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@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static crypt_path_t *onion_next_hop_in_cpath(crypt_path_t *cpath);
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static int onion_extend_cpath(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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static int count_acceptable_nodes(smartlist_t *routers);
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static int onion_append_hop(crypt_path_t **head_ptr, extend_info_t *choice);
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-static int entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
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+static int entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard);
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static void pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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static void pathbias_count_successful_close(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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static void pathbias_count_collapse(origin_circuit_t *circ);
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@@ -987,7 +987,7 @@ circuit_init_cpath_crypto(crypt_path_t *cpath, const char *key_data,
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return 0;
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}
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-/** The minimum number of first hop completions before we start
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+/** The minimum number of circuit attempts before we start
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* thinking about warning about path bias and dropping guards */
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static int
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pathbias_get_min_circs(const or_options_t *options)
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@@ -1134,8 +1134,8 @@ pathbias_state_to_string(path_state_t state)
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switch (state) {
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case PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC:
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return "new";
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- case PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP:
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- return "first hop";
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+ case PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED:
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+ return "build attempted";
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case PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED:
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return "build succeeded";
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case PATH_STATE_USE_SUCCEEDED:
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@@ -1230,17 +1230,17 @@ pathbias_should_count(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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}
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/**
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- * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful first hop.
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- * If so, record it in the current guard's path bias first_hop count.
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+ * Check our circuit state to see if this is a successful circuit attempt.
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+ * If so, record it in the current guard's path bias circ_attempt count.
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*
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* Also check for several potential error cases for bug #6475.
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*/
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static int
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-pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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+pathbias_count_circ_attempt(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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-#define FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
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- static ratelim_t first_hop_notice_limit =
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- RATELIM_INIT(FIRST_HOP_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
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+#define CIRC_ATTEMPT_NOTICE_INTERVAL (600)
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+ static ratelim_t circ_attempt_notice_limit =
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+ RATELIM_INIT(CIRC_ATTEMPT_NOTICE_INTERVAL);
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char *rate_msg = NULL;
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if (!pathbias_should_count(circ)) {
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@@ -1249,8 +1249,8 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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if (pathbias_is_new_circ_attempt(circ)) {
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/* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
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- if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
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- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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+ if (circ->has_opened && circ->path_state != PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED) {
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+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Opened circuit is in strange path state %s. "
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@@ -1277,14 +1277,14 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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if (guard) {
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if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
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- circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP;
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+ circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED;
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- if (entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(guard) < 0) {
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+ if (entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(guard) < 0) {
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/* Bogus guard; we already warned. */
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return -END_CIRC_REASON_TORPROTOCOL;
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}
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} else {
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- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Unopened circuit has strange path state %s. "
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@@ -1297,7 +1297,7 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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}
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}
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} else {
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- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"Unopened circuit has no known guard. "
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@@ -1312,7 +1312,7 @@ pathbias_count_first_hop(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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} else {
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/* Help track down the real cause of bug #6475: */
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if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_NEW_CIRC) {
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- if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&first_hop_notice_limit,
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+ if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&circ_attempt_notice_limit,
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approx_time()))) {
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log_info(LD_BUG,
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"A %s circuit is in cpath state %d (opened: %d). "
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@@ -1359,12 +1359,12 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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}
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if (guard) {
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- if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_DID_FIRST_HOP) {
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+ if (circ->path_state == PATH_STATE_BUILD_ATTEMPTED) {
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circ->path_state = PATH_STATE_BUILD_SUCCEEDED;
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guard->circuit_successes++;
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log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
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- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
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+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->circ_attempts,
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
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} else {
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if ((rate_msg = rate_limit_log(&success_notice_limit,
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@@ -1380,10 +1380,10 @@ pathbias_count_build_success(origin_circuit_t *circ)
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}
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}
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- if (guard->first_hops < guard->circuit_successes) {
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+ if (guard->circ_attempts < guard->circuit_successes) {
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log_notice(LD_BUG, "Unexpectedly high circuit_successes (%u/%u) "
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"for guard %s=%s",
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- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops,
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+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->circ_attempts,
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
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}
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/* In rare cases, CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_TESTING can get converted to
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@@ -1657,17 +1657,17 @@ pathbias_get_success_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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* eliminate the guard. Return -1 if the guard looks no good; return 0 if the
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* guard looks fine. */
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static int
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-entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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+entry_guard_inc_circ_attempt_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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{
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const or_options_t *options = get_options();
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entry_guards_changed();
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- if (guard->first_hops > (unsigned)pathbias_get_min_circs(options)) {
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+ if (guard->circ_attempts > (unsigned)pathbias_get_min_circs(options)) {
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/* Note: We rely on the < comparison here to allow us to set a 0
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* rate and disable the feature entirely. If refactoring, don't
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* change to <= */
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- if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/((double)guard->first_hops)
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+ if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/((double)guard->circ_attempts)
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< pathbias_get_extreme_rate(options)) {
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/* Dropping is currently disabled by default. */
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if (pathbias_get_dropguards(options)) {
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@@ -1680,7 +1680,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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"were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
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"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
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- pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), guard->first_hops,
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+ pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), guard->circ_attempts,
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->unusable_circuits,
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guard->collapsed_circuits, guard->timeouts,
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(long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
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@@ -1698,12 +1698,12 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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"were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
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"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
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- pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), guard->first_hops,
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+ pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), guard->circ_attempts,
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->unusable_circuits,
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guard->collapsed_circuits, guard->timeouts,
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(long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
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}
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- } else if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/((double)guard->first_hops)
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+ } else if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/((double)guard->circ_attempts)
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< pathbias_get_warn_rate(options)) {
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if (!guard->path_bias_warned) {
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guard->path_bias_warned = 1;
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@@ -1716,12 +1716,12 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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"were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
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"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
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- pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), guard->first_hops,
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+ pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), guard->circ_attempts,
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->unusable_circuits,
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guard->collapsed_circuits, guard->timeouts,
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(long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
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}
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- } else if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/((double)guard->first_hops)
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+ } else if (pathbias_get_success_count(guard)/((double)guard->circ_attempts)
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< pathbias_get_notice_rate(options)) {
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if (!guard->path_bias_noticed) {
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guard->path_bias_noticed = 1;
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@@ -1732,7 +1732,7 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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"were unusable, %d collapsed, and %d timed out. For "
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"reference, your timeout cutoff is %ld seconds.",
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guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN),
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- pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), guard->first_hops,
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+ pathbias_get_closed_count(guard), guard->circ_attempts,
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guard->circuit_successes, guard->unusable_circuits,
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guard->collapsed_circuits, guard->timeouts,
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(long)circ_times.close_ms/1000);
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@@ -1741,27 +1741,27 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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}
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/* If we get a ton of circuits, just scale everything down */
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- if (guard->first_hops > (unsigned)pathbias_get_scale_threshold(options)) {
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+ if (guard->circ_attempts > (unsigned)pathbias_get_scale_threshold(options)) {
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const int scale_factor = pathbias_get_scale_factor(options);
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const int mult_factor = pathbias_get_mult_factor(options);
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/* Only scale if there will be no rounding error for our scaling
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* factors */
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- if (((mult_factor*guard->first_hops) % scale_factor) == 0 &&
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+ if (((mult_factor*guard->circ_attempts) % scale_factor) == 0 &&
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((mult_factor*guard->circuit_successes) % scale_factor) == 0) {
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log_info(LD_CIRC,
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"Scaling pathbias counts to (%u/%u)*(%d/%d) for guard %s=%s",
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- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, mult_factor,
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+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->circ_attempts, mult_factor,
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scale_factor, guard->nickname, hex_str(guard->identity,
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DIGEST_LEN));
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- guard->first_hops *= mult_factor;
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+ guard->circ_attempts *= mult_factor;
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guard->circuit_successes *= mult_factor;
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guard->timeouts *= mult_factor;
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guard->successful_circuits_closed *= mult_factor;
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guard->collapsed_circuits *= mult_factor;
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guard->unusable_circuits *= mult_factor;
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- guard->first_hops /= scale_factor;
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+ guard->circ_attempts /= scale_factor;
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guard->circuit_successes /= scale_factor;
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guard->timeouts /= scale_factor;
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guard->successful_circuits_closed /= scale_factor;
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@@ -1769,9 +1769,9 @@ entry_guard_inc_first_hop_count(entry_guard_t *guard)
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guard->unusable_circuits /= scale_factor;
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}
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}
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- guard->first_hops++;
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+ guard->circ_attempts++;
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log_info(LD_CIRC, "Got success count %u/%u for guard %s=%s",
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- guard->circuit_successes, guard->first_hops, guard->nickname,
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+ guard->circuit_successes, guard->circ_attempts, guard->nickname,
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hex_str(guard->identity, DIGEST_LEN));
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -1794,7 +1794,7 @@ circuit_finish_handshake(origin_circuit_t *circ, uint8_t reply_type,
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crypt_path_t *hop;
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int rv;
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- if ((rv = pathbias_count_first_hop(circ)) < 0)
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+ if ((rv = pathbias_count_circ_attempt(circ)) < 0)
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return rv;
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if (circ->cpath->state == CPATH_STATE_AWAITING_KEYS) {
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