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@@ -51,7 +51,8 @@
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\begin{abstract}
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We present Tor, a connection-based low-latency anonymous communication
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-system which addresses many limitations in the original onion routing design.
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+system. It is intended as an update and replacement for onion routing
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+and addresses many limitations in the original onion routing design.
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Tor works in a real-world Internet environment,
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requires little synchronization or coordination between nodes, and
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protects against known anonymity-breaking attacks as well
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@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ is sent in fixed-size \emph{cells}, which are unwrapped by a symmetric key
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at each node, revealing the downstream node. The original onion routing
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project published several design and analysis papers
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\cite{or-jsac98,or-discex00,or-ih96,or-pet02}. While there was briefly
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-a network of about a dozen nodes at three widely distributed sites,
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+a wide area onion routing network,
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the only long-running and publicly accessible
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implementation was a fragile proof-of-concept that ran on a single
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machine. Many critical design and deployment issues were never implemented,
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@@ -460,7 +461,7 @@ The main differences are:
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acknowledge its existence.
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-\SubSubSection{Integration with user applications}
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+\subsubsection{Integration with user applications}
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\Section{Maintaining anonymity sets}
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\label{sec:maintaining-anonymity}
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Paul Syverson