- timeout = get_options()->CircuitBuildTimeout*1000;
|
|
|
- if (timeout < circuit_build_times_min_timeout()) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Config CircuitBuildTimeout too low. Setting to %ds",
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_min_timeout()/1000);
|
|
|
- timeout = circuit_build_times_min_timeout();
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- timeout = circuit_build_times_initial_timeout();
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
|
|
|
+ /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
|
|
|
+ * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches
|
|
|
+ * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ } else { /* it's already open. use it. */
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(!circ->base_.n_hop);
|
|
|
+ circ->base_.n_chan = n_chan;
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Conn open. Delivering first onion skin.");
|
|
|
+ if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ)) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed.");
|
|
|
+ return err_reason;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- timeout = get_options()->CircuitBuildTimeout*1000;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return timeout;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Reset the build time state.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Leave estimated parameters, timeout and network liveness intact
|
|
|
- * for future use.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_reset(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- memset(cbt->circuit_build_times, 0, sizeof(cbt->circuit_build_times));
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times = 0;
|
|
|
- cbt->build_times_idx = 0;
|
|
|
- cbt->have_computed_timeout = 0;
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Initialize the buildtimes structure for first use.
|
|
|
+/** Find any circuits that are waiting on <b>or_conn</b> to become
|
|
|
+ * open and get them to send their create cells forward.
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * Sets the initial timeout values based on either the config setting,
|
|
|
- * the consensus param, or the default (CBT_DEFAULT_TIMEOUT_INITIAL_VALUE).
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_init(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- memset(cbt, 0, sizeof(*cbt));
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * Check if we really are using adaptive timeouts, and don't keep
|
|
|
- * track of this stuff if not.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs =
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_recent_circuit_count(NULL);
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop =
|
|
|
- tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(int8_t)*cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs = 0;
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop = NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
|
|
|
- control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Free the saved timeouts, if the cbtdisabled consensus parameter got turned
|
|
|
- * on or something.
|
|
|
+ * Status is 1 if connect succeeded, or 0 if connect failed.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
+circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (!cbt) return;
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *pending_circs;
|
|
|
+ int err_reason = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop) {
|
|
|
- tor_free(cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs = 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"chan to %s/%s, status=%d",
|
|
|
+ chan->nickname ? chan->nickname : "NULL",
|
|
|
+ channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(chan), status);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-#if 0
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Rewind our build time history by n positions.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_rewind_history(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, int n)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int i = 0;
|
|
|
+ pending_circs = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
+ circuit_get_all_pending_on_channel(pending_circs, chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cbt->build_times_idx -= n;
|
|
|
- cbt->build_times_idx %= CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE;
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(pending_circs, circuit_t *, circ)
|
|
|
+ {
|
|
|
+ /* These checks are redundant wrt get_all_pending_on_or_conn, but I'm
|
|
|
+ * leaving them in in case it's possible for the status of a circuit to
|
|
|
+ * change as we're going down the list. */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->marked_for_close || circ->n_chan || !circ->n_hop ||
|
|
|
+ circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT)
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
|
|
|
- cbt->circuit_build_times[(i+cbt->build_times_idx)
|
|
|
- %CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE]=0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(circ->n_hop->identity_digest)) {
|
|
|
+ /* Look at addr/port. This is an unkeyed connection. */
|
|
|
+ if (!channel_matches_extend_info(chan, circ->n_hop))
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ /* We expected a key. See if it's the right one. */
|
|
|
+ if (tor_memneq(chan->identity_digest,
|
|
|
+ circ->n_hop->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (!status) { /* chan failed; close circ */
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Channel failed; closing circ.");
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED);
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found circ, sending create cell.");
|
|
|
+ /* circuit_deliver_create_cell will set n_circ_id and add us to
|
|
|
+ * chan_circuid_circuit_map, so we don't need to call
|
|
|
+ * set_circid_chan here. */
|
|
|
+ circ->n_chan = chan;
|
|
|
+ extend_info_free(circ->n_hop);
|
|
|
+ circ->n_hop = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (cbt->total_build_times > n) {
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times -= n;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times = 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
|
+ if ((err_reason =
|
|
|
+ circuit_send_next_onion_skin(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ))) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
+ "send_next_onion_skin failed; circuit marked for closing.");
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, -err_reason);
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ /* XXX could this be bad, eg if next_onion_skin failed because conn
|
|
|
+ * died? */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ /* pull the create cell out of circ->onionskin, and send it */
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ->n_chan_onionskin);
|
|
|
+ if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ,CELL_CREATE,
|
|
|
+ circ->n_chan_onionskin)<0) {
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ tor_free(circ->n_chan_onionskin);
|
|
|
+ circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Rewound history by %d places. Current index: %d. "
|
|
|
- "Total: %d", n, cbt->build_times_idx, cbt->total_build_times);
|
|
|
+ smartlist_free(pending_circs);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-#endif
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Add a new build time value <b>time</b> to the set of build times. Time
|
|
|
- * units are milliseconds.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * circuit_build_times <b>cbt</b> is a circular array, so loop around when
|
|
|
- * array is full.
|
|
|
+/** Find a new circid that isn't currently in use on the circ->n_chan
|
|
|
+ * for the outgoing
|
|
|
+ * circuit <b>circ</b>, and deliver a cell of type <b>cell_type</b>
|
|
|
+ * (either CELL_CREATE or CELL_CREATE_FAST) with payload <b>payload</b>
|
|
|
+ * to this circuit.
|
|
|
+ * Return -1 if we failed to find a suitable circid, else return 0.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_add_time(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, build_time_t time)
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type,
|
|
|
+ const char *payload)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (time <= 0 || time > CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Circuit build time is too large (%u)."
|
|
|
- "This is probably a bug.", time);
|
|
|
- tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
+ cell_t cell;
|
|
|
+ circid_t id;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ->n_chan);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(payload);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(cell_type == CELL_CREATE || cell_type == CELL_CREATE_FAST);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ id = get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(circ->n_chan);
|
|
|
+ if (!id) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to get unique circID.");
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen circID %u.", id);
|
|
|
+ circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circ, id, circ->n_chan);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Adding circuit build time %u", time);
|
|
|
+ memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
|
+ cell.command = cell_type;
|
|
|
+ cell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cbt->circuit_build_times[cbt->build_times_idx] = time;
|
|
|
- cbt->build_times_idx = (cbt->build_times_idx + 1) % CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE;
|
|
|
- if (cbt->total_build_times < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE)
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times++;
|
|
|
+ memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circ, circ->n_chan, &cell,
|
|
|
+ CELL_DIRECTION_OUT, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if ((cbt->total_build_times % CBT_SAVE_STATE_EVERY) == 0) {
|
|
|
- /* Save state every n circuit builds */
|
|
|
- if (!unit_tests && !get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
|
|
|
- or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0);
|
|
|
+ if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
|
+ /* mark it so it gets better rate limiting treatment. */
|
|
|
+ channel_timestamp_client(circ->n_chan);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Return maximum circuit build time
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static build_time_t
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_max(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
+/** We've decided to start our reachability testing. If all
|
|
|
+ * is set, log this to the user. Return 1 if we did, or 0 if
|
|
|
+ * we chose not to log anything. */
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+inform_testing_reachability(void)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int i = 0;
|
|
|
- build_time_t max_build_time = 0;
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] > max_build_time
|
|
|
- && cbt->circuit_build_times[i] != CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED)
|
|
|
- max_build_time = cbt->circuit_build_times[i];
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return max_build_time;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-#if 0
|
|
|
-/** Return minimum circuit build time */
|
|
|
-build_time_t
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_min(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int i = 0;
|
|
|
- build_time_t min_build_time = CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX;
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] && /* 0 <-> uninitialized */
|
|
|
- cbt->circuit_build_times[i] < min_build_time)
|
|
|
- min_build_time = cbt->circuit_build_times[i];
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (min_build_time == CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC, "No build times less than CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX!");
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return min_build_time;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-#endif
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Calculate and return a histogram for the set of build times.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Returns an allocated array of histrogram bins representing
|
|
|
- * the frequency of index*CBT_BIN_WIDTH millisecond
|
|
|
- * build times. Also outputs the number of bins in nbins.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * The return value must be freed by the caller.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static uint32_t *
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_create_histogram(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- build_time_t *nbins)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- uint32_t *histogram;
|
|
|
- build_time_t max_build_time = circuit_build_times_max(cbt);
|
|
|
- int i, c;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- *nbins = 1 + (max_build_time / CBT_BIN_WIDTH);
|
|
|
- histogram = tor_malloc_zero(*nbins * sizeof(build_time_t));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- // calculate histogram
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] == 0
|
|
|
- || cbt->circuit_build_times[i] == CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED)
|
|
|
- continue; /* 0 <-> uninitialized */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- c = (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] / CBT_BIN_WIDTH);
|
|
|
- histogram[c]++;
|
|
|
+ char dirbuf[128];
|
|
|
+ const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
|
+ if (!me)
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
|
+ "CHECKING_REACHABILITY ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
|
|
+ me->address, me->or_port);
|
|
|
+ if (me->dir_port) {
|
|
|
+ tor_snprintf(dirbuf, sizeof(dirbuf), " and DirPort %s:%d",
|
|
|
+ me->address, me->dir_port);
|
|
|
+ control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
|
+ "CHECKING_REACHABILITY DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
|
|
+ me->address, me->dir_port);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ log_notice(LD_OR, "Now checking whether ORPort %s:%d%s %s reachable... "
|
|
|
+ "(this may take up to %d minutes -- look for log "
|
|
|
+ "messages indicating success)",
|
|
|
+ me->address, me->or_port,
|
|
|
+ me->dir_port ? dirbuf : "",
|
|
|
+ me->dir_port ? "are" : "is",
|
|
|
+ TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT/60);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return histogram;
|
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Return the Pareto start-of-curve parameter Xm.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Because we are not a true Pareto curve, we compute this as the
|
|
|
- * weighted average of the N most frequent build time bins. N is either
|
|
|
- * 1 if we don't have enough circuit build time data collected, or
|
|
|
- * determined by the consensus parameter cbtnummodes (default 3).
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static build_time_t
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_get_xm(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
+/** Return true iff we should send a create_fast cell to start building a given
|
|
|
+ * circuit */
|
|
|
+static INLINE int
|
|
|
+should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- build_time_t i, nbins;
|
|
|
- build_time_t *nth_max_bin;
|
|
|
- int32_t bin_counts=0;
|
|
|
- build_time_t ret = 0;
|
|
|
- uint32_t *histogram = circuit_build_times_create_histogram(cbt, &nbins);
|
|
|
- int n=0;
|
|
|
- int num_modes = circuit_build_times_default_num_xm_modes();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(nbins > 0);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(num_modes > 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- // Only use one mode if < 1000 buildtimes. Not enough data
|
|
|
- // for multiple.
|
|
|
- if (cbt->total_build_times < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE)
|
|
|
- num_modes = 1;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- nth_max_bin = (build_time_t*)tor_malloc_zero(num_modes*sizeof(build_time_t));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Determine the N most common build times */
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < nbins; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (histogram[i] >= histogram[nth_max_bin[0]]) {
|
|
|
- nth_max_bin[0] = i;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (n = 1; n < num_modes; n++) {
|
|
|
- if (histogram[i] >= histogram[nth_max_bin[n]] &&
|
|
|
- (!histogram[nth_max_bin[n-1]]
|
|
|
- || histogram[i] < histogram[nth_max_bin[n-1]])) {
|
|
|
- nth_max_bin[n] = i;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (n = 0; n < num_modes; n++) {
|
|
|
- bin_counts += histogram[nth_max_bin[n]];
|
|
|
- ret += CBT_BIN_TO_MS(nth_max_bin[n])*histogram[nth_max_bin[n]];
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Xm mode #%d: %u %u", n, CBT_BIN_TO_MS(nth_max_bin[n]),
|
|
|
- histogram[nth_max_bin[n]]);
|
|
|
+ if (!circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key)
|
|
|
+ return 1; /* our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */
|
|
|
+ if (!options->FastFirstHopPK)
|
|
|
+ return 0; /* we prefer to avoid create_fast */
|
|
|
+ if (public_server_mode(options)) {
|
|
|
+ /* We're a server, and we know an onion key. We can choose.
|
|
|
+ * Prefer to blend our circuit into the other circuits we are
|
|
|
+ * creating on behalf of others. */
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* The following assert is safe, because we don't get called when we
|
|
|
- * haven't observed at least CBT_MIN_MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE circuits. */
|
|
|
- tor_assert(bin_counts > 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- ret /= bin_counts;
|
|
|
- tor_free(histogram);
|
|
|
- tor_free(nth_max_bin);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return ret;
|
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Output a histogram of current circuit build times to
|
|
|
- * the or_state_t state structure.
|
|
|
+/** Return true if <b>circ</b> is the type of circuit we want to count
|
|
|
+ * timeouts from. In particular, we want it to have not completed yet
|
|
|
+ * (already completing indicates we cannibalized it), and we want it to
|
|
|
+ * have exactly three hops.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_update_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- or_state_t *state)
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- uint32_t *histogram;
|
|
|
- build_time_t i = 0;
|
|
|
- build_time_t nbins = 0;
|
|
|
- config_line_t **next, *line;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- histogram = circuit_build_times_create_histogram(cbt, &nbins);
|
|
|
- // write to state
|
|
|
- config_free_lines(state->BuildtimeHistogram);
|
|
|
- next = &state->BuildtimeHistogram;
|
|
|
- *next = NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- state->TotalBuildTimes = cbt->total_build_times;
|
|
|
- state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] == CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED)
|
|
|
- state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount++;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < nbins; i++) {
|
|
|
- // compress the histogram by skipping the blanks
|
|
|
- if (histogram[i] == 0) continue;
|
|
|
- *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
|
- line->key = tor_strdup("CircuitBuildTimeBin");
|
|
|
- tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%d %d",
|
|
|
- CBT_BIN_TO_MS(i), histogram[i]);
|
|
|
- next = &(line->next);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!unit_tests) {
|
|
|
- if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
|
|
|
- or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_free(histogram);
|
|
|
+ return !circ->has_opened
|
|
|
+ && circ->build_state->desired_path_len == DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Shuffle the build times array.
|
|
|
+/** This is the backbone function for building circuits.
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * Adapted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisher-Yates_shuffle
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_shuffle_and_store_array(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- build_time_t *raw_times,
|
|
|
- uint32_t num_times)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- uint32_t n = num_times;
|
|
|
- if (num_times > CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE) {
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_CIRC, "The number of circuit times that this Tor version "
|
|
|
- "uses to calculate build times is less than the number stored "
|
|
|
- "in your state file. Decreasing the circuit time history from "
|
|
|
- "%lu to %d.", (unsigned long)num_times,
|
|
|
- CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (n > INT_MAX-1) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC, "For some insane reasons, you had %lu circuit build "
|
|
|
- "observations in your state file. That's far too many; probably "
|
|
|
- "there's a bug here.", (unsigned long)n);
|
|
|
- n = INT_MAX-1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* This code can only be run on a compact array */
|
|
|
- while (n-- > 1) {
|
|
|
- int k = crypto_rand_int(n + 1); /* 0 <= k <= n. */
|
|
|
- build_time_t tmp = raw_times[k];
|
|
|
- raw_times[k] = raw_times[n];
|
|
|
- raw_times[n] = tmp;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Since the times are now shuffled, take a random CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE
|
|
|
- * subset (ie the first CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE values) */
|
|
|
- for (n = 0; n < MIN(num_times, CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE); n++) {
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_add_time(cbt, raw_times[n]);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Filter old synthetic timeouts that were created before the
|
|
|
- * new right-censored Pareto calculation was deployed.
|
|
|
+ * If circ's first hop is closed, then we need to build a create
|
|
|
+ * cell and send it forward.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Otherwise, we need to build a relay extend cell and send it
|
|
|
+ * forward.
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * Once all clients before 0.2.1.13-alpha are gone, this code
|
|
|
- * will be unused.
|
|
|
+ * Return -reason if we want to tear down circ, else return 0.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_filter_timeouts(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int num_filtered=0, i=0;
|
|
|
- double timeout_rate = 0;
|
|
|
- build_time_t max_timeout = 0;
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
+ const node_t *node;
|
|
|
+ char payload[2+4+DIGEST_LEN+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
|
|
|
+ char *onionskin;
|
|
|
+ size_t payload_len;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- timeout_rate = circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(cbt);
|
|
|
- max_timeout = (build_time_t)cbt->close_ms;
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] > max_timeout) {
|
|
|
- build_time_t replaced = cbt->circuit_build_times[i];
|
|
|
- num_filtered++;
|
|
|
- cbt->circuit_build_times[i] = CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED;
|
|
|
+ if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) {
|
|
|
+ int fast;
|
|
|
+ uint8_t cell_type;
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"First skin; sending create cell.");
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
|
+ control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_ONEHOP_CREATE, 0);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CIRCUIT_CREATE, 0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Replaced timeout %d with %d", replaced,
|
|
|
- cbt->circuit_build_times[i]);
|
|
|
+ node = node_get_by_id(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest);
|
|
|
+ fast = should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(circ);
|
|
|
+ if (!fast) {
|
|
|
+ /* We are an OR and we know the right onion key: we should
|
|
|
+ * send an old slow create cell.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ cell_type = CELL_CREATE;
|
|
|
+ if (onion_skin_create(circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key,
|
|
|
+ &(circ->cpath->dh_handshake_state),
|
|
|
+ payload) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed.");
|
|
|
+ return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ note_request("cell: create", 1);
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ /* We are not an OR, and we're building the first hop of a circuit to a
|
|
|
+ * new OR: we can be speedy and use CREATE_FAST to save an RSA operation
|
|
|
+ * and a DH operation. */
|
|
|
+ cell_type = CELL_CREATE_FAST;
|
|
|
+ memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
|
|
|
+ crypto_rand((char*) circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
|
|
|
+ sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
|
+ memcpy(payload, circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
|
|
|
+ sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
|
+ note_request("cell: create fast", 1);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "We had %d timeouts out of %d build times, "
|
|
|
- "and filtered %d above the max of %u",
|
|
|
- (int)(cbt->total_build_times*timeout_rate),
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times, num_filtered, max_timeout);
|
|
|
+ if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), cell_type, payload) < 0)
|
|
|
+ return - END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return num_filtered;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
|
|
|
+ circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"First hop: finished sending %s cell to '%s'",
|
|
|
+ fast ? "CREATE_FAST" : "CREATE",
|
|
|
+ node ? node_describe(node) : "<unnamed>");
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"starting to send subsequent skin.");
|
|
|
+ hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
+ if (!hop) {
|
|
|
+ /* done building the circuit. whew. */
|
|
|
+ circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
+ if (circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(circ)) {
|
|
|
+ struct timeval end;
|
|
|
+ long timediff;
|
|
|
+ tor_gettimeofday(&end);
|
|
|
+ timediff = tv_mdiff(&circ->base_.timestamp_created, &end);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Load histogram from <b>state</b>, shuffling the resulting array
|
|
|
- * after we do so. Use this result to estimate parameters and
|
|
|
- * calculate the timeout.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Return -1 on error.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_parse_state(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- or_state_t *state)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int tot_values = 0;
|
|
|
- uint32_t loaded_cnt = 0, N = 0;
|
|
|
- config_line_t *line;
|
|
|
- unsigned int i;
|
|
|
- build_time_t *loaded_times;
|
|
|
- int err = 0;
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_init(cbt);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ /*
|
|
|
+ * If the circuit build time is much greater than we would have cut
|
|
|
+ * it off at, we probably had a suspend event along this codepath,
|
|
|
+ * and we should discard the value.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ if (timediff < 0 || timediff > 2*circ_times.close_ms+1000) {
|
|
|
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. "
|
|
|
+ "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff,
|
|
|
+ circ->base_.purpose,
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose));
|
|
|
+ } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
|
|
|
+ /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */
|
|
|
+ if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live(&circ_times)) {
|
|
|
+ circuit_build_times_add_time(&circ_times, (build_time_t)timediff);
|
|
|
+ circuit_build_times_set_timeout(&circ_times);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* build_time_t 0 means uninitialized */
|
|
|
- loaded_times = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(build_time_t)*state->TotalBuildTimes);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (line = state->BuildtimeHistogram; line; line = line->next) {
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *args = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- smartlist_split_string(args, line->value, " ",
|
|
|
- SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_len(args) < 2) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse circuit build times: "
|
|
|
- "Too few arguments to CircuitBuildTime");
|
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(args);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- const char *ms_str = smartlist_get(args,0);
|
|
|
- const char *count_str = smartlist_get(args,1);
|
|
|
- uint32_t count, k;
|
|
|
- build_time_t ms;
|
|
|
- int ok;
|
|
|
- ms = (build_time_t)tor_parse_ulong(ms_str, 0, 0,
|
|
|
- CBT_BUILD_TIME_MAX, &ok, NULL);
|
|
|
- if (!ok) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse circuit build times: "
|
|
|
- "Unparsable bin number");
|
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(args);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- count = (uint32_t)tor_parse_ulong(count_str, 0, 0,
|
|
|
- UINT32_MAX, &ok, NULL);
|
|
|
- if (!ok) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse circuit build times: "
|
|
|
- "Unparsable bin count");
|
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(args);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
+ if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) {
|
|
|
+ circuit_build_times_network_circ_success(&circ_times);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!");
|
|
|
+ circuit_reset_failure_count(0);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (loaded_cnt+count+state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount
|
|
|
- > state->TotalBuildTimes) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Too many build times in state file. "
|
|
|
- "Stopping short before %d",
|
|
|
- loaded_cnt+count);
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(args);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || circ->has_opened) {
|
|
|
+ control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS, 0);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- for (k = 0; k < count; k++) {
|
|
|
- loaded_times[loaded_cnt++] = ms;
|
|
|
+ if (!can_complete_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
|
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
+ can_complete_circuit=1;
|
|
|
+ /* FFFF Log a count of known routers here */
|
|
|
+ log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
|
+ "Tor has successfully opened a circuit. "
|
|
|
+ "Looks like client functionality is working.");
|
|
|
+ control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE, 0);
|
|
|
+ control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED");
|
|
|
+ clear_broken_connection_map(1);
|
|
|
+ if (server_mode(options) && !check_whether_orport_reachable()) {
|
|
|
+ inform_testing_reachability();
|
|
|
+ consider_testing_reachability(1, 1);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- N++;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(args);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Adding %d timeouts.", state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount);
|
|
|
- for (i=0; i < state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount; i++) {
|
|
|
- loaded_times[loaded_cnt++] = CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ pathbias_count_success(circ);
|
|
|
+ circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
|
|
|
+ circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (loaded_cnt != state->TotalBuildTimes) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Corrupt state file? Build times count mismatch. "
|
|
|
- "Read %d times, but file says %d", loaded_cnt,
|
|
|
- state->TotalBuildTimes);
|
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_reset(cbt);
|
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ /* We're done with measurement circuits here. Just close them */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT)
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (tor_addr_family(&hop->extend_info->addr) != AF_INET) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Trying to extend to a non-IPv4 address.");
|
|
|
+ return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_shuffle_and_store_array(cbt, loaded_times, loaded_cnt);
|
|
|
+ set_uint32(payload, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&hop->extend_info->addr));
|
|
|
+ set_uint16(payload+4, htons(hop->extend_info->port));
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Verify that we didn't overwrite any indexes */
|
|
|
- for (i=0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (!cbt->circuit_build_times[i])
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- tot_values++;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Loaded %d/%d values from %d lines in circuit time histogram",
|
|
|
- tot_values, cbt->total_build_times, N);
|
|
|
+ onionskin = payload+2+4;
|
|
|
+ memcpy(payload+2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
|
|
|
+ hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
+ payload_len = 2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (cbt->total_build_times != tot_values
|
|
|
- || cbt->total_build_times > CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Corrupt state file? Shuffled build times mismatch. "
|
|
|
- "Read %d times, but file says %d", tot_values,
|
|
|
- state->TotalBuildTimes);
|
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_reset(cbt);
|
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ if (onion_skin_create(hop->extend_info->onion_key,
|
|
|
+ &(hop->dh_handshake_state), onionskin) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create failed.");
|
|
|
+ return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_set_timeout(cbt);
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Sending extend relay cell.");
|
|
|
+ note_request("cell: extend", 1);
|
|
|
+ /* send it to hop->prev, because it will transfer
|
|
|
+ * it to a create cell and then send to hop */
|
|
|
+ if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
|
+ RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND,
|
|
|
+ payload, payload_len, hop->prev) < 0)
|
|
|
+ return 0; /* circuit is closed */
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (!state->CircuitBuildAbandonedCount && cbt->total_build_times) {
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_filter_timeouts(cbt);
|
|
|
+ hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- done:
|
|
|
- tor_free(loaded_times);
|
|
|
- return err ? -1 : 0;
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Estimates the Xm and Alpha parameters using
|
|
|
- * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * The notable difference is that we use mode instead of min to estimate Xm.
|
|
|
- * This is because our distribution is frechet-like. We claim this is
|
|
|
- * an acceptable approximation because we are only concerned with the
|
|
|
- * accuracy of the CDF of the tail.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_update_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- build_time_t *x=cbt->circuit_build_times;
|
|
|
- double a = 0;
|
|
|
- int n=0,i=0,abandoned_count=0;
|
|
|
- build_time_t max_time=0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Parameter_estimation */
|
|
|
- /* We sort of cheat here and make our samples slightly more pareto-like
|
|
|
- * and less frechet-like. */
|
|
|
- cbt->Xm = circuit_build_times_get_xm(cbt);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(cbt->Xm > 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (i=0; i< CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (!x[i]) {
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (x[i] < cbt->Xm) {
|
|
|
- a += tor_mathlog(cbt->Xm);
|
|
|
- } else if (x[i] == CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED) {
|
|
|
- abandoned_count++;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- a += tor_mathlog(x[i]);
|
|
|
- if (x[i] > max_time)
|
|
|
- max_time = x[i];
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- n++;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * We are erring and asserting here because this can only happen
|
|
|
- * in codepaths other than startup. The startup state parsing code
|
|
|
- * performs this same check, and resets state if it hits it. If we
|
|
|
- * hit it at runtime, something serious has gone wrong.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- if (n!=cbt->total_build_times) {
|
|
|
- log_err(LD_CIRC, "Discrepancy in build times count: %d vs %d", n,
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tor_assert(n==cbt->total_build_times);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (max_time <= 0) {
|
|
|
- /* This can happen if Xm is actually the *maximum* value in the set.
|
|
|
- * It can also happen if we've abandoned every single circuit somehow.
|
|
|
- * In either case, tell the caller not to compute a new build timeout. */
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Could not determine largest build time (%d). "
|
|
|
- "Xm is %dms and we've abandoned %d out of %d circuits.", max_time,
|
|
|
- cbt->Xm, abandoned_count, n);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- a += abandoned_count*tor_mathlog(max_time);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- a -= n*tor_mathlog(cbt->Xm);
|
|
|
- // Estimator comes from Eq #4 in:
|
|
|
- // "Bayesian estimation based on trimmed samples from Pareto populations"
|
|
|
- // by Arturo J. Fernández. We are right-censored only.
|
|
|
- a = (n-abandoned_count)/a;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- cbt->alpha = a;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * This is the Pareto Quantile Function. It calculates the point x
|
|
|
- * in the distribution such that F(x) = quantile (ie quantile*100%
|
|
|
- * of the mass of the density function is below x on the curve).
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * We use it to calculate the timeout and also to generate synthetic
|
|
|
- * values of time for circuits that timeout before completion.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantile_function,
|
|
|
- * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inverse_transform_sampling and
|
|
|
- * http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pareto_distribution#Generating_a_
|
|
|
- * random_sample_from_Pareto_distribution
|
|
|
- * That's right. I'll cite wikipedia all day long.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Return value is in milliseconds.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-double
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- double quantile)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- double ret;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(quantile >= 0);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(1.0-quantile > 0);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(cbt->Xm > 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- ret = cbt->Xm/pow(1.0-quantile,1.0/cbt->alpha);
|
|
|
- if (ret > INT32_MAX) {
|
|
|
- ret = INT32_MAX;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tor_assert(ret > 0);
|
|
|
- return ret;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Pareto CDF */
|
|
|
-double
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_cdf(circuit_build_times_t *cbt, double x)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- double ret;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(cbt->Xm > 0);
|
|
|
- ret = 1.0-pow(cbt->Xm/x,cbt->alpha);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(0 <= ret && ret <= 1.0);
|
|
|
- return ret;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Generate a synthetic time using our distribution parameters.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * The return value will be within the [q_lo, q_hi) quantile points
|
|
|
- * on the CDF.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-build_time_t
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_generate_sample(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- double q_lo, double q_hi)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- double randval = crypto_rand_double();
|
|
|
- build_time_t ret;
|
|
|
- double u;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Generate between [q_lo, q_hi) */
|
|
|
- /*XXXX This is what nextafter is supposed to be for; we should use it on the
|
|
|
- * platforms that support it. */
|
|
|
- q_hi -= 1.0/(INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(q_lo >= 0);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(q_hi < 1);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(q_lo < q_hi);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- u = q_lo + (q_hi-q_lo)*randval;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(0 <= u && u < 1.0);
|
|
|
- /* circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout returns <= INT32_MAX */
|
|
|
- ret = (build_time_t)
|
|
|
- tor_lround(circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(cbt, u));
|
|
|
- tor_assert(ret > 0);
|
|
|
- return ret;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Estimate an initial alpha parameter by solving the quantile
|
|
|
- * function with a quantile point and a specific timeout value.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
+/** Our clock just jumped by <b>seconds_elapsed</b>. Assume
|
|
|
+ * something has also gone wrong with our network: notify the user,
|
|
|
+ * and abandon all not-yet-used circuits. */
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_initial_alpha(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- double quantile, double timeout_ms)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- // Q(u) = Xm/((1-u)^(1/a))
|
|
|
- // Q(0.8) = Xm/((1-0.8))^(1/a)) = CircBuildTimeout
|
|
|
- // CircBuildTimeout = Xm/((1-0.8))^(1/a))
|
|
|
- // CircBuildTimeout = Xm*((1-0.8))^(-1/a))
|
|
|
- // ln(CircBuildTimeout) = ln(Xm)+ln(((1-0.8)))*(-1/a)
|
|
|
- // -ln(1-0.8)/(ln(CircBuildTimeout)-ln(Xm))=a
|
|
|
- tor_assert(quantile >= 0);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(cbt->Xm > 0);
|
|
|
- cbt->alpha = tor_mathlog(1.0-quantile)/
|
|
|
- (tor_mathlog(cbt->Xm)-tor_mathlog(timeout_ms));
|
|
|
- tor_assert(cbt->alpha > 0);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Returns true if we need circuits to be built
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
+circuit_note_clock_jumped(int seconds_elapsed)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- /* Return true if < MIN_CIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE */
|
|
|
- return !circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(cbt);
|
|
|
+ int severity = server_mode(get_options()) ? LOG_WARN : LOG_NOTICE;
|
|
|
+ tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Your system clock just jumped %d seconds %s; "
|
|
|
+ "assuming established circuits no longer work.",
|
|
|
+ seconds_elapsed >=0 ? seconds_elapsed : -seconds_elapsed,
|
|
|
+ seconds_elapsed >=0 ? "forward" : "backward");
|
|
|
+ control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN, "CLOCK_JUMPED TIME=%d",
|
|
|
+ seconds_elapsed);
|
|
|
+ can_complete_circuit=0; /* so it'll log when it works again */
|
|
|
+ control_event_client_status(severity, "CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED REASON=%s",
|
|
|
+ "CLOCK_JUMPED");
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
|
|
|
+ circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Returns true if we should build a timeout test circuit
|
|
|
- * right now.
|
|
|
+/** Take the 'extend' <b>cell</b>, pull out addr/port plus the onion
|
|
|
+ * skin and identity digest for the next hop. If we're already connected,
|
|
|
+ * pass the onion skin to the next hop using a create cell; otherwise
|
|
|
+ * launch a new OR connection, and <b>circ</b> will notice when the
|
|
|
+ * connection succeeds or fails.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit, else return 0.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
+circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- return circuit_build_times_needs_circuits(cbt) &&
|
|
|
- approx_time()-cbt->last_circ_at > circuit_build_times_test_frequency();
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ channel_t *n_chan;
|
|
|
+ relay_header_t rh;
|
|
|
+ char *onionskin;
|
|
|
+ char *id_digest=NULL;
|
|
|
+ uint32_t n_addr32;
|
|
|
+ uint16_t n_port;
|
|
|
+ tor_addr_t n_addr;
|
|
|
+ const char *msg = NULL;
|
|
|
+ int should_launch = 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Called to indicate that the network showed some signs of liveness,
|
|
|
- * i.e. we received a cell.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * This is used by circuit_build_times_network_check_live() to decide
|
|
|
- * if we should record the circuit build timeout or not.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * This function is called every time we receive a cell. Avoid
|
|
|
- * syscalls, events, and other high-intensity work.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_network_is_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- time_t now = approx_time();
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts > 0) {
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Tor now sees network activity. Restoring circuit build "
|
|
|
- "timeout recording. Network was down for %d seconds "
|
|
|
- "during %d circuit attempts.",
|
|
|
- (int)(now - cbt->liveness.network_last_live),
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts);
|
|
|
+ if (circ->n_chan) {
|
|
|
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "n_chan already set. Bug/attack. Closing.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.network_last_live = now;
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts = 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Called to indicate that we completed a circuit. Because this circuit
|
|
|
- * succeeded, it doesn't count as a timeout-after-the-first-hop.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * This is used by circuit_build_times_network_check_changed() to determine
|
|
|
- * if we had too many recent timeouts and need to reset our learned timeout
|
|
|
- * to something higher.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_network_circ_success(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- /* Check for NULLness because we might not be using adaptive timeouts */
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop &&
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs > 0) {
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop[cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx]
|
|
|
- = 0;
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx++;
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx %= cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs;
|
|
|
+ if (circ->n_hop) {
|
|
|
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "conn to next hop already launched. Bug/attack. Closing.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * A circuit just timed out. If it failed after the first hop, record it
|
|
|
- * in our history for later deciding if the network speed has changed.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * This is used by circuit_build_times_network_check_changed() to determine
|
|
|
- * if we had too many recent timeouts and need to reset our learned timeout
|
|
|
- * to something higher.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_network_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- int did_onehop)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- /* Check for NULLness because we might not be using adaptive timeouts */
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop &&
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs > 0) {
|
|
|
- if (did_onehop) {
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop[cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx]
|
|
|
- = 1;
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx++;
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx %= cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
|
|
|
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Got an extend cell, but running as a client. Closing.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * A circuit was just forcibly closed. If there has been no recent network
|
|
|
- * activity at all, but this circuit was launched back when we thought the
|
|
|
- * network was live, increment the number of "nonlive" circuit timeouts.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * This is used by circuit_build_times_network_check_live() to decide
|
|
|
- * if we should record the circuit build timeout or not.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_network_close(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- int did_onehop, time_t start_time)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * Check if this is a timeout that was for a circuit that spent its
|
|
|
- * entire existence during a time where we have had no network activity.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.network_last_live < start_time) {
|
|
|
- if (did_onehop) {
|
|
|
- char last_live_buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- char start_time_buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- char now_buf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- format_local_iso_time(last_live_buf, cbt->liveness.network_last_live);
|
|
|
- format_local_iso_time(start_time_buf, start_time);
|
|
|
- format_local_iso_time(now_buf, now);
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Circuit somehow completed a hop while the network was "
|
|
|
- "not live. Network was last live at %s, but circuit launched "
|
|
|
- "at %s. It's now %s.", last_live_buf, start_time_buf,
|
|
|
- now_buf);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts++;
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts == 1) {
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Tor has not observed any network activity for the past %d "
|
|
|
- "seconds. Disabling circuit build timeout recording.",
|
|
|
- (int)(now - cbt->liveness.network_last_live));
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Got non-live timeout. Current count is: %d",
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * When the network is not live, we do not record circuit build times.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * The network is considered not live if there has been at least one
|
|
|
- * circuit build that began and ended (had its close_ms measurement
|
|
|
- * period expire) since we last received a cell.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Also has the side effect of rewinding the circuit time history
|
|
|
- * in the case of recent liveness changes.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_network_check_live(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.nonlive_timeouts > 0) {
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
+ if (rh.length < 4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
|
|
|
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Wrong length %d on extend cell. Closing circuit.",
|
|
|
+ rh.length);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Returns true if we have seen more than MAX_RECENT_TIMEOUT_COUNT of
|
|
|
- * the past RECENT_CIRCUITS time out after the first hop. Used to detect
|
|
|
- * if the network connection has changed significantly, and if so,
|
|
|
- * resets our circuit build timeout to the default.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Also resets the entire timeout history in this case and causes us
|
|
|
- * to restart the process of building test circuits and estimating a
|
|
|
- * new timeout.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int total_build_times = cbt->total_build_times;
|
|
|
- int timeout_count=0;
|
|
|
- int i;
|
|
|
+ n_addr32 = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
|
|
|
+ n_port = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4));
|
|
|
+ onionskin = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2;
|
|
|
+ id_digest = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+
|
|
|
+ ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
|
|
|
+ tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&n_addr, n_addr32);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop &&
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs > 0) {
|
|
|
- /* how many of our recent circuits made it to the first hop but then
|
|
|
- * timed out? */
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs; i++) {
|
|
|
- timeout_count += cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop[i];
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ if (!n_port || !n_addr32) {
|
|
|
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Client asked me to extend to zero destination port or addr.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* If 80% of our recent circuits are timing out after the first hop,
|
|
|
- * we need to re-estimate a new initial alpha and timeout. */
|
|
|
- if (timeout_count < circuit_build_times_max_timeouts()) {
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
+ if (tor_addr_is_internal(&n_addr, 0) &&
|
|
|
+ !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) {
|
|
|
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Client asked me to extend to a private address");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_reset(cbt);
|
|
|
- if (cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop &&
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs > 0) {
|
|
|
- memset(cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop, 0,
|
|
|
- sizeof(*cbt->liveness.timeouts_after_firsthop)*
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.num_recent_circs);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- cbt->liveness.after_firsthop_idx = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Check to see if this has happened before. If so, double the timeout
|
|
|
- * to give people on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */
|
|
|
- if (cbt->timeout_ms >= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()) {
|
|
|
- if (cbt->timeout_ms > INT32_MAX/2 || cbt->close_ms > INT32_MAX/2) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Insanely large circuit build timeout value. "
|
|
|
- "(timeout = %fmsec, close = %fmsec)",
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms *= 2;
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms *= 2;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms
|
|
|
- = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
|
|
|
+ /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using
|
|
|
+ * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay),
|
|
|
+ * but we don't want to let people send us extend cells for empty
|
|
|
+ * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack,
|
|
|
+ * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a
|
|
|
+ * new TLS connection for each extend request. */
|
|
|
+ if (tor_digest_is_zero(id_digest)) {
|
|
|
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Client asked me to extend without specifying an id_digest.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_RESET);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Your network connection speed appears to have changed. Resetting "
|
|
|
- "timeout to %lds after %d timeouts and %d buildtimes.",
|
|
|
- tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000), timeout_count,
|
|
|
- total_build_times);
|
|
|
+ /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the
|
|
|
+ * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can
|
|
|
+ * assist circular-path attacks. */
|
|
|
+ if (tor_memeq(id_digest,
|
|
|
+ TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->identity_digest,
|
|
|
+ DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
|
|
+ log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ n_chan = channel_get_for_extend(id_digest,
|
|
|
+ &n_addr,
|
|
|
+ &msg,
|
|
|
+ &should_launch);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Count the number of timeouts in a set of cbt data.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-double
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int i=0,timeouts=0;
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] >= cbt->timeout_ms) {
|
|
|
- timeouts++;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ if (!n_chan) {
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC|LD_OR,"Next router (%s): %s",
|
|
|
+ fmt_addrport(&n_addr, n_port), msg?msg:"????");
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (!cbt->total_build_times)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
+ circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/,
|
|
|
+ id_digest,
|
|
|
+ NULL /*onion_key*/,
|
|
|
+ &n_addr, n_port);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return ((double)timeouts)/cbt->total_build_times;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ circ->n_chan_onionskin = tor_malloc(ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(circ->n_chan_onionskin, onionskin, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
+ circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Count the number of closed circuits in a set of cbt data.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-double
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_close_rate(const circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int i=0,closed=0;
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < CBT_NCIRCUITS_TO_OBSERVE; i++) {
|
|
|
- if (cbt->circuit_build_times[i] == CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED) {
|
|
|
- closed++;
|
|
|
+ if (should_launch) {
|
|
|
+ /* we should try to open a connection */
|
|
|
+ n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(&n_addr, n_port, id_digest);
|
|
|
+ if (!n_chan) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_chan failed. Closing circuit.");
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
|
|
|
+ * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches
|
|
|
+ * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (!cbt->total_build_times)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(!circ->n_hop); /* Connection is already established. */
|
|
|
+ circ->n_chan = n_chan;
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
+ "n_chan is %s",
|
|
|
+ channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan));
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return ((double)closed)/cbt->total_build_times;
|
|
|
+ if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, CELL_CREATE, onionskin) < 0)
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Store a timeout as a synthetic value.
|
|
|
+/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in
|
|
|
+ * key_data. key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL bytes, which are
|
|
|
+ * used as follows:
|
|
|
+ * - 20 to initialize f_digest
|
|
|
+ * - 20 to initialize b_digest
|
|
|
+ * - 16 to key f_crypto
|
|
|
+ * - 16 to key b_crypto
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * Returns true if the store was successful and we should possibly
|
|
|
- * update our timeout estimate.
|
|
|
+ * (If 'reverse' is true, then f_XX and b_XX are swapped.)
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_count_close(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- int did_onehop,
|
|
|
- time_t start_time)
|
|
|
+circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data,
|
|
|
+ int reverse)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms
|
|
|
- = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Record this force-close to help determine if the network is dead */
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_network_close(cbt, did_onehop, start_time);
|
|
|
+ crypto_digest_t *tmp_digest;
|
|
|
+ crypto_cipher_t *tmp_crypto;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Only count timeouts if network is live.. */
|
|
|
- if (!circuit_build_times_network_check_live(cbt)) {
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(cpath);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(key_data);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(!(cpath->f_crypto || cpath->b_crypto ||
|
|
|
+ cpath->f_digest || cpath->b_digest));
|
|
|
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_add_time(cbt, CBT_BUILD_ABANDONED);
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ cpath->f_digest = crypto_digest_new();
|
|
|
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->f_digest, key_data, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
+ cpath->b_digest = crypto_digest_new();
|
|
|
+ crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->b_digest, key_data+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Update timeout counts to determine if we need to expire
|
|
|
- * our build time history due to excessive timeouts.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * We do not record any actual time values at this stage;
|
|
|
- * we are only interested in recording the fact that a timeout
|
|
|
- * happened. We record the time values via
|
|
|
- * circuit_build_times_count_close() and circuit_build_times_add_time().
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_count_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt,
|
|
|
- int did_onehop)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms = cbt->timeout_ms
|
|
|
- = circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout();
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
+ if (!(cpath->f_crypto =
|
|
|
+ crypto_cipher_new(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)))) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Forward cipher initialization failed.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (!(cpath->b_crypto =
|
|
|
+ crypto_cipher_new(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)+CIPHER_KEY_LEN))) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Backward cipher initialization failed.");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Register the fact that a timeout just occurred. */
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_network_timeout(cbt, did_onehop);
|
|
|
+ if (reverse) {
|
|
|
+ tmp_digest = cpath->f_digest;
|
|
|
+ cpath->f_digest = cpath->b_digest;
|
|
|
+ cpath->b_digest = tmp_digest;
|
|
|
+ tmp_crypto = cpath->f_crypto;
|
|
|
+ cpath->f_crypto = cpath->b_crypto;
|
|
|
+ cpath->b_crypto = tmp_crypto;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* If there are a ton of timeouts, we should reset
|
|
|
- * the circuit build timeout. */
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(cbt);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Estimate a new timeout based on history and set our timeout
|
|
|
- * variable accordingly.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
+/** The minimum number of first hop completions before we start
|
|
|
+ * thinking about warning about path bias and dropping guards */
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_set_timeout_worker(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
+pathbias_get_min_circs(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- build_time_t max_time;
|
|
|
- if (!circuit_build_times_enough_to_compute(cbt))
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!circuit_build_times_update_alpha(cbt))
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms = circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(cbt,
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_quantile_cutoff());
|
|
|
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_CIRC 20
|
|
|
+ if (options->PathBiasCircThreshold >= 5)
|
|
|
+ return options->PathBiasCircThreshold;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_mincircs",
|
|
|
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_CIRC,
|
|
|
+ 5, INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms = circuit_build_times_calculate_timeout(cbt,
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_close_quantile());
|
|
|
+static double
|
|
|
+pathbias_get_notice_rate(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT 40
|
|
|
+ if (options->PathBiasNoticeRate >= 0.0)
|
|
|
+ return options->PathBiasNoticeRate;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_noticepct",
|
|
|
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- max_time = circuit_build_times_max(cbt);
|
|
|
+static double
|
|
|
+pathbias_get_disable_rate(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+// XXX: This needs tuning based on use + experimentation before we set it
|
|
|
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_DISABLE_PCT 0
|
|
|
+ if (options->PathBiasDisableRate >= 0.0)
|
|
|
+ return options->PathBiasDisableRate;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_disablepct",
|
|
|
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_DISABLE_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0;
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* Sometimes really fast guard nodes give us such a steep curve
|
|
|
- * that this ends up being not that much greater than timeout_ms.
|
|
|
- * Make it be at least 1 min to handle this case. */
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms = MAX(cbt->close_ms, circuit_build_times_initial_timeout());
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+pathbias_get_scale_threshold(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD 200
|
|
|
+ if (options->PathBiasScaleThreshold >= 2)
|
|
|
+ return options->PathBiasScaleThreshold;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scalecircs",
|
|
|
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD, 10,
|
|
|
+ INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (cbt->timeout_ms > max_time) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Circuit build timeout of %dms is beyond the maximum build "
|
|
|
- "time we have ever observed. Capping it to %dms.",
|
|
|
- (int)cbt->timeout_ms, max_time);
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms = max_time;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+pathbias_get_scale_factor(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_FACTOR 2
|
|
|
+ if (options->PathBiasScaleFactor >= 1)
|
|
|
+ return options->PathBiasScaleFactor;
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scalefactor",
|
|
|
+ DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_FACTOR, 1, INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
+}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (max_time < INT32_MAX/2 && cbt->close_ms > 2*max_time) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Circuit build measurement period of %dms is more than twice "
|
|
|
- "the maximum build time we have ever observed. Capping it to "
|
|
|
- "%dms.", (int)cbt->close_ms, 2*max_time);
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms = 2*max_time;
|
|
|
+static const char *
|
|
|
+pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state)
|
|
|
+{
|
|
|
+ switch (state) {
|
|
|
+ case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC:
|
|
|
+ return "new";
|
|
|
+ case PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP:
|
|
|
+ return "first hop";
|
|
|
+ case PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED:
|
|
|
+ return "succeeded";
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- cbt->have_computed_timeout = 1;
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
+ return "unknown";
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
/**
|
|
|
- * Exposed function to compute a new timeout. Dispatches events and
|
|
|
- * also filters out extremely high timeout values.
|
|
|
+ * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful first hop.
|
|
|
+ * If so, record it in the current guard's path bias first_hop count.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_build_times_set_timeout(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- long prev_timeout = tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000);
|
|
|
- double timeout_rate;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * Just return if we aren't using adaptive timeouts
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- if (circuit_build_times_disabled())
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
+#define FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
|
|
|
+ static ratelim_t first_hop_notice_limit =
|
|
|
+ RATELIM_INIT(FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
|
|
|
+ char *rate_msg = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (!circuit_build_times_set_timeout_worker(cbt))
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
+ /* We can't do path bias accounting without entry guards.
|
|
|
+ * Testing and controller circuits also have no guards. */
|
|
|
+ if (get_options()->UseEntryGuards == 0 ||
|
|
|
+ circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING ||
|
|
|
+ circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER) {
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (cbt->timeout_ms < circuit_build_times_min_timeout()) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Set buildtimeout to low value %fms. Setting to %dms",
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms, circuit_build_times_min_timeout());
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms = circuit_build_times_min_timeout();
|
|
|
- if (cbt->close_ms < cbt->timeout_ms) {
|
|
|
- /* This shouldn't happen because of MAX() in timeout_worker above,
|
|
|
- * but doing it just in case */
|
|
|
- cbt->close_ms = circuit_build_times_initial_timeout();
|
|
|
+ /* Completely ignore one hop circuits */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel ||
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1) {
|
|
|
+ /* Check for inconsistency */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len != 1 ||
|
|
|
+ !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_notice(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "One-hop circuit has length %d. Path state is %s. "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
|
|
|
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- control_event_buildtimeout_set(cbt, BUILDTIMEOUT_SET_EVENT_COMPUTED);
|
|
|
+ if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
|
|
|
+ /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Don't count cannibalized circs for path bias */
|
|
|
+ if (!circ->has_opened) {
|
|
|
+ entry_guard_t *guard;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- timeout_rate = circuit_build_times_timeout_rate(cbt);
|
|
|
+ guard =
|
|
|
+ entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest);
|
|
|
+ if (guard) {
|
|
|
+ if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
|
|
|
+ circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (prev_timeout > tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000)) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Based on %d circuit times, it looks like we don't need to "
|
|
|
- "wait so long for circuits to finish. We will now assume a "
|
|
|
- "circuit is too slow to use after waiting %ld seconds.",
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times,
|
|
|
- tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000));
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Circuit timeout data: %fms, %fms, Xm: %d, a: %f, r: %f",
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms, cbt->Xm, cbt->alpha,
|
|
|
- timeout_rate);
|
|
|
- } else if (prev_timeout < tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000)) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Based on %d circuit times, it looks like we need to wait "
|
|
|
- "longer for circuits to finish. We will now assume a "
|
|
|
- "circuit is too slow to use after waiting %ld seconds.",
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times,
|
|
|
- tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000));
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Circuit timeout data: %fms, %fms, Xm: %d, a: %f, r: %f",
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms, cbt->Xm, cbt->alpha,
|
|
|
- timeout_rate);
|
|
|
+ if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */
|
|
|
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "Unopened circuit has no known guard. "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Set circuit build timeout to %lds (%fms, %fms, Xm: %d, a: %f,"
|
|
|
- " r: %f) based on %d circuit times",
|
|
|
- tor_lround(cbt->timeout_ms/1000),
|
|
|
- cbt->timeout_ms, cbt->close_ms, cbt->Xm, cbt->alpha, timeout_rate,
|
|
|
- cbt->total_build_times);
|
|
|
+ /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "A %s circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
+ circ->cpath->state, circ->has_opened,
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Iterate over values of circ_id, starting from conn-\>next_circ_id,
|
|
|
- * and with the high bit specified by conn-\>circ_id_type, until we get
|
|
|
- * a circ_id that is not in use by any other circuit on that conn.
|
|
|
+/**
|
|
|
+ * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit
|
|
|
+ * completion. If so, record it in the current guard's path bias
|
|
|
+ * success count.
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * Return it, or 0 if can't get a unique circ_id.
|
|
|
+ * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-static circid_t
|
|
|
-get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(channel_t *chan)
|
|
|
+static void
|
|
|
+pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- circid_t test_circ_id;
|
|
|
- circid_t attempts=0;
|
|
|
- circid_t high_bit;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(chan);
|
|
|
+#define SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
|
|
|
+ static ratelim_t success_notice_limit =
|
|
|
+ RATELIM_INIT(SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
|
|
|
+ char *rate_msg = NULL;
|
|
|
+ entry_guard_t *guard = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (chan->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Trying to pick a circuit ID for a connection from "
|
|
|
- "a client with no identity.");
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- high_bit =
|
|
|
- (chan->circ_id_type == CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER) ? 1<<15 : 0;
|
|
|
- do {
|
|
|
- /* Sequentially iterate over test_circ_id=1...1<<15-1 until we find a
|
|
|
- * circID such that (high_bit|test_circ_id) is not already used. */
|
|
|
- test_circ_id = chan->next_circ_id++;
|
|
|
- if (test_circ_id == 0 || test_circ_id >= 1<<15) {
|
|
|
- test_circ_id = 1;
|
|
|
- chan->next_circ_id = 2;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (++attempts > 1<<15) {
|
|
|
- /* Make sure we don't loop forever if all circ_id's are used. This
|
|
|
- * matters because it's an external DoS opportunity.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,"No unused circ IDs. Failing.");
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- test_circ_id |= high_bit;
|
|
|
- } while (circuit_id_in_use_on_channel(test_circ_id, chan));
|
|
|
- return test_circ_id;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** If <b>verbose</b> is false, allocate and return a comma-separated list of
|
|
|
- * the currently built elements of <b>circ</b>. If <b>verbose</b> is true, also
|
|
|
- * list information about link status in a more verbose format using spaces.
|
|
|
- * If <b>verbose_names</b> is false, give nicknames for Named routers and hex
|
|
|
- * digests for others; if <b>verbose_names</b> is true, use $DIGEST=Name style
|
|
|
- * names.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static char *
|
|
|
-circuit_list_path_impl(origin_circuit_t *circ, int verbose, int verbose_names)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *elements;
|
|
|
- const char *states[] = {"closed", "waiting for keys", "open"};
|
|
|
- char *s;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- elements = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (verbose) {
|
|
|
- const char *nickname = build_state_get_exit_nickname(circ->build_state);
|
|
|
- smartlist_add_asprintf(elements, "%s%s circ (length %d%s%s):",
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->is_internal ? "internal" : "exit",
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->need_uptime ? " (high-uptime)" : "",
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
|
|
|
- circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" : ", last hop ",
|
|
|
- circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN ? "" :
|
|
|
- (nickname?nickname:"*unnamed*"));
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- hop = circ->cpath;
|
|
|
- do {
|
|
|
- char *elt;
|
|
|
- const char *id;
|
|
|
- const node_t *node;
|
|
|
- if (!hop)
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- if (!verbose && hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- if (!hop->extend_info)
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- id = hop->extend_info->identity_digest;
|
|
|
- if (verbose_names) {
|
|
|
- elt = tor_malloc(MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
|
|
|
- if ((node = node_get_by_id(id))) {
|
|
|
- node_get_verbose_nickname(node, elt);
|
|
|
- } else if (is_legal_nickname(hop->extend_info->nickname)) {
|
|
|
- elt[0] = '$';
|
|
|
- base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, id, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- elt[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1]= '~';
|
|
|
- strlcpy(elt+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2,
|
|
|
- hop->extend_info->nickname, MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- elt[0] = '$';
|
|
|
- base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, id, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else { /* ! verbose_names */
|
|
|
- node = node_get_by_id(id);
|
|
|
- if (node && node_is_named(node)) {
|
|
|
- elt = tor_strdup(node_get_nickname(node));
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- elt = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
|
|
|
- elt[0] = '$';
|
|
|
- base16_encode(elt+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1, id, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tor_assert(elt);
|
|
|
- if (verbose) {
|
|
|
- tor_assert(hop->state <= 2);
|
|
|
- smartlist_add_asprintf(elements,"%s(%s)",elt,states[hop->state]);
|
|
|
- tor_free(elt);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(elements, elt);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- hop = hop->next;
|
|
|
- } while (hop != circ->cpath);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, verbose?" ":",", 0, NULL);
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(elements);
|
|
|
- return s;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** If <b>verbose</b> is false, allocate and return a comma-separated
|
|
|
- * list of the currently built elements of <b>circ</b>. If
|
|
|
- * <b>verbose</b> is true, also list information about link status in
|
|
|
- * a more verbose format using spaces.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-char *
|
|
|
-circuit_list_path(origin_circuit_t *circ, int verbose)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- return circuit_list_path_impl(circ, verbose, 0);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Allocate and return a comma-separated list of the currently built elements
|
|
|
- * of <b>circ</b>, giving each as a verbose nickname.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-char *
|
|
|
-circuit_list_path_for_controller(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- return circuit_list_path_impl(circ, 0, 1);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Log, at severity <b>severity</b>, the nicknames of each router in
|
|
|
- * <b>circ</b>'s cpath. Also log the length of the cpath, and the intended
|
|
|
- * exit point.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_log_path(int severity, unsigned int domain, origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- char *s = circuit_list_path(circ,1);
|
|
|
- tor_log(severity,domain,"%s",s);
|
|
|
- tor_free(s);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Tell the rep(utation)hist(ory) module about the status of the links
|
|
|
- * in <b>circ</b>. Hops that have become OPEN are marked as successfully
|
|
|
- * extended; the _first_ hop that isn't open (if any) is marked as
|
|
|
- * unable to extend.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-/* XXXX Someday we should learn from OR circuits too. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_rep_hist_note_result(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
- const char *prev_digest = NULL;
|
|
|
- hop = circ->cpath;
|
|
|
- if (!hop) /* circuit hasn't started building yet. */
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- if (server_mode(get_options())) {
|
|
|
- const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
|
- if (!me)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- prev_digest = me->cache_info.identity_digest;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- do {
|
|
|
- const node_t *node = node_get_by_id(hop->extend_info->identity_digest);
|
|
|
- if (node) { /* Why do we check this? We know the identity. -NM XXXX */
|
|
|
- if (prev_digest) {
|
|
|
- if (hop->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
|
- rep_hist_note_extend_succeeded(prev_digest, node->identity);
|
|
|
- else {
|
|
|
- rep_hist_note_extend_failed(prev_digest, node->identity);
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- prev_digest = node->identity;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- prev_digest = NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- hop=hop->next;
|
|
|
- } while (hop!=circ->cpath);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Pick all the entries in our cpath. Stop and return 0 when we're
|
|
|
- * happy, or return -1 if an error occurs. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-onion_populate_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int r;
|
|
|
- again:
|
|
|
- r = onion_extend_cpath(circ);
|
|
|
- if (r < 0) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Generating cpath hop failed.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (r == 0)
|
|
|
- goto again;
|
|
|
- return 0; /* if r == 1 */
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Create and return a new origin circuit. Initialize its purpose and
|
|
|
- * build-state based on our arguments. The <b>flags</b> argument is a
|
|
|
- * bitfield of CIRCLAUNCH_* flags. */
|
|
|
-origin_circuit_t *
|
|
|
-origin_circuit_init(uint8_t purpose, int flags)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- /* sets circ->p_circ_id and circ->p_chan */
|
|
|
- origin_circuit_t *circ = origin_circuit_new();
|
|
|
- circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT);
|
|
|
- circ->build_state = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(cpath_build_state_t));
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel =
|
|
|
- ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->need_uptime =
|
|
|
- ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->need_capacity =
|
|
|
- ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->is_internal =
|
|
|
- ((flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) ? 1 : 0);
|
|
|
- circ->base_.purpose = purpose;
|
|
|
- return circ;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Build a new circuit for <b>purpose</b>. If <b>exit</b>
|
|
|
- * is defined, then use that as your exit router, else choose a suitable
|
|
|
- * exit node.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Also launch a connection to the first OR in the chosen path, if
|
|
|
- * it's not open already.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-origin_circuit_t *
|
|
|
-circuit_establish_circuit(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit, int flags)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
|
|
- int err_reason = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- circ = origin_circuit_init(purpose, flags);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (onion_pick_cpath_exit(circ, exit) < 0 ||
|
|
|
- onion_populate_cpath(circ) < 0) {
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_NOPATH);
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if ((err_reason = circuit_handle_first_hop(circ)) < 0) {
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason);
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return circ;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Start establishing the first hop of our circuit. Figure out what
|
|
|
- * OR we should connect to, and if necessary start the connection to
|
|
|
- * it. If we're already connected, then send the 'create' cell.
|
|
|
- * Return 0 for ok, -reason if circ should be marked-for-close. */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_handle_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *firsthop;
|
|
|
- channel_t *n_chan;
|
|
|
- int err_reason = 0;
|
|
|
- const char *msg = NULL;
|
|
|
- int should_launch = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- firsthop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(firsthop);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(firsthop->extend_info);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* now see if we're already connected to the first OR in 'route' */
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Looking for firsthop '%s'",
|
|
|
- fmt_addrport(&firsthop->extend_info->addr,
|
|
|
- firsthop->extend_info->port));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- n_chan = channel_get_for_extend(firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest,
|
|
|
- &firsthop->extend_info->addr,
|
|
|
- &msg,
|
|
|
- &should_launch);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!n_chan) {
|
|
|
- /* not currently connected in a useful way. */
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Next router is %s: %s",
|
|
|
- safe_str_client(extend_info_describe(firsthop->extend_info)),
|
|
|
- msg?msg:"???");
|
|
|
- circ->base_.n_hop = extend_info_dup(firsthop->extend_info);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (should_launch) {
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
|
- control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_DIR, 0);
|
|
|
- n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(
|
|
|
- &firsthop->extend_info->addr,
|
|
|
- firsthop->extend_info->port,
|
|
|
- firsthop->extend_info->identity_digest);
|
|
|
- if (!n_chan) { /* connect failed, forget the whole thing */
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"connect to firsthop failed. Closing.");
|
|
|
- return -END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
|
|
|
- /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
|
|
|
- * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches
|
|
|
- * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- } else { /* it's already open. use it. */
|
|
|
- tor_assert(!circ->base_.n_hop);
|
|
|
- circ->base_.n_chan = n_chan;
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Conn open. Delivering first onion skin.");
|
|
|
- if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ)) < 0) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit_send_next_onion_skin failed.");
|
|
|
- return err_reason;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Find any circuits that are waiting on <b>or_conn</b> to become
|
|
|
- * open and get them to send their create cells forward.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Status is 1 if connect succeeded, or 0 if connect failed.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_n_chan_done(channel_t *chan, int status)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *pending_circs;
|
|
|
- int err_reason = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(chan);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"chan to %s/%s, status=%d",
|
|
|
- chan->nickname ? chan->nickname : "NULL",
|
|
|
- channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(chan), status);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- pending_circs = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- circuit_get_all_pending_on_channel(pending_circs, chan);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(pending_circs, circuit_t *, circ)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- /* These checks are redundant wrt get_all_pending_on_or_conn, but I'm
|
|
|
- * leaving them in in case it's possible for the status of a circuit to
|
|
|
- * change as we're going down the list. */
|
|
|
- if (circ->marked_for_close || circ->n_chan || !circ->n_hop ||
|
|
|
- circ->state != CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT)
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (tor_digest_is_zero(circ->n_hop->identity_digest)) {
|
|
|
- /* Look at addr/port. This is an unkeyed connection. */
|
|
|
- if (!channel_matches_extend_info(chan, circ->n_hop))
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* We expected a key. See if it's the right one. */
|
|
|
- if (tor_memneq(chan->identity_digest,
|
|
|
- circ->n_hop->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!status) { /* chan failed; close circ */
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Channel failed; closing circ.");
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED);
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Found circ, sending create cell.");
|
|
|
- /* circuit_deliver_create_cell will set n_circ_id and add us to
|
|
|
- * chan_circuid_circuit_map, so we don't need to call
|
|
|
- * set_circid_chan here. */
|
|
|
- circ->n_chan = chan;
|
|
|
- extend_info_free(circ->n_hop);
|
|
|
- circ->n_hop = NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
|
- if ((err_reason =
|
|
|
- circuit_send_next_onion_skin(TO_ORIGIN_CIRCUIT(circ))) < 0) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "send_next_onion_skin failed; circuit marked for closing.");
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(circ, -err_reason);
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- /* XXX could this be bad, eg if next_onion_skin failed because conn
|
|
|
- * died? */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* pull the create cell out of circ->onionskin, and send it */
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ->n_chan_onionskin);
|
|
|
- if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ,CELL_CREATE,
|
|
|
- circ->n_chan_onionskin)<0) {
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT);
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tor_free(circ->n_chan_onionskin);
|
|
|
- circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(circ);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(pending_circs);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Find a new circid that isn't currently in use on the circ->n_chan
|
|
|
- * for the outgoing
|
|
|
- * circuit <b>circ</b>, and deliver a cell of type <b>cell_type</b>
|
|
|
- * (either CELL_CREATE or CELL_CREATE_FAST) with payload <b>payload</b>
|
|
|
- * to this circuit.
|
|
|
- * Return -1 if we failed to find a suitable circid, else return 0.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-circuit_deliver_create_cell(circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type,
|
|
|
- const char *payload)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- cell_t cell;
|
|
|
- circid_t id;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ->n_chan);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(payload);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(cell_type == CELL_CREATE || cell_type == CELL_CREATE_FAST);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- id = get_unique_circ_id_by_chan(circ->n_chan);
|
|
|
- if (!id) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to get unique circID.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen circID %u.", id);
|
|
|
- circuit_set_n_circid_chan(circ, id, circ->n_chan);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
|
- cell.command = cell_type;
|
|
|
- cell.circ_id = circ->n_circ_id;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- memcpy(cell.payload, payload, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
- append_cell_to_circuit_queue(circ, circ->n_chan, &cell,
|
|
|
- CELL_DIRECTION_OUT, 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (CIRCUIT_IS_ORIGIN(circ)) {
|
|
|
- /* mark it so it gets better rate limiting treatment. */
|
|
|
- channel_timestamp_client(circ->n_chan);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** We've decided to start our reachability testing. If all
|
|
|
- * is set, log this to the user. Return 1 if we did, or 0 if
|
|
|
- * we chose not to log anything. */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-inform_testing_reachability(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- char dirbuf[128];
|
|
|
- const routerinfo_t *me = router_get_my_routerinfo();
|
|
|
- if (!me)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
|
- "CHECKING_REACHABILITY ORADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
|
|
- me->address, me->or_port);
|
|
|
- if (me->dir_port) {
|
|
|
- tor_snprintf(dirbuf, sizeof(dirbuf), " and DirPort %s:%d",
|
|
|
- me->address, me->dir_port);
|
|
|
- control_event_server_status(LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
|
- "CHECKING_REACHABILITY DIRADDRESS=%s:%d",
|
|
|
- me->address, me->dir_port);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_OR, "Now checking whether ORPort %s:%d%s %s reachable... "
|
|
|
- "(this may take up to %d minutes -- look for log "
|
|
|
- "messages indicating success)",
|
|
|
- me->address, me->or_port,
|
|
|
- me->dir_port ? dirbuf : "",
|
|
|
- me->dir_port ? "are" : "is",
|
|
|
- TIMEOUT_UNTIL_UNREACHABILITY_COMPLAINT/60);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return true iff we should send a create_fast cell to start building a given
|
|
|
- * circuit */
|
|
|
-static INLINE int
|
|
|
-should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ->cpath->extend_info);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key)
|
|
|
- return 1; /* our hand is forced: only a create_fast will work. */
|
|
|
- if (!options->FastFirstHopPK)
|
|
|
- return 0; /* we prefer to avoid create_fast */
|
|
|
- if (public_server_mode(options)) {
|
|
|
- /* We're a server, and we know an onion key. We can choose.
|
|
|
- * Prefer to blend our circuit into the other circuits we are
|
|
|
- * creating on behalf of others. */
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return true if <b>circ</b> is the type of circuit we want to count
|
|
|
- * timeouts from. In particular, we want it to have not completed yet
|
|
|
- * (already completing indicates we cannibalized it), and we want it to
|
|
|
- * have exactly three hops.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- return !circ->has_opened
|
|
|
- && circ->build_state->desired_path_len == DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** This is the backbone function for building circuits.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * If circ's first hop is closed, then we need to build a create
|
|
|
- * cell and send it forward.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Otherwise, we need to build a relay extend cell and send it
|
|
|
- * forward.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Return -reason if we want to tear down circ, else return 0.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_send_next_onion_skin(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
- const node_t *node;
|
|
|
- char payload[2+4+DIGEST_LEN+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN];
|
|
|
- char *onionskin;
|
|
|
- size_t payload_len;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_CLOSED) {
|
|
|
- int fast;
|
|
|
- uint8_t cell_type;
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"First skin; sending create cell.");
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
|
- control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_ONEHOP_CREATE, 0);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CIRCUIT_CREATE, 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- node = node_get_by_id(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest);
|
|
|
- fast = should_use_create_fast_for_circuit(circ);
|
|
|
- if (!fast) {
|
|
|
- /* We are an OR and we know the right onion key: we should
|
|
|
- * send an old slow create cell.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- cell_type = CELL_CREATE;
|
|
|
- if (onion_skin_create(circ->cpath->extend_info->onion_key,
|
|
|
- &(circ->cpath->dh_handshake_state),
|
|
|
- payload) < 0) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create (first hop) failed.");
|
|
|
- return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- note_request("cell: create", 1);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* We are not an OR, and we're building the first hop of a circuit to a
|
|
|
- * new OR: we can be speedy and use CREATE_FAST to save an RSA operation
|
|
|
- * and a DH operation. */
|
|
|
- cell_type = CELL_CREATE_FAST;
|
|
|
- memset(payload, 0, sizeof(payload));
|
|
|
- crypto_rand((char*) circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
|
|
|
- sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
|
- memcpy(payload, circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state,
|
|
|
- sizeof(circ->cpath->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
|
- note_request("cell: create fast", 1);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), cell_type, payload) < 0)
|
|
|
- return - END_CIRC_REASON_RESOURCELIMIT;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- circ->cpath->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
|
|
|
- circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"First hop: finished sending %s cell to '%s'",
|
|
|
- fast ? "CREATE_FAST" : "CREATE",
|
|
|
- node ? node_describe(node) : "<unnamed>");
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ->base_.state == CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"starting to send subsequent skin.");
|
|
|
- hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
- if (!hop) {
|
|
|
- /* done building the circuit. whew. */
|
|
|
- circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
- if (circuit_timeout_want_to_count_circ(circ)) {
|
|
|
- struct timeval end;
|
|
|
- long timediff;
|
|
|
- tor_gettimeofday(&end);
|
|
|
- timediff = tv_mdiff(&circ->base_.timestamp_created, &end);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /*
|
|
|
- * If the circuit build time is much greater than we would have cut
|
|
|
- * it off at, we probably had a suspend event along this codepath,
|
|
|
- * and we should discard the value.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- if (timediff < 0 || timediff > 2*circ_times.close_ms+1000) {
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_CIRC, "Strange value for circuit build time: %ldmsec. "
|
|
|
- "Assuming clock jump. Purpose %d (%s)", timediff,
|
|
|
- circ->base_.purpose,
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose));
|
|
|
- } else if (!circuit_build_times_disabled()) {
|
|
|
- /* Only count circuit times if the network is live */
|
|
|
- if (circuit_build_times_network_check_live(&circ_times)) {
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_add_time(&circ_times, (build_time_t)timediff);
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_set_timeout(&circ_times);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) {
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_network_circ_success(&circ_times);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"circuit built!");
|
|
|
- circuit_reset_failure_count(0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel || circ->has_opened) {
|
|
|
- control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_STATUS, 0);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!can_complete_circuit && !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- can_complete_circuit=1;
|
|
|
- /* FFFF Log a count of known routers here */
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
|
- "Tor has successfully opened a circuit. "
|
|
|
- "Looks like client functionality is working.");
|
|
|
- control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE, 0);
|
|
|
- control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "CIRCUIT_ESTABLISHED");
|
|
|
- clear_broken_connection_map(1);
|
|
|
- if (server_mode(options) && !check_whether_orport_reachable()) {
|
|
|
- inform_testing_reachability();
|
|
|
- consider_testing_reachability(1, 1);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- pathbias_count_success(circ);
|
|
|
- circuit_rep_hist_note_result(circ);
|
|
|
- circuit_has_opened(circ); /* do other actions as necessary */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* We're done with measurement circuits here. Just close them */
|
|
|
- if (circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT)
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), END_CIRC_REASON_FINISHED);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (tor_addr_family(&hop->extend_info->addr) != AF_INET) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Trying to extend to a non-IPv4 address.");
|
|
|
- return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- set_uint32(payload, tor_addr_to_ipv4n(&hop->extend_info->addr));
|
|
|
- set_uint16(payload+4, htons(hop->extend_info->port));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- onionskin = payload+2+4;
|
|
|
- memcpy(payload+2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN,
|
|
|
- hop->extend_info->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- payload_len = 2+4+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (onion_skin_create(hop->extend_info->onion_key,
|
|
|
- &(hop->dh_handshake_state), onionskin) < 0) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_create failed.");
|
|
|
- return - END_CIRC_REASON_INTERNAL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Sending extend relay cell.");
|
|
|
- note_request("cell: extend", 1);
|
|
|
- /* send it to hop->prev, because it will transfer
|
|
|
- * it to a create cell and then send to hop */
|
|
|
- if (relay_send_command_from_edge(0, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
|
- RELAY_COMMAND_EXTEND,
|
|
|
- payload, payload_len, hop->prev) < 0)
|
|
|
- return 0; /* circuit is closed */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- hop->state = CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Our clock just jumped by <b>seconds_elapsed</b>. Assume
|
|
|
- * something has also gone wrong with our network: notify the user,
|
|
|
- * and abandon all not-yet-used circuits. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-circuit_note_clock_jumped(int seconds_elapsed)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int severity = server_mode(get_options()) ? LOG_WARN : LOG_NOTICE;
|
|
|
- tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "Your system clock just jumped %d seconds %s; "
|
|
|
- "assuming established circuits no longer work.",
|
|
|
- seconds_elapsed >=0 ? seconds_elapsed : -seconds_elapsed,
|
|
|
- seconds_elapsed >=0 ? "forward" : "backward");
|
|
|
- control_event_general_status(LOG_WARN, "CLOCK_JUMPED TIME=%d",
|
|
|
- seconds_elapsed);
|
|
|
- can_complete_circuit=0; /* so it'll log when it works again */
|
|
|
- control_event_client_status(severity, "CIRCUIT_NOT_ESTABLISHED REASON=%s",
|
|
|
- "CLOCK_JUMPED");
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_all_unused_circs();
|
|
|
- circuit_expire_all_dirty_circs();
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Take the 'extend' <b>cell</b>, pull out addr/port plus the onion
|
|
|
- * skin and identity digest for the next hop. If we're already connected,
|
|
|
- * pass the onion skin to the next hop using a create cell; otherwise
|
|
|
- * launch a new OR connection, and <b>circ</b> will notice when the
|
|
|
- * connection succeeds or fails.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Return -1 if we want to warn and tear down the circuit, else return 0.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- channel_t *n_chan;
|
|
|
- relay_header_t rh;
|
|
|
- char *onionskin;
|
|
|
- char *id_digest=NULL;
|
|
|
- uint32_t n_addr32;
|
|
|
- uint16_t n_port;
|
|
|
- tor_addr_t n_addr;
|
|
|
- const char *msg = NULL;
|
|
|
- int should_launch = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circ->n_chan) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "n_chan already set. Bug/attack. Closing.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (circ->n_hop) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "conn to next hop already launched. Bug/attack. Closing.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!server_mode(get_options())) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Got an extend cell, but running as a client. Closing.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- relay_header_unpack(&rh, cell->payload);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (rh.length < 4+2+ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN+DIGEST_LEN) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Wrong length %d on extend cell. Closing circuit.",
|
|
|
- rh.length);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- n_addr32 = ntohl(get_uint32(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE));
|
|
|
- n_port = ntohs(get_uint16(cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4));
|
|
|
- onionskin = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2;
|
|
|
- id_digest = (char*) cell->payload+RELAY_HEADER_SIZE+4+2+
|
|
|
- ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN;
|
|
|
- tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&n_addr, n_addr32);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!n_port || !n_addr32) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Client asked me to extend to zero destination port or addr.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (tor_addr_is_internal(&n_addr, 0) &&
|
|
|
- !get_options()->ExtendAllowPrivateAddresses) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Client asked me to extend to a private address");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using
|
|
|
- * an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay),
|
|
|
- * but we don't want to let people send us extend cells for empty
|
|
|
- * fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack,
|
|
|
- * and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a
|
|
|
- * new TLS connection for each extend request. */
|
|
|
- if (tor_digest_is_zero(id_digest)) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Client asked me to extend without specifying an id_digest.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Next, check if we're being asked to connect to the hop that the
|
|
|
- * extend cell came from. There isn't any reason for that, and it can
|
|
|
- * assist circular-path attacks. */
|
|
|
- if (tor_memeq(id_digest,
|
|
|
- TO_OR_CIRCUIT(circ)->p_chan->identity_digest,
|
|
|
- DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
|
|
- log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Client asked me to extend back to the previous hop.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- n_chan = channel_get_for_extend(id_digest,
|
|
|
- &n_addr,
|
|
|
- &msg,
|
|
|
- &should_launch);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!n_chan) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC|LD_OR,"Next router (%s): %s",
|
|
|
- fmt_addrport(&n_addr, n_port), msg?msg:"????");
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- circ->n_hop = extend_info_new(NULL /*nickname*/,
|
|
|
- id_digest,
|
|
|
- NULL /*onion_key*/,
|
|
|
- &n_addr, n_port);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- circ->n_chan_onionskin = tor_malloc(ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
- memcpy(circ->n_chan_onionskin, onionskin, ONIONSKIN_CHALLENGE_LEN);
|
|
|
- circuit_set_state(circ, CIRCUIT_STATE_CHAN_WAIT);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (should_launch) {
|
|
|
- /* we should try to open a connection */
|
|
|
- n_chan = channel_connect_for_circuit(&n_addr, n_port, id_digest);
|
|
|
- if (!n_chan) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Launching n_chan failed. Closing circuit.");
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(circ, END_CIRC_REASON_CONNECTFAILED);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"connecting in progress (or finished). Good.");
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- /* return success. The onion/circuit/etc will be taken care of
|
|
|
- * automatically (may already have been) whenever n_chan reaches
|
|
|
- * OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(!circ->n_hop); /* Connection is already established. */
|
|
|
- circ->n_chan = n_chan;
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "n_chan is %s",
|
|
|
- channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(n_chan));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circuit_deliver_create_cell(circ, CELL_CREATE, onionskin) < 0)
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Initialize cpath-\>{f|b}_{crypto|digest} from the key material in
|
|
|
- * key_data. key_data must contain CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL bytes, which are
|
|
|
- * used as follows:
|
|
|
- * - 20 to initialize f_digest
|
|
|
- * - 20 to initialize b_digest
|
|
|
- * - 16 to key f_crypto
|
|
|
- * - 16 to key b_crypto
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * (If 'reverse' is true, then f_XX and b_XX are swapped.)
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data,
|
|
|
- int reverse)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- crypto_digest_t *tmp_digest;
|
|
|
- crypto_cipher_t *tmp_crypto;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(cpath);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(key_data);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(!(cpath->f_crypto || cpath->b_crypto ||
|
|
|
- cpath->f_digest || cpath->b_digest));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- cpath->f_digest = crypto_digest_new();
|
|
|
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->f_digest, key_data, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- cpath->b_digest = crypto_digest_new();
|
|
|
- crypto_digest_add_bytes(cpath->b_digest, key_data+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!(cpath->f_crypto =
|
|
|
- crypto_cipher_new(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)))) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"Forward cipher initialization failed.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!(cpath->b_crypto =
|
|
|
- crypto_cipher_new(key_data+(2*DIGEST_LEN)+CIPHER_KEY_LEN))) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"Backward cipher initialization failed.");
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (reverse) {
|
|
|
- tmp_digest = cpath->f_digest;
|
|
|
- cpath->f_digest = cpath->b_digest;
|
|
|
- cpath->b_digest = tmp_digest;
|
|
|
- tmp_crypto = cpath->f_crypto;
|
|
|
- cpath->f_crypto = cpath->b_crypto;
|
|
|
- cpath->b_crypto = tmp_crypto;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** The minimum number of first hop completions before we start
|
|
|
- * thinking about warning about path bias and dropping guards */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-pathbias_get_min_circs(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
-#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_CIRC 20
|
|
|
- if (options->PathBiasCircThreshold >= 5)
|
|
|
- return options->PathBiasCircThreshold;
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_mincircs",
|
|
|
- DFLT_PATH_BIAS_MIN_CIRC,
|
|
|
- 5, INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-static double
|
|
|
-pathbias_get_notice_rate(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
-#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT 40
|
|
|
- if (options->PathBiasNoticeRate >= 0.0)
|
|
|
- return options->PathBiasNoticeRate;
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_noticepct",
|
|
|
- DFLT_PATH_BIAS_NOTICE_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-static double
|
|
|
-pathbias_get_disable_rate(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
-// XXX: This needs tuning based on use + experimentation before we set it
|
|
|
-#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_DISABLE_PCT 0
|
|
|
- if (options->PathBiasDisableRate >= 0.0)
|
|
|
- return options->PathBiasDisableRate;
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_disablepct",
|
|
|
- DFLT_PATH_BIAS_DISABLE_PCT, 0, 100)/100.0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-pathbias_get_scale_threshold(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
-#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD 200
|
|
|
- if (options->PathBiasScaleThreshold >= 2)
|
|
|
- return options->PathBiasScaleThreshold;
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scalecircs",
|
|
|
- DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_THRESHOLD, 10,
|
|
|
- INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-pathbias_get_scale_factor(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
-#define DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_FACTOR 2
|
|
|
- if (options->PathBiasScaleFactor >= 1)
|
|
|
- return options->PathBiasScaleFactor;
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return networkstatus_get_param(NULL, "pb_scalefactor",
|
|
|
- DFLT_PATH_BIAS_SCALE_FACTOR, 1, INT32_MAX);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-static const char *
|
|
|
-pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- switch (state) {
|
|
|
- case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC:
|
|
|
- return "new";
|
|
|
- case PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP:
|
|
|
- return "first hop";
|
|
|
- case PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED:
|
|
|
- return "succeeded";
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return "unknown";
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful first hop.
|
|
|
- * If so, record it in the current guard's path bias first_hop count.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
-#define FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
|
|
|
- static ratelim_t first_hop_notice_limit =
|
|
|
- RATELIM_INIT(FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
|
|
|
- char *rate_msg = NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* We can't do path bias accounting without entry guards.
|
|
|
- * Testing and controller circuits also have no guards. */
|
|
|
- if (get_options()->UseEntryGuards == 0 ||
|
|
|
- circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING ||
|
|
|
- circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER) {
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Completely ignore one hop circuits */
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel ||
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1) {
|
|
|
- /* Check for inconsistency */
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len != 1 ||
|
|
|
- !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "One-hop circuit has length %d. Path state is %s. "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
|
|
|
- pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
|
|
|
- /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
|
|
|
- if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Don't count cannibalized circs for path bias */
|
|
|
- if (!circ->has_opened) {
|
|
|
- entry_guard_t *guard;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- guard =
|
|
|
- entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest);
|
|
|
- if (guard) {
|
|
|
- if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
|
|
|
- circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) {
|
|
|
- /* Bogus guard; we already warned. */
|
|
|
- return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Unopened circuit has no known guard. "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
|
|
|
- if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "A %s circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
- circ->cpath->state, circ->has_opened,
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/**
|
|
|
- * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit
|
|
|
- * completion. If so, record it in the current guard's path bias
|
|
|
- * success count.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-pathbias_count_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
-#define SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
|
|
|
- static ratelim_t success_notice_limit =
|
|
|
- RATELIM_INIT(SUCCESS_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
|
|
|
- char *rate_msg = NULL;
|
|
|
- entry_guard_t *guard = NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* We can't do path bias accounting without entry guards.
|
|
|
- * Testing and controller circuits also have no guards. */
|
|
|
- if (get_options()->UseEntryGuards == 0 ||
|
|
|
- circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING ||
|
|
|
- circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER) {
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Ignore one hop circuits */
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel ||
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1) {
|
|
|
- /* Check for consistency */
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len != 1 ||
|
|
|
- !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "One-hop circuit has length %d. Path state is %s. "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
|
|
|
- pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias */
|
|
|
- if (!circ->has_opened) {
|
|
|
- guard =
|
|
|
- entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (guard) {
|
|
|
- if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
|
|
|
- circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED;
|
|
|
- guard->circuit_successes++;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
|
|
|
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
|
|
|
- guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Succeeded circuit is in strange path state %s. "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) {
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) "
|
|
|
- "for guard %s=%s",
|
|
|
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
|
|
|
- guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to
|
|
|
- * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here.
|
|
|
- * No need to log that case. */
|
|
|
- } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Completed circuit has no known guard. "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- if (circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED) {
|
|
|
- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
|
|
|
- approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
- "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
|
|
|
- "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
- pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
- circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
- rate_msg);
|
|
|
- tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to
|
|
|
- * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should
|
|
|
- * eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the
|
|
|
- * guard looks fine. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- entry_guards_changed();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (guard->first_hops > (unsigned)pathbias_get_min_circs(options)) {
|
|
|
- /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
|
|
|
- * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
|
|
|
- * change to <= */
|
|
|
- if (guard->circuit_successes/((double)guard->first_hops)
|
|
|
- < pathbias_get_disable_rate(options)) {
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* This message is currently disabled by default. */
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Extremely low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s. "
|
|
|
- "This indicates either an overloaded guard, an attack, or "
|
|
|
- "a bug.",
|
|
|
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
|
|
|
- hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- guard->path_bias_disabled = 1;
|
|
|
- guard->bad_since = approx_time();
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- } else if (guard->circuit_successes/((double)guard->first_hops)
|
|
|
- < pathbias_get_notice_rate(options)
|
|
|
- && !guard->path_bias_notice) {
|
|
|
- guard->path_bias_notice = 1;
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s.",
|
|
|
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
|
|
|
- hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* If we get a ton of circuits, just scale everything down */
|
|
|
- if (guard->first_hops > (unsigned)pathbias_get_scale_threshold(options)) {
|
|
|
- const int scale_factor = pathbias_get_scale_factor(options);
|
|
|
- /* For now, only scale if there will be no rounding error...
|
|
|
- * XXX024: We want to switch to a real moving average for 0.2.4. */
|
|
|
- if ((guard->first_hops % scale_factor) == 0 &&
|
|
|
- (guard->circuit_successes % scale_factor) == 0) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
- "Scaling pathbias counts to (%u/%u)/%d for guard %s=%s",
|
|
|
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
|
|
|
- scale_factor, guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity,
|
|
|
- DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
- guard->first_hops /= scale_factor;
|
|
|
- guard->circuit_successes /= scale_factor;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- guard->first_hops++;
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
|
|
|
- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
|
|
|
- hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, and it included
|
|
|
- * <b>reply</b> as its body. (If <b>reply_type</b> is CELL_CREATED, the body
|
|
|
- * contains (the second DH key, plus KH). If <b>reply_type</b> is
|
|
|
- * CELL_CREATED_FAST, the body contains a secret y and a hash H(x|y).)
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is
|
|
|
- * correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Return - reason if we want to mark circ for close, else return 0.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
|
|
|
- const uint8_t *reply)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
- int rv;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if ((rv = pathbias_count_first_hop(circ)) < 0)
|
|
|
- return rv;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
|
|
|
- hop = circ->cpath;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
- if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"got extended when circ already built? Closing.");
|
|
|
- return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED && hop->dh_handshake_state) {
|
|
|
- if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)reply,keys,
|
|
|
- DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed.");
|
|
|
- return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- /* Remember hash of g^xy */
|
|
|
- memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- } else if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST && !hop->dh_handshake_state) {
|
|
|
- if (fast_client_handshake(hop->fast_handshake_state, reply,
|
|
|
- (uint8_t*)keys,
|
|
|
- DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,"fast_client_handshake failed.");
|
|
|
- return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"CREATED cell type did not match CREATE cell type.");
|
|
|
- return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state); /* don't need it anymore */
|
|
|
- hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- memset(hop->fast_handshake_state, 0, sizeof(hop->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0)<0) {
|
|
|
- return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Finished building %scircuit hop:",
|
|
|
- (reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST) ? "fast " : "");
|
|
|
- circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,circ);
|
|
|
- control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED, 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** We received a relay truncated cell on circ.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
|
|
|
- * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
|
|
|
- * just give up: for circ to close, and return 0.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer, int reason)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
-// crypt_path_t *victim;
|
|
|
-// connection_t *stream;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(layer);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
|
|
|
- * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
|
|
|
- * just give up.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
|
- END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE|END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED|reason);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-#if 0
|
|
|
- while (layer->next != circ->cpath) {
|
|
|
- /* we need to clear out layer->next */
|
|
|
- victim = layer->next;
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Killing a layer of the cpath.");
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (stream = circ->p_streams; stream; stream=stream->next_stream) {
|
|
|
- if (stream->cpath_layer == victim) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_APP, "Marking stream %d for close because of truncate.",
|
|
|
- stream->stream_id);
|
|
|
- /* no need to send 'end' relay cells,
|
|
|
- * because the other side's already dead
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- connection_mark_unattached_ap(stream, END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- layer->next = victim->next;
|
|
|
- circuit_free_cpath_node(victim);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "finished");
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-#endif
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created
|
|
|
- * cell back.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type, const char *payload,
|
|
|
- const char *keys)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- cell_t cell;
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *tmp_cpath;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tmp_cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
|
- tmp_cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
|
- cell.command = cell_type;
|
|
|
- cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- memcpy(cell.payload, payload,
|
|
|
- cell_type == CELL_CREATED ? ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN : DIGEST_LEN*2);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
|
|
|
- (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys),
|
|
|
- (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20));
|
|
|
- if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0)<0) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed");
|
|
|
- tor_free(tmp_cpath);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- circ->n_digest = tmp_cpath->f_digest;
|
|
|
- circ->n_crypto = tmp_cpath->f_crypto;
|
|
|
- circ->p_digest = tmp_cpath->b_digest;
|
|
|
- circ->p_crypto = tmp_cpath->b_crypto;
|
|
|
- tmp_cpath->magic = 0;
|
|
|
- tor_free(tmp_cpath);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (cell_type == CELL_CREATED)
|
|
|
- memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- circ->is_first_hop = (cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
|
- circ->p_chan, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0);
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.",
|
|
|
- circ->is_first_hop ? "created_fast" : "created");
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) &&
|
|
|
- !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) {
|
|
|
- /* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn
|
|
|
- * that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells
|
|
|
- * can reach us too. */
|
|
|
- router_orport_found_reachable();
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>.
|
|
|
- * Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something
|
|
|
- * away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers
|
|
|
- * to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as
|
|
|
- * is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit,
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *nodes)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int num_acceptable_routers;
|
|
|
- int routelen;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_assert(nodes);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- routelen = DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
|
|
|
- if (exit &&
|
|
|
- purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
|
|
|
- purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
|
|
|
- routelen++;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- num_acceptable_routers = count_acceptable_nodes(nodes);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen route length %d (%d/%d routers suitable).",
|
|
|
- routelen, num_acceptable_routers, smartlist_len(nodes));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (num_acceptable_routers < 2) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Not enough acceptable routers (%d). Discarding this circuit.",
|
|
|
- num_acceptable_routers);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (num_acceptable_routers < routelen) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Not enough routers: cutting routelen from %d to %d.",
|
|
|
- routelen, num_acceptable_routers);
|
|
|
- routelen = num_acceptable_routers;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return routelen;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return a newly allocated list of uint16_t * for each predicted port not
|
|
|
- * handled by a current circuit. */
|
|
|
-static smartlist_t *
|
|
|
-circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time_t now)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *dest = rep_hist_get_predicted_ports(now);
|
|
|
- circuit_remove_handled_ports(dest);
|
|
|
- return dest;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return 1 if we already have circuits present or on the way for
|
|
|
- * all anticipated ports. Return 0 if we should make more.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * If we're returning 0, set need_uptime and need_capacity to
|
|
|
- * indicate any requirements that the unhandled ports have.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(time_t now, int *need_uptime,
|
|
|
- int *need_capacity)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int i, enough;
|
|
|
- uint16_t *port;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *sl = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(now);
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *LongLivedServices = get_options()->LongLivedPorts;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(need_uptime);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(need_capacity);
|
|
|
- // Always predict need_capacity
|
|
|
- *need_capacity = 1;
|
|
|
- enough = (smartlist_len(sl) == 0);
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl); ++i) {
|
|
|
- port = smartlist_get(sl, i);
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_string_num_isin(LongLivedServices, *port))
|
|
|
- *need_uptime = 1;
|
|
|
- tor_free(port);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
|
- return enough;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return 1 if <b>node</b> can handle one or more of the ports in
|
|
|
- * <b>needed_ports</b>, else return 0.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-node_handles_some_port(const node_t *node, smartlist_t *needed_ports)
|
|
|
-{ /* XXXX MOVE */
|
|
|
- int i;
|
|
|
- uint16_t port;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
|
|
|
- addr_policy_result_t r;
|
|
|
- /* alignment issues aren't a worry for this dereference, since
|
|
|
- needed_ports is explicitly a smartlist of uint16_t's */
|
|
|
- port = *(uint16_t *)smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(port);
|
|
|
- if (node)
|
|
|
- r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(NULL, port, node);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- if (r != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED && r != ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED)
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return true iff <b>conn</b> needs another general circuit to be
|
|
|
- * built. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(connection_t *conn)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- entry_connection_t *entry;
|
|
|
- if (conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- entry = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT &&
|
|
|
- !conn->marked_for_close &&
|
|
|
- !(entry->want_onehop) && /* ignore one-hop streams */
|
|
|
- !(entry->use_begindir) && /* ignore targeted dir fetches */
|
|
|
- !(entry->chosen_exit_name) && /* ignore defined streams */
|
|
|
- !connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)) &&
|
|
|
- !circuit_stream_is_being_handled(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn), 0,
|
|
|
- MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM))
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
|
|
|
- * general-purpose circuit we're about to build.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Look through the connection array, and choose a router that maximizes
|
|
|
- * the number of pending streams that can exit from this router.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Return NULL if we can't find any suitable routers.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static const node_t *
|
|
|
-choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int *n_supported;
|
|
|
- int n_pending_connections = 0;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *connections;
|
|
|
- int best_support = -1;
|
|
|
- int n_best_support=0;
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- const smartlist_t *the_nodes;
|
|
|
- const node_t *node=NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- connections = get_connection_array();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Count how many connections are waiting for a circuit to be built.
|
|
|
- * We use this for log messages now, but in the future we may depend on it.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(connections, connection_t *, conn,
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if (ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn))
|
|
|
- ++n_pending_connections;
|
|
|
- });
|
|
|
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Choosing exit node; %d connections are pending",
|
|
|
-// n_pending_connections);
|
|
|
- /* Now we count, for each of the routers in the directory, how many
|
|
|
- * of the pending connections could possibly exit from that
|
|
|
- * router (n_supported[i]). (We can't be sure about cases where we
|
|
|
- * don't know the IP address of the pending connection.)
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * -1 means "Don't use this router at all."
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- the_nodes = nodelist_get_list();
|
|
|
- n_supported = tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*smartlist_len(the_nodes));
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
|
|
|
- const int i = node_sl_idx;
|
|
|
- if (router_digest_is_me(node->identity)) {
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s -- it's me.", router->nickname);
|
|
|
- /* XXX there's probably a reverse predecessor attack here, but
|
|
|
- * it's slow. should we take this out? -RD
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!node_has_descriptor(node)) {
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!node->is_running || node->is_bad_exit) {
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
- continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) {
|
|
|
- /* never pick a non-general node as a random exit. */
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, node)) {
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
- continue; /* user asked us not to use it, no matter what */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (options->ExitNodes &&
|
|
|
- !routerset_contains_node(options->ExitNodes, node)) {
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
- continue; /* not one of our chosen exit nodes */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
- continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable. Don't worry if
|
|
|
- * this makes us reject all the possible routers: if so,
|
|
|
- * we'll retry later in this function with need_update and
|
|
|
- * need_capacity set to 0. */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!(node->is_valid || options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT)) {
|
|
|
- /* if it's invalid and we don't want it */
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- invalid router.",
|
|
|
-// router->nickname, i);
|
|
|
- continue; /* skip invalid routers */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (options->ExcludeSingleHopRelays &&
|
|
|
- node_allows_single_hop_exits(node)) {
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (node_exit_policy_rejects_all(node)) {
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- it rejects all.",
|
|
|
-// router->nickname, i);
|
|
|
- continue; /* skip routers that reject all */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- n_supported[i] = 0;
|
|
|
- /* iterate over connections */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(connections, connection_t *, conn) {
|
|
|
- if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn))
|
|
|
- continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */
|
|
|
- if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn), node)) {
|
|
|
- ++n_supported[i];
|
|
|
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.",
|
|
|
-// router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s (index %d) would reject this stream.",
|
|
|
-// router->nickname, i);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
|
|
|
- if (n_pending_connections > 0 && n_supported[i] == 0) {
|
|
|
- /* Leave best_support at -1 if that's where it is, so we can
|
|
|
- * distinguish it later. */
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (n_supported[i] > best_support) {
|
|
|
- /* If this router is better than previous ones, remember its index
|
|
|
- * and goodness, and start counting how many routers are this good. */
|
|
|
- best_support = n_supported[i]; n_best_support=1;
|
|
|
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is new best supported option so far.",
|
|
|
-// router->nickname);
|
|
|
- } else if (n_supported[i] == best_support) {
|
|
|
- /* If this router is _as good_ as the best one, just increment the
|
|
|
- * count of equally good routers.*/
|
|
|
- ++n_best_support;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Found %d servers that might support %d/%d pending connections.",
|
|
|
- n_best_support, best_support >= 0 ? best_support : 0,
|
|
|
- n_pending_connections);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one
|
|
|
- * at random. */
|
|
|
- if (best_support > 0) {
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(the_nodes, const node_t *, node, {
|
|
|
- if (n_supported[node_sl_idx] == best_support)
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(supporting, (void*)node);
|
|
|
- });
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(supporting);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to
|
|
|
- * possibly support any of them. Choose a router at random that satisfies
|
|
|
- * at least one predicted exit port. */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- int attempt;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (best_support == -1) {
|
|
|
- if (need_uptime || need_capacity) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "We couldn't find any live%s%s routers; falling back "
|
|
|
- "to list of all routers.",
|
|
|
- need_capacity?", fast":"",
|
|
|
- need_uptime?", stable":"");
|
|
|
- tor_free(n_supported);
|
|
|
- return choose_good_exit_server_general(0, 0);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_CIRC, "All routers are down or won't exit%s -- "
|
|
|
- "choosing a doomed exit at random.",
|
|
|
- options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ ? " or are Excluded" : "");
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- supporting = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL));
|
|
|
- for (attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
|
|
|
- /* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port,
|
|
|
- * then if there are none, pick from any that support exiting. */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
|
|
|
- if (n_supported[node_sl_idx] != -1 &&
|
|
|
- (attempt || node_handles_some_port(node, needed_ports))) {
|
|
|
-// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Try %d: '%s' is a possibility.",
|
|
|
-// try, router->nickname);
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(supporting, (void*)node);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
|
|
|
- if (node)
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- smartlist_clear(supporting);
|
|
|
- /* If we reach this point, we can't actually support any unhandled
|
|
|
- * predicted ports, so clear all the remaining ones. */
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_len(needed_ports))
|
|
|
- rep_hist_remove_predicted_ports(needed_ports);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(needed_ports);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(supporting);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_free(n_supported);
|
|
|
- if (node) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", node_describe(node));
|
|
|
- return node;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (options->ExitNodes) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "No specified %sexit routers seem to be running: "
|
|
|
- "can't choose an exit.",
|
|
|
- options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ ? "non-excluded " : "");
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
|
|
|
- * circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b> that we're about to build (or NULL
|
|
|
- * if no router is suitable).
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * For general-purpose circuits, pass it off to
|
|
|
- * choose_good_exit_server_general()
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * For client-side rendezvous circuits, choose a random node, weighted
|
|
|
- * toward the preferences in 'options'.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static const node_t *
|
|
|
-choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose,
|
|
|
- int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC;
|
|
|
- if (need_uptime)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
- if (need_capacity)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- switch (purpose) {
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
|
- if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
|
|
|
- if (is_internal) /* pick it like a middle hop */
|
|
|
- return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return choose_good_exit_server_general(need_uptime,need_capacity);
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
- if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
|
|
|
- return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
|
+ /* We can't do path bias accounting without entry guards.
|
|
|
+ * Testing and controller circuits also have no guards. */
|
|
|
+ if (get_options()->UseEntryGuards == 0 ||
|
|
|
+ circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING ||
|
|
|
+ circ->base_.purpose == CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER) {
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG,"Unhandled purpose %d", purpose);
|
|
|
- tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Log a warning if the user specified an exit for the circuit that
|
|
|
- * has been excluded from use by ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes. */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- routerset_t *rs = options->ExcludeNodes;
|
|
|
- const char *description;
|
|
|
- uint8_t purpose = circ->base_.purpose;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
|
+ /* Ignore one hop circuits */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel ||
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state->desired_path_len == 1) {
|
|
|
+ /* Check for consistency */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->desired_path_len != 1 ||
|
|
|
+ !circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_notice(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "One-hop circuit has length %d. Path state is %s. "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ circ->build_state->desired_path_len,
|
|
|
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- switch (purpose)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- default:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED:
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d, %s)",
|
|
|
- (int)purpose,
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
|
- if (circ->build_state->is_internal)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- description = "requested exit node";
|
|
|
- rs = options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_;
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED:
|
|
|
- description = "chosen rendezvous point";
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER:
|
|
|
- rs = options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_;
|
|
|
- description = "controller-selected circuit target";
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ /* Don't count cannibalized/reused circs for path bias */
|
|
|
+ if (!circ->has_opened) {
|
|
|
+ guard =
|
|
|
+ entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(circ->base_.n_chan->identity_digest);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) {
|
|
|
- /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */
|
|
|
- if (options->StrictNodes) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in ExcludeNodes%s, "
|
|
|
- "even though StrictNodes is set. Please report. "
|
|
|
- "(Circuit purpose: %s)",
|
|
|
- description, extend_info_describe(exit),
|
|
|
- rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes",
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in "
|
|
|
- "ExcludeNodes%s, because no better options were available. To "
|
|
|
- "prevent this (and possibly break your Tor functionality), "
|
|
|
- "set the StrictNodes configuration option. "
|
|
|
- "(Circuit purpose: %s)",
|
|
|
- description, extend_info_describe(exit),
|
|
|
- rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes",
|
|
|
- circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
|
|
|
+ if (guard) {
|
|
|
+ if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
|
|
|
+ circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED;
|
|
|
+ guard->circuit_successes++;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
|
|
|
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
|
|
|
+ guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "Succeeded circuit is in strange path state %s. "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) {
|
|
|
+ log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) "
|
|
|
+ "for guard %s=%s",
|
|
|
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
|
|
|
+ guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ /* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to
|
|
|
+ * CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT and have no guards here.
|
|
|
+ * No need to log that case. */
|
|
|
+ } else if (circ->base_.purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_MEASURE_TIMEOUT) {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "Completed circuit has no known guard. "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ if (circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_SUCCEEDED) {
|
|
|
+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
|
|
|
+ approx_time()))) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_BUG,
|
|
|
+ "Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
|
|
|
+ "Circuit is a %s currently %s.%s",
|
|
|
+ pathbias_state_to_string(circ->path_state),
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(circ->base_.purpose),
|
|
|
+ circuit_state_to_string(circ->base_.state),
|
|
|
+ rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(rate_msg);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, LD_CIRC, circ);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Decide a suitable length for circ's cpath, and pick an exit
|
|
|
- * router (or use <b>exit</b> if provided). Store these in the
|
|
|
- * cpath. Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */
|
|
|
+/** Increment the number of times we successfully extended a circuit to
|
|
|
+ * 'guard', first checking if the failure rate is high enough that we should
|
|
|
+ * eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the
|
|
|
+ * guard looks fine. */
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
-onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
|
+entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
|
|
|
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Launching a one-hop circuit for dir tunnel.");
|
|
|
- state->desired_path_len = 1;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- int r = new_route_len(circ->base_.purpose, exit, nodelist_get_list());
|
|
|
- if (r < 1) /* must be at least 1 */
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- state->desired_path_len = r;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ entry_guards_changed();
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (exit) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */
|
|
|
- warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Using requested exit node '%s'",
|
|
|
- extend_info_describe(exit));
|
|
|
- exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
|
|
|
- } else { /* we have to decide one */
|
|
|
- const node_t *node =
|
|
|
- choose_good_exit_server(circ->base_.purpose, state->need_uptime,
|
|
|
- state->need_capacity, state->is_internal);
|
|
|
- if (!node) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to choose an exit server");
|
|
|
+ if (guard->first_hops > (unsigned)pathbias_get_min_circs(options)) {
|
|
|
+ /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
|
|
|
+ * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
|
|
|
+ * change to <= */
|
|
|
+ if (guard->circuit_successes/((double)guard->first_hops)
|
|
|
+ < pathbias_get_disable_rate(options)) {
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* This message is currently disabled by default. */
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Extremely low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s. "
|
|
|
+ "This indicates either an overloaded guard, an attack, or "
|
|
|
+ "a bug.",
|
|
|
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
|
|
|
+ hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ guard->path_bias_disabled = 1;
|
|
|
+ guard->bad_since = approx_time();
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
+ } else if (guard->circuit_successes/((double)guard->first_hops)
|
|
|
+ < pathbias_get_notice_rate(options)
|
|
|
+ && !guard->path_bias_notice) {
|
|
|
+ guard->path_bias_notice = 1;
|
|
|
+ log_notice(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Low circuit success rate %u/%u for guard %s=%s.",
|
|
|
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
|
|
|
+ hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- exit = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(exit);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- state->chosen_exit = exit;
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Give <b>circ</b> a new exit destination to <b>exit</b>, and add a
|
|
|
- * hop to the cpath reflecting this. Don't send the next extend cell --
|
|
|
- * the caller will do this if it wants to.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- cpath_build_state_t *state;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(exit);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- state = circ->build_state;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(state);
|
|
|
- extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit);
|
|
|
- state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- ++circ->build_state->desired_path_len;
|
|
|
- onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Take an open <b>circ</b>, and add a new hop at the end, based on
|
|
|
- * <b>info</b>. Set its state back to CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING, and then
|
|
|
- * send the next extend cell to begin connecting to that hop.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int err_reason = 0;
|
|
|
- warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit);
|
|
|
- circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit);
|
|
|
- circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
|
- if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ))<0) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Couldn't extend circuit to new point %s.",
|
|
|
- extend_info_describe(exit));
|
|
|
- circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason);
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
+ /* If we get a ton of circuits, just scale everything down */
|
|
|
+ if (guard->first_hops > (unsigned)pathbias_get_scale_threshold(options)) {
|
|
|
+ const int scale_factor = pathbias_get_scale_factor(options);
|
|
|
+ /* For now, only scale if there will be no rounding error...
|
|
|
+ * XXX024: We want to switch to a real moving average for 0.2.4. */
|
|
|
+ if ((guard->first_hops % scale_factor) == 0 &&
|
|
|
+ (guard->circuit_successes % scale_factor) == 0) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,
|
|
|
+ "Scaling pathbias counts to (%u/%u)/%d for guard %s=%s",
|
|
|
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
|
|
|
+ scale_factor, guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity,
|
|
|
+ DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
+ guard->first_hops /= scale_factor;
|
|
|
+ guard->circuit_successes /= scale_factor;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ guard->first_hops++;
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_PROTOCOL, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
|
|
|
+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
|
|
|
+ hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return the number of routers in <b>routers</b> that are currently up
|
|
|
- * and available for building circuits through.
|
|
|
+/** A created or extended cell came back to us on the circuit, and it included
|
|
|
+ * <b>reply</b> as its body. (If <b>reply_type</b> is CELL_CREATED, the body
|
|
|
+ * contains (the second DH key, plus KH). If <b>reply_type</b> is
|
|
|
+ * CELL_CREATED_FAST, the body contains a secret y and a hash H(x|y).)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Calculate the appropriate keys and digests, make sure KH is
|
|
|
+ * correct, and initialize this hop of the cpath.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Return - reason if we want to mark circ for close, else return 0.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *nodes)
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
|
|
|
+ const uint8_t *reply)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int num=0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, const node_t *, node) {
|
|
|
- // log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
-// "Contemplating whether router %d (%s) is a new option.",
|
|
|
-// i, r->nickname);
|
|
|
- if (! node->is_running)
|
|
|
-// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i);
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- if (! node->is_valid)
|
|
|
-// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i);
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- if (! node_has_descriptor(node))
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- /* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters
|
|
|
- * allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate
|
|
|
- * count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we
|
|
|
- * should try to be smarter. */
|
|
|
- ++num;
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
|
|
+ char keys[CPATH_KEY_MATERIAL_LEN];
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *hop;
|
|
|
+ int rv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"I like %d. num_acceptable_routers now %d.",i, num);
|
|
|
+ if ((rv = pathbias_count_first_hop(circ)) < 0)
|
|
|
+ return rv;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return num;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
|
|
|
+ hop = circ->cpath;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ hop = onion_next_hop_in_cpath(circ->cpath);
|
|
|
+ if (!hop) { /* got an extended when we're all done? */
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"got extended when circ already built? Closing.");
|
|
|
+ return - END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(hop->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Add <b>new_hop</b> to the end of the doubly-linked-list <b>head_ptr</b>.
|
|
|
- * This function is used to extend cpath by another hop.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (*head_ptr) {
|
|
|
- new_hop->next = (*head_ptr);
|
|
|
- new_hop->prev = (*head_ptr)->prev;
|
|
|
- (*head_ptr)->prev->next = new_hop;
|
|
|
- (*head_ptr)->prev = new_hop;
|
|
|
+ if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED && hop->dh_handshake_state) {
|
|
|
+ if (onion_skin_client_handshake(hop->dh_handshake_state, (char*)reply,keys,
|
|
|
+ DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"onion_skin_client_handshake failed.");
|
|
|
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ /* Remember hash of g^xy */
|
|
|
+ memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
+ } else if (reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST && !hop->dh_handshake_state) {
|
|
|
+ if (fast_client_handshake(hop->fast_handshake_state, reply,
|
|
|
+ (uint8_t*)keys,
|
|
|
+ DIGEST_LEN*2+CIPHER_KEY_LEN*2) < 0) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"fast_client_handshake failed.");
|
|
|
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ memcpy(hop->handshake_digest, reply+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
- *head_ptr = new_hop;
|
|
|
- new_hop->prev = new_hop->next = new_hop;
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,"CREATED cell type did not match CREATE cell type.");
|
|
|
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** A helper function used by onion_extend_cpath(). Use <b>purpose</b>
|
|
|
- * and <b>state</b> and the cpath <b>head</b> (currently populated only
|
|
|
- * to length <b>cur_len</b> to decide a suitable middle hop for a
|
|
|
- * circuit. In particular, make sure we don't pick the exit node or its
|
|
|
- * family, and make sure we don't duplicate any previous nodes or their
|
|
|
- * families. */
|
|
|
-static const node_t *
|
|
|
-choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose,
|
|
|
- cpath_build_state_t *state,
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *head,
|
|
|
- int cur_len)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int i;
|
|
|
- const node_t *r, *choice;
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *cpath;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *excluded;
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ <= purpose &&
|
|
|
- purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_);
|
|
|
+ crypto_dh_free(hop->dh_handshake_state); /* don't need it anymore */
|
|
|
+ hop->dh_handshake_state = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice.");
|
|
|
- excluded = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- if ((r = build_state_get_exit_node(state))) {
|
|
|
- nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, r);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- for (i = 0, cpath = head; i < cur_len; ++i, cpath=cpath->next) {
|
|
|
- if ((r = node_get_by_id(cpath->extend_info->identity_digest))) {
|
|
|
- nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, r);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ memset(hop->fast_handshake_state, 0, sizeof(hop->fast_handshake_state));
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(hop, keys, 0)<0) {
|
|
|
+ return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (state->need_uptime)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
- if (state->need_capacity)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
|
- if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
|
|
|
- choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(excluded);
|
|
|
- return choice;
|
|
|
+ hop->state = CPATH_STATE_OPEN;
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Finished building %scircuit hop:",
|
|
|
+ (reply_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST) ? "fast " : "");
|
|
|
+ circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_CIRC,circ);
|
|
|
+ control_event_circuit_status(circ, CIRC_EVENT_EXTENDED, 0);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Pick a good entry server for the circuit to be built according to
|
|
|
- * <b>state</b>. Don't reuse a chosen exit (if any), don't use this
|
|
|
- * router (if we're an OR), and respect firewall settings; if we're
|
|
|
- * configured to use entry guards, return one.
|
|
|
+/** We received a relay truncated cell on circ.
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're choosing a router to serve as an entry
|
|
|
- * guard, not for any particular circuit.
|
|
|
+ * Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
|
|
|
+ * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
|
|
|
+ * just give up: for circ to close, and return 0.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-static const node_t *
|
|
|
-choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+circuit_truncated(origin_circuit_t *circ, crypt_path_t *layer, int reason)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- const node_t *choice;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *excluded;
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_GUARD|CRN_NEED_DESC;
|
|
|
- const node_t *node;
|
|
|
+// crypt_path_t *victim;
|
|
|
+// connection_t *stream;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (state && options->UseEntryGuards &&
|
|
|
- (purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || options->BridgeRelay)) {
|
|
|
- /* This request is for an entry server to use for a regular circuit,
|
|
|
- * and we use entry guard nodes. Just return one of the guard nodes. */
|
|
|
- return choose_random_entry(state);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(layer);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- excluded = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
+ /* XXX Since we don't ask for truncates currently, getting a truncated
|
|
|
+ * means that a connection broke or an extend failed. For now,
|
|
|
+ * just give up.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
|
+ END_CIRC_REASON_FLAG_REMOTE|END_CIRC_REASON_CHANNEL_CLOSED|reason);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (state && (node = build_state_get_exit_node(state))) {
|
|
|
- /* Exclude the exit node from the state, if we have one. Also exclude its
|
|
|
- * family. */
|
|
|
- nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, node);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (firewall_is_fascist_or()) {
|
|
|
- /* Exclude all ORs that we can't reach through our firewall */
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *nodes = nodelist_get_list();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodes, const node_t *, node, {
|
|
|
- if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node))
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(excluded, (void*)node);
|
|
|
- });
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- /* and exclude current entry guards and their families, if applicable */
|
|
|
- if (options->UseEntryGuards && entry_guards) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if ((node = node_get_by_id(entry->identity))) {
|
|
|
- nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, node);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- });
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+#if 0
|
|
|
+ while (layer->next != circ->cpath) {
|
|
|
+ /* we need to clear out layer->next */
|
|
|
+ victim = layer->next;
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Killing a layer of the cpath.");
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (state) {
|
|
|
- if (state->need_uptime)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
- if (state->need_capacity)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY)
|
|
|
- flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
|
|
|
+ for (stream = circ->p_streams; stream; stream=stream->next_stream) {
|
|
|
+ if (stream->cpath_layer == victim) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_APP, "Marking stream %d for close because of truncate.",
|
|
|
+ stream->stream_id);
|
|
|
+ /* no need to send 'end' relay cells,
|
|
|
+ * because the other side's already dead
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ connection_mark_unattached_ap(stream, END_STREAM_REASON_DESTROY);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(excluded);
|
|
|
- return choice;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ layer->next = victim->next;
|
|
|
+ circuit_free_cpath_node(victim);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return the first non-open hop in cpath, or return NULL if all
|
|
|
- * hops are open. */
|
|
|
-static crypt_path_t *
|
|
|
-onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *hop = cpath;
|
|
|
- do {
|
|
|
- if (hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
|
- return hop;
|
|
|
- hop = hop->next;
|
|
|
- } while (hop != cpath);
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "finished");
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+#endif
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Choose a suitable next hop in the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>,
|
|
|
- * based on <b>state</b>. Append the hop info to head_ptr.
|
|
|
+/** Given a response payload and keys, initialize, then send a created
|
|
|
+ * cell back.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t cell_type, const char *payload,
|
|
|
+ const char *keys)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- uint8_t purpose = circ->base_.purpose;
|
|
|
- cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
|
|
|
- int cur_len = circuit_get_cpath_len(circ);
|
|
|
- extend_info_t *info = NULL;
|
|
|
+ cell_t cell;
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *tmp_cpath;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (cur_len >= state->desired_path_len) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Path is complete: %d steps long",
|
|
|
- state->desired_path_len);
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ tmp_cpath = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
|
+ tmp_cpath->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Path is %d long; we want %d", cur_len,
|
|
|
- state->desired_path_len);
|
|
|
+ memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
|
|
|
+ cell.command = cell_type;
|
|
|
+ cell.circ_id = circ->p_circ_id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (cur_len == state->desired_path_len - 1) { /* Picking last node */
|
|
|
- info = extend_info_dup(state->chosen_exit);
|
|
|
- } else if (cur_len == 0) { /* picking first node */
|
|
|
- const node_t *r = choose_good_entry_server(purpose, state);
|
|
|
- if (r) {
|
|
|
- /* If we're a client, use the preferred address rather than the
|
|
|
- primary address, for potentially connecting to an IPv6 OR
|
|
|
- port. */
|
|
|
- info = extend_info_from_node(r, server_mode(get_options()) == 0);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(info);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- const node_t *r =
|
|
|
- choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, circ->cpath, cur_len);
|
|
|
- if (r) {
|
|
|
- info = extend_info_from_node(r, 0);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(info);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_OPEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (!info) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to find node for hop %d of our path. Discarding "
|
|
|
- "this circuit.", cur_len);
|
|
|
+ memcpy(cell.payload, payload,
|
|
|
+ cell_type == CELL_CREATED ? ONIONSKIN_REPLY_LEN : DIGEST_LEN*2);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"init digest forward 0x%.8x, backward 0x%.8x.",
|
|
|
+ (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys),
|
|
|
+ (unsigned int)get_uint32(keys+20));
|
|
|
+ if (circuit_init_cpath_crypto(tmp_cpath, keys, 0)<0) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Circuit initialization failed");
|
|
|
+ tor_free(tmp_cpath);
|
|
|
return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ circ->n_digest = tmp_cpath->f_digest;
|
|
|
+ circ->n_crypto = tmp_cpath->f_crypto;
|
|
|
+ circ->p_digest = tmp_cpath->b_digest;
|
|
|
+ circ->p_crypto = tmp_cpath->b_crypto;
|
|
|
+ tmp_cpath->magic = 0;
|
|
|
+ tor_free(tmp_cpath);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chose router %s for hop %d (exit is %s)",
|
|
|
- extend_info_describe(info),
|
|
|
- cur_len+1, build_state_get_exit_nickname(state));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, info);
|
|
|
- extend_info_free(info);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Create a new hop, annotate it with information about its
|
|
|
- * corresponding router <b>choice</b>, and append it to the
|
|
|
- * end of the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- crypt_path_t *hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* link hop into the cpath, at the end. */
|
|
|
- onion_append_to_cpath(head_ptr, hop);
|
|
|
+ if (cell_type == CELL_CREATED)
|
|
|
+ memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DH_KEY_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ memcpy(circ->handshake_digest, cell.payload+DIGEST_LEN, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- hop->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
|
|
- hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED;
|
|
|
+ circ->is_first_hop = (cell_type == CELL_CREATED_FAST);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- hop->extend_info = extend_info_dup(choice);
|
|
|
+ append_cell_to_circuit_queue(TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
|
|
|
+ circ->p_chan, &cell, CELL_DIRECTION_IN, 0);
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.",
|
|
|
+ circ->is_first_hop ? "created_fast" : "created");
|
|
|
|
|
|
- hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window();
|
|
|
- hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
|
|
|
+ if (!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) &&
|
|
|
+ !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) {
|
|
|
+ /* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn
|
|
|
+ * that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells
|
|
|
+ * can reach us too. */
|
|
|
+ router_orport_found_reachable();
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Allocate a new extend_info object based on the various arguments. */
|
|
|
-extend_info_t *
|
|
|
-extend_info_new(const char *nickname, const char *digest,
|
|
|
- crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
|
|
|
- const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
|
|
|
+/** Choose a length for a circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b>.
|
|
|
+ * Default length is 3 + the number of endpoints that would give something
|
|
|
+ * away. If the routerlist <b>routers</b> doesn't have enough routers
|
|
|
+ * to handle the desired path length, return as large a path length as
|
|
|
+ * is feasible, except if it's less than 2, in which case return -1.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+new_route_len(uint8_t purpose, extend_info_t *exit,
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *nodes)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- extend_info_t *info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
|
- memcpy(info->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- if (nickname)
|
|
|
- strlcpy(info->nickname, nickname, sizeof(info->nickname));
|
|
|
- if (onion_key)
|
|
|
- info->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(onion_key);
|
|
|
- tor_addr_copy(&info->addr, addr);
|
|
|
- info->port = port;
|
|
|
- return info;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ int num_acceptable_routers;
|
|
|
+ int routelen;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Allocate and return a new extend_info that can be used to build a
|
|
|
- * circuit to or through the node <b>node</b>. Use the primary address
|
|
|
- * of the node (i.e. its IPv4 address) unless
|
|
|
- * <b>for_direct_connect</b> is true, in which case the preferred
|
|
|
- * address is used instead. May return NULL if there is not enough
|
|
|
- * info about <b>node</b> to extend to it--for example, if there is no
|
|
|
- * routerinfo_t or microdesc_t.
|
|
|
- **/
|
|
|
-extend_info_t *
|
|
|
-extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- tor_addr_port_t ap;
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(nodes);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (node->ri == NULL && (node->rs == NULL || node->md == NULL))
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
+ routelen = DEFAULT_ROUTE_LEN;
|
|
|
+ if (exit &&
|
|
|
+ purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING &&
|
|
|
+ purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO)
|
|
|
+ routelen++;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (for_direct_connect)
|
|
|
- node_get_pref_orport(node, &ap);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- node_get_prim_orport(node, &ap);
|
|
|
+ num_acceptable_routers = count_acceptable_nodes(nodes);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "using %s for %s",
|
|
|
- fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port),
|
|
|
- node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname);
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chosen route length %d (%d/%d routers suitable).",
|
|
|
+ routelen, num_acceptable_routers, smartlist_len(nodes));
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (node->ri)
|
|
|
- return extend_info_new(node->ri->nickname,
|
|
|
- node->identity,
|
|
|
- node->ri->onion_pkey,
|
|
|
- &ap.addr,
|
|
|
- ap.port);
|
|
|
- else if (node->rs && node->md)
|
|
|
- return extend_info_new(node->rs->nickname,
|
|
|
- node->identity,
|
|
|
- node->md->onion_pkey,
|
|
|
- &ap.addr,
|
|
|
- ap.port);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ if (num_acceptable_routers < 2) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
+ "Not enough acceptable routers (%d). Discarding this circuit.",
|
|
|
+ num_acceptable_routers);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Release storage held by an extend_info_t struct. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (!info)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- crypto_pk_free(info->onion_key);
|
|
|
- tor_free(info);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ if (num_acceptable_routers < routelen) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Not enough routers: cutting routelen from %d to %d.",
|
|
|
+ routelen, num_acceptable_routers);
|
|
|
+ routelen = num_acceptable_routers;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t with the same contents as
|
|
|
- * <b>info</b>. */
|
|
|
-extend_info_t *
|
|
|
-extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- extend_info_t *newinfo;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(info);
|
|
|
- newinfo = tor_malloc(sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
|
- memcpy(newinfo, info, sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
|
- if (info->onion_key)
|
|
|
- newinfo->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(info->onion_key);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- newinfo->onion_key = NULL;
|
|
|
- return newinfo;
|
|
|
+ return routelen;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return the routerinfo_t for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>.
|
|
|
- * If there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for
|
|
|
- * the chosen exit, return NULL.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-const node_t *
|
|
|
-build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
|
+/** Return a newly allocated list of uint16_t * for each predicted port not
|
|
|
+ * handled by a current circuit. */
|
|
|
+static smartlist_t *
|
|
|
+circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time_t now)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- return node_get_by_id(state->chosen_exit->identity_digest);
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *dest = rep_hist_get_predicted_ports(now);
|
|
|
+ circuit_remove_handled_ports(dest);
|
|
|
+ return dest;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return the nickname for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>. If
|
|
|
- * there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for the
|
|
|
- * chosen exit, return NULL.
|
|
|
+/** Return 1 if we already have circuits present or on the way for
|
|
|
+ * all anticipated ports. Return 0 if we should make more.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If we're returning 0, set need_uptime and need_capacity to
|
|
|
+ * indicate any requirements that the unhandled ports have.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-const char *
|
|
|
-build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(time_t now, int *need_uptime,
|
|
|
+ int *need_capacity)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- return state->chosen_exit->nickname;
|
|
|
+ int i, enough;
|
|
|
+ uint16_t *port;
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *sl = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(now);
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *LongLivedServices = get_options()->LongLivedPorts;
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(need_uptime);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(need_capacity);
|
|
|
+ // Always predict need_capacity
|
|
|
+ *need_capacity = 1;
|
|
|
+ enough = (smartlist_len(sl) == 0);
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(sl); ++i) {
|
|
|
+ port = smartlist_get(sl, i);
|
|
|
+ if (smartlist_string_num_isin(LongLivedServices, *port))
|
|
|
+ *need_uptime = 1;
|
|
|
+ tor_free(port);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
|
+ return enough;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Check whether the entry guard <b>e</b> is usable, given the directory
|
|
|
- * authorities' opinion about the router (stored in <b>ri</b>) and the user's
|
|
|
- * configuration (in <b>options</b>). Set <b>e</b>->bad_since
|
|
|
- * accordingly. Return true iff the entry guard's status changes.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * If it's not usable, set *<b>reason</b> to a static string explaining why.
|
|
|
+/** Return 1 if <b>node</b> can handle one or more of the ports in
|
|
|
+ * <b>needed_ports</b>, else return 0.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
-entry_guard_set_status(entry_guard_t *e, const node_t *node,
|
|
|
- time_t now, const or_options_t *options,
|
|
|
- const char **reason)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- int changed = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- *reason = NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Do we want to mark this guard as bad? */
|
|
|
- if (!node)
|
|
|
- *reason = "unlisted";
|
|
|
- else if (!node->is_running)
|
|
|
- *reason = "down";
|
|
|
- else if (options->UseBridges && (!node->ri ||
|
|
|
- node->ri->purpose != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE))
|
|
|
- *reason = "not a bridge";
|
|
|
- else if (options->UseBridges && !node_is_a_configured_bridge(node))
|
|
|
- *reason = "not a configured bridge";
|
|
|
- else if (!options->UseBridges && !node->is_possible_guard &&
|
|
|
- !routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes,node))
|
|
|
- *reason = "not recommended as a guard";
|
|
|
- else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node))
|
|
|
- *reason = "excluded";
|
|
|
- else if (e->path_bias_disabled)
|
|
|
- *reason = "path-biased";
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (*reason && ! e->bad_since) {
|
|
|
- /* Router is newly bad. */
|
|
|
- base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard %s (%s) is %s: marking as unusable.",
|
|
|
- e->nickname, buf, *reason);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- e->bad_since = now;
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(e->nickname, e->identity, "BAD");
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
- } else if (!*reason && e->bad_since) {
|
|
|
- /* There's nothing wrong with the router any more. */
|
|
|
- base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard %s (%s) is no longer unusable: "
|
|
|
- "marking as ok.", e->nickname, buf);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- e->bad_since = 0;
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(e->nickname, e->identity, "GOOD");
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
+node_handles_some_port(const node_t *node, smartlist_t *needed_ports)
|
|
|
+{ /* XXXX MOVE */
|
|
|
+ int i;
|
|
|
+ uint16_t port;
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(needed_ports); ++i) {
|
|
|
+ addr_policy_result_t r;
|
|
|
+ /* alignment issues aren't a worry for this dereference, since
|
|
|
+ needed_ports is explicitly a smartlist of uint16_t's */
|
|
|
+ port = *(uint16_t *)smartlist_get(needed_ports, i);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(port);
|
|
|
+ if (node)
|
|
|
+ r = compare_tor_addr_to_node_policy(NULL, port, node);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ if (r != ADDR_POLICY_REJECTED && r != ADDR_POLICY_PROBABLY_REJECTED)
|
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- return changed;
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return true iff enough time has passed since we last tried to connect
|
|
|
- * to the unreachable guard <b>e</b> that we're willing to try again. */
|
|
|
+/** Return true iff <b>conn</b> needs another general circuit to be
|
|
|
+ * built. */
|
|
|
static int
|
|
|
-entry_is_time_to_retry(entry_guard_t *e, time_t now)
|
|
|
+ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(connection_t *conn)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- long diff;
|
|
|
- if (e->last_attempted < e->unreachable_since)
|
|
|
+ entry_connection_t *entry;
|
|
|
+ if (conn->type != CONN_TYPE_AP)
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
+ entry = TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (conn->state == AP_CONN_STATE_CIRCUIT_WAIT &&
|
|
|
+ !conn->marked_for_close &&
|
|
|
+ !(entry->want_onehop) && /* ignore one-hop streams */
|
|
|
+ !(entry->use_begindir) && /* ignore targeted dir fetches */
|
|
|
+ !(entry->chosen_exit_name) && /* ignore defined streams */
|
|
|
+ !connection_edge_is_rendezvous_stream(TO_EDGE_CONN(conn)) &&
|
|
|
+ !circuit_stream_is_being_handled(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn), 0,
|
|
|
+ MIN_CIRCUITS_HANDLING_STREAM))
|
|
|
return 1;
|
|
|
- diff = now - e->unreachable_since;
|
|
|
- if (diff < 6*60*60)
|
|
|
- return now > (e->last_attempted + 60*60);
|
|
|
- else if (diff < 3*24*60*60)
|
|
|
- return now > (e->last_attempted + 4*60*60);
|
|
|
- else if (diff < 7*24*60*60)
|
|
|
- return now > (e->last_attempted + 18*60*60);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return now > (e->last_attempted + 36*60*60);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return the node corresponding to <b>e</b>, if <b>e</b> is
|
|
|
- * working well enough that we are willing to use it as an entry
|
|
|
- * right now. (Else return NULL.) In particular, it must be
|
|
|
- * - Listed as either up or never yet contacted;
|
|
|
- * - Present in the routerlist;
|
|
|
- * - Listed as 'stable' or 'fast' by the current dirserver consensus,
|
|
|
- * if demanded by <b>need_uptime</b> or <b>need_capacity</b>
|
|
|
- * (unless it's a configured EntryNode);
|
|
|
- * - Allowed by our current ReachableORAddresses config option; and
|
|
|
- * - Currently thought to be reachable by us (unless <b>assume_reachable</b>
|
|
|
- * is true).
|
|
|
+/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
|
|
|
+ * general-purpose circuit we're about to build.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * Look through the connection array, and choose a router that maximizes
|
|
|
+ * the number of pending streams that can exit from this router.
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * If the answer is no, set *<b>msg</b> to an explanation of why.
|
|
|
+ * Return NULL if we can't find any suitable routers.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-static INLINE const node_t *
|
|
|
-entry_is_live(entry_guard_t *e, int need_uptime, int need_capacity,
|
|
|
- int assume_reachable, const char **msg)
|
|
|
+static const node_t *
|
|
|
+choose_good_exit_server_general(int need_uptime, int need_capacity)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- const node_t *node;
|
|
|
+ int *n_supported;
|
|
|
+ int n_pending_connections = 0;
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *connections;
|
|
|
+ int best_support = -1;
|
|
|
+ int n_best_support=0;
|
|
|
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- tor_assert(msg);
|
|
|
+ const smartlist_t *the_nodes;
|
|
|
+ const node_t *node=NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (e->path_bias_disabled) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "path-biased";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (e->bad_since) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "bad";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- /* no good if it's unreachable, unless assume_unreachable or can_retry. */
|
|
|
- if (!assume_reachable && !e->can_retry &&
|
|
|
- e->unreachable_since && !entry_is_time_to_retry(e, time(NULL))) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "unreachable";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- node = node_get_by_id(e->identity);
|
|
|
- if (!node || !node_has_descriptor(node)) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "no descriptor";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (get_options()->UseBridges) {
|
|
|
- if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "not a bridge";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
+ connections = get_connection_array();
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ /* Count how many connections are waiting for a circuit to be built.
|
|
|
+ * We use this for log messages now, but in the future we may depend on it.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(connections, connection_t *, conn,
|
|
|
+ {
|
|
|
+ if (ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn))
|
|
|
+ ++n_pending_connections;
|
|
|
+ });
|
|
|
+// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG, "Choosing exit node; %d connections are pending",
|
|
|
+// n_pending_connections);
|
|
|
+ /* Now we count, for each of the routers in the directory, how many
|
|
|
+ * of the pending connections could possibly exit from that
|
|
|
+ * router (n_supported[i]). (We can't be sure about cases where we
|
|
|
+ * don't know the IP address of the pending connection.)
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * -1 means "Don't use this router at all."
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ the_nodes = nodelist_get_list();
|
|
|
+ n_supported = tor_malloc(sizeof(int)*smartlist_len(the_nodes));
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
|
|
|
+ const int i = node_sl_idx;
|
|
|
+ if (router_digest_is_me(node->identity)) {
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s -- it's me.", router->nickname);
|
|
|
+ /* XXX there's probably a reverse predecessor attack here, but
|
|
|
+ * it's slow. should we take this out? -RD
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (!node_has_descriptor(node)) {
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- if (!node_is_a_configured_bridge(node)) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "not a configured bridge";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
+ if (!node->is_running || node->is_bad_exit) {
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+ continue; /* skip routers that are known to be down or bad exits */
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- } else { /* !get_options()->UseBridges */
|
|
|
if (node_get_purpose(node) != ROUTER_PURPOSE_GENERAL) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "not general-purpose";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
+ /* never pick a non-general node as a random exit. */
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) {
|
|
|
- /* they asked for it, they get it */
|
|
|
- need_uptime = need_capacity = 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "not fast/stable";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) {
|
|
|
- *msg = "unreachable by config";
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return node;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return the number of entry guards that we think are usable. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-num_live_entry_guards(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int n = 0;
|
|
|
- const char *msg;
|
|
|
- if (! entry_guards)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &msg))
|
|
|
- ++n;
|
|
|
- });
|
|
|
- return n;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** If <b>digest</b> matches the identity of any node in the
|
|
|
- * entry_guards list, return that node. Else return NULL. */
|
|
|
-static entry_guard_t *
|
|
|
-entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(const char *digest)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
|
- if (tor_memeq(digest, entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
|
- return entry;
|
|
|
- );
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Dump a description of our list of entry guards to the log at level
|
|
|
- * <b>severity</b>. */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-log_entry_guards(int severity)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *elements = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- char *s;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- const char *msg = NULL;
|
|
|
- if (entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 0, &msg))
|
|
|
- smartlist_add_asprintf(elements, "%s [%s] (up %s)",
|
|
|
- e->nickname,
|
|
|
- hex_str(e->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
|
|
|
- e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- smartlist_add_asprintf(elements, "%s [%s] (%s, %s)",
|
|
|
- e->nickname,
|
|
|
- hex_str(e->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
|
|
|
- msg,
|
|
|
- e->made_contact ? "made-contact" : "never-contacted");
|
|
|
+ if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_, node)) {
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+ continue; /* user asked us not to use it, no matter what */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (options->ExitNodes &&
|
|
|
+ !routerset_contains_node(options->ExitNodes, node)) {
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+ continue; /* not one of our chosen exit nodes */
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- s = smartlist_join_strings(elements, ",", 0, NULL);
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(elements, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(elements);
|
|
|
- log_fn(severity,LD_CIRC,"%s",s);
|
|
|
- tor_free(s);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Called when one or more guards that we would previously have used for some
|
|
|
- * purpose are no longer in use because a higher-priority guard has become
|
|
|
- * usable again. */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-control_event_guard_deferred(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- /* XXXX We don't actually have a good way to figure out _how many_ entries
|
|
|
- * are live for some purpose. We need an entry_is_even_slightly_live()
|
|
|
- * function for this to work right. NumEntryGuards isn't reliable: if we
|
|
|
- * need guards with weird properties, we can have more than that number
|
|
|
- * live.
|
|
|
- **/
|
|
|
-#if 0
|
|
|
- int n = 0;
|
|
|
- const char *msg;
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- if (!entry_guards)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if (entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &msg)) {
|
|
|
- if (n++ == options->NumEntryGuards) {
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DEFERRED");
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- });
|
|
|
-#endif
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Add a new (preferably stable and fast) router to our
|
|
|
- * entry_guards list. Return a pointer to the router if we succeed,
|
|
|
- * or NULL if we can't find any more suitable entries.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * If <b>chosen</b> is defined, use that one, and if it's not
|
|
|
- * already in our entry_guards list, put it at the *beginning*.
|
|
|
- * Else, put the one we pick at the end of the list. */
|
|
|
-static const node_t *
|
|
|
-add_an_entry_guard(const node_t *chosen, int reset_status, int prepend)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- const node_t *node;
|
|
|
- entry_guard_t *entry;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (chosen) {
|
|
|
- node = chosen;
|
|
|
- entry = entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(node->identity);
|
|
|
- if (entry) {
|
|
|
- if (reset_status) {
|
|
|
- entry->bad_since = 0;
|
|
|
- entry->can_retry = 1;
|
|
|
+ if (node_is_unreliable(node, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0)) {
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+ continue; /* skip routers that are not suitable. Don't worry if
|
|
|
+ * this makes us reject all the possible routers: if so,
|
|
|
+ * we'll retry later in this function with need_update and
|
|
|
+ * need_capacity set to 0. */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (!(node->is_valid || options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_EXIT)) {
|
|
|
+ /* if it's invalid and we don't want it */
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- invalid router.",
|
|
|
+// router->nickname, i);
|
|
|
+ continue; /* skip invalid routers */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (options->ExcludeSingleHopRelays &&
|
|
|
+ node_allows_single_hop_exits(node)) {
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (node_exit_policy_rejects_all(node)) {
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = -1;
|
|
|
+// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Skipping node %s (index %d) -- it rejects all.",
|
|
|
+// router->nickname, i);
|
|
|
+ continue; /* skip routers that reject all */
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ n_supported[i] = 0;
|
|
|
+ /* iterate over connections */
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(connections, connection_t *, conn) {
|
|
|
+ if (!ap_stream_wants_exit_attention(conn))
|
|
|
+ continue; /* Skip everything but APs in CIRCUIT_WAIT */
|
|
|
+ if (connection_ap_can_use_exit(TO_ENTRY_CONN(conn), node)) {
|
|
|
+ ++n_supported[i];
|
|
|
+// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is supported. n_supported[%d] now %d.",
|
|
|
+// router->nickname, i, n_supported[i]);
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s (index %d) would reject this stream.",
|
|
|
+// router->nickname, i);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
|
|
|
+ if (n_pending_connections > 0 && n_supported[i] == 0) {
|
|
|
+ /* Leave best_support at -1 if that's where it is, so we can
|
|
|
+ * distinguish it later. */
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- node = choose_good_entry_server(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, NULL);
|
|
|
- if (!node)
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- entry = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose %s as new entry guard.",
|
|
|
- node_describe(node));
|
|
|
- strlcpy(entry->nickname, node_get_nickname(node), sizeof(entry->nickname));
|
|
|
- memcpy(entry->identity, node->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- /* Choose expiry time smudged over the past month. The goal here
|
|
|
- * is to a) spread out when Tor clients rotate their guards, so they
|
|
|
- * don't all select them on the same day, and b) avoid leaving a
|
|
|
- * precise timestamp in the state file about when we first picked
|
|
|
- * this guard. For details, see the Jan 2010 or-dev thread. */
|
|
|
- entry->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
|
|
|
- entry->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(VERSION);
|
|
|
- if (prepend)
|
|
|
- smartlist_insert(entry_guards, 0, entry);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(entry_guards, entry);
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "NEW");
|
|
|
- control_event_guard_deferred();
|
|
|
- log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
|
- return node;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** If the use of entry guards is configured, choose more entry guards
|
|
|
- * until we have enough in the list. */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-pick_entry_guards(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int changed = 0;
|
|
|
+ if (n_supported[i] > best_support) {
|
|
|
+ /* If this router is better than previous ones, remember its index
|
|
|
+ * and goodness, and start counting how many routers are this good. */
|
|
|
+ best_support = n_supported[i]; n_best_support=1;
|
|
|
+// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"%s is new best supported option so far.",
|
|
|
+// router->nickname);
|
|
|
+ } else if (n_supported[i] == best_support) {
|
|
|
+ /* If this router is _as good_ as the best one, just increment the
|
|
|
+ * count of equally good routers.*/
|
|
|
+ ++n_best_support;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
+ "Found %d servers that might support %d/%d pending connections.",
|
|
|
+ n_best_support, best_support >= 0 ? best_support : 0,
|
|
|
+ n_pending_connections);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- tor_assert(entry_guards);
|
|
|
+ /* If any routers definitely support any pending connections, choose one
|
|
|
+ * at random. */
|
|
|
+ if (best_support > 0) {
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *supporting = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
- while (num_live_entry_guards() < options->NumEntryGuards) {
|
|
|
- if (!add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0))
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (changed)
|
|
|
- entry_guards_changed();
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(the_nodes, const node_t *, node, {
|
|
|
+ if (n_supported[node_sl_idx] == best_support)
|
|
|
+ smartlist_add(supporting, (void*)node);
|
|
|
+ });
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** How long (in seconds) do we allow an entry guard to be nonfunctional,
|
|
|
- * unlisted, excluded, or otherwise nonusable before we give up on it? */
|
|
|
-#define ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER (30*24*60*60)
|
|
|
+ node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
|
|
|
+ smartlist_free(supporting);
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ /* Either there are no pending connections, or no routers even seem to
|
|
|
+ * possibly support any of them. Choose a router at random that satisfies
|
|
|
+ * at least one predicted exit port. */
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Release all storage held by <b>e</b>. */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-entry_guard_free(entry_guard_t *e)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (!e)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- tor_free(e->chosen_by_version);
|
|
|
- tor_free(e);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ int attempt;
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *needed_ports, *supporting;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Remove any entry guard which was selected by an unknown version of Tor,
|
|
|
- * or which was selected by a version of Tor that's known to select
|
|
|
- * entry guards badly, or which was selected more 2 months ago. */
|
|
|
-/* XXXX The "obsolete guards" and "chosen long ago guards" things should
|
|
|
- * probably be different functions. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-remove_obsolete_entry_guards(time_t now)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int changed = 0, i;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ++i) {
|
|
|
- entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
|
|
|
- const char *ver = entry->chosen_by_version;
|
|
|
- const char *msg = NULL;
|
|
|
- tor_version_t v;
|
|
|
- int version_is_bad = 0, date_is_bad = 0;
|
|
|
- if (!ver) {
|
|
|
- msg = "does not say what version of Tor it was selected by";
|
|
|
- version_is_bad = 1;
|
|
|
- } else if (tor_version_parse(ver, &v)) {
|
|
|
- msg = "does not seem to be from any recognized version of Tor";
|
|
|
- version_is_bad = 1;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- char *tor_ver = NULL;
|
|
|
- tor_asprintf(&tor_ver, "Tor %s", ver);
|
|
|
- if ((tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.0.10-alpha") &&
|
|
|
- !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.1.2.16-dev")) ||
|
|
|
- (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.0-alpha") &&
|
|
|
- !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.0.6-alpha")) ||
|
|
|
- /* above are bug 440; below are bug 1217 */
|
|
|
- (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.3-alpha") &&
|
|
|
- !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.1.23")) ||
|
|
|
- (tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.0-alpha") &&
|
|
|
- !tor_version_as_new_as(tor_ver, "0.2.2.7-alpha"))) {
|
|
|
- msg = "was selected without regard for guard bandwidth";
|
|
|
- version_is_bad = 1;
|
|
|
+ if (best_support == -1) {
|
|
|
+ if (need_uptime || need_capacity) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
+ "We couldn't find any live%s%s routers; falling back "
|
|
|
+ "to list of all routers.",
|
|
|
+ need_capacity?", fast":"",
|
|
|
+ need_uptime?", stable":"");
|
|
|
+ tor_free(n_supported);
|
|
|
+ return choose_good_exit_server_general(0, 0);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- tor_free(tor_ver);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!version_is_bad && entry->chosen_on_date + 3600*24*60 < now) {
|
|
|
- /* It's been 2 months since the date listed in our state file. */
|
|
|
- msg = "was selected several months ago";
|
|
|
- date_is_bad = 1;
|
|
|
+ log_notice(LD_CIRC, "All routers are down or won't exit%s -- "
|
|
|
+ "choosing a doomed exit at random.",
|
|
|
+ options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ ? " or are Excluded" : "");
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ supporting = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
+ needed_ports = circuit_get_unhandled_ports(time(NULL));
|
|
|
+ for (attempt = 0; attempt < 2; attempt++) {
|
|
|
+ /* try once to pick only from routers that satisfy a needed port,
|
|
|
+ * then if there are none, pick from any that support exiting. */
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(the_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
|
|
|
+ if (n_supported[node_sl_idx] != -1 &&
|
|
|
+ (attempt || node_handles_some_port(node, needed_ports))) {
|
|
|
+// log_fn(LOG_DEBUG,"Try %d: '%s' is a possibility.",
|
|
|
+// try, router->nickname);
|
|
|
+ smartlist_add(supporting, (void*)node);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (version_is_bad || date_is_bad) { /* we need to drop it */
|
|
|
- char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- tor_assert(msg);
|
|
|
- base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- log_fn(version_is_bad ? LOG_NOTICE : LOG_INFO, LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Entry guard '%s' (%s) %s. (Version=%s.) Replacing it.",
|
|
|
- entry->nickname, dbuf, msg, ver?escaped(ver):"none");
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED");
|
|
|
- entry_guard_free(entry);
|
|
|
- smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, i--);
|
|
|
- log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
+ node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(supporting, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
|
|
|
+ if (node)
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ smartlist_clear(supporting);
|
|
|
+ /* If we reach this point, we can't actually support any unhandled
|
|
|
+ * predicted ports, so clear all the remaining ones. */
|
|
|
+ if (smartlist_len(needed_ports))
|
|
|
+ rep_hist_remove_predicted_ports(needed_ports);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(needed_ports, uint16_t *, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
+ smartlist_free(needed_ports);
|
|
|
+ smartlist_free(supporting);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- return changed ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Remove all entry guards that have been down or unlisted for so
|
|
|
- * long that we don't think they'll come up again. Return 1 if we
|
|
|
- * removed any, or 0 if we did nothing. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-remove_dead_entry_guards(time_t now)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- int i;
|
|
|
- int changed = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < smartlist_len(entry_guards); ) {
|
|
|
- entry_guard_t *entry = smartlist_get(entry_guards, i);
|
|
|
- if (entry->bad_since &&
|
|
|
- ! entry->path_bias_disabled &&
|
|
|
- entry->bad_since + ENTRY_GUARD_REMOVE_AFTER < now) {
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- format_local_iso_time(tbuf, entry->bad_since);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) has been down or unlisted "
|
|
|
- "since %s local time; removing.",
|
|
|
- entry->nickname, dbuf, tbuf);
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED");
|
|
|
- entry_guard_free(entry);
|
|
|
- smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, i);
|
|
|
- log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
- } else
|
|
|
- ++i;
|
|
|
+ tor_free(n_supported);
|
|
|
+ if (node) {
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC, "Chose exit server '%s'", node_describe(node));
|
|
|
+ return node;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
- return changed ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** A new directory or router-status has arrived; update the down/listed
|
|
|
- * status of the entry guards.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * An entry is 'down' if the directory lists it as nonrunning.
|
|
|
- * An entry is 'unlisted' if the directory doesn't include it.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Don't call this on startup; only on a fresh download. Otherwise we'll
|
|
|
- * think that things are unlisted.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-entry_guards_compute_status(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int changed = 0;
|
|
|
- digestmap_t *reasons;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (! entry_guards)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (options->EntryNodes) /* reshuffle the entry guard list if needed */
|
|
|
- entry_nodes_should_be_added();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- reasons = digestmap_new();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- const node_t *r = node_get_by_id(entry->identity);
|
|
|
- const char *reason = NULL;
|
|
|
- if (entry_guard_set_status(entry, r, now, options, &reason))
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (entry->bad_since)
|
|
|
- tor_assert(reason);
|
|
|
- if (reason)
|
|
|
- digestmap_set(reasons, entry->identity, (char*)reason);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (remove_dead_entry_guards(now))
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
- if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now))
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (changed) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) {
|
|
|
- const char *reason = digestmap_get(reasons, entry->identity);
|
|
|
- const char *live_msg = "";
|
|
|
- const node_t *r = entry_is_live(entry, 0, 1, 0, &live_msg);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Summary: Entry %s [%s] is %s, %s%s%s, and %s%s.",
|
|
|
- entry->nickname,
|
|
|
- hex_str(entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
|
|
|
- entry->unreachable_since ? "unreachable" : "reachable",
|
|
|
- entry->bad_since ? "unusable" : "usable",
|
|
|
- reason ? ", ": "",
|
|
|
- reason ? reason : "",
|
|
|
- r ? "live" : "not live / ",
|
|
|
- r ? "" : live_msg);
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, " (%d/%d entry guards are usable/new)",
|
|
|
- num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
|
|
|
- log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
|
- entry_guards_changed();
|
|
|
+ if (options->ExitNodes) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
+ "No specified %sexit routers seem to be running: "
|
|
|
+ "can't choose an exit.",
|
|
|
+ options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_ ? "non-excluded " : "");
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- digestmap_free(reasons, NULL);
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Called when a connection to an OR with the identity digest <b>digest</b>
|
|
|
- * is established (<b>succeeded</b>==1) or has failed (<b>succeeded</b>==0).
|
|
|
- * If the OR is an entry, change that entry's up/down status.
|
|
|
- * Return 0 normally, or -1 if we want to tear down the new connection.
|
|
|
+/** Return a pointer to a suitable router to be the exit node for the
|
|
|
+ * circuit of purpose <b>purpose</b> that we're about to build (or NULL
|
|
|
+ * if no router is suitable).
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * If <b>mark_relay_status</b>, also call router_set_status() on this
|
|
|
- * relay.
|
|
|
+ * For general-purpose circuits, pass it off to
|
|
|
+ * choose_good_exit_server_general()
|
|
|
*
|
|
|
- * XXX024 change succeeded and mark_relay_status into 'int flags'.
|
|
|
+ * For client-side rendezvous circuits, choose a random node, weighted
|
|
|
+ * toward the preferences in 'options'.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-entry_guard_register_connect_status(const char *digest, int succeeded,
|
|
|
- int mark_relay_status, time_t now)
|
|
|
+static const node_t *
|
|
|
+choose_good_exit_server(uint8_t purpose,
|
|
|
+ int need_uptime, int need_capacity, int is_internal)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int changed = 0;
|
|
|
- int refuse_conn = 0;
|
|
|
- int first_contact = 0;
|
|
|
- entry_guard_t *entry = NULL;
|
|
|
- int idx = -1;
|
|
|
- char buf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (! entry_guards)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
|
|
|
- tor_assert(e);
|
|
|
- if (tor_memeq(e->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
|
|
|
- entry = e;
|
|
|
- idx = e_sl_idx;
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!entry)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- base16_encode(buf, sizeof(buf), entry->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (succeeded) {
|
|
|
- if (entry->unreachable_since) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Entry guard '%s' (%s) is now reachable again. Good.",
|
|
|
- entry->nickname, buf);
|
|
|
- entry->can_retry = 0;
|
|
|
- entry->unreachable_since = 0;
|
|
|
- entry->last_attempted = now;
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "UP");
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!entry->made_contact) {
|
|
|
- entry->made_contact = 1;
|
|
|
- first_contact = changed = 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else { /* ! succeeded */
|
|
|
- if (!entry->made_contact) {
|
|
|
- /* We've never connected to this one. */
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Connection to never-contacted entry guard '%s' (%s) failed. "
|
|
|
- "Removing from the list. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
|
|
|
- entry->nickname, buf,
|
|
|
- num_live_entry_guards()-1, smartlist_len(entry_guards)-1);
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DROPPED");
|
|
|
- entry_guard_free(entry);
|
|
|
- smartlist_del_keeporder(entry_guards, idx);
|
|
|
- log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
- } else if (!entry->unreachable_since) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "Unable to connect to entry guard '%s' (%s). "
|
|
|
- "Marking as unreachable.", entry->nickname, buf);
|
|
|
- entry->unreachable_since = entry->last_attempted = now;
|
|
|
- control_event_guard(entry->nickname, entry->identity, "DOWN");
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
- entry->can_retry = 0; /* We gave it an early chance; no good. */
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- format_iso_time(tbuf, entry->unreachable_since);
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Failed to connect to unreachable entry guard "
|
|
|
- "'%s' (%s). It has been unreachable since %s.",
|
|
|
- entry->nickname, buf, tbuf);
|
|
|
- entry->last_attempted = now;
|
|
|
- entry->can_retry = 0; /* We gave it an early chance; no good. */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
+ router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC;
|
|
|
+ if (need_uptime)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
+ if (need_capacity)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* if the caller asked us to, also update the is_running flags for this
|
|
|
- * relay */
|
|
|
- if (mark_relay_status)
|
|
|
- router_set_status(digest, succeeded);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (first_contact) {
|
|
|
- /* We've just added a new long-term entry guard. Perhaps the network just
|
|
|
- * came back? We should give our earlier entries another try too,
|
|
|
- * and close this connection so we don't use it before we've given
|
|
|
- * the others a shot. */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
|
|
|
- if (e == entry)
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- if (e->made_contact) {
|
|
|
- const char *msg;
|
|
|
- const node_t *r = entry_is_live(e, 0, 1, 1, &msg);
|
|
|
- if (r && e->unreachable_since) {
|
|
|
- refuse_conn = 1;
|
|
|
- e->can_retry = 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
|
|
|
- if (refuse_conn) {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "Connected to new entry guard '%s' (%s). Marking earlier "
|
|
|
- "entry guards up. %d/%d entry guards usable/new.",
|
|
|
- entry->nickname, buf,
|
|
|
- num_live_entry_guards(), smartlist_len(entry_guards));
|
|
|
- log_entry_guards(LOG_INFO);
|
|
|
- changed = 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ switch (purpose) {
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
|
+ if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
|
|
|
+ if (is_internal) /* pick it like a middle hop */
|
|
|
+ return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ return choose_good_exit_server_general(need_uptime,need_capacity);
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
+ if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_RENDEZVOUS)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
|
|
|
+ return router_choose_random_node(NULL, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (changed)
|
|
|
- entry_guards_changed();
|
|
|
- return refuse_conn ? -1 : 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** When we try to choose an entry guard, should we parse and add
|
|
|
- * config's EntryNodes first? */
|
|
|
-static int should_add_entry_nodes = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Called when the value of EntryNodes changes in our configuration. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-entry_nodes_should_be_added(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC, "EntryNodes config option set. Putting configured "
|
|
|
- "relays at the front of the entry guard list.");
|
|
|
- should_add_entry_nodes = 1;
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_BUG,"Unhandled purpose %d", purpose);
|
|
|
+ tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Adjust the entry guards list so that it only contains entries from
|
|
|
- * EntryNodes, adding new entries from EntryNodes to the list as needed. */
|
|
|
+/** Log a warning if the user specified an exit for the circuit that
|
|
|
+ * has been excluded from use by ExcludeNodes or ExcludeExitNodes. */
|
|
|
static void
|
|
|
-entry_guards_set_from_config(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
+warn_if_last_router_excluded(origin_circuit_t *circ, const extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *entry_nodes, *worse_entry_nodes, *entry_fps;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *old_entry_guards_on_list, *old_entry_guards_not_on_list;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(entry_guards);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- should_add_entry_nodes = 0;
|
|
|
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
+ routerset_t *rs = options->ExcludeNodes;
|
|
|
+ const char *description;
|
|
|
+ uint8_t purpose = circ->base_.purpose;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (!options->EntryNodes) {
|
|
|
- /* It's possible that a controller set EntryNodes, thus making
|
|
|
- * should_add_entry_nodes set, then cleared it again, all before the
|
|
|
- * call to choose_random_entry() that triggered us. If so, just return.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel)
|
|
|
return;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- char *string = routerset_to_string(options->EntryNodes);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,"Adding configured EntryNodes '%s'.", string);
|
|
|
- tor_free(string);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- entry_nodes = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- worse_entry_nodes = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- entry_fps = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- old_entry_guards_on_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- old_entry_guards_not_on_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Split entry guards into those on the list and those not. */
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- routerset_get_all_nodes(entry_nodes, options->EntryNodes,
|
|
|
- options->ExcludeNodes, 0);
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_nodes, const node_t *,node,
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(entry_fps, (void*)node->identity));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e, {
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_digest_isin(entry_fps, e->identity))
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_on_list, e);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, e);
|
|
|
- });
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Remove all currently configured guard nodes, excluded nodes, unreachable
|
|
|
- * nodes, or non-Guard nodes from entry_nodes. */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
|
|
|
- if (entry_guard_get_by_id_digest(node->identity)) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- } else if (routerset_contains_node(options->ExcludeNodes, node)) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- } else if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node)) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- } else if (! node->is_possible_guard) {
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(worse_entry_nodes, (node_t*)node);
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(entry_nodes, node);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Now build the new entry_guards list. */
|
|
|
- smartlist_clear(entry_guards);
|
|
|
- /* First, the previously configured guards that are in EntryNodes. */
|
|
|
- smartlist_add_all(entry_guards, old_entry_guards_on_list);
|
|
|
- /* Next, scramble the rest of EntryNodes, putting the guards first. */
|
|
|
- smartlist_shuffle(entry_nodes);
|
|
|
- smartlist_shuffle(worse_entry_nodes);
|
|
|
- smartlist_add_all(entry_nodes, worse_entry_nodes);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Next, the rest of EntryNodes */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_nodes, const node_t *, node) {
|
|
|
- add_an_entry_guard(node, 0, 0);
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_len(entry_guards) > options->NumEntryGuards * 10)
|
|
|
+ switch (purpose)
|
|
|
+ {
|
|
|
+ default:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_POINT_WAITING:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_REND_ESTABLISHED:
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Called on non-origin circuit (purpose %d, %s)",
|
|
|
+ (int)purpose,
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL:
|
|
|
+ if (circ->build_state->is_internal)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ description = "requested exit node";
|
|
|
+ rs = options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_;
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCING:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACK_WAIT:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_INTRODUCE_ACKED:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_ESTABLISH_INTRO:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_CONNECT_REND:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_S_REND_JOINED:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING:
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_ESTABLISH_REND:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_READY_INTRO_ACKED:
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_REND_JOINED:
|
|
|
+ description = "chosen rendezvous point";
|
|
|
+ break;
|
|
|
+ case CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_CONTROLLER:
|
|
|
+ rs = options->ExcludeExitNodesUnion_;
|
|
|
+ description = "controller-selected circuit target";
|
|
|
break;
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "%d entries in guards", smartlist_len(entry_guards));
|
|
|
- /* Finally, free the remaining previously configured guards that are not in
|
|
|
- * EntryNodes. */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(old_entry_guards_not_on_list, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
|
- entry_guard_free(e));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(entry_nodes);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(worse_entry_nodes);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(entry_fps);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_on_list);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(old_entry_guards_not_on_list);
|
|
|
- entry_guards_changed();
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Return 0 if we're fine adding arbitrary routers out of the
|
|
|
- * directory to our entry guard list, or return 1 if we have a
|
|
|
- * list already and we must stick to it.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-entry_list_is_constrained(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (options->EntryNodes)
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
- if (options->UseBridges)
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Pick a live (up and listed) entry guard from entry_guards. If
|
|
|
- * <b>state</b> is non-NULL, this is for a specific circuit --
|
|
|
- * make sure not to pick this circuit's exit or any node in the
|
|
|
- * exit's family. If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're looking for a random
|
|
|
- * guard (likely a bridge). */
|
|
|
-const node_t *
|
|
|
-choose_random_entry(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *live_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *exit_family = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- const node_t *chosen_exit =
|
|
|
- state?build_state_get_exit_node(state) : NULL;
|
|
|
- const node_t *node = NULL;
|
|
|
- int need_uptime = state ? state->need_uptime : 0;
|
|
|
- int need_capacity = state ? state->need_capacity : 0;
|
|
|
- int preferred_min, consider_exit_family = 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (chosen_exit) {
|
|
|
- nodelist_add_node_and_family(exit_family, chosen_exit);
|
|
|
- consider_exit_family = 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!entry_guards)
|
|
|
- entry_guards = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (should_add_entry_nodes)
|
|
|
- entry_guards_set_from_config(options);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
|
|
|
- smartlist_len(entry_guards) < options->NumEntryGuards)
|
|
|
- pick_entry_guards(options);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- retry:
|
|
|
- smartlist_clear(live_entry_guards);
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, entry) {
|
|
|
- const char *msg;
|
|
|
- node = entry_is_live(entry, need_uptime, need_capacity, 0, &msg);
|
|
|
- if (!node)
|
|
|
- continue; /* down, no point */
|
|
|
- if (node == chosen_exit)
|
|
|
- continue; /* don't pick the same node for entry and exit */
|
|
|
- if (consider_exit_family && smartlist_isin(exit_family, node))
|
|
|
- continue; /* avoid relays that are family members of our exit */
|
|
|
-#if 0 /* since EntryNodes is always strict now, this clause is moot */
|
|
|
- if (options->EntryNodes &&
|
|
|
- !routerset_contains_node(options->EntryNodes, node)) {
|
|
|
- /* We've come to the end of our preferred entry nodes. */
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards))
|
|
|
- goto choose_and_finish; /* only choose from the ones we like */
|
|
|
- if (options->StrictNodes) {
|
|
|
- /* in theory this case should never happen, since
|
|
|
- * entry_guards_set_from_config() drops unwanted relays */
|
|
|
- tor_fragile_assert();
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
- "No relays from EntryNodes available. Using others.");
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-#endif
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(live_entry_guards, (void*)node);
|
|
|
- if (!entry->made_contact) {
|
|
|
- /* Always start with the first not-yet-contacted entry
|
|
|
- * guard. Otherwise we might add several new ones, pick
|
|
|
- * the second new one, and now we've expanded our entry
|
|
|
- * guard list without needing to. */
|
|
|
- goto choose_and_finish;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) >= options->NumEntryGuards)
|
|
|
- goto choose_and_finish; /* we have enough */
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(entry);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
|
|
|
- /* If we prefer the entry nodes we've got, and we have at least
|
|
|
- * one choice, that's great. Use it. */
|
|
|
- preferred_min = 1;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* Try to have at least 2 choices available. This way we don't
|
|
|
- * get stuck with a single live-but-crummy entry and just keep
|
|
|
- * using him.
|
|
|
- * (We might get 2 live-but-crummy entry guards, but so be it.) */
|
|
|
- preferred_min = 2;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_len(live_entry_guards) < preferred_min) {
|
|
|
- if (!entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
|
|
|
- /* still no? try adding a new entry then */
|
|
|
- /* XXX if guard doesn't imply fast and stable, then we need
|
|
|
- * to tell add_an_entry_guard below what we want, or it might
|
|
|
- * be a long time til we get it. -RD */
|
|
|
- node = add_an_entry_guard(NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
|
- if (node) {
|
|
|
- entry_guards_changed();
|
|
|
- /* XXX we start over here in case the new node we added shares
|
|
|
- * a family with our exit node. There's a chance that we'll just
|
|
|
- * load up on entry guards here, if the network we're using is
|
|
|
- * one big family. Perhaps we should teach add_an_entry_guard()
|
|
|
- * to understand nodes-to-avoid-if-possible? -RD */
|
|
|
- goto retry;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!node && need_uptime) {
|
|
|
- need_uptime = 0; /* try without that requirement */
|
|
|
- goto retry;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!node && need_capacity) {
|
|
|
- /* still no? last attempt, try without requiring capacity */
|
|
|
- need_capacity = 0;
|
|
|
- goto retry;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-#if 0
|
|
|
- /* Removing this retry logic: if we only allow one exit, and it is in the
|
|
|
- same family as all our entries, then we are just plain not going to win
|
|
|
- here. */
|
|
|
- if (!node && entry_list_is_constrained(options) && consider_exit_family) {
|
|
|
- /* still no? if we're using bridges or have strictentrynodes
|
|
|
- * set, and our chosen exit is in the same family as all our
|
|
|
- * bridges/entry guards, then be flexible about families. */
|
|
|
- consider_exit_family = 0;
|
|
|
- goto retry;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
-#endif
|
|
|
- /* live_entry_guards may be empty below. Oh well, we tried. */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- choose_and_finish:
|
|
|
- if (entry_list_is_constrained(options)) {
|
|
|
- /* We need to weight by bandwidth, because our bridges or entryguards
|
|
|
- * were not already selected proportional to their bandwidth. */
|
|
|
- node = node_sl_choose_by_bandwidth(live_entry_guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* We choose uniformly at random here, because choose_good_entry_server()
|
|
|
- * already weights its choices by bandwidth, so we don't want to
|
|
|
- * *double*-weight our guard selection. */
|
|
|
- node = smartlist_choose(live_entry_guards);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(live_entry_guards);
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(exit_family);
|
|
|
- return node;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Parse <b>state</b> and learn about the entry guards it describes.
|
|
|
- * If <b>set</b> is true, and there are no errors, replace the global
|
|
|
- * entry_list with what we find.
|
|
|
- * On success, return 0. On failure, alloc into *<b>msg</b> a string
|
|
|
- * describing the error, and return -1.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-entry_guards_parse_state(or_state_t *state, int set, char **msg)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- entry_guard_t *node = NULL;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *new_entry_guards = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- config_line_t *line;
|
|
|
- time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
- const char *state_version = state->TorVersion;
|
|
|
- digestmap_t *added_by = digestmap_new();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- *msg = NULL;
|
|
|
- for (line = state->EntryGuards; line; line = line->next) {
|
|
|
- if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuard")) {
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *args = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- node = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(entry_guard_t));
|
|
|
- /* all entry guards on disk have been contacted */
|
|
|
- node->made_contact = 1;
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(new_entry_guards, node);
|
|
|
- smartlist_split_string(args, line->value, " ",
|
|
|
- SPLIT_SKIP_SPACE|SPLIT_IGNORE_BLANK, 0);
|
|
|
- if (smartlist_len(args)<2) {
|
|
|
- *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
|
- "Too few arguments to EntryGuard");
|
|
|
- } else if (!is_legal_nickname(smartlist_get(args,0))) {
|
|
|
- *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
|
- "Bad nickname for EntryGuard");
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- strlcpy(node->nickname, smartlist_get(args,0), MAX_NICKNAME_LEN+1);
|
|
|
- if (base16_decode(node->identity, DIGEST_LEN, smartlist_get(args,1),
|
|
|
- strlen(smartlist_get(args,1)))<0) {
|
|
|
- *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
|
- "Bad hex digest for EntryGuard");
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(args, char*, cp, tor_free(cp));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(args);
|
|
|
- if (*msg)
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardDownSince") ||
|
|
|
- !strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardUnlistedSince")) {
|
|
|
- time_t when;
|
|
|
- time_t last_try = 0;
|
|
|
- if (!node) {
|
|
|
- *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
|
- "EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince without EntryGuard");
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (parse_iso_time(line->value, &when)<0) {
|
|
|
- *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
|
- "Bad time in EntryGuardDownSince/UnlistedSince");
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (when > now) {
|
|
|
- /* It's a bad idea to believe info in the future: you can wind
|
|
|
- * up with timeouts that aren't allowed to happen for years. */
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (strlen(line->value) >= ISO_TIME_LEN+ISO_TIME_LEN+1) {
|
|
|
- /* ignore failure */
|
|
|
- (void) parse_iso_time(line->value+ISO_TIME_LEN+1, &last_try);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardDownSince")) {
|
|
|
- node->unreachable_since = when;
|
|
|
- node->last_attempted = last_try;
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- node->bad_since = when;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardAddedBy")) {
|
|
|
- char d[DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
|
- /* format is digest version date */
|
|
|
- if (strlen(line->value) < HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1+1+1+ISO_TIME_LEN) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "EntryGuardAddedBy line is not long enough.");
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (base16_decode(d, sizeof(d), line->value, HEX_DIGEST_LEN)<0 ||
|
|
|
- line->value[HEX_DIGEST_LEN] != ' ') {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "EntryGuardAddedBy line %s does not begin with "
|
|
|
- "hex digest", escaped(line->value));
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- digestmap_set(added_by, d, tor_strdup(line->value+HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1));
|
|
|
- } else if (!strcasecmp(line->key, "EntryGuardPathBias")) {
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
- unsigned hop_cnt, success_cnt;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!node) {
|
|
|
- *msg = tor_strdup("Unable to parse entry nodes: "
|
|
|
- "EntryGuardPathBias without EntryGuard");
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (tor_sscanf(line->value, "%u %u", &success_cnt, &hop_cnt) != 2) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Unable to parse guard path bias info: "
|
|
|
- "Misformated EntryGuardPathBias %s", escaped(line->value));
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- node->first_hops = hop_cnt;
|
|
|
- node->circuit_successes = success_cnt;
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Read %u/%u path bias for node %s",
|
|
|
- node->circuit_successes, node->first_hops, node->nickname);
|
|
|
- /* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
|
|
|
- * rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
|
|
|
- * change to <= */
|
|
|
- if (node->circuit_successes/((double)node->first_hops)
|
|
|
- < pathbias_get_disable_rate(options)) {
|
|
|
- node->path_bias_disabled = 1;
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_GENERAL,
|
|
|
- "Path bias is too high (%u/%u); disabling node %s",
|
|
|
- node->circuit_successes, node->first_hops, node->nickname);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
|
|
|
+ if (routerset_contains_extendinfo(rs, exit)) {
|
|
|
+ /* We should never get here if StrictNodes is set to 1. */
|
|
|
+ if (options->StrictNodes) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_BUG, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in ExcludeNodes%s, "
|
|
|
+ "even though StrictNodes is set. Please report. "
|
|
|
+ "(Circuit purpose: %s)",
|
|
|
+ description, extend_info_describe(exit),
|
|
|
+ rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes",
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
|
|
|
} else {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Unexpected key %s", line->key);
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Using %s '%s' which is listed in "
|
|
|
+ "ExcludeNodes%s, because no better options were available. To "
|
|
|
+ "prevent this (and possibly break your Tor functionality), "
|
|
|
+ "set the StrictNodes configuration option. "
|
|
|
+ "(Circuit purpose: %s)",
|
|
|
+ description, extend_info_describe(exit),
|
|
|
+ rs==options->ExcludeNodes?"":" or ExcludeExitNodes",
|
|
|
+ circuit_purpose_to_string(purpose));
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
+ circuit_log_path(LOG_WARN, LD_CIRC, circ);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(new_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
|
|
|
- char *sp;
|
|
|
- char *val = digestmap_get(added_by, e->identity);
|
|
|
- if (val && (sp = strchr(val, ' '))) {
|
|
|
- time_t when;
|
|
|
- *sp++ = '\0';
|
|
|
- if (parse_iso_time(sp, &when)<0) {
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_BUG, "Can't read time %s in EntryGuardAddedBy", sp);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(val);
|
|
|
- e->chosen_on_date = when;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- if (state_version) {
|
|
|
- e->chosen_by_version = tor_strdup(state_version);
|
|
|
- e->chosen_on_date = time(NULL) - crypto_rand_int(3600*24*30);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (e->path_bias_disabled && !e->bad_since)
|
|
|
- e->bad_since = time(NULL);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (*msg || !set) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(new_entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
|
- entry_guard_free(e));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(new_entry_guards);
|
|
|
- } else { /* !err && set */
|
|
|
- if (entry_guards) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
|
- entry_guard_free(e));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(entry_guards);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- entry_guards = new_entry_guards;
|
|
|
- entry_guards_dirty = 0;
|
|
|
- /* XXX024 hand new_entry_guards to this func, and move it up a
|
|
|
- * few lines, so we don't have to re-dirty it */
|
|
|
- if (remove_obsolete_entry_guards(now))
|
|
|
- entry_guards_dirty = 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- digestmap_free(added_by, tor_free_);
|
|
|
- return *msg ? -1 : 0;
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Our list of entry guards has changed, or some element of one
|
|
|
- * of our entry guards has changed. Write the changes to disk within
|
|
|
- * the next few minutes.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-entry_guards_changed(void)
|
|
|
+/** Decide a suitable length for circ's cpath, and pick an exit
|
|
|
+ * router (or use <b>exit</b> if provided). Store these in the
|
|
|
+ * cpath. Return 0 if ok, -1 if circuit should be closed. */
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- time_t when;
|
|
|
- entry_guards_dirty = 1;
|
|
|
+ cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* or_state_save() will call entry_guards_update_state(). */
|
|
|
- when = get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites ? time(NULL) + 3600 : time(NULL)+600;
|
|
|
- or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), when);
|
|
|
+ if (state->onehop_tunnel) {
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Launching a one-hop circuit for dir tunnel.");
|
|
|
+ state->desired_path_len = 1;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ int r = new_route_len(circ->base_.purpose, exit, nodelist_get_list());
|
|
|
+ if (r < 1) /* must be at least 1 */
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ state->desired_path_len = r;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (exit) { /* the circuit-builder pre-requested one */
|
|
|
+ warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit);
|
|
|
+ log_info(LD_CIRC,"Using requested exit node '%s'",
|
|
|
+ extend_info_describe(exit));
|
|
|
+ exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
|
|
|
+ } else { /* we have to decide one */
|
|
|
+ const node_t *node =
|
|
|
+ choose_good_exit_server(circ->base_.purpose, state->need_uptime,
|
|
|
+ state->need_capacity, state->is_internal);
|
|
|
+ if (!node) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to choose an exit server");
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ exit = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(exit);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ state->chosen_exit = exit;
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** If the entry guard info has not changed, do nothing and return.
|
|
|
- * Otherwise, free the EntryGuards piece of <b>state</b> and create
|
|
|
- * a new one out of the global entry_guards list, and then mark
|
|
|
- * <b>state</b> dirty so it will get saved to disk.
|
|
|
+/** Give <b>circ</b> a new exit destination to <b>exit</b>, and add a
|
|
|
+ * hop to the cpath reflecting this. Don't send the next extend cell --
|
|
|
+ * the caller will do this if it wants to.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-entry_guards_update_state(or_state_t *state)
|
|
|
+int
|
|
|
+circuit_append_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- config_line_t **next, *line;
|
|
|
- if (! entry_guards_dirty)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
+ cpath_build_state_t *state;
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(exit);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(circ);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- config_free_lines(state->EntryGuards);
|
|
|
- next = &state->EntryGuards;
|
|
|
- *next = NULL;
|
|
|
- if (!entry_guards)
|
|
|
- entry_guards = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
|
|
|
- char dbuf[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- if (!e->made_contact)
|
|
|
- continue; /* don't write this one to disk */
|
|
|
- *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
|
- line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuard");
|
|
|
- base16_encode(dbuf, sizeof(dbuf), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%s %s", e->nickname, dbuf);
|
|
|
- next = &(line->next);
|
|
|
- if (e->unreachable_since) {
|
|
|
- *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
|
- line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardDownSince");
|
|
|
- line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1+ISO_TIME_LEN+1);
|
|
|
- format_iso_time(line->value, e->unreachable_since);
|
|
|
- if (e->last_attempted) {
|
|
|
- line->value[ISO_TIME_LEN] = ' ';
|
|
|
- format_iso_time(line->value+ISO_TIME_LEN+1, e->last_attempted);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- next = &(line->next);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (e->bad_since) {
|
|
|
- *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
|
- line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardUnlistedSince");
|
|
|
- line->value = tor_malloc(ISO_TIME_LEN+1);
|
|
|
- format_iso_time(line->value, e->bad_since);
|
|
|
- next = &(line->next);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (e->chosen_on_date && e->chosen_by_version &&
|
|
|
- !strchr(e->chosen_by_version, ' ')) {
|
|
|
- char d[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- char t[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
|
- line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardAddedBy");
|
|
|
- base16_encode(d, sizeof(d), e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- format_iso_time(t, e->chosen_on_date);
|
|
|
- tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%s %s %s",
|
|
|
- d, e->chosen_by_version, t);
|
|
|
- next = &(line->next);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (e->first_hops) {
|
|
|
- *next = line = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(config_line_t));
|
|
|
- line->key = tor_strdup("EntryGuardPathBias");
|
|
|
- tor_asprintf(&line->value, "%u %u",
|
|
|
- e->circuit_successes, e->first_hops);
|
|
|
- next = &(line->next);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ state = circ->build_state;
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(state);
|
|
|
+ extend_info_free(state->chosen_exit);
|
|
|
+ state->chosen_exit = extend_info_dup(exit);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
|
|
|
- if (!get_options()->AvoidDiskWrites)
|
|
|
- or_state_mark_dirty(get_or_state(), 0);
|
|
|
- entry_guards_dirty = 0;
|
|
|
+ ++circ->build_state->desired_path_len;
|
|
|
+ onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, exit);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** If <b>question</b> is the string "entry-guards", then dump
|
|
|
- * to *<b>answer</b> a newly allocated string describing all of
|
|
|
- * the nodes in the global entry_guards list. See control-spec.txt
|
|
|
- * for details.
|
|
|
- * For backward compatibility, we also handle the string "helper-nodes".
|
|
|
- * */
|
|
|
+/** Take an open <b>circ</b>, and add a new hop at the end, based on
|
|
|
+ * <b>info</b>. Set its state back to CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING, and then
|
|
|
+ * send the next extend cell to begin connecting to that hop.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
int
|
|
|
-getinfo_helper_entry_guards(control_connection_t *conn,
|
|
|
- const char *question, char **answer,
|
|
|
- const char **errmsg)
|
|
|
+circuit_extend_to_new_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- (void) conn;
|
|
|
- (void) errmsg;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!strcmp(question,"entry-guards") ||
|
|
|
- !strcmp(question,"helper-nodes")) {
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *sl = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- char tbuf[ISO_TIME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- char nbuf[MAX_VERBOSE_NICKNAME_LEN+1];
|
|
|
- if (!entry_guards)
|
|
|
- entry_guards = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
|
|
|
- const char *status = NULL;
|
|
|
- time_t when = 0;
|
|
|
- const node_t *node;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!e->made_contact) {
|
|
|
- status = "never-connected";
|
|
|
- } else if (e->bad_since) {
|
|
|
- when = e->bad_since;
|
|
|
- status = "unusable";
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- status = "up";
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- node = node_get_by_id(e->identity);
|
|
|
- if (node) {
|
|
|
- node_get_verbose_nickname(node, nbuf);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- nbuf[0] = '$';
|
|
|
- base16_encode(nbuf+1, sizeof(nbuf)-1, e->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- /* e->nickname field is not very reliable if we don't know about
|
|
|
- * this router any longer; don't include it. */
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (when) {
|
|
|
- format_iso_time(tbuf, when);
|
|
|
- smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s %s %s\n", nbuf, status, tbuf);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- smartlist_add_asprintf(sl, "%s %s\n", nbuf, status);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
|
|
|
- *answer = smartlist_join_strings(sl, "", 0, NULL);
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(sl, char *, c, tor_free(c));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(sl);
|
|
|
+ int err_reason = 0;
|
|
|
+ warn_if_last_router_excluded(circ, exit);
|
|
|
+ circuit_append_new_exit(circ, exit);
|
|
|
+ circuit_set_state(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_STATE_BUILDING);
|
|
|
+ if ((err_reason = circuit_send_next_onion_skin(circ))<0) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Couldn't extend circuit to new point %s.",
|
|
|
+ extend_info_describe(exit));
|
|
|
+ circuit_mark_for_close(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), -err_reason);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** A list of configured bridges. Whenever we actually get a descriptor
|
|
|
- * for one, we add it as an entry guard. Note that the order of bridges
|
|
|
- * in this list does not necessarily correspond to the order of bridges
|
|
|
- * in the torrc. */
|
|
|
-static smartlist_t *bridge_list = NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Mark every entry of the bridge list to be removed on our next call to
|
|
|
- * sweep_bridge_list unless it has first been un-marked. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-mark_bridge_list(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- bridge_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b,
|
|
|
- b->marked_for_removal = 1);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Remove every entry of the bridge list that was marked with
|
|
|
- * mark_bridge_list if it has not subsequently been un-marked. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-sweep_bridge_list(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- bridge_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b) {
|
|
|
- if (b->marked_for_removal) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(bridge_list, b);
|
|
|
- bridge_free(b);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(b);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Initialize the bridge list to empty, creating it if needed. */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-clear_bridge_list(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- bridge_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, b, bridge_free(b));
|
|
|
- smartlist_clear(bridge_list);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** Free the bridge <b>bridge</b>. */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-bridge_free(bridge_info_t *bridge)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (!bridge)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_free(bridge->transport_name);
|
|
|
- tor_free(bridge);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches <b>digest</b>, or a
|
|
|
- * bridge with no known digest whose address matches any of the
|
|
|
- * tor_addr_port_t's in <b>orports</b>, return that bridge. Else return
|
|
|
- * NULL. */
|
|
|
-static bridge_info_t *
|
|
|
-get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(const char *digest,
|
|
|
- const smartlist_t *orports)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, ap)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if (tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &ap->addr, CMP_EXACT) == 0 &&
|
|
|
- bridge->port == ap->port)
|
|
|
- return bridge;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(ap);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
|
- return bridge;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
-/** If we have a bridge configured whose digest matches <b>digest</b>, or a
|
|
|
- * bridge with no known digest whose address matches <b>addr</b>:<b>/port</b>,
|
|
|
- * return that bridge. Else return NULL. */
|
|
|
-static bridge_info_t *
|
|
|
-get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(const tor_addr_t *addr,
|
|
|
- uint16_t port,
|
|
|
- const char *digest)
|
|
|
+/** Return the number of routers in <b>routers</b> that are currently up
|
|
|
+ * and available for building circuits through.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *nodes)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if (tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) &&
|
|
|
- !tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
|
|
|
- bridge->port == port)
|
|
|
- return bridge;
|
|
|
- if (digest && tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
|
- return bridge;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ int num=0;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Wrapper around get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest() to look
|
|
|
- * it up via router descriptor <b>ri</b>. */
|
|
|
-static bridge_info_t *
|
|
|
-get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(const routerinfo_t *ri)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- bridge_info_t *bi = NULL;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *orports = router_get_all_orports(ri);
|
|
|
- bi = get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
|
|
|
- orports);
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, p, tor_free(p));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(orports);
|
|
|
- return bi;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(nodes, const node_t *, node) {
|
|
|
+ // log_debug(LD_CIRC,
|
|
|
+// "Contemplating whether router %d (%s) is a new option.",
|
|
|
+// i, r->nickname);
|
|
|
+ if (! node->is_running)
|
|
|
+// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not running.",i);
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ if (! node->is_valid)
|
|
|
+// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Nope, the directory says %d is not valid.",i);
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ if (! node_has_descriptor(node))
|
|
|
+ continue;
|
|
|
+ /* XXX This clause makes us count incorrectly: if AllowInvalidRouters
|
|
|
+ * allows this node in some places, then we're getting an inaccurate
|
|
|
+ * count. For now, be conservative and don't count it. But later we
|
|
|
+ * should try to be smarter. */
|
|
|
+ ++num;
|
|
|
+ } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return 1 if <b>ri</b> is one of our known bridges, else 0. */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-routerinfo_is_a_configured_bridge(const routerinfo_t *ri)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- return get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri) ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+// log_debug(LD_CIRC,"I like %d. num_acceptable_routers now %d.",i, num);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return 1 if <b>node</b> is one of our configured bridges, else 0. */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-node_is_a_configured_bridge(const node_t *node)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int retval = 0;
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *orports = node_get_all_orports(node);
|
|
|
- retval = get_configured_bridge_by_orports_digest(node->identity,
|
|
|
- orports) != NULL;
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(orports, tor_addr_port_t *, p, tor_free(p));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(orports);
|
|
|
- return retval;
|
|
|
+ return num;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** We made a connection to a router at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>
|
|
|
- * without knowing its digest. Its digest turned out to be <b>digest</b>.
|
|
|
- * If it was a bridge, and we still don't know its digest, record it.
|
|
|
+/** Add <b>new_hop</b> to the end of the doubly-linked-list <b>head_ptr</b>.
|
|
|
+ * This function is used to extend cpath by another hop.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
void
|
|
|
-learned_router_identity(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
|
|
|
- const char *digest)
|
|
|
+onion_append_to_cpath(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, crypt_path_t *new_hop)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- bridge_info_t *bridge =
|
|
|
- get_configured_bridge_by_addr_port_digest(addr, port, digest);
|
|
|
- if (bridge && tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity)) {
|
|
|
- memcpy(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_DIR, "Learned fingerprint %s for bridge %s",
|
|
|
- hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN), fmt_addrport(addr, port));
|
|
|
+ if (*head_ptr) {
|
|
|
+ new_hop->next = (*head_ptr);
|
|
|
+ new_hop->prev = (*head_ptr)->prev;
|
|
|
+ (*head_ptr)->prev->next = new_hop;
|
|
|
+ (*head_ptr)->prev = new_hop;
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ *head_ptr = new_hop;
|
|
|
+ new_hop->prev = new_hop->next = new_hop;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return true if <b>bridge</b> has the same identity digest as
|
|
|
- * <b>digest</b>. If <b>digest</b> is NULL, it matches
|
|
|
- * bridges with unspecified identity digests. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-bridge_has_digest(const bridge_info_t *bridge, const char *digest)
|
|
|
+/** A helper function used by onion_extend_cpath(). Use <b>purpose</b>
|
|
|
+ * and <b>state</b> and the cpath <b>head</b> (currently populated only
|
|
|
+ * to length <b>cur_len</b> to decide a suitable middle hop for a
|
|
|
+ * circuit. In particular, make sure we don't pick the exit node or its
|
|
|
+ * family, and make sure we don't duplicate any previous nodes or their
|
|
|
+ * families. */
|
|
|
+static const node_t *
|
|
|
+choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose,
|
|
|
+ cpath_build_state_t *state,
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *head,
|
|
|
+ int cur_len)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (digest)
|
|
|
- return tor_memeq(digest, bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- return tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity);
|
|
|
+ int i;
|
|
|
+ const node_t *r, *choice;
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *cpath;
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *excluded;
|
|
|
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
+ router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_DESC;
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ <= purpose &&
|
|
|
+ purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice.");
|
|
|
+ excluded = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
+ if ((r = build_state_get_exit_node(state))) {
|
|
|
+ nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, r);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ for (i = 0, cpath = head; i < cur_len; ++i, cpath=cpath->next) {
|
|
|
+ if ((r = node_get_by_id(cpath->extend_info->identity_digest))) {
|
|
|
+ nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, r);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (state->need_uptime)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
+ if (state->need_capacity)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
|
+ if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_MIDDLE)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
|
|
|
+ choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
|
+ smartlist_free(excluded);
|
|
|
+ return choice;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** We are about to add a new bridge at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>, with optional
|
|
|
- * <b>digest</b> and <b>transport_name</b>. Mark for removal any previously
|
|
|
- * existing bridge with the same address and port, and warn the user as
|
|
|
- * appropriate.
|
|
|
+/** Pick a good entry server for the circuit to be built according to
|
|
|
+ * <b>state</b>. Don't reuse a chosen exit (if any), don't use this
|
|
|
+ * router (if we're an OR), and respect firewall settings; if we're
|
|
|
+ * configured to use entry guards, return one.
|
|
|
+ *
|
|
|
+ * If <b>state</b> is NULL, we're choosing a router to serve as an entry
|
|
|
+ * guard, not for any particular circuit.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-bridge_resolve_conflicts(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
|
|
|
- const char *digest, const char *transport_name)
|
|
|
+static const node_t *
|
|
|
+choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- /* Iterate the already-registered bridge list:
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- If you find a bridge with the same adress and port, mark it for
|
|
|
- removal. It doesn't make sense to have two active bridges with
|
|
|
- the same IP:PORT. If the bridge in question has a different
|
|
|
- digest or transport than <b>digest</b>/<b>transport_name</b>,
|
|
|
- it's probably a misconfiguration and we should warn the user.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge) {
|
|
|
- if (bridge->marked_for_removal)
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
+ const node_t *choice;
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *excluded;
|
|
|
+ const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
+ router_crn_flags_t flags = CRN_NEED_GUARD|CRN_NEED_DESC;
|
|
|
+ const node_t *node;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) && (bridge->port == port)) {
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- bridge->marked_for_removal = 1;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_has_digest(bridge, digest) ||
|
|
|
- strcmp_opt(bridge->transport_name, transport_name)) {
|
|
|
- /* warn the user */
|
|
|
- char *bridge_description_new, *bridge_description_old;
|
|
|
- tor_asprintf(&bridge_description_new, "%s:%s:%s",
|
|
|
- fmt_addrport(addr, port),
|
|
|
- digest ? hex_str(digest, DIGEST_LEN) : "",
|
|
|
- transport_name ? transport_name : "");
|
|
|
- tor_asprintf(&bridge_description_old, "%s:%s:%s",
|
|
|
- fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, bridge->port),
|
|
|
- tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) ?
|
|
|
- "" : hex_str(bridge->identity,DIGEST_LEN),
|
|
|
- bridge->transport_name ? bridge->transport_name : "");
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_GENERAL,"Tried to add bridge '%s', but we found a conflict"
|
|
|
- " with the already registered bridge '%s'. We will discard"
|
|
|
- " the old bridge and keep '%s'. If this is not what you"
|
|
|
- " wanted, please change your configuration file accordingly.",
|
|
|
- bridge_description_new, bridge_description_old,
|
|
|
- bridge_description_new);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- tor_free(bridge_description_new);
|
|
|
- tor_free(bridge_description_old);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ if (state && options->UseEntryGuards &&
|
|
|
+ (purpose != CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING || options->BridgeRelay)) {
|
|
|
+ /* This request is for an entry server to use for a regular circuit,
|
|
|
+ * and we use entry guard nodes. Just return one of the guard nodes. */
|
|
|
+ return choose_random_entry(state);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Remember a new bridge at <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b>. If <b>digest</b>
|
|
|
- * is set, it tells us the identity key too. If we already had the
|
|
|
- * bridge in our list, unmark it, and don't actually add anything new.
|
|
|
- * If <b>transport_name</b> is non-NULL - the bridge is associated with a
|
|
|
- * pluggable transport - we assign the transport to the bridge. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-bridge_add_from_config(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
|
|
|
- const char *digest, const char *transport_name)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- bridge_info_t *b;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- bridge_resolve_conflicts(addr, port, digest, transport_name);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- b = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(bridge_info_t));
|
|
|
- tor_addr_copy(&b->addr, addr);
|
|
|
- b->port = port;
|
|
|
- if (digest)
|
|
|
- memcpy(b->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- if (transport_name)
|
|
|
- b->transport_name = tor_strdup(transport_name);
|
|
|
- b->fetch_status.schedule = DL_SCHED_BRIDGE;
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- bridge_list = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- smartlist_add(bridge_list, b);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ excluded = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return true iff <b>routerset</b> contains the bridge <b>bridge</b>. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-routerset_contains_bridge(const routerset_t *routerset,
|
|
|
- const bridge_info_t *bridge)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- int result;
|
|
|
- extend_info_t *extinfo;
|
|
|
- tor_assert(bridge);
|
|
|
- if (!routerset)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
+ if (state && (node = build_state_get_exit_node(state))) {
|
|
|
+ /* Exclude the exit node from the state, if we have one. Also exclude its
|
|
|
+ * family. */
|
|
|
+ nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, node);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (firewall_is_fascist_or()) {
|
|
|
+ /* Exclude all ORs that we can't reach through our firewall */
|
|
|
+ smartlist_t *nodes = nodelist_get_list();
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(nodes, const node_t *, node, {
|
|
|
+ if (!fascist_firewall_allows_node(node))
|
|
|
+ smartlist_add(excluded, (void*)node);
|
|
|
+ });
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ /* and exclude current entry guards and their families, if applicable */
|
|
|
+ if (options->UseEntryGuards) {
|
|
|
+ SMARTLIST_FOREACH(get_entry_guards(), const entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
|
|
+ {
|
|
|
+ if ((node = node_get_by_id(entry->identity))) {
|
|
|
+ nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, node);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ });
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- extinfo = extend_info_new(
|
|
|
- NULL, bridge->identity, NULL, &bridge->addr, bridge->port);
|
|
|
- result = routerset_contains_extendinfo(routerset, extinfo);
|
|
|
- extend_info_free(extinfo);
|
|
|
- return result;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ if (state) {
|
|
|
+ if (state->need_uptime)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_NEED_UPTIME;
|
|
|
+ if (state->need_capacity)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ if (options->AllowInvalid_ & ALLOW_INVALID_ENTRY)
|
|
|
+ flags |= CRN_ALLOW_INVALID;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** If <b>digest</b> is one of our known bridges, return it. */
|
|
|
-static bridge_info_t *
|
|
|
-find_bridge_by_digest(const char *digest)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge,
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if (tor_memeq(bridge->identity, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
|
|
|
- return bridge;
|
|
|
- });
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
+ choice = router_choose_random_node(excluded, options->ExcludeNodes, flags);
|
|
|
+ smartlist_free(excluded);
|
|
|
+ return choice;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/* DOCDOC find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport */
|
|
|
-const char *
|
|
|
-find_transport_name_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
|
|
|
+/** Return the first non-open hop in cpath, or return NULL if all
|
|
|
+ * hops are open. */
|
|
|
+static crypt_path_t *
|
|
|
+onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) {
|
|
|
- if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) &&
|
|
|
- (bridge->port == port))
|
|
|
- return bridge->transport_name;
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *hop = cpath;
|
|
|
+ do {
|
|
|
+ if (hop->state != CPATH_STATE_OPEN)
|
|
|
+ return hop;
|
|
|
+ hop = hop->next;
|
|
|
+ } while (hop != cpath);
|
|
|
return NULL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** If <b>addr</b> and <b>port</b> match the address and port of a
|
|
|
- * bridge of ours that uses pluggable transports, place its transport
|
|
|
- * in <b>transport</b>.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * Return 0 on success (found a transport, or found a bridge with no
|
|
|
- * transport, or found no bridge); return -1 if we should be using a
|
|
|
- * transport, but the transport could not be found.
|
|
|
+/** Choose a suitable next hop in the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>,
|
|
|
+ * based on <b>state</b>. Append the hop info to head_ptr.
|
|
|
*/
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-find_transport_by_bridge_addrport(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
|
|
|
- const transport_t **transport)
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- *transport = NULL;
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, const bridge_info_t *, bridge) {
|
|
|
- if (tor_addr_eq(&bridge->addr, addr) &&
|
|
|
- (bridge->port == port)) { /* bridge matched */
|
|
|
- if (bridge->transport_name) { /* it also uses pluggable transports */
|
|
|
- *transport = transport_get_by_name(bridge->transport_name);
|
|
|
- if (*transport == NULL) { /* it uses pluggable transports, but
|
|
|
- the transport could not be found! */
|
|
|
- return -1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- } else { /* bridge matched, but it doesn't use transports. */
|
|
|
- break;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- *transport = NULL;
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ uint8_t purpose = circ->base_.purpose;
|
|
|
+ cpath_build_state_t *state = circ->build_state;
|
|
|
+ int cur_len = circuit_get_cpath_len(circ);
|
|
|
+ extend_info_t *info = NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** We need to ask <b>bridge</b> for its server descriptor. */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge_info_t *bridge)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- char *address;
|
|
|
- const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
|
|
+ if (cur_len >= state->desired_path_len) {
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Path is complete: %d steps long",
|
|
|
+ state->desired_path_len);
|
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (connection_get_by_type_addr_port_purpose(
|
|
|
- CONN_TYPE_DIR, &bridge->addr, bridge->port,
|
|
|
- DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC))
|
|
|
- return; /* it's already on the way */
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Path is %d long; we want %d", cur_len,
|
|
|
+ state->desired_path_len);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) {
|
|
|
- download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status);
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.",
|
|
|
- safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr)));
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
+ if (cur_len == state->desired_path_len - 1) { /* Picking last node */
|
|
|
+ info = extend_info_dup(state->chosen_exit);
|
|
|
+ } else if (cur_len == 0) { /* picking first node */
|
|
|
+ const node_t *r = choose_good_entry_server(purpose, state);
|
|
|
+ if (r) {
|
|
|
+ /* If we're a client, use the preferred address rather than the
|
|
|
+ primary address, for potentially connecting to an IPv6 OR
|
|
|
+ port. */
|
|
|
+ info = extend_info_from_node(r, server_mode(get_options()) == 0);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(info);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
|
+ const node_t *r =
|
|
|
+ choose_good_middle_server(purpose, state, circ->cpath, cur_len);
|
|
|
+ if (r) {
|
|
|
+ info = extend_info_from_node(r, 0);
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(info);
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
- address = tor_dup_addr(&bridge->addr);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- directory_initiate_command(address, &bridge->addr,
|
|
|
- bridge->port, 0/*no dirport*/,
|
|
|
- bridge->identity,
|
|
|
- DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC,
|
|
|
- ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE,
|
|
|
- DIRIND_ONEHOP, "authority.z", NULL, 0, 0);
|
|
|
- tor_free(address);
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ if (!info) {
|
|
|
+ log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to find node for hop %d of our path. Discarding "
|
|
|
+ "this circuit.", cur_len);
|
|
|
+ return -1;
|
|
|
+ }
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Fetching the bridge descriptor from the bridge authority returned a
|
|
|
- * "not found". Fall back to trying a direct fetch. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-retry_bridge_descriptor_fetch_directly(const char *digest)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- bridge_info_t *bridge = find_bridge_by_digest(digest);
|
|
|
- if (!bridge)
|
|
|
- return; /* not found? oh well. */
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Chose router %s for hop %d (exit is %s)",
|
|
|
+ extend_info_describe(info),
|
|
|
+ cur_len+1, build_state_get_exit_nickname(state));
|
|
|
|
|
|
- launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge);
|
|
|
+ onion_append_hop(&circ->cpath, info);
|
|
|
+ extend_info_free(info);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** For each bridge in our list for which we don't currently have a
|
|
|
- * descriptor, fetch a new copy of its descriptor -- either directly
|
|
|
- * from the bridge or via a bridge authority. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-fetch_bridge_descriptors(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
|
|
|
+/** Create a new hop, annotate it with information about its
|
|
|
+ * corresponding router <b>choice</b>, and append it to the
|
|
|
+ * end of the cpath <b>head_ptr</b>. */
|
|
|
+static int
|
|
|
+onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- int num_bridge_auths = get_n_authorities(BRIDGE_DIRINFO);
|
|
|
- int ask_bridge_directly;
|
|
|
- int can_use_bridge_authority;
|
|
|
+ crypt_path_t *hop = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(crypt_path_t));
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (!bridge_list)
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
+ /* link hop into the cpath, at the end. */
|
|
|
+ onion_append_to_cpath(head_ptr, hop);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* If we still have unconfigured managed proxies, don't go and
|
|
|
- connect to a bridge. */
|
|
|
- if (pt_proxies_configuration_pending())
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
+ hop->magic = CRYPT_PATH_MAGIC;
|
|
|
+ hop->state = CPATH_STATE_CLOSED;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(bridge_list, bridge_info_t *, bridge)
|
|
|
- {
|
|
|
- if (!download_status_is_ready(&bridge->fetch_status, now,
|
|
|
- IMPOSSIBLE_TO_DOWNLOAD))
|
|
|
- continue; /* don't bother, no need to retry yet */
|
|
|
- if (routerset_contains_bridge(options->ExcludeNodes, bridge)) {
|
|
|
- download_status_mark_impossible(&bridge->fetch_status);
|
|
|
- log_warn(LD_APP, "Not using bridge at %s: it is in ExcludeNodes.",
|
|
|
- safe_str_client(fmt_and_decorate_addr(&bridge->addr)));
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ hop->extend_info = extend_info_dup(choice);
|
|
|
|
|
|
- /* schedule another fetch as if this one will fail, in case it does */
|
|
|
- download_status_failed(&bridge->fetch_status, 0);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- can_use_bridge_authority = !tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity) &&
|
|
|
- num_bridge_auths;
|
|
|
- ask_bridge_directly = !can_use_bridge_authority ||
|
|
|
- !options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority;
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_DIR, "ask_bridge_directly=%d (%d, %d, %d)",
|
|
|
- ask_bridge_directly, tor_digest_is_zero(bridge->identity),
|
|
|
- !options->UpdateBridgesFromAuthority, !num_bridge_auths);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (ask_bridge_directly &&
|
|
|
- !fascist_firewall_allows_address_or(&bridge->addr, bridge->port)) {
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_DIR, "Bridge at '%s' isn't reachable by our "
|
|
|
- "firewall policy. %s.",
|
|
|
- fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, bridge->port),
|
|
|
- can_use_bridge_authority ?
|
|
|
- "Asking bridge authority instead" : "Skipping");
|
|
|
- if (can_use_bridge_authority)
|
|
|
- ask_bridge_directly = 0;
|
|
|
- else
|
|
|
- continue;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ hop->package_window = circuit_initial_package_window();
|
|
|
+ hop->deliver_window = CIRCWINDOW_START;
|
|
|
|
|
|
- if (ask_bridge_directly) {
|
|
|
- /* we need to ask the bridge itself for its descriptor. */
|
|
|
- launch_direct_bridge_descriptor_fetch(bridge);
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- /* We have a digest and we want to ask an authority. We could
|
|
|
- * combine all the requests into one, but that may give more
|
|
|
- * hints to the bridge authority than we want to give. */
|
|
|
- char resource[10 + HEX_DIGEST_LEN];
|
|
|
- memcpy(resource, "fp/", 3);
|
|
|
- base16_encode(resource+3, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
|
|
|
- bridge->identity, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
- memcpy(resource+3+HEX_DIGEST_LEN, ".z", 3);
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_DIR, "Fetching bridge info '%s' from bridge authority.",
|
|
|
- resource);
|
|
|
- directory_get_from_dirserver(DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC,
|
|
|
- ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE, resource, 0);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(bridge);
|
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** If our <b>bridge</b> is configured to be a different address than
|
|
|
- * the bridge gives in <b>node</b>, rewrite the routerinfo
|
|
|
- * we received to use the address we meant to use. Now we handle
|
|
|
- * multihomed bridges better.
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
-static void
|
|
|
-rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(const bridge_info_t *bridge, node_t *node)
|
|
|
+/** Allocate a new extend_info object based on the various arguments. */
|
|
|
+extend_info_t *
|
|
|
+extend_info_new(const char *nickname, const char *digest,
|
|
|
+ crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
|
|
|
+ const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- /* XXXX move this function. */
|
|
|
- /* XXXX overridden addresses should really live in the node_t, so that the
|
|
|
- * routerinfo_t and the microdesc_t can be immutable. But we can only
|
|
|
- * do that safely if we know that no function that connects to an OR
|
|
|
- * does so through an address from any source other than node_get_addr().
|
|
|
- */
|
|
|
- tor_addr_t addr;
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (node->ri) {
|
|
|
- routerinfo_t *ri = node->ri;
|
|
|
- tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, ri->addr);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if ((!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
|
|
|
- bridge->port == ri->or_port) ||
|
|
|
- (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &ri->ipv6_addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
|
|
|
- bridge->port == ri->ipv6_orport)) {
|
|
|
- /* they match, so no need to do anything */
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- if (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET) {
|
|
|
- ri->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&bridge->addr);
|
|
|
- tor_free(ri->address);
|
|
|
- ri->address = tor_dup_ip(ri->addr);
|
|
|
- ri->or_port = bridge->port;
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_DIR,
|
|
|
- "Adjusted bridge routerinfo for '%s' to match configured "
|
|
|
- "address %s:%d.",
|
|
|
- ri->nickname, ri->address, ri->or_port);
|
|
|
- } else if (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6) {
|
|
|
- tor_addr_copy(&ri->ipv6_addr, &bridge->addr);
|
|
|
- ri->ipv6_orport = bridge->port;
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_DIR,
|
|
|
- "Adjusted bridge routerinfo for '%s' to match configured "
|
|
|
- "address %s.",
|
|
|
- ri->nickname, fmt_addrport(&ri->ipv6_addr, ri->ipv6_orport));
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- log_err(LD_BUG, "Address family not supported: %d.",
|
|
|
- tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr));
|
|
|
- return;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* Mark which address to use based on which bridge_t we got. */
|
|
|
- node->ipv6_preferred = (tor_addr_family(&bridge->addr) == AF_INET6 &&
|
|
|
- !tor_addr_is_null(&node->ri->ipv6_addr));
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* XXXipv6 we lack support for falling back to another address for
|
|
|
- the same relay, warn the user */
|
|
|
- if (!tor_addr_is_null(&ri->ipv6_addr)) {
|
|
|
- tor_addr_port_t ap;
|
|
|
- node_get_pref_orport(node, &ap);
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_CONFIG,
|
|
|
- "Bridge '%s' has both an IPv4 and an IPv6 address. "
|
|
|
- "Will prefer using its %s address (%s).",
|
|
|
- ri->nickname,
|
|
|
- tor_addr_family(&ap.addr) == AF_INET6 ? "IPv6" : "IPv4",
|
|
|
- fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port));
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- if (node->rs) {
|
|
|
- routerstatus_t *rs = node->rs;
|
|
|
- tor_addr_from_ipv4h(&addr, rs->addr);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (!tor_addr_compare(&bridge->addr, &addr, CMP_EXACT) &&
|
|
|
- bridge->port == rs->or_port) {
|
|
|
- /* they match, so no need to do anything */
|
|
|
- } else {
|
|
|
- rs->addr = tor_addr_to_ipv4h(&bridge->addr);
|
|
|
- rs->or_port = bridge->port;
|
|
|
- log_info(LD_DIR,
|
|
|
- "Adjusted bridge routerstatus for '%s' to match "
|
|
|
- "configured address %s.",
|
|
|
- rs->nickname, fmt_addrport(&bridge->addr, rs->or_port));
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
+ extend_info_t *info = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
|
+ memcpy(info->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
|
|
|
+ if (nickname)
|
|
|
+ strlcpy(info->nickname, nickname, sizeof(info->nickname));
|
|
|
+ if (onion_key)
|
|
|
+ info->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(onion_key);
|
|
|
+ tor_addr_copy(&info->addr, addr);
|
|
|
+ info->port = port;
|
|
|
+ return info;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** We just learned a descriptor for a bridge. See if that
|
|
|
- * digest is in our entry guard list, and add it if not. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-learned_bridge_descriptor(routerinfo_t *ri, int from_cache)
|
|
|
+/** Allocate and return a new extend_info that can be used to build a
|
|
|
+ * circuit to or through the node <b>node</b>. Use the primary address
|
|
|
+ * of the node (i.e. its IPv4 address) unless
|
|
|
+ * <b>for_direct_connect</b> is true, in which case the preferred
|
|
|
+ * address is used instead. May return NULL if there is not enough
|
|
|
+ * info about <b>node</b> to extend to it--for example, if there is no
|
|
|
+ * routerinfo_t or microdesc_t.
|
|
|
+ **/
|
|
|
+extend_info_t *
|
|
|
+extend_info_from_node(const node_t *node, int for_direct_connect)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- tor_assert(ri);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(ri->purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE);
|
|
|
- if (get_options()->UseBridges) {
|
|
|
- int first = !any_bridge_descriptors_known();
|
|
|
- bridge_info_t *bridge = get_configured_bridge_by_routerinfo(ri);
|
|
|
- time_t now = time(NULL);
|
|
|
- router_set_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest, 1);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- if (bridge) { /* if we actually want to use this one */
|
|
|
- node_t *node;
|
|
|
- /* it's here; schedule its re-fetch for a long time from now. */
|
|
|
- if (!from_cache)
|
|
|
- download_status_reset(&bridge->fetch_status);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- node = node_get_mutable_by_id(ri->cache_info.identity_digest);
|
|
|
- tor_assert(node);
|
|
|
- rewrite_node_address_for_bridge(bridge, node);
|
|
|
- add_an_entry_guard(node, 1, 1);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- log_notice(LD_DIR, "new bridge descriptor '%s' (%s): %s", ri->nickname,
|
|
|
- from_cache ? "cached" : "fresh", router_describe(ri));
|
|
|
- /* set entry->made_contact so if it goes down we don't drop it from
|
|
|
- * our entry node list */
|
|
|
- entry_guard_register_connect_status(ri->cache_info.identity_digest,
|
|
|
- 1, 0, now);
|
|
|
- if (first)
|
|
|
- routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(now);
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ tor_addr_port_t ap;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return 1 if any of our entry guards have descriptors that
|
|
|
- * are marked with purpose 'bridge' and are running. Else return 0.
|
|
|
- *
|
|
|
- * We use this function to decide if we're ready to start building
|
|
|
- * circuits through our bridges, or if we need to wait until the
|
|
|
- * directory "server/authority" requests finish. */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-any_bridge_descriptors_known(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- tor_assert(get_options()->UseBridges);
|
|
|
- return choose_random_entry(NULL)!=NULL ? 1 : 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ if (node->ri == NULL && (node->rs == NULL || node->md == NULL))
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return 1 if there are any directory conns fetching bridge descriptors
|
|
|
- * that aren't marked for close. We use this to guess if we should tell
|
|
|
- * the controller that we have a problem. */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-any_pending_bridge_descriptor_fetches(void)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- smartlist_t *conns = get_connection_array();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(conns, connection_t *, conn) {
|
|
|
- if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_DIR &&
|
|
|
- conn->purpose == DIR_PURPOSE_FETCH_SERVERDESC &&
|
|
|
- TO_DIR_CONN(conn)->router_purpose == ROUTER_PURPOSE_BRIDGE &&
|
|
|
- !conn->marked_for_close &&
|
|
|
- conn->linked &&
|
|
|
- conn->linked_conn && !conn->linked_conn->marked_for_close) {
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_DIR, "found one: %s", conn->address);
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(conn);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
-}
|
|
|
+ if (for_direct_connect)
|
|
|
+ node_get_pref_orport(node, &ap);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ node_get_prim_orport(node, &ap);
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return 1 if we have at least one descriptor for an entry guard
|
|
|
- * (bridge or member of EntryNodes) and all descriptors we know are
|
|
|
- * down. Else return 0. If <b>act</b> is 1, then mark the down guards
|
|
|
- * up; else just observe and report. */
|
|
|
-static int
|
|
|
-entries_retry_helper(const or_options_t *options, int act)
|
|
|
-{
|
|
|
- const node_t *node;
|
|
|
- int any_known = 0;
|
|
|
- int any_running = 0;
|
|
|
- int need_bridges = options->UseBridges != 0;
|
|
|
- if (!entry_guards)
|
|
|
- entry_guards = smartlist_new();
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
|
|
|
- node = node_get_by_id(e->identity);
|
|
|
- if (node && node_has_descriptor(node) &&
|
|
|
- node_is_bridge(node) == need_bridges) {
|
|
|
- any_known = 1;
|
|
|
- if (node->is_running)
|
|
|
- any_running = 1; /* some entry is both known and running */
|
|
|
- else if (act) {
|
|
|
- /* Mark all current connections to this OR as unhealthy, since
|
|
|
- * otherwise there could be one that started 30 seconds
|
|
|
- * ago, and in 30 seconds it will time out, causing us to mark
|
|
|
- * the node down and undermine the retry attempt. We mark even
|
|
|
- * the established conns, since if the network just came back
|
|
|
- * we'll want to attach circuits to fresh conns. */
|
|
|
- connection_or_set_bad_connections(node->identity, 1);
|
|
|
-
|
|
|
- /* mark this entry node for retry */
|
|
|
- router_set_status(node->identity, 1);
|
|
|
- e->can_retry = 1;
|
|
|
- e->bad_since = 0;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
|
|
|
- log_debug(LD_DIR, "%d: any_known %d, any_running %d",
|
|
|
- act, any_known, any_running);
|
|
|
- return any_known && !any_running;
|
|
|
+ log_debug(LD_CIRC, "using %s for %s",
|
|
|
+ fmt_addrport(&ap.addr, ap.port),
|
|
|
+ node->ri ? node->ri->nickname : node->rs->nickname);
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ if (node->ri)
|
|
|
+ return extend_info_new(node->ri->nickname,
|
|
|
+ node->identity,
|
|
|
+ node->ri->onion_pkey,
|
|
|
+ &ap.addr,
|
|
|
+ ap.port);
|
|
|
+ else if (node->rs && node->md)
|
|
|
+ return extend_info_new(node->rs->nickname,
|
|
|
+ node->identity,
|
|
|
+ node->md->onion_pkey,
|
|
|
+ &ap.addr,
|
|
|
+ ap.port);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Do we know any descriptors for our bridges / entrynodes, and are
|
|
|
- * all the ones we have descriptors for down? */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-entries_known_but_down(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
+/** Release storage held by an extend_info_t struct. */
|
|
|
+void
|
|
|
+extend_info_free(extend_info_t *info)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options));
|
|
|
- return entries_retry_helper(options, 0);
|
|
|
+ if (!info)
|
|
|
+ return;
|
|
|
+ crypto_pk_free(info->onion_key);
|
|
|
+ tor_free(info);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Mark all down known bridges / entrynodes up. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-entries_retry_all(const or_options_t *options)
|
|
|
+/** Allocate and return a new extend_info_t with the same contents as
|
|
|
+ * <b>info</b>. */
|
|
|
+extend_info_t *
|
|
|
+extend_info_dup(extend_info_t *info)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- tor_assert(entry_list_is_constrained(options));
|
|
|
- entries_retry_helper(options, 1);
|
|
|
+ extend_info_t *newinfo;
|
|
|
+ tor_assert(info);
|
|
|
+ newinfo = tor_malloc(sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
|
+ memcpy(newinfo, info, sizeof(extend_info_t));
|
|
|
+ if (info->onion_key)
|
|
|
+ newinfo->onion_key = crypto_pk_dup_key(info->onion_key);
|
|
|
+ else
|
|
|
+ newinfo->onion_key = NULL;
|
|
|
+ return newinfo;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Return true if we've ever had a bridge running a Tor version that can't
|
|
|
- * provide microdescriptors to us. In that case fall back to asking for
|
|
|
- * full descriptors. Eventually all bridges will support microdescriptors
|
|
|
- * and we can take this check out; see bug 4013. */
|
|
|
-int
|
|
|
-any_bridges_dont_support_microdescriptors(void)
|
|
|
+/** Return the routerinfo_t for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>.
|
|
|
+ * If there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for
|
|
|
+ * the chosen exit, return NULL.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+const node_t *
|
|
|
+build_state_get_exit_node(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- const node_t *node;
|
|
|
- static int ever_answered_yes = 0;
|
|
|
- if (!get_options()->UseBridges || !entry_guards)
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
- if (ever_answered_yes)
|
|
|
- return 1; /* if we ever answer 'yes', always answer 'yes' */
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e) {
|
|
|
- node = node_get_by_id(e->identity);
|
|
|
- if (node && node->ri &&
|
|
|
- node_is_bridge(node) && node_is_a_configured_bridge(node) &&
|
|
|
- !tor_version_supports_microdescriptors(node->ri->platform)) {
|
|
|
- /* This is one of our current bridges, and we know enough about
|
|
|
- * it to know that it won't be able to answer our microdescriptor
|
|
|
- * questions. */
|
|
|
- ever_answered_yes = 1;
|
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- } SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(e);
|
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
|
+ if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
+ return node_get_by_id(state->chosen_exit->identity_digest);
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
-/** Release all storage held by the list of entry guards and related
|
|
|
- * memory structs. */
|
|
|
-void
|
|
|
-entry_guards_free_all(void)
|
|
|
+/** Return the nickname for the chosen exit router in <b>state</b>. If
|
|
|
+ * there is no chosen exit, or if we don't know the routerinfo_t for the
|
|
|
+ * chosen exit, return NULL.
|
|
|
+ */
|
|
|
+const char *
|
|
|
+build_state_get_exit_nickname(cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|
|
{
|
|
|
- if (entry_guards) {
|
|
|
- SMARTLIST_FOREACH(entry_guards, entry_guard_t *, e,
|
|
|
- entry_guard_free(e));
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(entry_guards);
|
|
|
- entry_guards = NULL;
|
|
|
- }
|
|
|
- clear_bridge_list();
|
|
|
- smartlist_free(bridge_list);
|
|
|
- bridge_list = NULL;
|
|
|
- circuit_build_times_free_timeouts(&circ_times);
|
|
|
+ if (!state || !state->chosen_exit)
|
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
|
+ return state->chosen_exit->nickname;
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|