Move key-loading and crosscert-checking out of feature/relay

This is also used by onion services, so it needs to go in another
module.

src/core/include.am

@@ -86,6 +86,8 @@ LIBTOR_APP_A_SOURCES = 				\
 	src/feature/hs/hs_stats.c		\
 	src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.c	\
 	src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.c	\
+	src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c		\
+	src/feature/dirauth/keypin.c		\
 	src/feature/nodelist/authcert.c		\
 	src/feature/nodelist/dirlist.c		\
 	src/feature/nodelist/microdesc.c	\
@@ -289,6 +291,7 @@ noinst_HEADERS +=					\
 	src/feature/hs/hsdir_index_st.h			\
 	src/feature/hs_common/replaycache.h		\
 	src/feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h	\
+	src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h			\
 	src/feature/nodelist/authcert.h			\
 	src/feature/nodelist/authority_cert_st.h	\
 	src/feature/nodelist/desc_store_st.h		\

src/feature/hs/hs_service.c

@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
 #include "core/or/relay.h"
 #include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
 #include "feature/relay/router.h"
-#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+//#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
 #include "feature/nodelist/node_select.h"
 #include "feature/hs_common/shared_random_client.h"
 #include "app/config/statefile.h"

src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.c

@@ -0,0 +1,755 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file loadkey.c
+ * \brief Read keys from disk, creating as needed
+ *
+ * This code is shared by relays and onion services, which both need
+ * this functionality.
+ **/
+
+#include "core/or/or.h"
+#include "app/config/config.h"
+#include "app/main/main.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_pwbox.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
+#include "lib/term/getpass.h"
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+
+#define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key"
+#define ENC_KEY_TAG "master"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
+#include <unistd.h>
+#endif
+
+/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>.  If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist
+ * and <b>generate</b> is true, create a new RSA key and save it in
+ * <b>fname</b>.  Return the read/created key, or NULL on error.  Log all
+ * errors at level <b>severity</b>. If <b>created_out/b> is non-NULL and a
+ * new key was created, set *<b>created_out</b> to true.
+ */
+crypto_pk_t *
+init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity,
+                   bool *created_out)
+{
+  crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
+
+  if (created_out) {
+    *created_out = false;
+  }
+
+  if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing key");
+    goto error;
+  }
+
+  switch (file_status(fname)) {
+    case FN_DIR:
+    case FN_ERROR:
+      tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
+      goto error;
+    /* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and,
+     * if generate is set, replace the empty file in
+     * crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename() */
+    case FN_NOENT:
+    case FN_EMPTY:
+      if (generate) {
+        if (!have_lockfile()) {
+          if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
+            /* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
+             * if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
+            tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
+                    "Not writing any new keys.", fname);
+            /*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
+             * maybe we should wait for it. */
+            goto error;
+          }
+        }
+        log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
+                 fname);
+        if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
+          tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error generating onion key");
+          goto error;
+        }
+        if (! crypto_pk_is_valid_private_key(prkey)) {
+          tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Generated key seems invalid");
+          goto error;
+        }
+        log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated key seems valid");
+        if (created_out) {
+          *created_out = true;
+        }
+        if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
+          tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
+              "Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
+          goto error;
+        }
+      } else {
+        tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
+        goto error;
+      }
+      return prkey;
+    case FN_FILE:
+      if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
+        tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
+        goto error;
+      }
+      return prkey;
+    default:
+      tor_assert(0);
+  }
+
+ error:
+  if (prkey)
+    crypto_pk_free(prkey);
+  return NULL;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC */
+static ssize_t
+do_getpass(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t buflen,
+           int twice, const or_options_t *options)
+{
+  if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF) {
+    tor_assert(buflen);
+    buf[0] = 0;
+    return 0;
+  }
+
+  char *prompt2 = NULL;
+  char *buf2 = NULL;
+  int fd = -1;
+  ssize_t length = -1;
+
+  if (options->use_keygen_passphrase_fd) {
+    twice = 0;
+    fd = options->keygen_passphrase_fd;
+    length = read_all_from_fd(fd, buf, buflen-1);
+    if (length >= 0)
+      buf[length] = 0;
+    goto done_reading;
+  }
+
+  if (twice) {
+    const char msg[] = "One more time:";
+    size_t p2len = strlen(prompt) + 1;
+    if (p2len < sizeof(msg))
+      p2len = sizeof(msg);
+    prompt2 = tor_malloc(p2len);
+    memset(prompt2, ' ', p2len);
+    memcpy(prompt2 + p2len - sizeof(msg), msg, sizeof(msg));
+
+    buf2 = tor_malloc_zero(buflen);
+  }
+
+  while (1) {
+    length = tor_getpass(prompt, buf, buflen);
+    if (length < 0)
+      goto done_reading;
+
+    if (! twice)
+      break;
+
+    ssize_t length2 = tor_getpass(prompt2, buf2, buflen);
+
+    if (length != length2 || tor_memneq(buf, buf2, length)) {
+      fprintf(stderr, "That didn't match.\n");
+    } else {
+      break;
+    }
+  }
+
+ done_reading:
+  if (twice) {
+    tor_free(prompt2);
+    memwipe(buf2, 0, buflen);
+    tor_free(buf2);
+  }
+
+  if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON && length == 0)
+    return -1;
+
+  return length;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC */
+int
+read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
+                          const char *fname)
+{
+  int r = -1;
+  uint8_t *secret = NULL;
+  size_t secret_len = 0;
+  char pwbuf[256];
+  uint8_t encrypted_key[256];
+  char *tag = NULL;
+  int saved_errno = 0;
+
+  ssize_t encrypted_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname,
+                                          ENC_KEY_HEADER,
+                                          &tag,
+                                          encrypted_key,
+                                          sizeof(encrypted_key));
+  if (encrypted_len < 0) {
+    saved_errno = errno;
+    log_info(LD_OR, "%s is missing", fname);
+    r = 0;
+    goto done;
+  }
+  if (strcmp(tag, ENC_KEY_TAG)) {
+    saved_errno = EINVAL;
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  while (1) {
+    ssize_t pwlen =
+      do_getpass("Enter passphrase for master key:", pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), 0,
+                 get_options());
+    if (pwlen < 0) {
+      saved_errno = EINVAL;
+      goto done;
+    }
+    const int r_unbox = crypto_unpwbox(&secret, &secret_len,
+                                       encrypted_key, encrypted_len,
+                                       pwbuf, pwlen);
+    if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_CORRUPTED) {
+      log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
+      saved_errno = EINVAL;
+      goto done;
+    } else if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_OKAY) {
+      break;
+    }
+
+    /* Otherwise, passphrase is bad, so try again till user does ctrl-c or gets
+     * it right. */
+  }
+
+  if (secret_len != ED25519_SECKEY_LEN) {
+    log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
+    saved_errno = EINVAL;
+    goto done;
+  }
+  memcpy(out->seckey, secret, ED25519_SECKEY_LEN);
+  r = 1;
+
+ done:
+  memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, sizeof(encrypted_key));
+  memwipe(pwbuf, 0, sizeof(pwbuf));
+  tor_free(tag);
+  if (secret) {
+    memwipe(secret, 0, secret_len);
+    tor_free(secret);
+  }
+  if (saved_errno)
+    errno = saved_errno;
+  return r;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC */
+int
+write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key,
+                           const char *fname)
+{
+  int r = -1;
+  char pwbuf0[256];
+  uint8_t *encrypted_key = NULL;
+  size_t encrypted_len = 0;
+
+  if (do_getpass("Enter new passphrase:", pwbuf0, sizeof(pwbuf0), 1,
+                 get_options()) < 0) {
+    log_warn(LD_OR, "NO/failed passphrase");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (strlen(pwbuf0) == 0) {
+    if (get_options()->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON)
+      return -1;
+    else
+      return 0;
+  }
+
+  if (crypto_pwbox(&encrypted_key, &encrypted_len,
+                   key->seckey, sizeof(key->seckey),
+                   pwbuf0, strlen(pwbuf0),  0) < 0) {
+    log_warn(LD_OR, "crypto_pwbox failed!?");
+    goto done;
+  }
+  if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
+                                           ENC_KEY_HEADER,
+                                           ENC_KEY_TAG,
+                                           encrypted_key, encrypted_len) < 0)
+    goto done;
+  r = 1;
+ done:
+  if (encrypted_key) {
+    memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, encrypted_len);
+    tor_free(encrypted_key);
+  }
+  memwipe(pwbuf0, 0, sizeof(pwbuf0));
+  return r;
+}
+
+/* DOCDOC */
+static int
+write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
+                 const char *fname,
+                 const char *fname_tag,
+                 const char *encrypted_fname)
+{
+  if (encrypted) {
+    int r = write_encrypted_secret_key(key, encrypted_fname);
+    if (r == 1) {
+      /* Success! */
+
+      /* Try to unlink the unencrypted key, if any existed before */
+      if (strcmp(fname, encrypted_fname))
+        unlink(fname);
+      return r;
+    } else if (r != 0) {
+      /* Unrecoverable failure! */
+      return r;
+    }
+
+    fprintf(stderr, "Not encrypting the secret key.\n");
+  }
+  return ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(key, fname, fname_tag);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
+ * <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>.  On failure, return
+ * NULL; on success return the keypair.
+ *
+ * The <b>options</b> is used to look at the change_key_passphrase value when
+ * writing to disk a secret key. It is safe to be NULL even in that case.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
+ * certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
+ * too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>.  Fail if the cert can't be
+ * found/created.  To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
+ * the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
+ * <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
+ * whether we can read the old one or not.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
+ * flag when creating the secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
+ * we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
+ * store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
+ * public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not try to load a
+ * secret key unless no public key is found.  Do not return a secret key. (but
+ * create and save one if needed).
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
+ * and consider encrypting any new secret key.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR is set, and there is any issue loading the keys
+ * from disk _other than their absence_ (full or partial), we do not try to
+ * replace them.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN is set, have log messages about failures
+ * refer to the --keygen option.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the
+ * secret key file, encrypted or not.
+ *
+ * If INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET is set, we won't try to load the master
+ * secret key and we log a message at <b>severity</b> that we've done so.
+ */
+ed25519_keypair_t *
+ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
+                      int severity,
+                      const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                      time_t now,
+                      time_t lifetime,
+                      uint8_t cert_type,
+                      struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
+                      const or_options_t *options)
+{
+  char *secret_fname = NULL;
+  char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
+  char *public_fname = NULL;
+  char *cert_fname = NULL;
+  const char *loaded_secret_fname = NULL;
+  int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
+  const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
+  const int encrypt_key = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
+  const int norepair = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
+  const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
+  const int omit_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET);
+  const int offline_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET);
+  const int explicit_fname = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME);
+
+  /* we don't support setting both of these flags at once. */
+  tor_assert((flags & (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT)) !=
+                      (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT));
+
+  char tag[8];
+  tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
+
+  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
+  char *got_tag = NULL;
+  ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
+
+  if (explicit_fname) {
+    secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
+    encrypted_secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
+  } else {
+    tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
+    tor_asprintf(&encrypted_secret_fname, "%s_secret_key_encrypted", fname);
+  }
+  tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
+  tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
+
+  /* Try to read the secret key. */
+  int have_secret = 0;
+  int load_secret = try_to_load &&
+    !offline_secret &&
+    (!omit_secret || file_status(public_fname)==FN_NOENT);
+  if (load_secret) {
+    int rv = ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
+                                           &got_tag, secret_fname);
+    if (rv == 0) {
+      have_secret = 1;
+      loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname;
+      tor_assert(got_tag);
+    } else {
+      if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+        tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,
+                strerror(errno));
+        goto err;
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* Should we try for an encrypted key? */
+  int have_encrypted_secret_file = 0;
+  if (!have_secret && try_to_load && encrypt_key) {
+    int r = read_encrypted_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
+                                      encrypted_secret_fname);
+    if (r > 0) {
+      have_secret = 1;
+      have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
+      tor_free(got_tag); /* convince coverity we aren't leaking */
+      got_tag = tor_strdup(tag);
+      loaded_secret_fname = encrypted_secret_fname;
+    } else if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s",
+              encrypted_secret_fname, strerror(errno));
+      goto err;
+    }
+  } else {
+    if (try_to_load) {
+      /* Check if it's there anyway, so we don't replace it. */
+      if (file_status(encrypted_secret_fname) != FN_NOENT)
+        have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
+    }
+  }
+
+  if (have_secret) {
+    if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", loaded_secret_fname);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    /* Derive the public key */
+    if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key",
+              loaded_secret_fname);
+      goto err;
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* If we do split keys here, try to read the pubkey. */
+  int found_public = 0;
+  if (try_to_load && (!have_secret || split)) {
+    ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_tmp;
+    tor_free(got_tag);
+    found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pubkey_tmp,
+                                                 &got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
+    if (!found_public && errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", public_fname,
+              strerror(errno));
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
+      goto err;
+    }
+    if (found_public) {
+      if (have_secret) {
+        /* If we have a secret key and we're reloading the public key,
+         * the key must match! */
+        if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp)) {
+          tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s does not match %s!  If you are trying "
+                  "to restore from backup, make sure you didn't mix up the "
+                  "key files. If you are absolutely sure that %s is the right "
+                  "key for this relay, delete %s or move it out of the way.",
+                  public_fname, loaded_secret_fname,
+                  loaded_secret_fname, public_fname);
+          goto err;
+        }
+      } else {
+        /* We only have the public key; better use that. */
+        tor_assert(split);
+        memcpy(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp, sizeof(pubkey_tmp));
+      }
+    } else {
+      /* We have no public key file, but we do have a secret key, make the
+       * public key file! */
+      if (have_secret) {
+        if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag)
+            < 0) {
+          tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't repair %s", public_fname);
+          goto err;
+        } else {
+          tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR,
+                  "Found secret key but not %s. Regenerating.",
+                  public_fname);
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+
+  /* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
+  if (!have_secret && found_public &&
+      !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK)) {
+    if (have_encrypted_secret_file) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
+              "but it was encrypted. Try 'tor --keygen' instead, so you "
+              "can enter the passphrase.",
+              secret_fname);
+    } else if (offline_secret) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We wanted to load a secret key from %s, "
+              "but you're keeping it offline. (OfflineMasterKey is set.)",
+              secret_fname);
+    } else {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
+              "but couldn't find it. %s", secret_fname,
+              (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN) ?
+              "If you're keeping your master secret key offline, you will "
+              "need to run 'tor --keygen' to generate new signing keys." :
+              "Did you forget to copy it over when you copied the rest of the "
+              "signing key material?");
+    }
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
+  if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
+    if (split) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s or %s.",
+              secret_fname, public_fname);
+    } else {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s.", secret_fname);
+    }
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* If the secret key is absent, but the encrypted key would be present,
+   * that's an error */
+  if (!have_secret && !found_public && have_encrypted_secret_file) {
+    tor_assert(!encrypt_key);
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Found an encrypted secret key, "
+            "but not public key file %s!", public_fname);
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* if it's absent, make a new keypair... */
+  if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
+    tor_free(keypair);
+    keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
+                         cert_type, &cert);
+    if (!keypair) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
+  }
+
+  /* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if
+   * we just created it. */
+  if (created_sk || (have_secret && options != NULL &&
+                     options->change_key_passphrase)) {
+    if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
+                         encrypt_key,
+                         secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0
+        ||
+        (split &&
+         ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
+        ||
+        (cert &&
+         crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+                                 tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
+      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
+      goto err;
+    }
+    goto done;
+  }
+
+  /* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
+  if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
+    goto done;
+
+  /* Read a cert. */
+  tor_free(got_tag);
+  uint8_t certbuf[256];
+  ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
+                 cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+                 &got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
+  if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
+    cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);
+
+  /* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
+  int bad_cert = 0;
+
+  if (! cert) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
+    bad_cert = 1;
+  } else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
+                        ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
+    bad_cert = 1;
+  } else if (signing_key &&
+             tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate: %s",
+            tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
+    bad_cert = 1;
+  } else if (cert->cert_expired) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate is expired");
+    bad_cert = 1;
+  } else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included &&
+             ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");
+    bad_cert = 1;
+  }
+
+  if (bad_cert) {
+    tor_cert_free(cert);
+    cert = NULL;
+  }
+
+  /* If we got a cert, we're done. */
+  if (cert)
+    goto done;
+
+  /* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
+  if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Without signing key, can't create certificate");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
+  uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
+  if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
+    cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
+  cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
+                         &keypair->pubkey,
+                         now, lifetime,
+                         cert_flags);
+
+  if (! cert) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create certificate");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  /* Write it to disk. */
+  created_cert = 1;
+  if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
+                             tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
+    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+ done:
+  if (cert_out)
+    *cert_out = cert;
+  else
+    tor_cert_free(cert);
+
+  goto cleanup;
+
+ err:
+  if (keypair)
+    memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
+  tor_free(keypair);
+  tor_cert_free(cert);
+  if (cert_out)
+    *cert_out = NULL;
+  if (created_sk)
+    unlink(secret_fname);
+  if (created_pk)
+    unlink(public_fname);
+  if (created_cert)
+    unlink(cert_fname);
+
+ cleanup:
+  tor_free(encrypted_secret_fname);
+  tor_free(secret_fname);
+  tor_free(public_fname);
+  tor_free(cert_fname);
+  tor_free(got_tag);
+
+  return keypair;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Create a new signing key and (optionally) certficiate; do not read or write
+ * from disk.  See ed_key_init_from_file() for more information.
+ */
+ed25519_keypair_t *
+ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+           uint32_t flags,
+           time_t now,
+           time_t lifetime,
+           uint8_t cert_type,
+           struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
+{
+  if (cert_out)
+    *cert_out = NULL;
+
+  const int extra_strong = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
+  ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
+  if (ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, extra_strong) < 0)
+    goto err;
+
+  if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
+    return keypair;
+
+  tor_assert(signing_key);
+  tor_assert(cert_out);
+  uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
+  if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
+    cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
+  tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
+                                     &keypair->pubkey,
+                                     now, lifetime,
+                                     cert_flags);
+  if (! cert)
+    goto err;
+
+  *cert_out = cert;
+  return keypair;
+
+ err:
+  tor_free(keypair);
+  return NULL;
+}

src/feature/keymgt/loadkey.h

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2018, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file loadkey.h
+ * \brief Header file for loadkey.c
+ **/
+
+#ifndef TOR_LOADKEY_H
+#define TOR_LOADKEY_H
+
+#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
+
+crypto_pk_t *init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate,
+                                int severity, bool *created_out);
+
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE                      (1u<<0)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE                     (1u<<1)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT                       (1u<<2)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK           (1u<<3)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT                    (1u<<4)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG                (1u<<5)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT (1u<<6)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET                 (1u<<7)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED               (1u<<8)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR                   (1u<<9)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN              (1u<<10)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET              (1u<<11)
+#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME              (1u<<12)
+
+struct tor_cert_st;
+ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
+                                         int severity,
+                                         const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                                         time_t now,
+                                         time_t lifetime,
+                                         uint8_t cert_type,
+                                         struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
+                                         const or_options_t *options);
+ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
+                              uint32_t flags,
+                              time_t now,
+                              time_t lifetime,
+                              uint8_t cert_type,
+                              struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
+
+int read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
+                              const char *fname);
+int write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
+                               const char *fname);
+
+#endif

src/feature/nodelist/torcert.c

@@ -638,6 +638,43 @@ or_handshake_certs_ed25519_ok(int severity,
   return 1;
 }
 
+/** Check whether an RSA-TAP cross-certification is correct. Return 0 if it
+ * is, -1 if it isn't. */
+MOCK_IMPL(int,
+check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
+                               int crosscert_len,
+                               const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
+                               const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
+                               const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest))
+{
+  uint8_t *cc = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey));
+  int cc_len =
+    crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_pkey,
+                              (char*)cc,
+                              crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey),
+                              (const char*)crosscert,
+                              crosscert_len);
+  if (cc_len < 0) {
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (cc_len < DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
+    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Short signature on cross-certification with TAP key");
+    goto err;
+  }
+  if (tor_memneq(cc, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN) ||
+      tor_memneq(cc + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_pkey->pubkey,
+                 ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
+    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect cross-certification with TAP key");
+    goto err;
+  }
+
+  tor_free(cc);
+  return 0;
+ err:
+  tor_free(cc);
+  return -1;
+}
+
 /**
  * Check the Ed certificates and/or the RSA certificates, as appropriate.  If
  * we obtained an Ed25519 identity, set *ed_id_out. If we obtained an RSA

src/feature/nodelist/torcert.h

@@ -107,4 +107,10 @@ void or_handshake_certs_check_both(int severity,
 
 int tor_cert_encode_ed22519(const tor_cert_t *cert, char **cert_str_out);
 
+MOCK_DECL(int, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
+                                  int crosscert_len,
+                                  const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
+                                  const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
+                                  const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest));
+
 #endif /* !defined(TORCERT_H_INCLUDED) */

src/feature/relay/router.c

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "core/or/policies.h"
 #include "core/or/protover.h"
 #include "core/or/relay.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
 #include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
 #include "feature/relay/router.h"
 #include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
@@ -540,85 +541,6 @@ log_new_relay_greeting(void)
   already_logged = 1;
 }
 
-/** Try to read an RSA key from <b>fname</b>.  If <b>fname</b> doesn't exist
- * and <b>generate</b> is true, create a new RSA key and save it in
- * <b>fname</b>.  Return the read/created key, or NULL on error.  Log all
- * errors at level <b>severity</b>. If <b>log_greeting</b> is non-zero and a
- * new key was created, log_new_relay_greeting() is called.
- */
-crypto_pk_t *
-init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate, int severity,
-                   int log_greeting)
-{
-  crypto_pk_t *prkey = NULL;
-
-  if (!(prkey = crypto_pk_new())) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error constructing key");
-    goto error;
-  }
-
-  switch (file_status(fname)) {
-    case FN_DIR:
-    case FN_ERROR:
-      tor_log(severity, LD_FS,"Can't read key from \"%s\"", fname);
-      goto error;
-    /* treat empty key files as if the file doesn't exist, and,
-     * if generate is set, replace the empty file in
-     * crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename() */
-    case FN_NOENT:
-    case FN_EMPTY:
-      if (generate) {
-        if (!have_lockfile()) {
-          if (try_locking(get_options(), 0)<0) {
-            /* Make sure that --list-fingerprint only creates new keys
-             * if there is no possibility for a deadlock. */
-            tor_log(severity, LD_FS, "Another Tor process has locked \"%s\". "
-                    "Not writing any new keys.", fname);
-            /*XXXX The 'other process' might make a key in a second or two;
-             * maybe we should wait for it. */
-            goto error;
-          }
-        }
-        log_info(LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"; generating fresh key.",
-                 fname);
-        if (crypto_pk_generate_key(prkey)) {
-          tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error generating onion key");
-          goto error;
-        }
-        if (! crypto_pk_is_valid_private_key(prkey)) {
-          tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Generated key seems invalid");
-          goto error;
-        }
-        log_info(LD_GENERAL, "Generated key seems valid");
-        if (log_greeting) {
-            log_new_relay_greeting();
-        }
-        if (crypto_pk_write_private_key_to_filename(prkey, fname)) {
-          tor_log(severity, LD_FS,
-              "Couldn't write generated key to \"%s\".", fname);
-          goto error;
-        }
-      } else {
-        tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL, "No key found in \"%s\"", fname);
-        goto error;
-      }
-      return prkey;
-    case FN_FILE:
-      if (crypto_pk_read_private_key_from_filename(prkey, fname)) {
-        tor_log(severity, LD_GENERAL,"Error loading private key.");
-        goto error;
-      }
-      return prkey;
-    default:
-      tor_assert(0);
-  }
-
- error:
-  if (prkey)
-    crypto_pk_free(prkey);
-  return NULL;
-}
-
 /** Load a curve25519 keypair from the file <b>fname</b>, writing it into
  * <b>keys_out</b>.  If the file isn't found, or is empty, and <b>generate</b>
  * is true, create a new keypair and write it into the file.  If there are
@@ -708,7 +630,7 @@ load_authority_keyset(int legacy, crypto_pk_t **key_out,
 
   fname = get_keydir_fname(
                  legacy ? "legacy_signing_key" : "authority_signing_key");
-  signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, 0);
+  signing_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_ERR, NULL);
   if (!signing_key) {
     log_warn(LD_DIR, "No version 3 directory key found in %s", fname);
     goto done;
@@ -1042,9 +964,12 @@ init_keys(void)
   /* 1b. Read identity key. Make it if none is found. */
   keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_id_key");
   log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making identity key \"%s\"...",keydir);
-  prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, 1);
+  bool created = false;
+  prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
   tor_free(keydir);
   if (!prkey) return -1;
+  if (created)
+    log_new_relay_greeting();
   set_server_identity_key(prkey);
 
   /* 1c. If we are configured as a bridge, generate a client key;
@@ -1070,7 +995,9 @@ init_keys(void)
   /* 2. Read onion key.  Make it if none is found. */
   keydir = get_keydir_fname("secret_onion_key");
   log_info(LD_GENERAL,"Reading/making onion key \"%s\"...",keydir);
-  prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, 1);
+  prkey = init_key_from_file(keydir, 1, LOG_ERR, &created);
+  if (created)
+    log_new_relay_greeting();
   tor_free(keydir);
   if (!prkey) return -1;
   set_onion_key(prkey);

src/feature/relay/router.h

@@ -39,8 +39,6 @@ crypto_pk_t *get_my_v3_legacy_signing_key(void);
 void dup_onion_keys(crypto_pk_t **key, crypto_pk_t **last);
 void expire_old_onion_keys(void);
 void rotate_onion_key(void);
-crypto_pk_t *init_key_from_file(const char *fname, int generate,
-                                    int severity, int log_greeting);
 void v3_authority_check_key_expiry(void);
 int get_onion_key_lifetime(void);
 int get_onion_key_grace_period(void);

src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c

@@ -18,14 +18,12 @@
 #include "app/config/config.h"
 #include "feature/relay/router.h"
 #include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
 #include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
 
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_pwbox.h"
 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_util.h"
-#include "lib/term/getpass.h"
 #include "lib/tls/tortls.h"
 #include "lib/tls/x509.h"
-#include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
 
 #define ENC_KEY_HEADER "Boxed Ed25519 key"
 #define ENC_KEY_TAG "master"
@@ -34,647 +32,6 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #endif
 
-/* DOCDOC */
-static ssize_t
-do_getpass(const char *prompt, char *buf, size_t buflen,
-           int twice, const or_options_t *options)
-{
-  if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_OFF) {
-    tor_assert(buflen);
-    buf[0] = 0;
-    return 0;
-  }
-
-  char *prompt2 = NULL;
-  char *buf2 = NULL;
-  int fd = -1;
-  ssize_t length = -1;
-
-  if (options->use_keygen_passphrase_fd) {
-    twice = 0;
-    fd = options->keygen_passphrase_fd;
-    length = read_all_from_fd(fd, buf, buflen-1);
-    if (length >= 0)
-      buf[length] = 0;
-    goto done_reading;
-  }
-
-  if (twice) {
-    const char msg[] = "One more time:";
-    size_t p2len = strlen(prompt) + 1;
-    if (p2len < sizeof(msg))
-      p2len = sizeof(msg);
-    prompt2 = tor_malloc(p2len);
-    memset(prompt2, ' ', p2len);
-    memcpy(prompt2 + p2len - sizeof(msg), msg, sizeof(msg));
-
-    buf2 = tor_malloc_zero(buflen);
-  }
-
-  while (1) {
-    length = tor_getpass(prompt, buf, buflen);
-    if (length < 0)
-      goto done_reading;
-
-    if (! twice)
-      break;
-
-    ssize_t length2 = tor_getpass(prompt2, buf2, buflen);
-
-    if (length != length2 || tor_memneq(buf, buf2, length)) {
-      fprintf(stderr, "That didn't match.\n");
-    } else {
-      break;
-    }
-  }
-
- done_reading:
-  if (twice) {
-    tor_free(prompt2);
-    memwipe(buf2, 0, buflen);
-    tor_free(buf2);
-  }
-
-  if (options->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON && length == 0)
-    return -1;
-
-  return length;
-}
-
-/* DOCDOC */
-int
-read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
-                          const char *fname)
-{
-  int r = -1;
-  uint8_t *secret = NULL;
-  size_t secret_len = 0;
-  char pwbuf[256];
-  uint8_t encrypted_key[256];
-  char *tag = NULL;
-  int saved_errno = 0;
-
-  ssize_t encrypted_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(fname,
-                                          ENC_KEY_HEADER,
-                                          &tag,
-                                          encrypted_key,
-                                          sizeof(encrypted_key));
-  if (encrypted_len < 0) {
-    saved_errno = errno;
-    log_info(LD_OR, "%s is missing", fname);
-    r = 0;
-    goto done;
-  }
-  if (strcmp(tag, ENC_KEY_TAG)) {
-    saved_errno = EINVAL;
-    goto done;
-  }
-
-  while (1) {
-    ssize_t pwlen =
-      do_getpass("Enter passphrase for master key:", pwbuf, sizeof(pwbuf), 0,
-                 get_options());
-    if (pwlen < 0) {
-      saved_errno = EINVAL;
-      goto done;
-    }
-    const int r_unbox = crypto_unpwbox(&secret, &secret_len,
-                                       encrypted_key, encrypted_len,
-                                       pwbuf, pwlen);
-    if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_CORRUPTED) {
-      log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
-      saved_errno = EINVAL;
-      goto done;
-    } else if (r_unbox == UNPWBOX_OKAY) {
-      break;
-    }
-
-    /* Otherwise, passphrase is bad, so try again till user does ctrl-c or gets
-     * it right. */
-  }
-
-  if (secret_len != ED25519_SECKEY_LEN) {
-    log_err(LD_OR, "%s is corrupted.", fname);
-    saved_errno = EINVAL;
-    goto done;
-  }
-  memcpy(out->seckey, secret, ED25519_SECKEY_LEN);
-  r = 1;
-
- done:
-  memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, sizeof(encrypted_key));
-  memwipe(pwbuf, 0, sizeof(pwbuf));
-  tor_free(tag);
-  if (secret) {
-    memwipe(secret, 0, secret_len);
-    tor_free(secret);
-  }
-  if (saved_errno)
-    errno = saved_errno;
-  return r;
-}
-
-/* DOCDOC */
-int
-write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key,
-                           const char *fname)
-{
-  int r = -1;
-  char pwbuf0[256];
-  uint8_t *encrypted_key = NULL;
-  size_t encrypted_len = 0;
-
-  if (do_getpass("Enter new passphrase:", pwbuf0, sizeof(pwbuf0), 1,
-                 get_options()) < 0) {
-    log_warn(LD_OR, "NO/failed passphrase");
-    return -1;
-  }
-
-  if (strlen(pwbuf0) == 0) {
-    if (get_options()->keygen_force_passphrase == FORCE_PASSPHRASE_ON)
-      return -1;
-    else
-      return 0;
-  }
-
-  if (crypto_pwbox(&encrypted_key, &encrypted_len,
-                   key->seckey, sizeof(key->seckey),
-                   pwbuf0, strlen(pwbuf0),  0) < 0) {
-    log_warn(LD_OR, "crypto_pwbox failed!?");
-    goto done;
-  }
-  if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(fname,
-                                           ENC_KEY_HEADER,
-                                           ENC_KEY_TAG,
-                                           encrypted_key, encrypted_len) < 0)
-    goto done;
-  r = 1;
- done:
-  if (encrypted_key) {
-    memwipe(encrypted_key, 0, encrypted_len);
-    tor_free(encrypted_key);
-  }
-  memwipe(pwbuf0, 0, sizeof(pwbuf0));
-  return r;
-}
-
-/* DOCDOC */
-static int
-write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
-                 const char *fname,
-                 const char *fname_tag,
-                 const char *encrypted_fname)
-{
-  if (encrypted) {
-    int r = write_encrypted_secret_key(key, encrypted_fname);
-    if (r == 1) {
-      /* Success! */
-
-      /* Try to unlink the unencrypted key, if any existed before */
-      if (strcmp(fname, encrypted_fname))
-        unlink(fname);
-      return r;
-    } else if (r != 0) {
-      /* Unrecoverable failure! */
-      return r;
-    }
-
-    fprintf(stderr, "Not encrypting the secret key.\n");
-  }
-  return ed25519_seckey_write_to_file(key, fname, fname_tag);
-}
-
-/**
- * Read an ed25519 key and associated certificates from files beginning with
- * <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>.  On failure, return
- * NULL; on success return the keypair.
- *
- * The <b>options</b> is used to look at the change_key_passphrase value when
- * writing to disk a secret key. It is safe to be NULL even in that case.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
- * certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT is set in <b>flags</b>, load/create a certificate
- * too and store it in *<b>cert_out</b>.  Fail if the cert can't be
- * found/created.  To create a certificate, <b>signing_key</b> must be set to
- * the key that should sign it; <b>now</b> to the current time, and
- * <b>lifetime</b> to the lifetime of the key.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create and save new key
- * whether we can read the old one or not.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG is set in <b>flags</b>, set the extra_strong
- * flag when creating the secret key.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT is set in <b>flags</b>, and
- * we create a new certificate, create it with the signing key embedded.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT is set in <b>flags</b>, and we create a new key,
- * store the public key in a separate file from the secret key.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK is set in <b>flags</b>, and we find a
- * public key file but no secret key file, return successfully anyway.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, do not try to load a
- * secret key unless no public key is found.  Do not return a secret key. (but
- * create and save one if needed).
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
- * and consider encrypting any new secret key.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR is set, and there is any issue loading the keys
- * from disk _other than their absence_ (full or partial), we do not try to
- * replace them.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN is set, have log messages about failures
- * refer to the --keygen option.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the
- * secret key file, encrypted or not.
- *
- * If INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET is set, we won't try to load the master
- * secret key and we log a message at <b>severity</b> that we've done so.
- */
-ed25519_keypair_t *
-ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
-                      int severity,
-                      const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
-                      time_t now,
-                      time_t lifetime,
-                      uint8_t cert_type,
-                      struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
-                      const or_options_t *options)
-{
-  char *secret_fname = NULL;
-  char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
-  char *public_fname = NULL;
-  char *cert_fname = NULL;
-  const char *loaded_secret_fname = NULL;
-  int created_pk = 0, created_sk = 0, created_cert = 0;
-  const int try_to_load = ! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE);
-  const int encrypt_key = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED);
-  const int norepair = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR);
-  const int split = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT);
-  const int omit_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET);
-  const int offline_secret = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET);
-  const int explicit_fname = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME);
-
-  /* we don't support setting both of these flags at once. */
-  tor_assert((flags & (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT)) !=
-                      (INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR|INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT));
-
-  char tag[8];
-  tor_snprintf(tag, sizeof(tag), "type%d", (int)cert_type);
-
-  tor_cert_t *cert = NULL;
-  char *got_tag = NULL;
-  ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
-
-  if (explicit_fname) {
-    secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
-    encrypted_secret_fname = tor_strdup(fname);
-  } else {
-    tor_asprintf(&secret_fname, "%s_secret_key", fname);
-    tor_asprintf(&encrypted_secret_fname, "%s_secret_key_encrypted", fname);
-  }
-  tor_asprintf(&public_fname, "%s_public_key", fname);
-  tor_asprintf(&cert_fname, "%s_cert", fname);
-
-  /* Try to read the secret key. */
-  int have_secret = 0;
-  int load_secret = try_to_load &&
-    !offline_secret &&
-    (!omit_secret || file_status(public_fname)==FN_NOENT);
-  if (load_secret) {
-    int rv = ed25519_seckey_read_from_file(&keypair->seckey,
-                                           &got_tag, secret_fname);
-    if (rv == 0) {
-      have_secret = 1;
-      loaded_secret_fname = secret_fname;
-      tor_assert(got_tag);
-    } else {
-      if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
-        tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", secret_fname,
-                strerror(errno));
-        goto err;
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* Should we try for an encrypted key? */
-  int have_encrypted_secret_file = 0;
-  if (!have_secret && try_to_load && encrypt_key) {
-    int r = read_encrypted_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
-                                      encrypted_secret_fname);
-    if (r > 0) {
-      have_secret = 1;
-      have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
-      tor_free(got_tag); /* convince coverity we aren't leaking */
-      got_tag = tor_strdup(tag);
-      loaded_secret_fname = encrypted_secret_fname;
-    } else if (errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s",
-              encrypted_secret_fname, strerror(errno));
-      goto err;
-    }
-  } else {
-    if (try_to_load) {
-      /* Check if it's there anyway, so we don't replace it. */
-      if (file_status(encrypted_secret_fname) != FN_NOENT)
-        have_encrypted_secret_file = 1;
-    }
-  }
-
-  if (have_secret) {
-    if (strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", loaded_secret_fname);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    /* Derive the public key */
-    if (ed25519_public_key_generate(&keypair->pubkey, &keypair->seckey)<0) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s can't produce a public key",
-              loaded_secret_fname);
-      goto err;
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* If we do split keys here, try to read the pubkey. */
-  int found_public = 0;
-  if (try_to_load && (!have_secret || split)) {
-    ed25519_public_key_t pubkey_tmp;
-    tor_free(got_tag);
-    found_public = ed25519_pubkey_read_from_file(&pubkey_tmp,
-                                                 &got_tag, public_fname) == 0;
-    if (!found_public && errno != ENOENT && norepair) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Unable to read %s: %s", public_fname,
-              strerror(errno));
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (found_public && strcmp(got_tag, tag)) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s has wrong tag", public_fname);
-      goto err;
-    }
-    if (found_public) {
-      if (have_secret) {
-        /* If we have a secret key and we're reloading the public key,
-         * the key must match! */
-        if (! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp)) {
-          tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "%s does not match %s!  If you are trying "
-                  "to restore from backup, make sure you didn't mix up the "
-                  "key files. If you are absolutely sure that %s is the right "
-                  "key for this relay, delete %s or move it out of the way.",
-                  public_fname, loaded_secret_fname,
-                  loaded_secret_fname, public_fname);
-          goto err;
-        }
-      } else {
-        /* We only have the public key; better use that. */
-        tor_assert(split);
-        memcpy(&keypair->pubkey, &pubkey_tmp, sizeof(pubkey_tmp));
-      }
-    } else {
-      /* We have no public key file, but we do have a secret key, make the
-       * public key file! */
-      if (have_secret) {
-        if (ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag)
-            < 0) {
-          tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't repair %s", public_fname);
-          goto err;
-        } else {
-          tor_log(LOG_NOTICE, LD_OR,
-                  "Found secret key but not %s. Regenerating.",
-                  public_fname);
-        }
-      }
-    }
-  }
-
-  /* If the secret key is absent and it's not allowed to be, fail. */
-  if (!have_secret && found_public &&
-      !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK)) {
-    if (have_encrypted_secret_file) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
-              "but it was encrypted. Try 'tor --keygen' instead, so you "
-              "can enter the passphrase.",
-              secret_fname);
-    } else if (offline_secret) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We wanted to load a secret key from %s, "
-              "but you're keeping it offline. (OfflineMasterKey is set.)",
-              secret_fname);
-    } else {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "We needed to load a secret key from %s, "
-              "but couldn't find it. %s", secret_fname,
-              (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN) ?
-              "If you're keeping your master secret key offline, you will "
-              "need to run 'tor --keygen' to generate new signing keys." :
-              "Did you forget to copy it over when you copied the rest of the "
-              "signing key material?");
-    }
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* If it's absent, and we're not supposed to make a new keypair, fail. */
-  if (!have_secret && !found_public && !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
-    if (split) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s or %s.",
-              secret_fname, public_fname);
-    } else {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "No key found in %s.", secret_fname);
-    }
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* If the secret key is absent, but the encrypted key would be present,
-   * that's an error */
-  if (!have_secret && !found_public && have_encrypted_secret_file) {
-    tor_assert(!encrypt_key);
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Found an encrypted secret key, "
-            "but not public key file %s!", public_fname);
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* if it's absent, make a new keypair... */
-  if (!have_secret && !found_public) {
-    tor_free(keypair);
-    keypair = ed_key_new(signing_key, flags, now, lifetime,
-                         cert_type, &cert);
-    if (!keypair) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create keypair");
-      goto err;
-    }
-    created_pk = created_sk = created_cert = 1;
-  }
-
-  /* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if
-   * we just created it. */
-  if (created_sk || (have_secret && options != NULL &&
-                     options->change_key_passphrase)) {
-    if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
-                         encrypt_key,
-                         secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0
-        ||
-        (split &&
-         ed25519_pubkey_write_to_file(&keypair->pubkey, public_fname, tag) < 0)
-        ||
-        (cert &&
-         crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
-                                 tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0)) {
-      tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write keys or cert to file.");
-      goto err;
-    }
-    goto done;
-  }
-
-  /* If we're not supposed to get a cert, we're done. */
-  if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
-    goto done;
-
-  /* Read a cert. */
-  tor_free(got_tag);
-  uint8_t certbuf[256];
-  ssize_t cert_body_len = crypto_read_tagged_contents_from_file(
-                 cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
-                 &got_tag, certbuf, sizeof(certbuf));
-  if (cert_body_len >= 0 && !strcmp(got_tag, tag))
-    cert = tor_cert_parse(certbuf, cert_body_len);
-
-  /* If we got it, check it to the extent we can. */
-  int bad_cert = 0;
-
-  if (! cert) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was unparseable");
-    bad_cert = 1;
-  } else if (!tor_memeq(cert->signed_key.pubkey, keypair->pubkey.pubkey,
-                        ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Cert was for wrong key");
-    bad_cert = 1;
-  } else if (signing_key &&
-             tor_cert_checksig(cert, &signing_key->pubkey, now) < 0) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Can't check certificate: %s",
-            tor_cert_describe_signature_status(cert));
-    bad_cert = 1;
-  } else if (cert->cert_expired) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate is expired");
-    bad_cert = 1;
-  } else if (signing_key && cert->signing_key_included &&
-             ! ed25519_pubkey_eq(&signing_key->pubkey, &cert->signing_key)) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Certificate signed by unexpectd key!");
-    bad_cert = 1;
-  }
-
-  if (bad_cert) {
-    tor_cert_free(cert);
-    cert = NULL;
-  }
-
-  /* If we got a cert, we're done. */
-  if (cert)
-    goto done;
-
-  /* If we didn't get a cert, and we're not supposed to make one, fail. */
-  if (!signing_key || !(flags & INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE)) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Without signing key, can't create certificate");
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* We have keys but not a certificate, so make one. */
-  uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
-  if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
-    cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
-  cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
-                         &keypair->pubkey,
-                         now, lifetime,
-                         cert_flags);
-
-  if (! cert) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't create certificate");
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  /* Write it to disk. */
-  created_cert = 1;
-  if (crypto_write_tagged_contents_to_file(cert_fname, "ed25519v1-cert",
-                             tag, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len) < 0) {
-    tor_log(severity, LD_OR, "Couldn't write cert to disk.");
-    goto err;
-  }
-
- done:
-  if (cert_out)
-    *cert_out = cert;
-  else
-    tor_cert_free(cert);
-
-  goto cleanup;
-
- err:
-  if (keypair)
-    memwipe(keypair, 0, sizeof(*keypair));
-  tor_free(keypair);
-  tor_cert_free(cert);
-  if (cert_out)
-    *cert_out = NULL;
-  if (created_sk)
-    unlink(secret_fname);
-  if (created_pk)
-    unlink(public_fname);
-  if (created_cert)
-    unlink(cert_fname);
-
- cleanup:
-  tor_free(encrypted_secret_fname);
-  tor_free(secret_fname);
-  tor_free(public_fname);
-  tor_free(cert_fname);
-  tor_free(got_tag);
-
-  return keypair;
-}
-
-/**
- * Create a new signing key and (optionally) certficiate; do not read or write
- * from disk.  See ed_key_init_from_file() for more information.
- */
-ed25519_keypair_t *
-ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
-           uint32_t flags,
-           time_t now,
-           time_t lifetime,
-           uint8_t cert_type,
-           struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
-{
-  if (cert_out)
-    *cert_out = NULL;
-
-  const int extra_strong = !! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG);
-  ed25519_keypair_t *keypair = tor_malloc_zero(sizeof(ed25519_keypair_t));
-  if (ed25519_keypair_generate(keypair, extra_strong) < 0)
-    goto err;
-
-  if (! (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT))
-    return keypair;
-
-  tor_assert(signing_key);
-  tor_assert(cert_out);
-  uint32_t cert_flags = 0;
-  if (flags & INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT)
-    cert_flags |= CERT_FLAG_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY;
-  tor_cert_t *cert = tor_cert_create(signing_key, cert_type,
-                                     &keypair->pubkey,
-                                     now, lifetime,
-                                     cert_flags);
-  if (! cert)
-    goto err;
-
-  *cert_out = cert;
-  return keypair;
-
- err:
-  tor_free(keypair);
-  return NULL;
-}
-
 static ed25519_keypair_t *master_identity_key = NULL;
 static ed25519_keypair_t *master_signing_key = NULL;
 static ed25519_keypair_t *current_auth_key = NULL;
@@ -1363,43 +720,6 @@ make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
   return tor_memdup(signature, r);
 }
 
-/** Check whether an RSA-TAP cross-certification is correct. Return 0 if it
- * is, -1 if it isn't. */
-MOCK_IMPL(int,
-check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
-                               int crosscert_len,
-                               const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
-                               const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
-                               const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest))
-{
-  uint8_t *cc = tor_malloc(crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey));
-  int cc_len =
-    crypto_pk_public_checksig(onion_pkey,
-                              (char*)cc,
-                              crypto_pk_keysize(onion_pkey),
-                              (const char*)crosscert,
-                              crosscert_len);
-  if (cc_len < 0) {
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (cc_len < DIGEST_LEN + ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN) {
-    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Short signature on cross-certification with TAP key");
-    goto err;
-  }
-  if (tor_memneq(cc, rsa_id_digest, DIGEST_LEN) ||
-      tor_memneq(cc + DIGEST_LEN, master_id_pkey->pubkey,
-                 ED25519_PUBKEY_LEN)) {
-    log_warn(LD_DIR, "Incorrect cross-certification with TAP key");
-    goto err;
-  }
-
-  tor_free(cc);
-  return 0;
- err:
-  tor_free(cc);
-  return -1;
-}
-
 void
 routerkeys_free_all(void)
 {

src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h

@@ -6,35 +6,6 @@
 
 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_ed25519.h"
 
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE                      (1u<<0)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_REPLACE                     (1u<<1)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT                       (1u<<2)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_MISSING_SECRET_OK           (1u<<3)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT                    (1u<<4)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG                (1u<<5)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT (1u<<6)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_OMIT_SECRET                 (1u<<7)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED               (1u<<8)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_NO_REPAIR                   (1u<<9)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_SUGGEST_KEYGEN              (1u<<10)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET              (1u<<11)
-#define INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME              (1u<<12)
-
-struct tor_cert_st;
-ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
-                                         int severity,
-                                         const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
-                                         time_t now,
-                                         time_t lifetime,
-                                         uint8_t cert_type,
-                                         struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
-                                         const or_options_t *options);
-ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
-                              uint32_t flags,
-                              time_t now,
-                              time_t lifetime,
-                              uint8_t cert_type,
-                              struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
 const ed25519_public_key_t *get_master_identity_key(void);
 const ed25519_keypair_t *get_master_signing_keypair(void);
 const struct tor_cert_st *get_master_signing_key_cert(void);
@@ -58,23 +29,12 @@ uint8_t *make_tap_onion_key_crosscert(const crypto_pk_t *onion_key,
                                   const crypto_pk_t *rsa_id_key,
                                   int *len_out);
 
-MOCK_DECL(int, check_tap_onion_key_crosscert,(const uint8_t *crosscert,
-                                  int crosscert_len,
-                                  const crypto_pk_t *onion_pkey,
-                                  const ed25519_public_key_t *master_id_pkey,
-                                  const uint8_t *rsa_id_digest));
-
 int log_cert_expiration(void);
 int load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now);
 int should_make_new_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, const time_t now);
 
 int generate_ed_link_cert(const or_options_t *options, time_t now, int force);
 
-int read_encrypted_secret_key(ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
-                              const char *fname);
-int write_encrypted_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *out,
-                               const char *fname);
-
 void routerkeys_free_all(void);
 
 #ifdef TOR_UNIT_TESTS
@@ -83,4 +43,3 @@ void init_mock_ed_keys(const crypto_pk_t *rsa_identity_key);
 #endif
 
 #endif /* !defined(TOR_ROUTERKEYS_H) */
-

src/feature/rend/rendservice.c

@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include "feature/rend/rendcommon.h"
 #include "feature/rend/rendservice.h"
 #include "feature/relay/router.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
 #include "core/or/relay.h"
 #include "feature/stats/rephist.h"
 #include "feature/hs_common/replaycache.h"
@@ -1363,7 +1364,7 @@ rend_service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path)
 
   /* Load key */
   fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, private_key_fname);
-  pk = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_DEBUG, 0);
+  pk = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_DEBUG, NULL);
   if (pk) {
     ret = 1;
   }
@@ -1535,7 +1536,7 @@ rend_service_load_keys(rend_service_t *s)
 
   /* Load key */
   fname = rend_service_path(s, private_key_fname);
-  s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR, 0);
+  s->private_key = init_key_from_file(fname, 1, LOG_ERR, NULL);
 
   if (!s->private_key)
     goto err;

src/test/fuzz/fuzz_descriptor.c

@@ -4,7 +4,8 @@
 #include "core/or/or.h"
 #include "feature/nodelist/routerparse.h"
 #include "feature/nodelist/routerlist.h"
-#include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
+#include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
 #include "test/fuzz/fuzzing.h"
 
 static int
@@ -76,4 +77,3 @@ fuzz_main(const uint8_t *data, size_t sz)
   }
   return 0;
 }
-

src/test/test_routerkeys.c

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include "feature/relay/routerkeys.h"
 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_cipher.h"
 #include "lib/crypt_ops/crypto_format.h"
+#include "feature/keymgt/loadkey.h"
 #include "feature/nodelist/torcert.h"
 #include "test/test.h"