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@@ -0,0 +1,1403 @@
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+// Copyright (c) The Tor Project, Inc.
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+// See LICENSE for licensing information
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+// This is an asciidoc file used to generate the manpage/html reference.
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+// Learn asciidoc on http://www.methods.co.nz/asciidoc/userguide.html
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+TOR(1)
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+======
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+
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+NAME
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+----
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+tor - The second-generation onion router
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+
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+
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+SYNOPSIS
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+--------
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+**tor** [__OPTION__ __value__]...
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+
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+DESCRIPTION
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+-----------
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+__tor__ is a connection-oriented anonymizing communication
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+service. Users choose a source-routed path through a set of nodes, and
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+negotiate a "virtual circuit" through the network, in which each node
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+knows its predecessor and successor, but no others. Traffic flowing down
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+the circuit is unwrapped by a symmetric key at each node, which reveals
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+the downstream node. +
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+
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+Basically __tor__ provides a distributed network of servers ("onion routers").
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+Users bounce their TCP streams -- web traffic, ftp, ssh, etc -- around the
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+routers, and recipients, observers, and even the routers themselves have
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+difficulty tracking the source of the stream.
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+
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+OPTIONS
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+-------
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+**-h**, **-help**::
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+ Display a short help message and exit.
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+
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+**-f** __FILE__::
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+ FILE contains further "option value" paris. (Default: @CONFDIR@/torrc)
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+
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+**--hash-password**::
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+ Generates a hashed password for control port access.
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+
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+**--list-fingerprint**::
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+ Generate your keys and output your nickname and fingerprint.
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+
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+**--verify-config**::
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+ Verify the configuration file is valid.
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+
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+**--nt-service**::
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+ **--service [install|remove|start|stop]** Manage the Tor Windows
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+ NT/2000/XP service. Current instructions can be found at
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+ https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WinNTService
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+
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+**--list-torrc-options**::
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+ List all valid options.
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+
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+**--version**::
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+ Display Tor version and exit.
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+
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+**--quiet**::
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+ Do not start Tor with a console log unless explicitly requested to do so.
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+ (By default, Tor starts out logging messages at level "notice" or higher to
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+ the console, until it has parsed its configuration.)
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+
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+Other options can be specified either on the command-line (--option
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+ value), or in the configuration file (option value or option "value").
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+ Options are case-insensitive. C-style escaped characters are allowed inside
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+ quoted values.
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+
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+**BandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
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+ A token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth usage on this node to
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+ the specified number of bytes per second, and the average outgoing
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+ bandwidth usage to that same value. (Default: 5 MB)
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+
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+**BandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
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+ Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) to the given
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+ number of bytes in each direction. (Default: 10 MB)
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+
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+**MaxAdvertisedBandwidth** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
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+ If set, we will not advertise more than this amount of bandwidth for our
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+ BandwidthRate. Server operators who want to reduce the number of clients
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+ who ask to build circuits through them (since this is proportional to
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+ advertised bandwidth rate) can thus reduce the CPU demands on their server
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+ without impacting network performance.
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+
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+**RelayBandwidthRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
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+ If defined, a separate token bucket limits the average incoming bandwidth
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+ usage for \_relayed traffic_ on this node to the specified number of bytes
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+ per second, and the average outgoing bandwidth usage to that same value.
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+ Relayed traffic currently is calculated to include answers to directory
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+ requests, but that may change in future versions. (Default: 0)
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+
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+**RelayBandwidthBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
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+ Limit the maximum token bucket size (also known as the burst) for
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+ \_relayed traffic_ to the given number of bytes in each direction.
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+ (Default: 0)
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+
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+**PerConnBWRate** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
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+ If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.
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+ You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is
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+ published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
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+
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+**PerConnBWBurst** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
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+ If set, do separate rate limiting for each connection from a non-relay.
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+ You should never need to change this value, since a network-wide value is
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+ published in the consensus and your relay will use that value. (Default: 0)
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+
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+**ConLimit** __NUM__::
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+ The minimum number of file descriptors that must be available to the Tor
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+ process before it will start. Tor will ask the OS for as many file
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+ descriptors as the OS will allow (you can find this by "ulimit -H -n").
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+ If this number is less than ConnLimit, then Tor will refuse to start. +
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+ +
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+ You probably don't need to adjust this. It has no effect on Windows
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+ since that platform lacks getrlimit(). (Default: 1000)
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+
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+**ConstrainedSockets** **0**|**1**::
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+ If set, Tor will tell the kernel to attempt to shrink the buffers for all
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+ sockets to the size specified in **ConstrainedSockSize**. This is useful for
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+ virtual servers and other environments where system level TCP buffers may
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+ be limited. If you're on a virtual server, and you encounter the "Error
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+ creating network socket: No buffer space available" message, you are
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+ likely experiencing this problem. +
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+ +
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+ The preferred solution is to have the admin increase the buffer pool for
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+ the host itself via /proc/sys/net/ipv4/tcp_mem or equivalent facility;
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+ this configuration option is a second-resort. +
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+ +
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+ The DirPort option should also not be used if TCP buffers are scarce. The
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+ cached directory requests consume additional sockets which exacerbates
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+ the problem. +
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+ +
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+ You should **not** enable this feature unless you encounter the "no buffer
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+ space available" issue. Reducing the TCP buffers affects window size for
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+ the TCP stream and will reduce throughput in proportion to round trip
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+ time on long paths. (Default: 0.)
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+
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+**ConstrainedSockSize** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**::
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+ When **ConstrainedSockets** is enabled the receive and transmit buffers for
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+ all sockets will be set to this limit. Must be a value between 2048 and
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+ 262144, in 1024 byte increments. Default of 8192 is recommended.
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+
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+**ControlPort** __Port__::
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+ If set, Tor will accept connections on this port and allow those
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+ connections to control the Tor process using the Tor Control Protocol
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+ (described in control-spec.txt). Note: unless you also specify one of
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+ **HashedControlPassword** or **CookieAuthentication**, setting this option will
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+ cause Tor to allow any process on the local host to control it. This
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+ option is required for many Tor controllers; most use the value of 9051.
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+
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+**ControlListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
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+ Bind the controller listener to this address. If you specify a port, bind
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+ to this port rather than the one specified in ControlPort. We strongly
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+ recommend that you leave this alone unless you know what you're doing,
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+ since giving attackers access to your control listener is really
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+ dangerous. (Default: 127.0.0.1) This directive can be specified multiple
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+ times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
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+
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+**ControlSocket** __Path__::
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+ Like ControlPort, but listens on a Unix domain socket, rather than a TCP
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+ socket. (Unix and Unix-like systems only.)
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+
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+**HashedControlPassword** __hashed_password__::
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+ Don't allow any connections on the control port except when the other
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+ process knows the password whose one-way hash is __hashed_password__. You
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+ can compute the hash of a password by running "tor --hash-password
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+ __password__". You can provide several acceptable passwords by using more
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+ than HashedControlPassword line.
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+
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+**CookieAuthentication** **0**|**1**::
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+ If this option is set to 1, don't allow any connections on the control port
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+ except when the connecting process knows the contents of a file named
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+ "control_auth_cookie", which Tor will create in its data directory. This
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+ authentication method should only be used on systems with good filesystem
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+ security. (Default: 0)
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+
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+**CookieAuthFile** __Path__::
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+ If set, this option overrides the default location and file name
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+ for Tor's cookie file. (See CookieAuthentication above.)
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+
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+**CookieAuthFileGroupReadable** **0**|**1**|__Groupname__::
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+ If this option is set to 0, don't allow the filesystem group to read the
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+ cookie file. If the option is set to 1, make the cookie file readable by
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+ the default GID. [Making the file readable by other groups is not yet
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+ implemented; let us know if you need this for some reason.] (Default: 0).
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+
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+**DataDirectory** __DIR__::
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+ Store working data in DIR (Default: @LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor)
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+
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+**DirServer** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__::
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+ Use a nonstandard authoritative directory server at the provided address
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+ and port, with the specified key fingerprint. This option can be repeated
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+ many times, for multiple authoritative directory servers. Flags are
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+ separated by spaces, and determine what kind of an authority this directory
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+ is. By default, every authority is authoritative for current ("v2")-style
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+ directories, unless the "no-v2" flag is given. If the "v1" flags is
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+ provided, Tor will use this server as an authority for old-style (v1)
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+ directories as well. (Only directory mirrors care about this.) Tor will
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+ use this server as an authority for hidden service information if the "hs"
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+ flag is set, or if the "v1" flag is set and the "no-hs" flag is **not** set.
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+ Tor will use this authority as a bridge authoritative directory if the
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+ "bridge" flag is set. If a flag "orport=**port**" is given, Tor will use the
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+ given port when opening encrypted tunnels to the dirserver. Lastly, if a
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+ flag "v3ident=**fp**" is given, the dirserver is a v3 directory authority
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+ whose v3 long-term signing key has the fingerprint **fp**. +
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+ +
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+ If no **dirserver** line is given, Tor will use the default directory
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+ servers. NOTE: this option is intended for setting up a private Tor
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+ network with its own directory authorities. If you use it, you will be
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+ distinguishable from other users, because you won't believe the same
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+ authorities they do.
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+
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+**AlternateDirAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
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+
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+**AlternateHSAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __fingerprint__ +
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+
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+**AlternateBridgeAuthority** [__nickname__] [**flags**] __address__:__port__ __ fingerprint__::
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+ As DirServer, but replaces less of the default directory authorities. Using
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+ AlternateDirAuthority replaces the default Tor directory authorities, but
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+ leaves the hidden service authorities and bridge authorities in place.
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+ Similarly, Using AlternateHSAuthority replaces the default hidden service
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+ authorities, but not the directory or bridge authorities.
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+
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+**DisableAllSwap** **0**|**1**::
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+ If set to 1, Tor will attempt to lock all current and future memory pages.
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+ On supported platforms, this should effectively disable any and all
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+ attempts to page out memory. Under the hood, DisableAllSwap uses mlockall()
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+ on unix-like platforms. Windows is currently unsupported. We believe that
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+ this feature works on modern Gnu/Linux distributions. Mac OS X appears to
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+ be broken by design. On reasonable *BSD systems it should also be
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+ supported but this is untested. This option requires that you start your
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+ Tor as root. If you use DisableAllSwap, please consider using the User
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+ option to properly reduce the privileges of your Tor.
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+ (Default: 0)
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+
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+**FetchDirInfoEarly** **0**|**1**::
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+ If set to 1, Tor will always fetch directory information like other
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+ directory caches, even if you don't meet the normal criteria for fetching
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+ early. Normal users should leave it off. (Default: 0)
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+
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+**FetchDirInfoExtraEarly** **0**|**1**::
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+ If set to 1, Tor will fetch directory information before other directory
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+ caches. It will attempt to download directory information closer to the
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+ start of the consensus period. Normal users should leave it off.
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+ (Default: 0)
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+
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+**FetchHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
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+ If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any hidden service descriptors from the
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+ rendezvous directories. This option is only useful if you're using a Tor
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+ controller that handles hidden service fetches for you. (Default: 1)
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+
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+**FetchServerDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
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+ If set to 0, Tor will never fetch any network status summaries or server
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+ descriptors from the directory servers. This option is only useful if
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+ you're using a Tor controller that handles directory fetches for you.
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+ (Default: 1)
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+
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+**FetchUselessDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
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+ If set to 1, Tor will fetch every non-obsolete descriptor from the
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+ authorities that it hears about. Otherwise, it will avoid fetching useless
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+ descriptors, for example for routers that are not running. This option is
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+ useful if you're using the contributed "exitlist" script to enumerate Tor
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+ nodes that exit to certain addresses. (Default: 0)
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+
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+**HTTPProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
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+ Tor will make all its directory requests through this host:port (or host:80
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+ if port is not specified), rather than connecting directly to any directory
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+ servers.
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+
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+**HTTPProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
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+ If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTP proxy
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+ authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTP
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+ proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
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+ want it to support others.
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+
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+**HTTPSProxy** __host__[:__port__]::
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+ Tor will make all its OR (SSL) connections through this host:port (or
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+ host:443 if port is not specified), via HTTP CONNECT rather than connecting
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+ directly to servers. You may want to set **FascistFirewall** to restrict
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+ the set of ports you might try to connect to, if your HTTPS proxy only
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+ allows connecting to certain ports.
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+
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+**HTTPSProxyAuthenticator** __username:password__::
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+ If defined, Tor will use this username:password for Basic HTTPS proxy
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+ authentication, as in RFC 2617. This is currently the only form of HTTPS
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+ proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
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+ want it to support others.
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+
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+**Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
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+ Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
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+ (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
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+
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+**Socks5Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
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+ Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 5 proxy at host:port
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+ (or host:1080 if port is not specified).
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+
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+**Socks5ProxyUsername** __username__ +
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+
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+**Socks5ProxyPassword** __password__::
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+ If defined, authenticate to the SOCKS 5 server using username and password
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+ in accordance to RFC 1929. Both username and password must be between 1 and
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+ 255 characters.
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+
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+**KeepalivePeriod** __NUM__::
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+ To keep firewalls from expiring connections, send a padding keepalive cell
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+ every NUM seconds on open connections that are in use. If the connection
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+ has no open circuits, it will instead be closed after NUM seconds of
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+ idleness. (Default: 5 minutes)
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+
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+**Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **stderr**|**stdout**|**syslog**::
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+ Send all messages between __minSeverity__ and __maxSeverity__ to the standard
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+ output stream, the standard error stream, or to the system log. (The
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+ "syslog" value is only supported on Unix.) Recognized severity levels are
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+ debug, info, notice, warn, and err. We advise using "notice" in most cases,
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+ since anything more verbose may provide sensitive information to an
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+ attacker who obtains the logs. If only one severity level is given, all
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+ messages of that level or higher will be sent to the listed destination.
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+
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+**Log** __minSeverity__[-__maxSeverity__] **file** __FILENAME__::
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+ As above, but send log messages to the listed filename. The
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+ "Log" option may appear more than once in a configuration file.
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+ Messages are sent to all the logs that match their severity
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+ level.
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+
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+**OutboundBindAddress** __IP__::
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+ Make all outbound connections originate from the IP address specified. This
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+ is only useful when you have multiple network interfaces, and you want all
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+ of Tor's outgoing connections to use a single one.
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+
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+**PidFile** __FILE__::
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+ On startup, write our PID to FILE. On clean shutdown, remove
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+ FILE.
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+
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+**ProtocolWarnings** **0**|**1**::
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+ If 1, Tor will log with severity \'warn' various cases of other parties not
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+ following the Tor specification. Otherwise, they are logged with severity
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+ \'info'. (Default: 0)
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+
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+**RunAsDaemon** **0**|**1**::
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+ If 1, Tor forks and daemonizes to the background. This option has no effect
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+ on Windows; instead you should use the --service command-line option.
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+ (Default: 0)
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+
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+
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+**SafeLogging** **0**|**1**|**relay**::
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+ Tor can scrub potentially sensitive strings from log messages (e.g.
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+ addresses) by replacing them with the string [scrubbed]. This way logs can
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+ still be useful, but they don't leave behind personally identifying
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+ information about what sites a user might have visited. +
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+ +
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+ If this option is set to 0, Tor will not perform any scrubbing, if it is
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+ set to 1, all potentially sensitive strings are replaced. If it is set to
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+ relay, all log messages generated when acting as a relay are sanitized, but
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+ all messages generated when acting as a client are not. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**User** __UID__::
|
|
|
+ On startup, setuid to this user and setgid to their primary group.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**HardwareAccel** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If non-zero, try to use built-in (static) crypto hardware acceleration when
|
|
|
+ available. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AccelName** __NAME__::
|
|
|
+ When using OpenSSL hardware crypto acceleration attempt to load the dynamic
|
|
|
+ engine of this name. This must be used for any dynamic hardware engine.
|
|
|
+ Names can be verified with the openssl engine command.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AccelDir** __DIR__::
|
|
|
+ Specify this option if using dynamic hardware acceleration and the engine
|
|
|
+ implementation library resides somewhere other than the OpenSSL default.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AvoidDiskWrites** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If non-zero, try to write to disk less frequently than we would otherwise.
|
|
|
+ This is useful when running on flash memory or other media that support
|
|
|
+ only a limited number of writes. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TunnelDirConns** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If non-zero, when a directory server we contact supports it, we will build
|
|
|
+ a one-hop circuit and make an encrypted connection via its ORPort.
|
|
|
+ (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**PreferTunneledDirConns** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If non-zero, we will avoid directory servers that don't support tunneled
|
|
|
+ directory connections, when possible. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**CircuitPriorityHalflife** **NUM1**::
|
|
|
+ If this value is set, we override the default algorithm for choosing which
|
|
|
+ circuit's cell to deliver or relay next. When the value is 0, we
|
|
|
+ round-robin between the active circuits on a connection, delivering one
|
|
|
+ cell from each in turn. When the value is positive, we prefer delivering
|
|
|
+ cells from whichever connection has the lowest weighted cell count, where
|
|
|
+ cells are weighted exponentially according to the supplied
|
|
|
+ CircuitPriorityHalflife value (in seconds). If this option is not set at
|
|
|
+ all, we use the behavior recommended in the current consensus
|
|
|
+ networkstatus. This is an advanced option; you generally shouldn't have
|
|
|
+ mess with it. (Default: not set.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+CLIENT OPTIONS
|
|
|
+--------------
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+The following options are useful only for clients (that is, if
|
|
|
+**SocksPort** is non-zero):
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AllowInvalidNodes** **entry**|**exit**|**middle**|**introduction**|**rendezvous**|**...**::
|
|
|
+ If some Tor servers are obviously not working right, the directory
|
|
|
+ authorities can manually mark them as invalid, meaning that it's not
|
|
|
+ recommended you use them for entry or exit positions in your circuits. You
|
|
|
+ can opt to use them in some circuit positions, though. The default is
|
|
|
+ "middle,rendezvous", and other choices are not advised.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ExcludeSingleHopRelays** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ This option controls whether circuits built by Tor will include relays with
|
|
|
+ the AllowSingleHopExits flag set to true. If ExcludeSingleHopRelays is set
|
|
|
+ to 0, these relays will be included. Note that these relays might be at
|
|
|
+ higher risk of being seized or observed, so they are not normally included.
|
|
|
+ (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**Bridge** __IP__:__ORPort__ [fingerprint]::
|
|
|
+ When set along with UseBridges, instructs Tor to use the relay at
|
|
|
+ "IP:ORPort" as a "bridge" relaying into the Tor network. If "fingerprint"
|
|
|
+ is provided (using the same format as for DirServer), we will verify that
|
|
|
+ the relay running at that location has the right fingerprint. We also use
|
|
|
+ fingerprint to look up the bridge descriptor at the bridge authority, if
|
|
|
+ it's provided and if UpdateBridgesFromAuthority is set too.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**CircuitBuildTimeout** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ Try for at most NUM seconds when building circuits. If the circuit isn't
|
|
|
+ open in that time, give up on it. (Default: 1 minute.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**CircuitIdleTimeout** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ If we have kept a clean (never used) circuit around for NUM seconds, then
|
|
|
+ close it. This way when the Tor client is entirely idle, it can expire all
|
|
|
+ of its circuits, and then expire its TLS connections. Also, if we end up
|
|
|
+ making a circuit that is not useful for exiting any of the requests we're
|
|
|
+ receiving, it won't forever take up a slot in the circuit list. (Default: 1
|
|
|
+ hour.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**CircuitStreamTimeout** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ If non-zero, this option overrides our internal timeout schedule for how
|
|
|
+ many seconds until we detach a stream from a circuit and try a new circuit.
|
|
|
+ If your network is particularly slow, you might want to set this to a
|
|
|
+ number like 60. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ClientOnly** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If set to 1, Tor will under no circumstances run as a server or serve
|
|
|
+ directory requests. The default is to run as a client unless ORPort is
|
|
|
+ configured. (Usually, you don't need to set this; Tor is pretty smart at
|
|
|
+ figuring out whether you are reliable and high-bandwidth enough to be a
|
|
|
+ useful server.) (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ExcludeNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
|
|
|
+ patterns of nodes to never use when building a circuit. (Example:
|
|
|
+ ExcludeNodes SlowServer, $ EFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF, \{cc}, 255.254.0.0/8)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ExcludeExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
|
|
|
+ patterns of nodes to never use when picking an exit node. Note that any
|
|
|
+ node listed in ExcludeNodes is automatically considered to be part of this
|
|
|
+ list.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**EntryNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
|
|
|
+ patterns of nodes to use for the first hop in normal circuits. These are
|
|
|
+ treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ExitNodes** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ A list of identity fingerprints, nicknames, country codes and address
|
|
|
+ patterns of nodes to use for the last hop in normal exit circuits. These
|
|
|
+ are treated only as preferences unless StrictNodes (see below) is also set.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**StrictNodes** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If 1 and EntryNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes
|
|
|
+ besides those listed in EntryNodes for the first hop of a normal circuit.
|
|
|
+ If 1 and ExitNodes config option is set, Tor will never use any nodes
|
|
|
+ besides those listed in ExitNodes for the last hop of a normal exit
|
|
|
+ circuit. Note that Tor might still use these nodes for non-exit circuits
|
|
|
+ such as one-hop directory fetches or hidden service support circuits.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**FascistFirewall** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If 1, Tor will only create outgoing connections to ORs running on ports
|
|
|
+ that your firewall allows (defaults to 80 and 443; see **FirewallPorts**).
|
|
|
+ This will allow you to run Tor as a client behind a firewall with
|
|
|
+ restrictive policies, but will not allow you to run as a server behind such
|
|
|
+ a firewall. If you prefer more fine-grained control, use
|
|
|
+ ReachableAddresses instead.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**FirewallPorts** __PORTS__::
|
|
|
+ A list of ports that your firewall allows you to connect to. Only used when
|
|
|
+ **FascistFirewall** is set. This option is deprecated; use ReachableAddresses
|
|
|
+ instead. (Default: 80, 443)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**HidServAuth** __onion-address__ __auth-cookie__ [__service-name__]::
|
|
|
+ Client authorization for a hidden service. Valid onion addresses contain 16
|
|
|
+ characters in a-z2-7 plus ".onion", and valid auth cookies contain 22
|
|
|
+ characters in A-Za-z0-9+/. The service name is only used for internal
|
|
|
+ purposes, e.g., for Tor controllers. This option may be used multiple times
|
|
|
+ for different hidden services. If a hidden service uses authorization and
|
|
|
+ this option is not set, the hidden service is not accessible. Hidden
|
|
|
+ services can be configured to require authorization using the
|
|
|
+ **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** option.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ReachableAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
|
|
|
+ A comma-separated list of IP addresses and ports that your firewall allows
|
|
|
+ you to connect to. The format is as for the addresses in ExitPolicy, except
|
|
|
+ that "accept" is understood unless "reject" is explicitly provided. For
|
|
|
+ example, \'ReachableAddresses 99.0.0.0/8, reject 18.0.0.0/8:80, accept
|
|
|
+ \*:80' means that your firewall allows connections to everything inside net
|
|
|
+ 99, rejects port 80 connections to net 18, and accepts connections to port
|
|
|
+ 80 otherwise. (Default: \'accept \*:*'.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ReachableDirAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
|
|
|
+ Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
|
|
|
+ these restrictions when fetching directory information, using standard HTTP
|
|
|
+ GET requests. If not set explicitly then the value of
|
|
|
+ **ReachableAddresses** is used. If **HTTPProxy** is set then these
|
|
|
+ connections will go through that proxy.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ReachableORAddresses** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]...::
|
|
|
+ Like **ReachableAddresses**, a list of addresses and ports. Tor will obey
|
|
|
+ these restrictions when connecting to Onion Routers, using TLS/SSL. If not
|
|
|
+ set explicitly then the value of **ReachableAddresses** is used. If
|
|
|
+ **HTTPSProxy** is set then these connections will go through that proxy. +
|
|
|
+ +
|
|
|
+ The separation between **ReachableORAddresses** and
|
|
|
+ **ReachableDirAddresses** is only interesting when you are connecting
|
|
|
+ through proxies (see **HTTPProxy** and **HTTPSProxy**). Most proxies limit
|
|
|
+ TLS connections (which Tor uses to connect to Onion Routers) to port 443,
|
|
|
+ and some limit HTTP GET requests (which Tor uses for fetching directory
|
|
|
+ information) to port 80.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**LongLivedPorts** __PORTS__::
|
|
|
+ A list of ports for services that tend to have long-running connections
|
|
|
+ (e.g. chat and interactive shells). Circuits for streams that use these
|
|
|
+ ports will contain only high-uptime nodes, to reduce the chance that a node
|
|
|
+ will go down before the stream is finished. (Default: 21, 22, 706, 1863,
|
|
|
+ 5050, 5190, 5222, 5223, 6667, 6697, 8300)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**MapAddress** __address__ __newaddress__::
|
|
|
+ When a request for address arrives to Tor, it will rewrite it to newaddress
|
|
|
+ before processing it. For example, if you always want connections to
|
|
|
+ www.indymedia.org to exit via __torserver__ (where __torserver__ is the
|
|
|
+ nickname of the server), use "MapAddress www.indymedia.org
|
|
|
+ www.indymedia.org.torserver.exit".
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**NewCircuitPeriod** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ Every NUM seconds consider whether to build a new circuit. (Default: 30
|
|
|
+ seconds)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**MaxCircuitDirtiness** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ Feel free to reuse a circuit that was first used at most NUM seconds ago,
|
|
|
+ but never attach a new stream to a circuit that is too old. (Default: 10
|
|
|
+ minutes)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**NodeFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ The Tor servers, defined by their identity fingerprints or nicknames,
|
|
|
+ constitute a "family" of similar or co-administered servers, so never use
|
|
|
+ any two of them in the same circuit. Defining a NodeFamily is only needed
|
|
|
+ when a server doesn't list the family itself (with MyFamily). This option
|
|
|
+ can be used multiple times.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**EnforceDistinctSubnets** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If 1, Tor will not put two servers whose IP addresses are "too close" on
|
|
|
+ the same circuit. Currently, two addresses are "too close" if they lie in
|
|
|
+ the same /16 range. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SocksPort** __PORT__::
|
|
|
+ Advertise this port to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
|
|
|
+ applications. Set this to 0 if you don't want to allow application
|
|
|
+ connections. (Default: 9050)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SocksListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
|
+ Bind to this address to listen for connections from Socks-speaking
|
|
|
+ applications. (Default: 127.0.0.1) You can also specify a port (e.g.
|
|
|
+ 192.168.0.1:9100). This directive can be specified multiple times to bind
|
|
|
+ to multiple addresses/ports.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SocksPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
|
|
|
+ SocksPort and DNSPort ports. The policies have the same form as exit
|
|
|
+ policies below.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SocksTimeout** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ Let a socks connection wait NUM seconds handshaking, and NUM seconds
|
|
|
+ unattached waiting for an appropriate circuit, before we fail it. (Default:
|
|
|
+ 2 minutes.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TrackHostExits** __host__,__.domain__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ For each value in the comma separated list, Tor will track recent
|
|
|
+ connections to hosts that match this value and attempt to reuse the same
|
|
|
+ exit node for each. If the value is prepended with a \'.\', it is treated as
|
|
|
+ matching an entire domain. If one of the values is just a \'.', it means
|
|
|
+ match everything. This option is useful if you frequently connect to sites
|
|
|
+ that will expire all your authentication cookies (i.e. log you out) if
|
|
|
+ your IP address changes. Note that this option does have the disadvantage
|
|
|
+ of making it more clear that a given history is associated with a single
|
|
|
+ user. However, most people who would wish to observe this will observe it
|
|
|
+ through cookies or other protocol-specific means anyhow.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TrackHostExitsExpire** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ Since exit servers go up and down, it is desirable to expire the
|
|
|
+ association between host and exit server after NUM seconds. The default is
|
|
|
+ 1800 seconds (30 minutes).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**UpdateBridgesFromAuthority** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When set (along with UseBridges), Tor will try to fetch bridge descriptors
|
|
|
+ from the configured bridge authorities when feasible. It will fall back to
|
|
|
+ a direct request if the authority responds with a 404. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**UseBridges** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When set, Tor will fetch descriptors for each bridge listed in the "Bridge"
|
|
|
+ config lines, and use these relays as both entry guards and directory
|
|
|
+ guards. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**UseEntryGuards** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If this option is set to 1, we pick a few long-term entry servers, and try
|
|
|
+ to stick with them. This is desirable because constantly changing servers
|
|
|
+ increases the odds that an adversary who owns some servers will observe a
|
|
|
+ fraction of your paths. (Defaults to 1.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**NumEntryGuards** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ If UseEntryGuards is set to 1, we will try to pick a total of NUM routers
|
|
|
+ as long-term entries for our circuits. (Defaults to 3.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SafeSocks** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled, Tor will reject application connections that
|
|
|
+ use unsafe variants of the socks protocol -- ones that only provide an IP
|
|
|
+ address, meaning the application is doing a DNS resolve first.
|
|
|
+ Specifically, these are socks4 and socks5 when not doing remote DNS.
|
|
|
+ (Defaults to 0.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TestSocks** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled, Tor will make a notice-level log entry for
|
|
|
+ each connection to the Socks port indicating whether the request used a
|
|
|
+ safe socks protocol or an unsafe one (see above entry on SafeSocks). This
|
|
|
+ helps to determine whether an application using Tor is possibly leaking
|
|
|
+ DNS requests. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**VirtualAddrNetwork** __Address__/__bits__::
|
|
|
+ When a controller asks for a virtual (unused) address with the MAPADDRESS
|
|
|
+ command, Tor picks an unassigned address from this range. (Default:
|
|
|
+ 127.192.0.0/10) +
|
|
|
+ +
|
|
|
+ When providing proxy server service to a network of computers using a tool
|
|
|
+ like dns-proxy-tor, change this address to "10.192.0.0/10" or
|
|
|
+ "172.16.0.0/12". The default **VirtualAddrNetwork** address range on a
|
|
|
+ properly configured machine will route to the loopback interface. For
|
|
|
+ local use, no change to the default VirtualAddrNetwork setting is needed.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is disabled, Tor blocks hostnames containing illegal
|
|
|
+ characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an exit node to be
|
|
|
+ resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve URLs and so on.
|
|
|
+ (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AllowDotExit** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If enabled, we convert "www.google.com.foo.exit" addresses on the
|
|
|
+ SocksPort/TransPort/NatdPort into "www.google.com" addresses that exit from
|
|
|
+ the node "foo". Disabled by default since attacking websites and exit
|
|
|
+ relays can use it to manipulate your path selection. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**FastFirstHopPK** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is disabled, Tor uses the public key step for the first
|
|
|
+ hop of creating circuits. Skipping it is generally safe since we have
|
|
|
+ already used TLS to authenticate the relay and to establish forward-secure
|
|
|
+ keys. Turning this option off makes circuit building slower. +
|
|
|
+ +
|
|
|
+ Note that Tor will always use the public key step for the first hop if it's
|
|
|
+ operating as a relay, and it will never use the public key step if it
|
|
|
+ doesn't yet know the onion key of the first hop. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TransPort** __PORT__::
|
|
|
+ If non-zero, enables transparent proxy support on __PORT__ (by convention,
|
|
|
+ 9040). Requires OS support for transparent proxies, such as BSDs' pf or
|
|
|
+ Linux's IPTables. If you're planning to use Tor as a transparent proxy for
|
|
|
+ a network, you'll want to examine and change VirtualAddrNetwork from the
|
|
|
+ default setting. You'll also want to set the TransListenAddress option for
|
|
|
+ the network you'd like to proxy. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TransListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
|
+ Bind to this address to listen for transparent proxy connections. (Default:
|
|
|
+ 127.0.0.1). This is useful for exporting a transparent proxy server to an
|
|
|
+ entire network.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**NATDPort** __PORT__::
|
|
|
+ Allow old versions of ipfw (as included in old versions of FreeBSD, etc.)
|
|
|
+ to send connections through Tor using the NATD protocol. This option is
|
|
|
+ only for people who cannot use TransPort.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**NATDListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
|
+ Bind to this address to listen for NATD connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AutomapHostsOnResolve** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled, and we get a request to resolve an address
|
|
|
+ that ends with one of the suffixes in **AutomapHostsSuffixes**, we map an
|
|
|
+ unused virtual address to that address, and return the new virtual address.
|
|
|
+ This is handy for making ".onion" addresses work with applications that
|
|
|
+ resolve an address and then connect to it. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AutomapHostsSuffixes** __SUFFIX__,__SUFFIX__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ A comma-separated list of suffixes to use with **AutomapHostsOnResolve**.
|
|
|
+ The "." suffix is equivalent to "all addresses." (Default: .exit,.onion).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DNSPort** __PORT__::
|
|
|
+ If non-zero, Tor listens for UDP DNS requests on this port and resolves
|
|
|
+ them anonymously. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DNSListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
|
+ Bind to this address to listen for DNS connections. (Default: 127.0.0.1).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If true, Tor does not believe any anonymously retrieved DNS answer that
|
|
|
+ tells it that an address resolves to an internal address (like 127.0.0.1 or
|
|
|
+ 192.168.0.1). This option prevents certain browser-based attacks; don't
|
|
|
+ turn it off unless you know what you're doing. (Default: 1).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DownloadExtraInfo** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If true, Tor downloads and caches "extra-info" documents. These documents
|
|
|
+ contain information about servers other than the information in their
|
|
|
+ regular router descriptors. Tor does not use this information for anything
|
|
|
+ itself; to save bandwidth, leave this option turned off. (Default: 0).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**FallbackNetworkstatusFile** __FILENAME__::
|
|
|
+ If Tor doesn't have a cached networkstatus file, it starts out using this
|
|
|
+ one instead. Even if this file is out of date, Tor can still use it to
|
|
|
+ learn about directory mirrors, so it doesn't need to put load on the
|
|
|
+ authorities. (Default: None).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**WarnPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ Tells Tor to issue a warnings whenever the user tries to make an anonymous
|
|
|
+ connection to one of these ports. This option is designed to alert users
|
|
|
+ to services that risk sending passwords in the clear. (Default:
|
|
|
+ 23,109,110,143).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**RejectPlaintextPorts** __port__,__port__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ Like WarnPlaintextPorts, but instead of warning about risky port uses, Tor
|
|
|
+ will instead refuse to make the connection. (Default: None).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
|
+--------------
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+The following options are useful only for servers (that is, if ORPort
|
|
|
+is non-zero):
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**Address** __address__::
|
|
|
+ The IP address or fully qualified domain name of this server (e.g.
|
|
|
+ moria.mit.edu). You can leave this unset, and Tor will guess your IP
|
|
|
+ address.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AllowSingleHopExits** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ This option controls whether clients can use this server as a single hop
|
|
|
+ proxy. If set to 1, clients can use this server as an exit even if it is
|
|
|
+ the only hop in the circuit. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AssumeReachable** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ This option is used when bootstrapping a new Tor network. If set to 1,
|
|
|
+ don't do self-reachability testing; just upload your server descriptor
|
|
|
+ immediately. If **AuthoritativeDirectory** is also set, this option
|
|
|
+ instructs the dirserver to bypass remote reachability testing too and list
|
|
|
+ all connected servers as running.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**BridgeRelay** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ Sets the relay to act as a "bridge" with respect to relaying connections
|
|
|
+ from bridge users to the Tor network. Mainly it influences how the relay
|
|
|
+ will cache and serve directory information. Usually used in combination
|
|
|
+ with PublishServerDescriptor.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ContactInfo** __email_address__::
|
|
|
+ Administrative contact information for server. This line might get picked
|
|
|
+ up by spam harvesters, so you may want to obscure the fact that it's an
|
|
|
+ email address.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ExitPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ Set an exit policy for this server. Each policy is of the form
|
|
|
+ "**accept**|**reject** __ADDR__[/__MASK__][:__PORT__]". If /__MASK__ is
|
|
|
+ omitted then this policy just applies to the host given. Instead of giving
|
|
|
+ a host or network you can also use "\*" to denote the universe (0.0.0.0/0).
|
|
|
+ __PORT__ can be a single port number, an interval of ports
|
|
|
+ "__FROM_PORT__-__TO_PORT__", or "\*". If __PORT__ is omitted, that means
|
|
|
+ "\*". +
|
|
|
+ +
|
|
|
+ For example, "accept 18.7.22.69:\*,reject 18.0.0.0/8:\*,accept \*:\*" would
|
|
|
+ reject any traffic destined for MIT except for web.mit.edu, and accept
|
|
|
+ anything else. +
|
|
|
+ +
|
|
|
+ To specify all internal and link-local networks (including 0.0.0.0/8,
|
|
|
+ 169.254.0.0/16, 127.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 10.0.0.0/8, and
|
|
|
+ 172.16.0.0/12), you can use the "private" alias instead of an address.
|
|
|
+ These addresses are rejected by default (at the beginning of your exit
|
|
|
+ policy), along with your public IP address, unless you set the
|
|
|
+ ExitPolicyRejectPrivate config option to 0. For example, once you've done
|
|
|
+ that, you could allow HTTP to 127.0.0.1 and block all other connections to
|
|
|
+ internal networks with "accept 127.0.0.1:80,reject private:\*", though that
|
|
|
+ may also allow connections to your own computer that are addressed to its
|
|
|
+ public (external) IP address. See RFC 1918 and RFC 3330 for more details
|
|
|
+ about internal and reserved IP address space. +
|
|
|
+ +
|
|
|
+ This directive can be specified multiple times so you don't have to put it
|
|
|
+ all on one line. +
|
|
|
+ +
|
|
|
+ Policies are considered first to last, and the first match wins. If you
|
|
|
+ want to \_replace_ the default exit policy, end your exit policy with
|
|
|
+ either a reject \*:* or an accept \*:*. Otherwise, you're \_augmenting_
|
|
|
+ (prepending to) the default exit policy. The default exit policy is: +
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ reject *:25
|
|
|
+ reject *:119
|
|
|
+ reject *:135-139
|
|
|
+ reject *:445
|
|
|
+ reject *:563
|
|
|
+ reject *:1214
|
|
|
+ reject *:4661-4666
|
|
|
+ reject *:6346-6429
|
|
|
+ reject *:6699
|
|
|
+ reject *:6881-6999
|
|
|
+ accept *:*
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ExitPolicyRejectPrivate** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ Reject all private (local) networks, along with your own public IP address,
|
|
|
+ at the beginning of your exit policy. See above entry on ExitPolicy.
|
|
|
+ (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**MaxOnionsPending** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ If you have more than this number of onionskins queued for decrypt, reject
|
|
|
+ new ones. (Default: 100)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**MyFamily** __node__,__node__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ Declare that this Tor server is controlled or administered by a group or
|
|
|
+ organization identical or similar to that of the other servers, defined by
|
|
|
+ their identity fingerprints or nicknames. When two servers both declare
|
|
|
+ that they are in the same \'family', Tor clients will not use them in the
|
|
|
+ same circuit. (Each server only needs to list the other servers in its
|
|
|
+ family; it doesn't need to list itself, but it won't hurt.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**Nickname** __name__::
|
|
|
+ Set the server's nickname to \'name'. Nicknames must be between 1 and 19
|
|
|
+ characters inclusive, and must contain only the characters [a-zA-Z0-9].
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**NumCPUs** __num__::
|
|
|
+ How many processes to use at once for decrypting onionskins. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ORPort** __PORT__::
|
|
|
+ Advertise this port to listen for connections from Tor clients and servers.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ORListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
|
+ Bind to this IP address to listen for connections from Tor clients and
|
|
|
+ servers. If you specify a port, bind to this port rather than the one
|
|
|
+ specified in ORPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0) This directive can be specified
|
|
|
+ multiple times to bind to multiple addresses/ports.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**PublishServerDescriptor** **0**|**1**|**v1**|**v2**|**v3**|**bridge**|**hidserv**,**...**::
|
|
|
+ This option is only considered if you have an ORPort defined. You can
|
|
|
+ choose multiple arguments, separated by commas.
|
|
|
+ +
|
|
|
+ If set to 0, Tor will act as a server but it will not publish its
|
|
|
+ descriptor to the directory authorities. (This is useful if you're testing
|
|
|
+ out your server, or if you're using a Tor controller that handles directory
|
|
|
+ publishing for you.) Otherwise, Tor will publish its descriptor to all
|
|
|
+ directory authorities of the type(s) specified. The value "1" is the
|
|
|
+ default, which means "publish to the appropriate authorities".
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ShutdownWaitLength** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ When we get a SIGINT and we're a server, we begin shutting down:
|
|
|
+ we close listeners and start refusing new circuits. After **NUM**
|
|
|
+ seconds, we exit. If we get a second SIGINT, we exit immedi-
|
|
|
+ ately. (Default: 30 seconds)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AccountingMax** __N__ **bytes**|**KB**|**MB**|**GB**|**TB**::
|
|
|
+ Never send more than the specified number of bytes in a given accounting
|
|
|
+ period, or receive more than that number in the period. For example, with
|
|
|
+ AccountingMax set to 1 GB, a server could send 900 MB and receive 800 MB
|
|
|
+ and continue running. It will only hibernate once one of the two reaches 1
|
|
|
+ GB. When the number of bytes is exhausted, Tor will hibernate until some
|
|
|
+ time in the next accounting period. To prevent all servers from waking at
|
|
|
+ the same time, Tor will also wait until a random point in each period
|
|
|
+ before waking up. If you have bandwidth cost issues, enabling hibernation
|
|
|
+ is preferable to setting a low bandwidth, since it provides users with a
|
|
|
+ collection of fast servers that are up some of the time, which is more
|
|
|
+ useful than a set of slow servers that are always "available".
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AccountingStart** **day**|**week**|**month** [__day__] __HH:MM__::
|
|
|
+ Specify how long accounting periods last. If **month** is given, each
|
|
|
+ accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ on the __dayth__ day of one
|
|
|
+ month to the same day and time of the next. (The day must be between 1 and
|
|
|
+ 28.) If **week** is given, each accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__
|
|
|
+ of the __dayth__ day of one week to the same day and time of the next week,
|
|
|
+ with Monday as day 1 and Sunday as day 7. If **day** is given, each
|
|
|
+ accounting period runs from the time __HH:MM__ each day to the same time on
|
|
|
+ the next day. All times are local, and given in 24-hour time. (Defaults to
|
|
|
+ "month 1 0:00".)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ServerDNSResolvConfFile** __filename__::
|
|
|
+ Overrides the default DNS configuration with the configuration in
|
|
|
+ __filename__. The file format is the same as the standard Unix
|
|
|
+ "**resolv.conf**" file (7). This option, like all other ServerDNS options,
|
|
|
+ only affects name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients.
|
|
|
+ (Defaults to use the system DNS configuration.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If this option is false, Tor exits immediately if there are problems
|
|
|
+ parsing the system DNS configuration or connecting to nameservers.
|
|
|
+ Otherwise, Tor continues to periodically retry the system nameservers until
|
|
|
+ it eventually succeeds. (Defaults to "1".)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ServerDNSSearchDomains** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If set to 1, then we will search for addresses in the local search domain.
|
|
|
+ For example, if this system is configured to believe it is in
|
|
|
+ "example.com", and a client tries to connect to "www", the client will be
|
|
|
+ connected to "www.example.com". This option only affects name lookups that
|
|
|
+ your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "0".)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ServerDNSDetectHijacking** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set to 1, we will test periodically to determine
|
|
|
+ whether our local nameservers have been configured to hijack failing DNS
|
|
|
+ requests (usually to an advertising site). If they are, we will attempt to
|
|
|
+ correct this. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
|
|
|
+ on behalf of clients. (Defaults to "1".)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ServerDNSTestAddresses** __address__,__address__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ When we're detecting DNS hijacking, make sure that these __valid__ addresses
|
|
|
+ aren't getting redirected. If they are, then our DNS is completely useless,
|
|
|
+ and we'll reset our exit policy to "reject *:*". This option only affects
|
|
|
+ name lookups that your server does on behalf of clients. (Defaults to
|
|
|
+ "www.google.com, www.mit.edu, www.yahoo.com, www.slashdot.org".)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ServerDNSAllowNonRFC953Hostnames** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is disabled, Tor does not try to resolve hostnames
|
|
|
+ containing illegal characters (like @ and :) rather than sending them to an
|
|
|
+ exit node to be resolved. This helps trap accidental attempts to resolve
|
|
|
+ URLs and so on. This option only affects name lookups that your server does
|
|
|
+ on behalf of clients. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**BridgeRecordUsageByCountry** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled and BridgeRelay is also enabled, and we have
|
|
|
+ GeoIP data, Tor keeps a keep a per-country count of how many client
|
|
|
+ addresses have contacted it so that it can help the bridge authority guess
|
|
|
+ which countries have blocked access to it. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ServerDNSRandomizeCase** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set, Tor sets the case of each character randomly in
|
|
|
+ outgoing DNS requests, and makes sure that the case matches in DNS replies.
|
|
|
+ This so-called "0x20 hack" helps resist some types of DNS poisoning attack.
|
|
|
+ For more information, see "Increased DNS Forgery Resistance through
|
|
|
+ 0x20-Bit Encoding". This option only affects name lookups that your server
|
|
|
+ does on behalf of clients. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**GeoIPFile** __filename__::
|
|
|
+ A filename containing GeoIP data, for use with BridgeRecordUsageByCountry.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**CellStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the mean time that
|
|
|
+ cells spend in circuit queues to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed
|
|
|
+ while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DirReqStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number and
|
|
|
+ response time of network status requests to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be
|
|
|
+ changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**EntryStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of
|
|
|
+ directly connecting clients to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be changed while
|
|
|
+ Tor is running. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ExitPortStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled, Tor writes statistics on the number of relayed
|
|
|
+ bytes and opened stream per exit port to disk every 24 hours. Cannot be
|
|
|
+ changed while Tor is running. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ExtraInfoStatistics** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is enabled, Tor includes previously gathered statistics in
|
|
|
+ its extra-info documents that it uploads to the directory authorities.
|
|
|
+ (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+DIRECTORY SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
|
+------------------------
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+The following options are useful only for directory servers (that is,
|
|
|
+if DirPort is non-zero):
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set to 1, Tor operates as an authoritative directory
|
|
|
+ server. Instead of caching the directory, it generates its own list of
|
|
|
+ good servers, signs it, and sends that to the clients. Unless the clients
|
|
|
+ already have you listed as a trusted directory, you probably do not want
|
|
|
+ to set this option. Please coordinate with the other admins at
|
|
|
+ tor-ops@freehaven.net if you think you should be a directory.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DirPortFrontPage** __FILENAME__::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set, it takes an HTML file and publishes it as "/" on
|
|
|
+ the DirPort. Now relay operators can provide a disclaimer without needing
|
|
|
+ to set up a separate webserver. There's a sample disclaimer in
|
|
|
+ contrib/tor-exit-notice.html.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**V1AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
|
+ generates version 1 directory and running-routers documents (for legacy
|
|
|
+ Tor clients up to 0.1.0.x).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**V2AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
|
+ generates version 2 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
|
|
|
+ described in doc/spec/dir-spec-v2.txt (for Tor clients and servers running
|
|
|
+ 0.1.1.x and 0.1.2.x).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**V3AuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
|
+ generates version 3 network statuses and serves descriptors, etc as
|
|
|
+ described in doc/spec/dir-spec.txt (for Tor clients and servers running at
|
|
|
+ least 0.2.0.x).
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set to 1, Tor adds information on which versions of
|
|
|
+ Tor are still believed safe for use to the published directory. Each
|
|
|
+ version 1 authority is automatically a versioning authority; version 2
|
|
|
+ authorities provide this service optionally. See **RecommendedVersions**,
|
|
|
+ **RecommendedClientVersions**, and **RecommendedServerVersions**.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**NamingAuthoritativeDirectory** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set to 1, then the server advertises that it has
|
|
|
+ opinions about nickname-to-fingerprint bindings. It will include these
|
|
|
+ opinions in its published network-status pages, by listing servers with
|
|
|
+ the flag "Named" if a correct binding between that nickname and fingerprint
|
|
|
+ has been registered with the dirserver. Naming dirservers will refuse to
|
|
|
+ accept or publish descriptors that contradict a registered binding. See
|
|
|
+ **approved-routers** in the **FILES** section below.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**HSAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor also
|
|
|
+ accepts and serves hidden service descriptors. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**HidServDirectoryV2** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set, Tor accepts and serves v2 hidden service
|
|
|
+ descriptors. Setting DirPort is not required for this, because clients
|
|
|
+ connect via the ORPort by default. (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**BridgeAuthoritativeDir** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ When this option is set in addition to **AuthoritativeDirectory**, Tor
|
|
|
+ accepts and serves router descriptors, but it caches and serves the main
|
|
|
+ networkstatus documents rather than generating its own. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**MinUptimeHidServDirectoryV2** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
|
|
+ Minimum uptime of a v2 hidden service directory to be accepted as such by
|
|
|
+ authoritative directories. (Default: 24 hours)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DirPort** __PORT__::
|
|
|
+ Advertise the directory service on this port.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DirListenAddress** __IP__[:__PORT__]::
|
|
|
+ Bind the directory service to this address. If you specify a port, bind to
|
|
|
+ this port rather than the one specified in DirPort. (Default: 0.0.0.0)
|
|
|
+ This directive can be specified multiple times to bind to multiple
|
|
|
+ addresses/ports.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DirPolicy** __policy__,__policy__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ Set an entrance policy for this server, to limit who can connect to the
|
|
|
+ directory ports. The policies have the same form as exit policies above.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+DIRECTORY AUTHORITY SERVER OPTIONS
|
|
|
+----------------------------------
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**RecommendedVersions** __STRING__::
|
|
|
+ STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
|
|
|
+ safe. The list is included in each directory, and nodes which pull down the
|
|
|
+ directory learn whether they need to upgrade. This option can appear
|
|
|
+ multiple times: the values from multiple lines are spliced together. When
|
|
|
+ this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should be set too.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**RecommendedClientVersions** __STRING__::
|
|
|
+ STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
|
|
|
+ safe for clients to use. This information is included in version 2
|
|
|
+ directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
|
|
|
+ is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
|
|
|
+ be set too.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**RecommendedServerVersions** __STRING__::
|
|
|
+ STRING is a comma-separated list of Tor versions currently believed to be
|
|
|
+ safe for servers to use. This information is included in version 2
|
|
|
+ directories. If this is not set then the value of **RecommendedVersions**
|
|
|
+ is used. When this is set then **VersioningAuthoritativeDirectory** should
|
|
|
+ be set too.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**ConsensusParams** __STRING__::
|
|
|
+ STRING is a space-separated list of key=value pairs that Tor will include
|
|
|
+ in the "params" line of its networkstatus vote.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**DirAllowPrivateAddresses** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If set to 1, Tor will accept router descriptors with arbitrary "Address"
|
|
|
+ elements. Otherwise, if the address is not an IP address or is a private IP
|
|
|
+ address, it will reject the router descriptor. Defaults to 0.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirBadDir** __AddressPattern...__::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
|
+ will be listed as bad directories in any network status document this
|
|
|
+ authority publishes, if **AuthDirListBadDirs** is set.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirBadExit** __AddressPattern...__::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
|
+ will be listed as bad exits in any network status document this authority
|
|
|
+ publishes, if **AuthDirListBadExits** is set.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirInvalid** __AddressPattern...__::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
|
+ will never be listed as "valid" in any network status document that this
|
|
|
+ authority publishes.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirReject** __AddressPattern__...::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. A set of address patterns for servers that
|
|
|
+ will never be listed at all in any network status document that this
|
|
|
+ authority publishes, or accepted as an OR address in any descriptor
|
|
|
+ submitted for publication by this authority.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirListBadDirs** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
|
|
|
+ opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as directory caches. (Do not set
|
|
|
+ this to 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning directories as bad;
|
|
|
+ otherwise, you are effectively voting in favor of every declared
|
|
|
+ directory.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirListBadExits** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, this directory has some
|
|
|
+ opinion about which nodes are unsuitable as exit nodes. (Do not set this to
|
|
|
+ 1 unless you plan to list non-functioning exits as bad; otherwise, you are
|
|
|
+ effectively voting in favor of every declared exit as an exit.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirRejectUnlisted** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. If set to 1, the directory server rejects
|
|
|
+ all uploaded server descriptors that aren't explicitly listed in the
|
|
|
+ fingerprints file. This acts as a "panic button" if we get hit with a Sybil
|
|
|
+ attack. (Default: 0)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. The maximum number of servers that we will
|
|
|
+ list as acceptable on a single IP address. Set this to "0" for "no limit".
|
|
|
+ (Default: 2)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ Authoritative directories only. Like AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr, but applies
|
|
|
+ to addresses shared with directory authorities. (Default: 5)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**V3AuthVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
|
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred voting
|
|
|
+ interval. Note that voting will __actually__ happen at an interval chosen
|
|
|
+ by consensus from all the authorities' preferred intervals. This time
|
|
|
+ SHOULD divide evenly into a day. (Default: 1 hour)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**V3AuthVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
|
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
|
|
|
+ between publishing its vote and assuming it has all the votes from all the
|
|
|
+ other authorities. Note that the actual time used is not the server's
|
|
|
+ preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences. (Default: 5 minutes.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**V3AuthDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
|
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the server's preferred delay
|
|
|
+ between publishing its consensus and signature and assuming it has all the
|
|
|
+ signatures from all the other authorities. Note that the actual time used
|
|
|
+ is not the server's preferred time, but the consensus of all preferences.
|
|
|
+ (Default: 5 minutes.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**V3AuthNIntervalsValid** __NUM__::
|
|
|
+ V3 authoritative directories only. Configures the number of VotingIntervals
|
|
|
+ for which each consensus should be valid for. Choosing high numbers
|
|
|
+ increases network partitioning risks; choosing low numbers increases
|
|
|
+ directory traffic. Note that the actual number of intervals used is not the
|
|
|
+ server's preferred number, but the consensus of all preferences. Must be at
|
|
|
+ least 2. (Default: 3.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+HIDDEN SERVICE OPTIONS
|
|
|
+----------------------
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**HiddenServiceDir** __DIRECTORY__::
|
|
|
+ Store data files for a hidden service in DIRECTORY. Every hidden service
|
|
|
+ must have a separate directory. You may use this option multiple times to
|
|
|
+ specify multiple services.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**HiddenServicePort** __VIRTPORT__ [__TARGET__]::
|
|
|
+ Configure a virtual port VIRTPORT for a hidden service. You may use this
|
|
|
+ option multiple times; each time applies to the service using the most
|
|
|
+ recent hiddenservicedir. By default, this option maps the virtual port to
|
|
|
+ the same port on 127.0.0.1. You may override the target port, address, or
|
|
|
+ both by specifying a target of addr, port, or addr:port. You may also have
|
|
|
+ multiple lines with the same VIRTPORT: when a user connects to that
|
|
|
+ VIRTPORT, one of the TARGETs from those lines will be chosen at random.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**PublishHidServDescriptors** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If set to 0, Tor will run any hidden services you configure, but it won't
|
|
|
+ advertise them to the rendezvous directory. This option is only useful if
|
|
|
+ you're using a Tor controller that handles hidserv publishing for you.
|
|
|
+ (Default: 1)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**HiddenServiceVersion** __version__,__version__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
|
|
|
+ service. Currently, only version 2 is supported. (Default: 2)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** __auth-type__ __client-name__,__client-name__,__...__::
|
|
|
+ If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients
|
|
|
+ only. The auth-type can either be \'basic' for a general-purpose
|
|
|
+ authorization protocol or \'stealth' for a less scalable protocol that also
|
|
|
+ hides service activity from unauthorized clients. Only clients that are
|
|
|
+ listed here are authorized to access the hidden service. Valid client names
|
|
|
+ are 1 to 19 characters long and only use characters in A-Za-z0-9+-_ (no
|
|
|
+ spaces). If this option is set, the hidden service is not accessible for
|
|
|
+ clients without authorization any more. Generated authorization data can be
|
|
|
+ found in the hostname file. Clients need to put this authorization data in
|
|
|
+ their configuration file using **HidServAuth**.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**RendPostPeriod** __N__ **seconds**|**minutes**|**hours**|**days**|**weeks**::
|
|
|
+ Every time the specified period elapses, Tor uploads any rendezvous
|
|
|
+ service descriptors to the directory servers. This information is also
|
|
|
+ uploaded whenever it changes. (Default: 20 minutes)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+TESTING NETWORK OPTIONS
|
|
|
+-----------------------
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+The following options are used for running a testing Tor network.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TestingTorNetwork** **0**|**1**::
|
|
|
+ If set to 1, Tor adjusts default values of the configuration options below,
|
|
|
+ so that it is easier to set up a testing Tor network. May only be set if
|
|
|
+ non-default set of DirServers is set. Cannot be unset while Tor is running.
|
|
|
+ (Default: 0) +
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+ ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig 1
|
|
|
+ DirAllowPrivateAddresses 1
|
|
|
+ EnforceDistinctSubnets 0
|
|
|
+ AssumeReachable 1
|
|
|
+ AuthDirMaxServersPerAddr 0
|
|
|
+ AuthDirMaxServersPerAuthAddr 0
|
|
|
+ ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses 0
|
|
|
+ ExitPolicyRejectPrivate 0
|
|
|
+ V3AuthVotingInterval 5 minutes
|
|
|
+ V3AuthVoteDelay 20 seconds
|
|
|
+ V3AuthDistDelay 20 seconds
|
|
|
+ TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval 5 minutes
|
|
|
+ TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay 20 seconds
|
|
|
+ TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay 20 seconds
|
|
|
+ TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability 0 minutes
|
|
|
+ TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime 0 minutes
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TestingV3AuthInitialVotingInterval** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
|
+ Like V3AuthVotingInterval, but for initial voting interval before the first
|
|
|
+ consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
|
|
|
+ **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
|
+ Like TestingV3AuthInitialVoteDelay, but for initial voting interval before
|
|
|
+ the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
|
|
|
+ **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
|
+ Like TestingV3AuthInitialDistDelay, but for initial voting interval before
|
|
|
+ the first consensus has been created. Changing this requires that
|
|
|
+ **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 5 minutes)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TestingAuthDirTimeToLearnReachability** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
|
+ After starting as an authority, do not make claims about whether routers
|
|
|
+ are Running until this much time has passed. Changing this requires
|
|
|
+ that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default: 30 minutes)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**TestingEstimatedDescriptorPropagationTime** __N__ **minutes**|**hours**::
|
|
|
+ Clients try downloading router descriptors from directory caches after this
|
|
|
+ time. Changing this requires that **TestingTorNetwork** is set. (Default:
|
|
|
+ 10 minutes)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SIGNALS
|
|
|
+-------
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+Tor catches the following signals:
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SIGTERM**::
|
|
|
+ Tor will catch this, clean up and sync to disk if necessary, and exit.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SIGINT**::
|
|
|
+ Tor clients behave as with SIGTERM; but Tor servers will do a controlled
|
|
|
+ slow shutdown, closing listeners and waiting 30 seconds before exiting.
|
|
|
+ (The delay can be configured with the ShutdownWaitLength config option.)
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SIGHUP**::
|
|
|
+ The signal instructs Tor to reload its configuration (including closing and
|
|
|
+ reopening logs), fetch a new directory, and kill and restart its helper
|
|
|
+ processes if applicable.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SIGUSR1**::
|
|
|
+ Log statistics about current connections, past connections, and throughput.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SIGUSR2**::
|
|
|
+ Switch all logs to loglevel debug. You can go back to the old loglevels by
|
|
|
+ sending a SIGHUP.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SIGCHLD**::
|
|
|
+ Tor receives this signal when one of its helper processes has exited, so it
|
|
|
+ can clean up.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SIGPIPE**::
|
|
|
+ Tor catches this signal and ignores it.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**SIGXFSZ**::
|
|
|
+ If this signal exists on your platform, Tor catches and ignores it.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+FILES
|
|
|
+-----
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**@CONFDIR@/torrc**::
|
|
|
+ The configuration file, which contains "option value" pairs.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**@LOCALSTATEDIR@/lib/tor/**::
|
|
|
+ The tor process stores keys and other data here.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/cached-status/**::
|
|
|
+ The most recently downloaded network status document for each authority.
|
|
|
+ Each file holds one such document; the filenames are the hexadecimal
|
|
|
+ identity key fingerprints of the directory authorities.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/cached-descriptors** and **cached-descriptors.new**::
|
|
|
+ These files hold downloaded router statuses. Some routers may appear more
|
|
|
+ than once; if so, the most recently published descriptor is used. Lines
|
|
|
+ beginning with @-signs are annotations that contain more information about
|
|
|
+ a given router. The ".new" file is an append-only journal; when it gets
|
|
|
+ too large, all entries are merged into a new cached-descriptors file.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/cached-routers** and **cached-routers.new**::
|
|
|
+ Obsolete versions of cached-descriptors and cached-descriptors.new. When
|
|
|
+ Tor can't find the newer files, it looks here instead.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/state**::
|
|
|
+ A set of persistent key-value mappings. These are documented in
|
|
|
+ the file. These include:
|
|
|
+ - The current entry guards and their status.
|
|
|
+ - The current bandwidth accounting values (unused so far; see
|
|
|
+ below).
|
|
|
+ - When the file was last written
|
|
|
+ - What version of Tor generated the state file
|
|
|
+ - A short history of bandwidth usage, as produced in the router
|
|
|
+ descriptors.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/bw_accounting**::
|
|
|
+ Used to track bandwidth accounting values (when the current period starts
|
|
|
+ and ends; how much has been read and written so far this period). This file
|
|
|
+ is obsolete, and the data is now stored in the \'state' file as well. Only
|
|
|
+ used when bandwidth accounting is enabled.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/hsusage**::
|
|
|
+ Used to track hidden service usage in terms of fetch and publish requests
|
|
|
+ to this hidden service authoritative directory. Only used when recording of
|
|
|
+ statistics is enabled.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/control_auth_cookie**::
|
|
|
+ Used for cookie authentication with the controller. Location can be
|
|
|
+ overridden by the CookieAuthFile config option. Regenerated on startup. See
|
|
|
+ control-spec.txt for details. Only used when cookie authentication is
|
|
|
+ enabled.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/keys/***::
|
|
|
+ Only used by servers. Holds identity keys and onion keys.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/fingerprint**::
|
|
|
+ Only used by servers. Holds the fingerprint of the server's identity key.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/approved-routers**::
|
|
|
+ Only for naming authoritative directory servers (see
|
|
|
+ **NamingAuthoritativeDirectory**). This file lists nickname to identity
|
|
|
+ bindings. Each line lists a nickname and a fingerprint separated by
|
|
|
+ whitespace. See your **fingerprint** file in the __DataDirectory__ for an
|
|
|
+ example line. If the nickname is **!reject** then descriptors from the
|
|
|
+ given identity (fingerprint) are rejected by this server. If it is
|
|
|
+ **!invalid** then descriptors are accepted but marked in the directory as
|
|
|
+ not valid, that is, not recommended.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__DataDirectory__**/router-stability**::
|
|
|
+ Only used by authoritative directory servers. Tracks measurements for
|
|
|
+ router mean-time-between-failures so that authorities have a good idea of
|
|
|
+ how to set their Stable flags.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/hostname**::
|
|
|
+ The <base32-encoded-fingerprint>.onion domain name for this hidden service.
|
|
|
+ If the hidden service is restricted to authorized clients only, this file
|
|
|
+ also contains authorization data for all clients.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/private_key**::
|
|
|
+ The private key for this hidden service.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+__HiddenServiceDirectory__**/client_keys**::
|
|
|
+ Authorization data for a hidden service that is only accessible by
|
|
|
+ authorized clients.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+SEE ALSO
|
|
|
+--------
|
|
|
+**privoxy**(1), **tsocks**(1), **torify**(1) +
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+**https://www.torproject.org/**
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+BUGS
|
|
|
+----
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+Plenty, probably. Tor is still in development. Please report them.
|
|
|
+
|
|
|
+AUTHORS
|
|
|
+-------
|
|
|
+Roger Dingledine <mailto:arma@mit.edu[arma@mit.edu]>, Nick Mathewson <mailto:nickm@alum.mit.edu[nickm@alum.mit.edu]>.
|
|
|
+
|
Sebastian Hahn