Merge remote-tracking branch 'public/gsoc-ctoader-cap-phase1-squashed'

changes/seccomp2_sandbox

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+  o Major features (security):
+    - Use the seccomp2 syscall filtering facility on Linux to limit
+      which system calls Tor can invoke. This is an experimental,
+      Linux-only feature to provide defense-in-depth against unknown
+      attacks. To try turning it on, set "Sandbox 1" in your torrc
+      file. This is an experimental feature, however, and some things
+      may break, so please be ready to report bugs. We hope to add
+      support for better sandboxing in the future,
+      including more fine-grained filters, better division of
+      responsibility, and support for more platforms. This work has
+      been done by Cristian-Matei Toader for Google Summer of Code.
+

configure.ac

@@ -655,6 +655,12 @@ if test "$upnp" = "true"; then
     fi
 fi
 
+dnl ============================================================
+dnl Check for libseccomp
+
+AC_CHECK_HEADERS([seccomp.h])
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS(seccomp_init, [seccomp])
+
 dnl ============================================================
 dnl We need an implementation of curve25519.
 

doc/tor.1.txt

@@ -423,6 +423,11 @@ GENERAL OPTIONS
     proxy authentication that Tor supports; feel free to submit a patch if you
     want it to support others.
 
+**Sandbox** **0**|**1**::
+    If set to 1, Tor will run securely through the use of a syscall sandbox.
+    Otherwise the sandbox will be disabled. The option is currently an 
+    experimental feature. (Default: 0)
+
 **Socks4Proxy** __host__[:__port__]::
     Tor will make all OR connections through the SOCKS 4 proxy at host:port
     (or host:1080 if port is not specified).

src/common/include.am

@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ src_common_libor_a_SOURCES = \
   src/common/procmon.c					\
   src/common/util.c					\
   src/common/util_codedigest.c				\
+  src/common/sandbox.c \
   $(libor_extra_source)
 
 src_common_libor_crypto_a_SOURCES = \

src/common/log.c

@@ -1138,6 +1138,22 @@ get_min_log_level(void)
   return min;
 }
 
+/** Return the fd of a file log that is receiving ERR messages, or -1 if
+ * no such log exists. */
+int
+get_err_logging_fd(void)
+{
+  const logfile_t *lf;
+  for (lf = logfiles; lf; lf = lf->next) {
+    if (lf->is_temporary || lf->is_syslog || !lf->filename ||
+        lf->callback || lf->seems_dead || lf->fd < 0)
+      continue;
+    if (lf->severities->masks[LOG_ERR] & LD_GENERAL)
+      return lf->fd;
+  }
+  return -1;
+}
+
 /** Switch all logs to output at most verbose level. */
 void
 switch_logs_debug(void)

src/common/sandbox.c

@@ -0,0 +1,328 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file sandbox.c
+ * \brief Code to enable sandboxing.
+ **/
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+#include "sandbox.h"
+#include "torlog.h"
+#include "orconfig.h"
+
+#if defined(HAVE_SECCOMP_H) && defined(__linux__)
+#define USE_LIBSECCOMP
+#endif
+
+#define DEBUGGING_CLOSE
+
+#if defined(USE_LIBSECCOMP)
+
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#include <seccomp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+/** Variable used for storing all syscall numbers that will be allowed with the
+ * stage 1 general Tor sandbox.
+ */
+static int general_filter[] = {
+    SCMP_SYS(access),
+    SCMP_SYS(brk),
+    SCMP_SYS(clock_gettime),
+    SCMP_SYS(close),
+    SCMP_SYS(clone),
+    SCMP_SYS(epoll_create),
+    SCMP_SYS(epoll_ctl),
+    SCMP_SYS(epoll_wait),
+    SCMP_SYS(execve),
+    SCMP_SYS(fcntl),
+#ifdef __NR_fcntl64
+    /* Older libseccomp versions don't define PNR entries for all of these,
+     * so we need to ifdef them here.*/
+    SCMP_SYS(fcntl64),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(flock),
+    SCMP_SYS(fstat),
+#ifdef __NR_fstat64
+    SCMP_SYS(fstat64),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(futex),
+    SCMP_SYS(getdents64),
+    SCMP_SYS(getegid),
+#ifdef __NR_getegid32
+    SCMP_SYS(getegid32),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(geteuid),
+#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
+    SCMP_SYS(geteuid32),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(getgid),
+#ifdef __NR_getgid32
+    SCMP_SYS(getgid32),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(getrlimit),
+    SCMP_SYS(gettimeofday),
+    SCMP_SYS(getuid),
+#ifdef __NR_getuid32
+    SCMP_SYS(getuid32),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(lseek),
+#ifdef __NR__llseek
+    SCMP_SYS(_llseek),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(mkdir),
+    SCMP_SYS(mlockall),
+    SCMP_SYS(mmap),
+#ifdef __NR_mmap2
+    SCMP_SYS(mmap2),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(mprotect),
+    SCMP_SYS(mremap),
+    SCMP_SYS(munmap),
+    SCMP_SYS(open),
+    SCMP_SYS(openat),
+    SCMP_SYS(poll),
+    SCMP_SYS(prctl),
+    SCMP_SYS(read),
+    SCMP_SYS(rename),
+    SCMP_SYS(rt_sigaction),
+    SCMP_SYS(rt_sigprocmask),
+    SCMP_SYS(rt_sigreturn),
+#ifdef __NR_sigreturn
+    SCMP_SYS(sigreturn),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(set_robust_list),
+    SCMP_SYS(set_thread_area),
+    SCMP_SYS(set_tid_address),
+    SCMP_SYS(stat),
+#ifdef __NR_stat64
+    SCMP_SYS(stat64),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(time),
+    SCMP_SYS(uname),
+    SCMP_SYS(write),
+    SCMP_SYS(exit_group),
+    SCMP_SYS(exit),
+
+    // socket syscalls
+    SCMP_SYS(accept4),
+    SCMP_SYS(bind),
+    SCMP_SYS(connect),
+    SCMP_SYS(getsockname),
+    SCMP_SYS(getsockopt),
+    SCMP_SYS(listen),
+#if __NR_recv >= 0
+    /* This is a kludge; It's necessary on 64-bit with libseccomp 1.0.0; I
+     * don't know if other 64-bit or other versions require it. */
+    SCMP_SYS(recv),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(recvmsg),
+#if __NR_send >= 0
+    SCMP_SYS(send),
+#endif
+    SCMP_SYS(sendto),
+    SCMP_SYS(setsockopt),
+    SCMP_SYS(socket),
+    SCMP_SYS(socketpair),
+
+    // TODO: remove when accept4 is fixed
+#ifdef __NR_socketcall
+    SCMP_SYS(socketcall),
+#endif
+
+    SCMP_SYS(recvfrom),
+    SCMP_SYS(unlink)
+};
+
+/**
+ * Function responsible for setting up and enabling a global syscall filter.
+ * The function is a prototype developed for stage 1 of sandboxing Tor.
+ * Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+static int
+install_glob_syscall_filter(void)
+{
+  int rc = 0, i, filter_size;
+  scmp_filter_ctx ctx;
+
+  ctx = seccomp_init(SCMP_ACT_TRAP);
+  if (ctx == NULL) {
+    log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to initialise libseccomp context");
+    rc = -1;
+    goto end;
+  }
+
+  if (general_filter != NULL) {
+    filter_size = sizeof(general_filter) / sizeof(general_filter[0]);
+  } else {
+    filter_size = 0;
+  }
+
+  // add general filters
+  for (i = 0; i < filter_size; i++) {
+    rc = seccomp_rule_add(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, general_filter[i], 0);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+      log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add syscall index %d, "
+          "received libseccomp error %d", i, rc);
+      goto end;
+    }
+  }
+
+  rc = seccomp_load(ctx);
+
+ end:
+  seccomp_release(ctx);
+  return (rc < 0 ? -rc : rc);
+}
+
+/** Additional file descriptor to use when logging seccomp2 failures */
+static int sigsys_debugging_fd = -1;
+
+/** Use the file descriptor <b>fd</b> to log seccomp2 failures. */
+static void
+sigsys_set_debugging_fd(int fd)
+{
+  sigsys_debugging_fd = fd;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Function called when a SIGSYS is caught by the application. It notifies the
+ * user that an error has occurred and either terminates or allows the
+ * application to continue execution, based on the DEBUGGING_CLOSE symbol.
+ */
+static void
+sigsys_debugging(int nr, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
+{
+  ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *) (void_context);
+  char message[64];
+  int rv = 0, syscall, length, err;
+  (void) nr;
+
+  if (info->si_code != SYS_SECCOMP)
+    return;
+
+  if (!ctx)
+    return;
+
+  syscall = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_SYSCALL];
+
+  /* XXXX Avoid use of snprintf; it isn't on the list of Stuff You're Allowed
+   * To Do In A Signal Handler. */
+  length = snprintf(message, sizeof(message),
+      "\n\n(Sandbox) bad syscall (%d) was caught.\n",
+      syscall);
+
+  err = 0;
+  if (sigsys_debugging_fd >= 0) {
+    rv = write(sigsys_debugging_fd, message, length);
+    err += rv != length;
+  }
+
+  rv = write(STDOUT_FILENO, message, length);
+  err += rv != length;
+
+  if (err)
+    _exit(2);
+
+#if defined(DEBUGGING_CLOSE)
+  _exit(1);
+#endif // DEBUGGING_CLOSE
+}
+
+/**
+ * Function that adds a handler for SIGSYS, which is the signal thrown
+ * when the application is issuing a syscall which is not allowed. The
+ * main purpose of this function is to help with debugging by identifying
+ * filtered syscalls.
+ */
+static int
+install_sigsys_debugging(void)
+{
+  struct sigaction act;
+  sigset_t mask;
+
+  memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
+  sigemptyset(&mask);
+  sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
+
+  act.sa_sigaction = &sigsys_debugging;
+  act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
+  if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) < 0) {
+    log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) Failed to register SIGSYS signal handler");
+    return -1;
+  }
+
+  if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL)) {
+    log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) Failed call to sigprocmask()");
+    return -2;
+  }
+
+  return 0;
+}
+#endif // USE_LIBSECCOMP
+
+#ifdef USE_LIBSECCOMP
+/**
+ * Initialises the syscall sandbox filter for any linux architecture, taking
+ * into account various available features for different linux flavours.
+ */
+static int
+initialise_libseccomp_sandbox(void)
+{
+  if (install_sigsys_debugging())
+    return -1;
+
+  if (install_glob_syscall_filter())
+    return -2;
+
+  return 0;
+}
+
+#endif // USE_LIBSECCOMP
+
+/**
+ * Enables the stage 1 general sandbox. It applies a syscall filter which does
+ * not restrict any Tor features. The filter is representative for the whole
+ * application.
+ */
+int
+tor_global_sandbox(void)
+{
+
+#if defined(USE_LIBSECCOMP)
+  return initialise_libseccomp_sandbox();
+
+#elif defined(_WIN32)
+  log_warn(LD_BUG,"Windows sandboxing is not implemented. The feature is "
+      "currently disabled.");
+  return 0;
+
+#elif defined(TARGET_OS_MAC)
+  log_warn(LD_BUG,"Mac OSX sandboxing is not implemented. The feature is "
+      "currently disabled");
+  return 0;
+#else
+  log_warn(LD_BUG,"Sandboxing is not implemented for your platform. The "
+      "feature is currently disabled");
+  return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+/** Use <b>fd</b> to log non-survivable sandbox violations */
+void
+sandbox_set_debugging_fd(int fd)
+{
+#ifdef USE_LIBSECCOMP
+  sigsys_set_debugging_fd(fd);
+#else
+  (void)fd;
+#endif
+}

src/common/sandbox.h

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
+ * Copyright (c) 2004-2006, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson.
+ * Copyright (c) 2007-2013, The Tor Project, Inc. */
+/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
+
+/**
+ * \file sandbox.h
+ * \brief Header file for sandbox.c.
+ **/
+
+#ifndef SANDBOX_H_
+#define SANDBOX_H_
+
+#ifndef SYS_SECCOMP
+
+/**
+ * Used by SIGSYS signal handler to check if the signal was issued due to a
+ * seccomp2 filter violation.
+ */
+#define SYS_SECCOMP 1
+
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * Linux definitions
+ */
+#ifdef __linux__
+
+#define __USE_GNU
+#include <sys/ucontext.h>
+
+/**
+ * Linux 32 bit definitions
+ */
+#if defined(__i386__)
+
+#define REG_SYSCALL REG_EAX
+
+/**
+ * Linux 64 bit definitions
+ */
+#elif defined(__x86_64__)
+
+#define REG_SYSCALL REG_RAX
+
+#endif
+
+#endif // __linux__
+
+void sandbox_set_debugging_fd(int fd);
+int tor_global_sandbox(void);
+
+#endif /* SANDBOX_H_ */
+

src/common/torlog.h

@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ int get_min_log_level(void);
 void switch_logs_debug(void);
 void logs_free_all(void);
 void add_temp_log(int min_severity);
+int get_err_logging_fd(void);
 void close_temp_logs(void);
 void rollback_log_changes(void);
 void mark_logs_temp(void);

src/or/config.c

@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
 #include "rendservice.h"
 #include "rephist.h"
 #include "router.h"
+#include "sandbox.h"
 #include "util.h"
 #include "routerlist.h"
 #include "routerset.h"
@@ -370,6 +371,7 @@ static config_var_t option_vars_[] = {
   V(RunAsDaemon,                 BOOL,     "0"),
 //  V(RunTesting,                  BOOL,     "0"),
   OBSOLETE("RunTesting"), // currently unused
+  V(Sandbox,                     BOOL,     "0"),
   V(SafeLogging,                 STRING,   "1"),
   V(SafeSocks,                   BOOL,     "0"),
   V(ServerDNSAllowBrokenConfig,  BOOL,     "1"),
@@ -1144,6 +1146,8 @@ options_act_reversible(const or_options_t *old_options, char **msg)
     goto rollback;
   }
 
+  sandbox_set_debugging_fd(get_err_logging_fd());
+
  commit:
   r = 0;
   if (logs_marked) {

src/or/main.c

@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #endif
 #include "memarea.h"
+#include "../common/sandbox.h"
 
 #ifdef HAVE_EVENT2_EVENT_H
 #include <event2/event.h>
@@ -2704,6 +2705,14 @@ tor_main(int argc, char *argv[])
 #endif
   if (tor_init(argc, argv)<0)
     return -1;
+
+  if (get_options()->Sandbox) {
+    if (tor_global_sandbox()) {
+      log_err(LD_BUG,"Failed to create syscall sandbox filter");
+      return -1;
+    }
+  }
+
   switch (get_options()->command) {
   case CMD_RUN_TOR:
 #ifdef NT_SERVICE

src/or/or.h

@@ -3759,6 +3759,7 @@ typedef struct {
     SAFELOG_SCRUB_ALL, SAFELOG_SCRUB_RELAY, SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE
   } SafeLogging_;
 
+  int Sandbox; /** < Boolean: should sandboxing be enabled? */
   int SafeSocks; /**< Boolean: should we outright refuse application
                   * connections that use socks4 or socks5-with-local-dns? */
 #define LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN (get_options()->ProtocolWarnings ? \